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PREFACE
The costs and frustrations of running the nation's prisons and
jails have escalated in recent years. It is not surprising, therefore,
that all levels of government have desperately been seeking new
ways to respond to what appears to many to be an uncontrollable
crisis.
One approach that gained adherents during this decade was to
turn to private enterprise for solutions. It has long been assumed
that the private sector, with far more flexibility than governmental
bureaucracies have, can provide a range of services more efficiently
and economically. Thus, it was inevitable that the concept of private
prisons and jails would emerge at some point. In fact, private com-
panies have administered individual programs such as vocational
training and health-care services in some jurisdictions for many
years.
When proposals for privatization of single institutions or entire
prison systems first emerged, little thought had been given to the
complex legal issues that they created. It was not all that clear, for
example, whether government could delegate a function such as
corrections to private industry, what the implications of such a dele-
gation would be for liability if negligence or constitutional depriva-
tion occurred, what the standards of performance should be, how
performance should be monitored, and what would happen if there
were breaches of contract or if a private correctional entity declared
bankruptcy.
Given the potential importance of privatization and the legal un-
certainties, the Prison and Jail Problems Committee of the ABA
Criminal Justice Section agreed to review these issues. The Com-
mittee determined after an initial assessment that jurisdictions
should not move precipitously into privatization arrangements until
more careful analysis of the legal issues could be made. It recom-
mended, therefore, that the ABA adopt the following Resolution:
Be It Resolved, That the American Bar Association urges that ju-
risdictions that are considering the privatization of prisons and
jails not proceed to so contract until the complex constitutional,
statutory, and contractual issues are satisfactorily developed and
resolved. 'Privatization' refers to c6ntracting for total operational
responsibility for a prison orjail; it does not encompass construc-
tion or leasing physical facilities or contracting for institutional
services, such as food preparation, medical care, and vocational
training, in full security institutions or for operation of non-secure
facilities such as half-way houses.
This Resolution was formally adopted in February 1986.
536
PRIVATE INCARCERATION
The Criminal Justice Section next applied for and received grant
funds from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
and the National Institute of Justice to do the comprehensive study
and to prepare a Model Contract and Model Statute as guidance for
all jurisdictions considering delegating correctional functions to pri-
vate enterprise. The Section selected Professor Ira P. Robbins, a
nationally recognized correctional-law scholar from American Uni-
versity's Washington College of Law, to undertake the necessary re-
search and report preparation. An Advisory Committee met on two
separate occasions and was asked to comment on the Report while it
was in draft form.
Professor Robbins has now completed this major project, which
cuts across a large number of legal fields. Professor Robbins takes
no position on privatization in his Report. Instead, Professor Rob-
bins addresses the myriad legal issues in neutral terms. In my view,
the Report will be an invaluable resource document.
The decision has been made to distribute the Report immediately,
even though it has not yet been reviewed by the ABA Committees
nor formally endorsed by the ABA. That process will take some
time. In the interim, it was felt that interested jurisdictions should





ABA Section of Criminal Justice
August 1988
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Although the policy aspects of private-prison and private-jail op-
eration have received a great deal of recent attention, there is a
dearth of literature on the legal aspects of private incarceration.
Not surprisingly, therefore, discussions to date have largely been
uninformed, ill informed, or misinformed, since many of the policy
questions have important constitutional, statutory, or contractual
dimensions. This project was undertaken to present a comprehen-
sive analysis of these dimensions and to provide practical guidance
in the form of a Model Contract and Model Statute.***
An important feature of this study is the relationship between
these model documents, on the one hand, and the constitutional-
delegation doctrine, on the other hand. That doctrine has the po-
tential to invalidate delegations of governmental functions that af-
fect the liberty interests of individuals. The Model Contract and
Model Statute, therefore, attempt to safeguard these interests, while
at the same time accommodating the interests of the public, the gov-
ernment, and the private contractors.
Other significant issues that are addressed in this study include:
" state-action liability;
* indemnification, immunity, and insurance;
* standards of operation;
* monitoring;
* inmate management; and
* statutory authority to privatize federal facilities.
The privatization of incarceration may be neither constitutional
nor wise. Therefore, this study concludes that, if this critical gov-
ernmental function is to be contracted out, it must be accomplished
with total accountability. With incarceration, as with all areas of the
justice system, we must remain eternally vigilant.
I. INTRODUCTION
Few people would contend that the state of our nation's prisons
and jails is ideal. Apart from whatever other ills plague these insti-
tutions, overcrowding is pervasive. Populations have doubled in a
decade, and - with preventive detention, mandatory minimum
sentences, habitual-offender statutes, and the abolition of parole in
*** Formulation of these documents, however, should not be taken as an indication that
either the American Bar Association or the author supports private incarceration. Rather, the
documents have been drafted to balance the interests of the respective parties ifprivatization
is undertaken.
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some jurisdictions - there is no relief in sight. Some states are
even leasing or purchasing prison space in other states. And it is
costing the taxpayers more than seventeen million dollars a day to
operate the facilities, with estimates ranging up to sixty dollars a day
per inmate. Several commentators have not so facetiously noted
that we could finance college educations at less cost for all of the
inmates in the country.1
To reduce some of this stress on the system, a new concept has
emerged: the privatization of incarceration facilities, sometimes
known as "prisons for profit" or "punishment for profit." 2 The idea
is to remove the operation (and sometimes the ownership) of an in-
stitution from the local, state, or federal government and turn it
over to a private corporation.3
At the outset, it should be emphasized that private prisons are
different from private industries in prison. The latter concept refers
to Chief Justice Burger's "factories with fences" proposal, which
seeks to turn prisoners into productive members of society by hav-
ing them work at a decent wage and produce or perform services
that can be sold in the marketplace.4 In the process, the prisoners
would be able to pay off some of the costs of their incarceration and,
one would hope, gain some self-esteem. Privatization is also differ-
ent from the situation in which some of the services of a facility -
such as medical, food, educational, or vocational services - are con-
tracted out to private industry. Rather, the developing idea, which
may turn out to be a lasting force or just a passing fancy, is to have
the government contract with a private company to run the total
institution.
The privatization concept has sparked a major debate. 5 Its propo-
1. See, e.g., Burger, The High Cost of Prison Tuition, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 903, 909 (1986)
(article by ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger).
2. See, e.g., Bacas, When Prisons and Profits Go Together, NATION'S Bus., Oct. 1984, at 62;
Castro, Public Service, Private Profits, TIME, Feb. 10, 1986, at 64; Kroll, Prisons for Profit, PRo-
GRESSIVE, Sept. 1984, at 18; Logan & Rausch, Punish and Profit: The Emergence of Private Enter-
prise Prisons, 2 JUST. Q. 303 (1985).
3. Privatization, of course, is not unique to incarceration. One writer has noted, for
example, that experiments in privatization literally run the gamut of the alphabet, from adop-
tion and airport services to zoning control. E. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER
GOVERNMENT 73-74 (1987) (listing 157 city and county services contracted out to private
firms).
4. Keynote address by Warren E. Burger, National Conference on "Factories with
Fences": The Prison Industries Approach to Correctional Dilemmas (June 18, 1984), reprinted
in PRISONERS AND THE LAW ch. 21 (1. Robbins ed. 1988).
5. This debate has not been peculiar to the United States. Other countries have been
looking to us for guidance, giving our early experience mixed reviews. See, e.g., HOME AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE, FOURTH REPORT: CONTRACT PROVISION OF PRISONS, 1986-87 SESS. (May 6, 1987)
(United Kingdom); HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THIRD REPORT: STATE AND USE OF PRISONS,
1986-87 SEss. (Apr. 23, 1987) (United Kingdom); Sbnat Rapport No. 102 (France), Premire
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nents, who include not only some corrections professionals, but also
major financial brokers who advise investors to consider putting
their money into private prisons and jails, argue that the govern-
ment has been doing a dismal job of administering its correctional
institutions and detention facilities. Costs have soared, prisoners
are coming out worse off than when they went in, and while they are
in they are kept in conditions that shock the conscience, if not the
stomach.
The private sector, advocates claim, can save the taxpayers
money. It can build facilities faster and cheaper, and it can operate
them more economically and more efficiently. With maximum flexi-
bility and little or no bureaucracy, new ideas (like testing new phi-
losophies) and routine matters (like hiring new staff) can be
implemented quickly. Overcrowding - perhaps the major systemic
problem facing corrections today - can be reduced. A further an-
ticipated benefit of privatization is decreased liability of the govern-
ment in suits that are brought by inmates and prison employees.
The critics respond on many fronts. They claim, for example, that
it is inappropriate to operate incarceration facilities with a profit
motive, which provides no incentive to reduce inmate populations
(especially if the company is paid on a per-prisoner basis), nor to
consider alternatives to incarceration, nor to deal with the broader
problems of criminal justice. On the contrary, critics claim that the
incentive would be to build more prisons and jails. And if they are
built, we will fill them. This is a fact of correctional life: the number
of incarcerated criminals has always risen to fill whatever space is
available.
Moreover, opponents argue that private-prison corporations will
be drawn to cost-cutting measures that will have adverse effects on
the prison system. As a reporter for Barron's has written, "the bro-
Session Ordinaire de 1986-87 (Dec. 10, 1986); H. Friel, Operational and Resource Manage-
ment, Review No. 7: Privatization, Phase 1 (1985) (Canada); P. YOUNG, THE PRISON CELL 39
(1987) (recommending "wide-ranging [privatization] experiment in Britain"); Ballantyne, US
Private Gaols 'Shock' UK Officers, Guardian, Feb. 12, 1987, at 6; Ballantyne, MPs Say Private US
Gaols Show Way for Britain, Guardian, Oct. 28, 1986, at 5; Le Gendre, Prisons Prives: Les "Pour"
el les "Contre", Le Monde, Dec. 19, 1986; Le Gendre, Une Seule Solution, la Privatisation des Pris-
ons, Le Monde, Nov. 20, 1986 (noting argument that incarceration is an essential duty of
government, but also noting expectation of reduced costs from privatization); Prison Officers'
Association (U.K.), America's Private Prisons: "Penal Institutions as Potential Moneyspinners",
Jericho, Fall 1987, at 10, 11 (warning of "loss leader" concern from private company "estab-
lish[ing] the respective state's dependence on the private sector and then ... substantially
increas[ing] charges"); PROP, Private Prisons - By Appointment to H.M. The Queen: Purveyors of
Incarceration, Solitary Confinement and Body Belts, Abolitionist, No. 23, at 23 (1987) [hereinafter
Purveyors of Incarceration] ("[t]he model, as is so often the case with penal policies, is an Ameri-
can one - a fact which, in itself, should be sufficient to counsel extreme caution"); M. Ryan &
T. Ward, Politics and Prison Privatization in Britain (1988) (unpublished manuscript).
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kers, architects, builders and banks ... will make out like bandits." 6
But questions concerning people's freedom should not be con-
tracted out to the lowest bidder. In short, privatization is not a pan-
acea; the private sector is more interested in doing well than in doing
good.
7
These policy aspects of private incarceration have gotten a great
deal of attention.8 Unfortunately, however, there is scant legal liter-
ature on private-prison and private-jail operation. 9 Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, discussions to date have largely been uninformed,
ill informed, or misinformed, since many of the policy questions
have important constitutional, statutory, or contractual dimensions.
Such questions include the following:
o Is it constitutional to contract out the operation of an entire
prison or jail facility?
.o Will privatization reduce or eliminate the government's state-
action liability?
" What standards will govern the operation of a private
institution?
" Who will monitor implementation of the standards?
o Will the public still have access to the facility?
* What recourse will members of the public have if they do not
approve of how the institution is operated?
" Who will be responsible for maintaining security and using
force at the institution?
" Who will be responsible for maintaining security and control-
ling the institution if the private personnel go on strike?
" Where will the responsibility lie for making quasi-judicial deci-
sions - such as classification, transfer, discipline, and parole?
* Will the private company be able to refuse to accept certain in-
mates - such as those who have contracted AIDS?
6. Duffy, Breaking Into Jail, Barron's, May 14, 1984, at 20, 22.
7. This idea was succinctly expressed by the director of program development of Triad
America Corporation, a multimillion-dollar Utah-based company that was considering pro-
posing a privately run county jail in Missoula, Montana: "We'll hopefully make a buck at it.
I'm not going to kid any of you and say we are in this for humanitarian reasons." Triad Studies
Possibility of Building, Operating Jail in Missoula County, Deseret News, June 20-21, 1985, at B7
(statement ofJack Lyman); see also Privatizing Prisons Has Become a Ripe Marketfor Entrepreneurs
Despite Public Sector, Union Opposition and Risks, PRIVATIZATION, July 21, 1988, at 4.
8. See infra Selected Bibliography.
9. Some of the literature is excellent. See, e.g., Note, Inmates' Rights and the Privatization of
Prisons, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1475 (1986) (analyzing theoretical and practical legal aspects of
privatization). Some is superficial and naive. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT's COMMIS-
SION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 146-59
(1988) (providing thinly supported and poorly reasoned recommendation for contracting out
entire facilities).
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" What options will be available to the government if the private
company substantially raises its fees?
* What safeguards will prevent a private contractor from making
a low initial bid to obtain a contract, then raising the price after
the government is no longer able to reassume the task of oper-
ating the facility (e.g., due to a lack of adequately trained
personnel)?
" What will happen if the company declares bankruptcy (e.g., be-
cause of liability arising from a prison riot), or simply goes out
of business because there is not enough profit?
" What safeguards will prevent private vendors, after gaining a
foothold in the incarceration field, from lobbying for philo-
sophical changes for their greater profit?
Because of these and other weighty and difficult questions, the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association passed a Reso-
lution in February 1986 recommending that "jurisdictions that are
considering the privatization of prisons and jails not proceed ...
until the complex constitutional, statutory, and contractual issues
are satisfactorily developed and resolved." This study picks up
where the Resolution left off. Its goals are twofold: to present a
comprehensive analysis of the numerous legal dimensions of private
incarceration; and to provide practical guidance in the form of
model contractual and statutory provisions, with accompanying
commentary, for those jurisdictions that wish to privatize.
A word of caution is in order regarding these provisions. The
Model Contract and Model Statute contained in this paper do not
presuppose the desirability of private incarceration. That question
was not the subject of this study. Plainly stated, therefore, formula-
tion of these documents should not be taken as an indication that
either the American Bar Association or the author supports the pri-
vate operation of prisons and jails. Rather, the documents have
been drafted to accommodate the interests of the respective parties
if privatization is undertaken. 10 The theme of the documents -
and, indeed, of this entire study - is that, if jurisdictions seek to
privatize their incarceration facilities, they must ensure accountability -
to the public, to the government, to the inmates, and to the contrac-
tor's own promises.
10. More than one individual has already missed the significance of this distinction. See,
e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 9, at 154 (seeming
to infer support for privatization from ABA's grant to develop model statutes and contracts);
Letter from Richard Crane, Vice President, Legal Affairs, Corrections Corporation of America
(Feb. 23, 1987) ("[The grant to work] on model contractual provisions ... obviously implies
something more than a simple 'don't do it' position.").
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS
All of the issues and concerns that are mentioned in the Introduc-
tion are significant. Before any of them come into play, however,
three constitutional dimensions of private incarceration must be ad-
dressed: the delegation doctrine, the state-action requirement, and
the thirteenth amendment. The most important of these subjects -
the delegation doctrine - raises the threshold question for private
incarceration: Is it constitutional, under both federal and state con-
stitutions, to delegate the incarceration function to private corpora-
tions? This question alone is the subject of this section of the paper.
A. The Delegation Doctrine
1. Introduction
Since prison privatization is an issue at both the federal and state
levels, it is necessary to discuss the development of the delegation
doctrine at both levels. This discussion, however, necessarily in-
volves different approaches because development of the doctrine it-
self has differed markedly in federal and state courts. The doctrine
has suffered from lack of attention and use at the federal level, while
state courts continue actively to review private 'delegation. At the
federal level, the Supreme Court has not invalidated legislation on
delegation grounds since 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.I 1 Federal
courts have accepted, often without comment, delegation of federal
power to private actors. 12 In 1974, Justice Marshall wrote that the
doctrine "has been virtually abandoned by the Court for all practical
purposes."' 3 Although several recent concurring and dissenting
opinions may prove this comment to have been a bit premature, it is
clear that doctrinal development at the federal level has been ham-
pered by disuse.
In addition, fundamental differences between federal and state
due process approaches, the constitutional source for limitations on
private delegation, account for differences in the development and
application of the doctrine. Federal courts face considerations of
judicial economy, federalism, and institutional constraints that do
not present particular concern to many state courts.'
The first part of this portion of the paper discusses the likely im-
pact that the federal delegation doctrine would have on an attempt
11. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
12. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 648 (1986).
13. FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
14. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 672-75.
544
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to privatize federal prisons. The second part discusses similar issues
under state delegation doctrines. These parts explain the oversight
and review functions that the governmental entity must perform
over private-prison companies. Moreover, they note the activities
that the government cannot delegate to the private-prison company
and conclude that the principles announced in current delegation
law may allow government to delegate prison management to a pri-
vate company if the government properly oversees, reviews, and cir-
cumscribes the private company's authority. This section of the
paper notes, however, that, because incarceration implicates the life
and liberty interests of the persons who are detained, courts might
not apply the delegation principles announced in extant delegation
cases, since only property interests generally were at issue in those
cases. Thus, the question is an extremely close one, and it would
not be surprising if a court were to rule against constitutionality.
2. Federal delegation
a. Brief history
Although the Constitution does not explicitly state that Congress
may not delegate its powers to others, the United States Supreme
Court has asserted the principle that Congress may not delegate its
powers to other branches of the government 15 or to private par-
ties.16 Roots of the doctrine are found both in article I of the Con-
stitution, which states that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,"' 7 and in the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' 8 As Jus-
tice Brandeis pointed out, the two concepts are related: "The doc-
trine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbi-
trary power."' 9 The constitutional limits on executive power serve
to prevent arbitrary executive action under the conviction that the
people must look to representative bodies and courts to protect
their liberties. Protection of the individual from the arbitrary and
capricious exercise of power, by an official body or a private party
acting under delegated authority, is an essential element of free gov-
ernment. Thus, the underlying purpose of the delegation doctrine
15. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (dictum).
16. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
18. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902) (rejecting argument that state gov-
ernment improperly delegated judicial power to executive parole board and upholding dele-
gation on fourteenth amendment due process grounds).
19. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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should be to provide needed protection against uncontrolled discre-
tionary power.20 The Supreme Court generally has used an article I
separation-of-powers argument when considering delegation to an
agency or other public body. When considering delegations to pri-
vate parties, however, the Court has employed a due process
analysis.
(1) Delegation to public bodies
Although it frequently asserts the nondelegation principle, the
Supreme Court almost always sustains the constitutionality of chal-
lenged delegations. 2 ' In doing so, the Court has taken various ap-
proaches to accommodate increasingly broad congressional
delegations.2 2 Although in its early stages the delegation doctrine
required Congress to legislate "as far as was reasonably practica-
ble," 23 the doctrine now requires only that Congress state an "intel-
ligible principle" 24 when it delegates legislative power.
Field v. Clark 25 was one of the early Supreme Court cases to dis-
cuss the delegation doctrine. Congress had empowered the Presi-
dent to raise tariff schedules and suspend trade with a foreign
country if he determined that a duty imposed by the foreign country
on American products was "reciprocally unequal and unreasona-
ble." 26 This delegation was challenged on the ground that it dele-
gated the power to tax; it was upheld, however, on the theory that
the President "was the mere agent of the law-making department"
and his only role was to ascertain a fact.
2 7
The principle announced in Field, that Congress constitutionally
may delegate a fact-finding function, was reiterated in Buttield v.
Stranahan.28 In Buttfield, Congress delegated authority to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to prohibit the importation of impure and un-
wholesome tea.29 The Supreme Court observed that the duty of the
government experts who examined the tea was to ascertain whether
such conditions existed that conferred a right to import.30 Citing
20. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.2, at 150 (2d ed. 1978).
21. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 307, 307
(1976).
22. Comment, The Fourth Branch: Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REV.
619, 621-30.
23. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
24. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
25. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
26. Id. at 693.
27. Id.
28. 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
29. Id. at 471-72 n.l.
30. Id. at 497.
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Field, the Court held that the statute did not confer legislative power
on administrative officials, and added that "Congress legislated on
the subject as far as was reasonably practicable."3 1
Within twenty-five years, the Court retreated to a less stringent
standard. In United States v. Grimaud,3 2 the Court cited Field's prohib-
itory language against delegation, but deflated its meaning by stat-
ing that "the authority to make administrative rules is not a
delegation of legislative power."33 A further retreat in the Grimaud
case involved the shift to permitting delegation if it was accompa-
nied by an "adequate standard. '3
4
In J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,3 5 the Supreme Court
changed its "adequate standard" test to require Congress to estab-
lish "intelligible principles."'3 6 The Court upheld a delegation of
authority to the President to audit tariffs to equalize differences be-
tween costs of goods produced domestically and those produced by
foreign competitors.3 7 The Act also established certain guidelines
for determining trade imbalances and fixing limits of exchange, and
made investigation by the Tariff Commission a prerequisite to
changing duties.3 8 The Court stated that, "[i]f Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person
or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power."39
The Supreme Court has invalidated Congress's delegation of au-
thority on article I grounds on only two occasions, both occurring
during the New Deal era of the 1930s. Although the Court has
never expressly overruled either case, the cases are probably aberra-
tions, because the Court has never relied seriously on either case to
analyze delegation issues. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
31. Id. at 496.
32. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
33. Id. at 521.
34. Id. at 515-16; see also Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 384-85 (1907)
(holding that Congress cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under the
limitation of a prescribed standard); cf. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 282
U.S. 311, 324 (1931) (asserting that an Interstate Commerce Commission rule was a proper
exercise of delegated authority only if it was warranted by statutory standards that defined the
delegated authority).
35. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
36. Id. at 409.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 400-02.
39. Id. at 409; see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (applying intelligible-
principle test to uphold constitutionality of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 745-46 (D.D.C. 1971) (upholding Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 1971 against delegation challenge) (citing Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424).
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States,4 0 the Court struck down a section of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA) authorizing the President to establish "codes
of fair competition" for a virtually unlimited number of industries
and trades.4 1 Section 3 of the Act gave the President power to ap-
prove detailed codes on his own initiative or on application by the
industries or trade associations that were affected.42 The Court fo-
cused on the absence of standards or restrictions as well as on the
scope of the delegated powers and the discretion granted to the
President. Justice Cardozo termed the statute "delegation running
riot," amounting to a complete transfer of Congress's power under
the commerce clause.4
3
In contrast, the Court in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 44 dealt with a
different section of NIRA that seemed more in line with legislation
that the Court had previously upheld. It authorized the President to
restrict the interstate transportation of petroleum produced in ex-
cess of the amount permitted by state law.45 The Court found no
adequate criteria to control the President's authority. General pol-
icy statements admonishing the President "to remove obstructions
to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to
diminish the amount thereof," "eliminate unfair competitive prac-
tices," and "conserve natural resources" were declared to be inade-
quate principles. 46
(2) Delegation to private parties
Although the Supreme Court has held delegations to private par-
ties to be unconstitutional on delegation grounds several times dur-
ing this century, 47 the vast majority of Court cases have upheld such
40. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
41. Id. at 521-22.
42. Id. at 521-23. The Court summarized its discussion of section 3 by stating:
It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to
prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by
appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it au-
thorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, § 3
sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation,
correction and expansion described in section one.
Id. at 541.
43. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
44. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
45. Id. at 406-07.
46. Id. at 417-19.
47. See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928)
(invalidating ordinance that prohibited philanthropic home for the aged in zoning district
without consent of designated portion of neighbors); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S.
137, 144 (1912) (invalidating statute that delegated to two-thirds of certain property owners
the power to determine how far buildings were to be set back from the street).
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delegations as constitutionally valid.48 In fact, the Supreme Court
has not invalidated a private delegation since the New Deal era case
of Carter v. Carter Coal Co. ,49 in which a federal statute making maxi-
mum hours and minimum wages agreed on by a majority of miners
and producers binding on the remainder was held invalid. The
Court in Carter Coal stated:
This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is
not even delegation to an official or an official body, presump-
tively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be
and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same busi-
ness.'. . . And a statute which attempts to confer such power un-
dertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with
personal liberty and private property.
50
The ban on delegation was based on fifth amendment due process
grounds. The choice of due process grounds rather than separa-
tion-of-powers notions might suggest that article I imposes no per
se ban on federal delegations to private parties 51 and that they are
to be judged by more flexible due process criteria. Carter also may
48. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397-98 (1940) (hold-
ing that Bituminous Coal Act did not unconstitutionally delegate to National Bituminous Coal
Commission the power to fix prices because statutory standard that guided Commission was
sufficiently specific); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939) (uphold-
ing against delegation challenge statute providing that administrative determination concern-
ing milk price was not effective unless two-thirds of area milk producers approved price);
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939) (reasoning that statute conditioning tobacco-
inspection requirements on votes of two-thirds of affected tobacco producers did not unlaw-
fully delegate legislative power to those producers, but rather was a condition that Congress
permissibly could place on operation of its own statute); Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Sea-
gram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193-94 (1936) (holding that Illinois fair-trade law forbid-
ding retailers to sell product below resale price, fixed in contract with other producers, did
not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to those other retailers because producer's
interest in protecting value of its good will in trademark or brand name was itself a property
interest that the state could legitimately protect); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242
U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (reasoning that statute permitting one-half of property owners to re-
move zoning restriction on property was not unconstitutional delegation because statute
merely allowed property owners to remove existing restrictions rather than impose new ones);
Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126-27 (1905) (upholding against delegation
challenge statute giving legal effect to rules that miners had developed concerning whether
and in what circumstances property rights in mining claim vest).
49. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
50. Id. at 311.
51. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 665-66. Lawrence explained that
[s]eparation-of-powers may have some relevance to delegations of legislative power
to executive agencies, in that one department might then in fact be exercising the
power of another, but a private delegation does not cross the lines between depart-
ments. It has been argued that the purpose of the separation-of-powers requirement
is to protect individual liberty, in that dispersing power among several agents pre-
vents a liberty-endangering concentration of power in one or a few hands. If that
view is correct, then private delegations serve the same goal because power is spread
still further. One need not carry the argument that far, however, to see that the
separation-of-powers principle is a weak foundation for limiting private delegations.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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suggest that whatever constitutional restrictions do exist may apply
equally to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, a result
that would not be reached if the prohibition found its source in arti-
cle 1.52 (It is important to note, however, that, whatever the federal
practice, state courts continue actively to review private delega-
tions.53) The delegation cases that followed Carter all upheld in-
creasingly broad private delegations without ever questioning
Carter's holding that Congress could not delegate legislative power
to private parties.
54
Commentators generally agree that the Supreme Court has not
stated a satisfactory theory of the principles governing the delega-
tion doctrine and has failed to articulate a precise test to distinguish
between statutes that properly delegate and those that do not.55
Although there is some indication of renewed interest in the doc-
trine in dissenting and concurring opinions,56 not since 1948 has
any opinion for the Court's majority even attempted to deal in a
substantial manner with the delegation doctrine. Consequently, it is
difficult to predict how the Court would treat delegation in the pri-
vate-incarceration context. The Supreme Court has often decided
cases that could have turned on delegation issues on other grounds
and avoided the issue altogether, or has treated it only in passing.
57
For example, the Court chose to decide several cases on state-action
grounds even though it could have ruled on delegation grounds.58
52. Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650,
664 (1975).
53. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 675. Lawrence stated that
the doctrinal development of federal due process may be affected by considerations
ofjudicial economy, federalism, and institutional constraints that do not so strongly
affect the state courts. In addition, the election of state courts, the nature of state
constitutions, and the methods of state legislatures combine to make it more tenable
for a state court to overturn legislative decisions.
Id.
54. See supra note 48 (listing, inter alia, post-Carter delegation cases upheld by the
Supreme Court).
55. For commentary criticizing the Court's failure to develop and consistently apply ra-
tional principles to delegation cases, see, e.g., 1 K. DAvis, supra note 20, § 3.12, at 193; Lieb-
mann, supra note 52, at 664; Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It
Substance?, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1223, 1289 (1985); Comment, supra note 22, at 620.
56. See infra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
57. See Schoenbrod, supra note 55, at 1232-33 (arguing that recent Supreme Court cases
that have narrowed or invalidated statutes on vagueness or due process grounds have avoided
explication of delegation doctrine); cf. Liebmann, supra note 52, at 652-54 (observing that the
distinction between deprivation of due process and equal protection, on the one hand, and
unlawful delegation, on the other hand, is often obscure).
58. See Liebmann, supra note 52, at 654 n.16 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)). Liebmann argued that,
if courts are willing to find state action under such circumstances, definite parallels to
the former abuses of the delegation doctrine exist. It may not be too much to say
that the due process and equal protection clauses have in recent years been doing
some of the work formerly done by the delegation doctrine.
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b. Current federal law
Because there are no recent Supreme Court cases that have
turned on the delegation doctrine, current federal law that is most
analogous to the private-prison context is found in opinions up-
holding the Maloney Act,59 which authorizes self-regulation of the
securities industry, against challenges that the Act unconstitution-
ally delegated legislative power to a private institution. The Act
provides for promulgation of rules by a dealer association and disci-
plinary proceedings against its members. 60 Under the statute, disci-
plinary rules must require specific charges, a hearing of record, and
a statement of the findings.6' In addition, if an association member
is disciplined, it has the right to appeal to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), which in turn decides whether the peti-
tioner committed the charged acts and whether those acts violated
the association's rules.6 2 The SEC may then reduce, cancel, or leave
undisturbed the penalty that was imposed.63
In R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC,6 4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit found no merit in a constitutional challenge
to the delegation. The court summarily dismissed the challenge,
noting that the SEC, a fully public body, has the power, according to
reasonably fixed statutory standards, to approve or disapprove of
the association's rules and to review any disciplinary action.65
(1) The Todd test
The test for measuring the constitutionality of the delegation was
stated more specifically in Todd and Co. v. SEC.66 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Maloney Act
did not unconstitutionally delegate governmental power to private
securities associations. 67 In so holding, the court articulated a
three-pronged test.68 First, following R.H. Johnson & Co., the SEC
Id. But see Schneider, The 1982 State Action Trilogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion, and a Proposal
for Change, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1150, 1152 (1985) (observing that in recent years the
Supreme Court has been moving toward a restrictive state-action doctrine). See generally infra
notes 115 & 214-395 and accompanying text (discussing state-action doctrine in private-incar-
ceration context).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982).
60. Id. § 78o-3(b).
61. Id. § 78o-3(h).
62. Id. § 78o-3(h)(3).
63. Id.
64. 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1952).
65. Id. at 695.
66. 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 1012.
68. Id.
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must have the power to approve or disapprove of the association's
rules. 69 Second, in any disciplinary proceeding, the SEC must make
de novo findings aided by additional evidence, if necessary.
70
Third, the SEC must make an independent decision on the violation
and the penalty.71 Another part of the Todd opinion held that the
Board of Governors of the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers (N.A.S.D.) erred in reinstating a dropped charge without notice
of its intention to do so. 72 The court chastised the SEC for failing to
insist on meticulous compliance with N.A.S.D. appellate proce-
dure. 73 As a consequence, the SEC order was vacated and re-
manded with instructions that the proper procedure be followed.
74
The decision thus emphasized the close link between the delegation
doctrine and due process concerns.
75
The Todd test suggests that the constitutionality of the delegation
in the private-prison context would turn on the structure under
which the delegation occurred. If a corrections agency promulgated
rules of prison administration in the first instance, then the delega-
tion would satisfy the first prong of the Todd test because the public
body, not the private party, is responsible for the rule-making pro-
cess. If the private company had rule-making power, however, then
the corrections agency, an independent public body, must have au-
thority to approve or disapprove of those rules according to reason-
ably fixed standards. The second and third prongs of the Todd test
concern disciplinary proceedings. This aspect is of particular con-
cern in the private-prison context because these proceedings may
affect the length of a prisoner's confinement, his eligibility for pa-
role, or his loss of good-time credits. Under the second prong of
the test, the corrections agency must make de novo findings. Under
the third prong, the agency must make an independent decision on
69. Id.
70. Id. But cf. FirstJersey Sec. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that
amendment to Maloney Act was constitutional even though it restricted the SEC's ability to
receive additional evidence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
71. 557 F.2d at 1012.
72. Id. at 1014.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1015.
75. The court reasoned that, because the SEC was
[c]harged with making independent decisions and its own interpretations of the
N.A.S.D.'s rules, the Commission must insure fair treatment of those disciplined by
the Association .... Since it is a departure from the traditional governmental exer-
cise of enforcement power in the first instance, confidence in the impartiality and
fairness of the Association's procedures must be maintained. The S.E.C., therefore,
should not cavalierly dismiss procedural errors affecting the rights of those subjected





the violation and the penalty. Whether a delegation would satisfy
the second and third prongs depends initially on who has control
over disciplinary proceedings. If the private company maintained
control over such proceedings, then the corrections agency must
make de novo findings and an independent decision on the violation
and the penalty.
A recent article suggests that, to avoid legal challenge, it might be
preferable for the state to maintain control over all disciplinary pro-
ceedings. 76 In this situation, where the private company is confined
to a primarily administrative role, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, in Crain v. First National Bank,77 sug-
gested a minimal delegation problem. Crain dealt with provisions of
the Klamath Termination Act, which provides that Indians who are
determined to be in need of assistance may place their funds in pri-
vate trusts. 78 Pursuant to provisions of the Act, the Secretary of the
Interior made individual determinations that certain members of the
Klamath Indian tribe were in need of assistance in conducting their
affairs and placed appellants' funds in private trusts that the bank
administered. The court held that the Act did not unconstitution-
ally delegate legislative power to a private corporation. In support
of its holding, the court cited Berman v. Parker,79 a 1954 Supreme
Court case that distinguished between the power to enact laws and
authority or discretion concerning their execution. 0 The court
stated: "While Congress cannot delegate to private corporations or
anyone else the power to enact laws, it may employ them in an ad-
ministrative capacity to carry them into effect."81 Additionally, the
court observed that Congress had detailed the proper objectives,
goals, and methods of carrying out such management.8 2
Again, when applied in the private-prison context, Berman sug-
gests that courts would uphold delegations to private-prison compa-
nies because the private corporation was employed not to enact laws
but to carry them into effect in an administrative capacity. The ex-
tent to which this case is fully analogous to the private-prison con-
text, however, depends on who makes the initial determination to
76. Mayer, Legal Issues Surrounding Private Operation of Pisons, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 309, 320
(1986).
77. 324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963).
78. Id. at 533.
79. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
80. Crahn, 324 F.2d at 537.
81. Id.
82. Id. But see Republic Indus., Inc. v. Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290
(3d Cir. 1982) (striking delegation to private arbitrator of power to adjudicate rights of em-
ployers in multi-employer pension fund).
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discipline the prisoner. In Crain, the Secretary of the Interior had
made the initial determination. An employee of the private com-
pany, however, might make the initial determination to discipline a
prisoner.
(2) Possible inapplicability of the Todd test
It is important to note that all of the aforementioned cases dealt
with property interests. Therefore, courts might not apply the rea-
soning of these cases to the private-prison context because a private
prison affects the prisoner's liberty interests. In Kent v. Dulles,83 the
Supreme Court suggested that it would apply a more stringent stan-
dard when it analyzed the constitutionality of delegations in cases
affecting a liberty interest.8 4 The Court in Kent construed a statute
that granted broad discretion to deny passports.8 5 The Court held
that, if "activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the
well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we
will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute
them."8 6 The opinion did not identify these rights, but commenta-
tors generally have understood these standards to apply to statutes
involving "protected freedoms," as opposed to statutes that regu-
late property.8
7
c. Possible trend to revive the delegation doctrine
As stated earlier, no Supreme Court majority opinion since 1948
has even attempted to deal in a substantial manner with the delega-
tion doctrine.88 A number of dissents and concurrences, however,
have argued forcefully for one side or the other.8 9 Moreover, two
opinions by Justice Rehnquist may signify that the doctrine is not
entirely dead, although their line of reasoning is not directly appli-
83. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
84. Id. at 129.
85. Id.
86. Id.; cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(asserting that "numerous deficiencies connected with vague legislative directives ... are far
more serious when liberty and the exercise of fundamental rights are at stake").
87. Schoenbrod, supra note 55, at 1232. The property/ liberty distinction has been used
to invalidate the federal sentencing guidelines on delegation grounds. See, e.g., United States
v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (en banc). The Walliamns court stated: "In our
view.... the property interests in [economic] regulations, which fall at one end of the delega-
tion continuum, are readily distinguishable from the liberty interest implicated in being incar-
cerated or subject to other criminal sanctions." Id. at 51. The Supreme Court has recently
granted certiorari on this issue in another case. See United States v. Mistretta, 108 S. Ct. 2818
(1988).
88. See FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J., con-
curring) (the delegation doctrine "has been virtually abandoned by the Court for all practical
purposes," except where personal liberties are involved).
89. Schoenbrod, supra note 55, at 1233.
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cable to private delegations. 90
Justice Brennan wrote a well-considered analysis of the delegation
doctrine in a dissenting opinion in the 1971 case, McGautha v. Cali-
fornia,91 which upheld a California statute allowing the jury to fix the
death penalty without guidelines. Three Justices would have invali-
dated the statute on delegation grounds. After sketching the history
of the delegation doctrine, Justice Brennan outlined three legislative
techniques that Congress has used to "assure that policy is set in
accordance with congressional desires and that individuals are
treated according to uniform principles rather than administrative
whim."'9 2 He noted, first, that Congress has undertaken to regulate
even rather complex questions by the prescription of relatively spe-
cific standards.93 Second, Justice Brennan noted that Congress has
at times granted to others the power to prescribe fixed rules to gov-
ern future activity and adjudication. 94 Third, he noted that the most
common legislative technique for dealing with complex questions
has been delegation to another group of lawmaking power that the
group may exercise either through rule-making or the adjudication
of individual cases, with choice between the two methods left to the
agency's judgment.9 5 Justice Brennan then concluded that there
was nothing inherent in the nature of capital punishment that made
impossible the application of any or all of these means to check arbi-
trary action, but that the two state procedures under review failed to
provide the necessary safeguards. 96
Justice Brennan's opinion in McGautha involved a delegation of
judicial sentencing power to a private group, the jury. A 1980 opin-
ion by Justice Rehnquist, however, discussed the delegation doc-
90. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing recent Supreme Court
opinions in which Justice Rehnquist wrote separately on delegation grounds).
91. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
92. Id. at 275 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 276.
95. Id. at 278.
96. Id. at 280, 309. For other cases that discussed the delegation doctrine, see National
Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42 (1974) (construing narrowly a
statute that authorized the FCC to set licensing fees to avoid the possibility that the statute
unconstitutionally delegated the power to tax); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 625-26
(1963) (Harlan,J., dissenting in part) (arguing that a statute that delegated power to Secretary
of Interior to allocate waters from the Colorado River system was unconstitutional because
the statute lacked standards to guide the Secretary's discretion).
Justice Harlan's dissent in Arizona discussed two purposes for the delegation doctrine that
he believed were not furthered by the statute at issue. First, he stated that the delegation
doctrine ensures that the elected body that is immediately responsible to the people will make
fundamental policy decisions. Id. at 626. Second. Justice Harlan asserted that the delegation
doctrine provides a statutory standard against which the courts can review a challenged offi-
cial action. Id.
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trine in a case involving a delegation to a governmental agency. In
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (the Benzene
case), 97 five Justices voted to overturn an action taken under the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act. Four Justices reached this result
by narrowly construing the Act to avoid an unconstitutionally broad
delegation.98 Justice Rehnquist, the fifth vote, asserted that the con-
gressional delegation itself was unconstitutional because it was am-
biguous and violated the delegation doctrine.9 9 He argued that the
delegation doctrine serves three important functions.' 00 First, "it
ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental adminis-
tration that important [social policy choices] are made by Con-
gress." 0 1 Second, it guarantees that the recipient of the authority is
provided "with an 'intelligible principle' to guide the exercise of the
delegated discretion."'' 0 2 Third, the doctrine enables "courts
charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discre-
tion . . . to test that exercise against ascertainable standards."'
03
Justice Rehnquist believed that the legislation at issue failed on all
three counts.
10 4
Justice Rehnquist's logic in the Benzene case is not directly applica-
ble to the private-prison context, because the case dealt with a con-
gressional delegation to a public agency rather than to a private
party. Justice Rehnquist's concern centered on delegation of con-
gressional responsibility for deciding major social policy. A delega-
tion to a private-prison company that had adequate statutory
guidelines does not involve the same issues.
At least one commentator' 0 5 has viewed Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion in Benzene as consistent with the Court's decision in Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.106 The Court in Chadha invali-
dated the legislative-veto provision in an immigration statute on the
theory that the provision improperly delegated legislative power be-
cause it violated article I separation-of-powers requirements.'
0 7
97. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
98. Id. at 611-71 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, GJ., Stewart & Powell,.JJ.).
99. Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 685.
102. Id. at 685-86.
103. Id. at 686.
104. Id.; see also American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543, 545-46
(1981) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (arguing that Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 at
issue in Industrial Union Department unconstitutionally delegated to Secretary of Labor the pol-
icy choice of whether and to what extent cost-benefit analysis should determine industrial-
safety standards) (citing Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 668 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
105. See Schoenbrod, supra note 55, at 1235.
106. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
107. Id. at 954-55.
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The Court approved the delegation to the Attorney General of au-
thority to waive deportation because the Attorney General was
bound by an articulated principle that could be applied in a consis-
tent manner.'08 The Court, however, rejected the further delega-
tion of uncontrolled decisionmaking discretion to one house of the
legislature.109
The Supreme Court used a formalistic and structural argument,
turning on express constitutional requirements of bicameral pas-
sage and congressional presentment of the legislation to the Presi-
dent for signature into law. In striking down the legislation, the
Court demanded that each branch of government exercise its con-
stitutional responsibilities. The Court's focus, however, was abdica-
tion of constitutional functions to another branch of government,
and not to a private party.
Justice White's dissent suggested that delegation to a private
group contingent on some fixed statutory standard was not over-
ruled and that previous doctrine survived." 0 But commentators
have suggested that Chadha will effect "a significant judicial tighten-
ing of the limits within which Congress may entrust anyone with law-
making power,""'  and that Chadha will encourage Congress to
delegate less with better policy standards when it does delegate.'
1 2
Thus, although the analysis in Chadha does not apply directly to
delegations to private-prison companies, Chadha may encourage
Congress to make delegations under stricter statutory standards.
In summary, although no Supreme Court majority has attempted
to deal in a substantial manner with the delegation doctrine since
1948, there have been several important dissenting and concurring
opinions. A consideration of these opinions leads one to conclude
that courts might apply a more stringent standard of review to dele-
gations that affect liberty interests than they do to those that affect
property interests.
3. State delegation
Although some commentators regard state delegation cases as
unprincipled,' 13 for the purpose of analysis this section of the paper
108. Id.
109. Id. at 958-59.
110. Id. at 967-1013 (White, J., dissenting); see also supra note 48.
111. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other.vName?, 21 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 1,
17 (1984) (emphasis in original).
112. Comment, supra note 22, at 621.
113. See, e.g., 1 K. DAvis, supra note 20, § 3.12, at 196 ("The first edition of the Treatise
and the 1970 Supplement elaborately presented the state law concerning delegation to pri-
vate parties, but retention of that material in the present edition, along with the updating of it,
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divides state delegation cases into three parts. The first part dis-
cusses cases upholding statutes that delegate the management of
government programs to private persons. The private parties in
these cases had neither rule-making nor adjudicative powers, but
merely managed government programs within the parameters es-
tablished by either the legislature or an administrative agency. The
second part discusses the issue of whether and in what circum-
stances states may delegate rule-making functions to private parties.
The third part discusses the circumstances in which a state may al-
low a private party to adjudicate the rights of others and whether
judicial review of private adjudication is necessary.
As each of these classes of cases is discussed, this section com-
pares the factual differences between the cases discussed and the
private-prison context. This section then explores the issue of
whether a court would actually apply the principles announced in
these cases to the private-prison context. The section concludes
that the principles announced in existing case law may permit states
to contract with private companies for the incarceration of its pris-
oners. The state, though, must retain certain rule-making and adju-
dicative functions.
It is crucial to note, however, that the factual and philosophical
differences between the private-prison context and the cases dis-
cussed may well motivate a court to hold that a statute authorizing a
state to contract with a private company to incarcerate its prisoners
is unconstitutional.
a. Delegation of management functions
The constitutionality of privatization focuses, in the first instance,
on whether a particular activity in which the government is involved
is a governmental power, rather than a governmental function. If
the privatization at issue involves the former, a delegation issue
arises."14 A private entity exercises governmental power when it de-
seems undesirable, because identifiable principles do not emerge."); Lawrence, supra note 12,
at 647 (noting that cases on delegation are inconsistent both within and among the states); see
also D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL
SYSTEM 598 (2d ed. 1983). Mandelker, Netsch, and Salsich concluded that
[t]he nondelegation doctrine is alive and well in the state courts. Delegation of
power objections are frequently made to state and local legislation, although a re-
view of the state cases indicates that most delegations are upheld. State delegation
cases are common but the decisions are unprincipled. Except for the conclusion that
some state courts more frequently invalidate delegations of power than others, a
principled basis for the application of the delegation of power doctrine is difficult to
find.
Id.
114. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 647. Professor Lawrence stated:
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prives a person of life, liberty, or property at the behest of govern-
ment.' 1 5 Thus, a delegation can occur even though the private
Much of the debate over privatization has been political in nature, rather than legal;
and indeed when privatization involves governmental functions, the legal issues are
largely secondary, involving only details. But if privatization proposals should in-
volve governmental powers, the legal problems become considerably more formida-
ble. The transfer of governmental powers raises the issue of to what extent it is
constitutionally permissible to delegate those powers to private actors.
Id. (emphasis in original). An early New York Court of Appeals case explained this distinction
between governmental functions and powers differently. In Fox v. Mohawk & Hudson River
Humane Soc'y, 165 N.Y. 517, 59 N.E. 353 (1901), Judge Cullen wrote:
I certainly should deny the right of the legislature to vest in private associations or
corporations authority and power affecting the life, liberty, and property of the citi-
zens .... Of course, the state... may employ individuals or corporations to do work
or render service for it, but the distinction between a public officer and a public
employee or contractor is plain and well recognized.
Id. at 525, 59 N.E. at 355. Thus, if the government gives a private party power to affect a
person's life, liberty, or property interest, it is delegating governmental power. If, however,
the government merely contracts with a private party to confer a benefit on members of the
public that does not affect any person's existing life, liberty, or property interest, it has not
delegated its governmental power. Therefore, a contract to provide food or medical care to
prisoners in an institution that the state owns and controls does not in itself raise a constitu-
tional issue. A prisoner has no interest in receiving his food or medical care directly from the
government rather than from an independent contractor. But, if the government leaves the
entire operation of the prison in private hands, it is the private company, and not the govern-
ment, that is immediately responsible for the prisoner's day-to-day deprivation of liberty.
For a critique of the "government functions" approach in a different context, see Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-47 (1985) (holding that transit authority
was not immune from minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
115. If the government gives a private party the authority to deprive another of life, lib-
erty, or property, the issue of state action arises. If a private actor exercises governmental
power, the state nevertheless retains the responsibility to protect the constitutional rights of
those persons over whom the private company exercises control. Schneider, supra note 58, at
1169-70. Thus, "[a]lthough the state may have a private actor performing the service .... the
nondelegable nature of the service means that the state must remain responsible for the per-
formance of that service." Id. at 1170. Stated another way, the government can delegate the
function, but not the duty to perform that function. Compare Ancata v. Prison Health Servs.,
769 F.2d 700, 703 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("Although Prison Health Services and its employees are
not strictly speaking public employees, state action is clearly present. Where a function which
is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.., is performed by a private entity, state
action is present.") with West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 994-96 (4th Cir. 1987) (7-3) (en banc)
(declining to overrule Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1132 (1985), in which the court held that a physician who had contracted with the state to
furnish medical services in prison was not acting under color of state law when he allegedly
provided inadequate medical treatment to prisoner), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988). See gener-
ally infra notes 381-392 and accompanying text (discussing West v. Atkins). Noting the overlap
between the state-action and delegation analyses, the court in Ancata stated:
The federal courts have consistently ruled that governments, state and local, have an
obligation to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals .... This duty is not
absolved by contracting with an entity such as Prison Health Services. Although
Prison Health Services has contracted to perform an obligation owed by the county,
the county itself remains liable for any constitutional deprivations caused by the poli-
cies or customs of the Health Service. In that sense, the county's duty is non-
delegable.
769 F.2d at 705 (footnote omitted).
Even if a state-action problem does not exist under current law, the validity of the delega-
tion still depends, in part, on whether the private actor performs its duty in a constitutional
manner. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 693 (even if state action is not present, if the private
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party exercises neither rule-making nor adjudicative powers but
merely manages a government program that is already in place.
The first category of delegations, therefore, is the delegation of
the management of government property and programs. In People v.
Chicago Railroad Terminal Authority,1 16 for example, the validity of a
statute permitting railroad-terminal authorities to contract with pri-
vate companies to maintain and operate the authorities' terminals
was attacked on delegation grounds. 1 7 The statute reserved ulti-
mate power over the terminal's management to the Authority118 and
authorized the railroad-terminal authorities to delegate administra-
tive duties to railroad companies. 1 9 The court held that this dele-
gation was constitutional.' 20
Chicago Railroad established the proposition that, under the Illi-
nois Constitution, a governmental body can constitutionally dele-
gate the management of a government enterprise to a private
company if the governmental body retains ultimate control over the
program. Significantly, the statute challenged in Chicago Railroad did
not permit private railroad companies to choose the terminal sites
or acquire the land for the terminals.' 2 ' Thus, the Terminal Au-
thority, not the railroad company, made the policy decision con-
cerning terminal location and design, including the issue of whether
and how many shops to construct and lease. The statute at issue
permitted the Terminal Authority to vest the power to supervise and
control the construction, maintenance, and operation of the termi-
nal in a committee that was composed, in part, of railroad-company
officials. 122 Noting that the Terminal Authority retained ultimate
control over the terminal, the court held that the statute did not
unconstitutionally allow the Authority to delegate its powers to pri-
vate parties. 23
The statute did not, however, permit the Terminal Authority to
delegate either rule-making or adjudicative powers to private rail-
road companies. Rather, it reserved the adjudicative power of con-
party makes decisions regarding the life, liberty, or property of citizens at the behest of the
government, courts may find delegation improper unless the private actor creates and follows
a program that satisfies principles of procedural due process).
116. 14Il1. 2d 230, 151 N.E.2d 311 (1958).
117. Id. at 238-40, 151 N.E.2d at 316-17.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 239-40, 151 N.E.2d at 317.
120. Id. at 242, 151 N.E.2d at 318.
121. See id. at 234, 240-41, 151 N.E.2d at 314, 317 (noting that the statute required the
Authority to select and the city council to approve the terminal site and, once approved, the
Authority had the power to acquire designated land).
122. Id. at 239-40, 151 N.E.2d at 316.
123. Id. at 238-40. 151 N.E.2d at 316-17.
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demning land for terminal use to the Terminal Authority itself.
Although the statute permitted the prerogative to delegate the au-
thority to establish terminal management policy to a board consist-
ing of private-company appointees, the Authority retained ultimate
control over the board. Thus, because the Authority could accept,
reject, or modify the rules that the management committee estab-
lished, the rules were advisory. The board, therefore, did not have
rule-making power. Instead, the statute limited the private dele-
gate's power to the function of administering a program that a gov-
ernmental body established.
Nevertheless, because the statute permitted the Terminal Author-
ity to yield physical control of terminal property to a private com-
pany, a private delegate potentially could affect the property rights
of terminal lessees. Therefore, the statute in fact permitted a true
delegation of governmental power to affect private property inter-
ests for a public purpose.
Statutes that permit private security guards to detain suspected
shoplifters present another example of administrative delegation.
Although the statutes and relevant cases do not expressly discuss
the delegation doctrine, they effectively authorize private persons to
deprive people of their liberty for the public purpose of enforcing
criminal laws. An Indiana statute, for example, authorizes private
security guards to detain suspected shoplifters if the guards have
probable cause to believe that the detainee has stolen any item be-
longing to the store. 124 But this statute does not authorize store
security guards to make arrests; 125 their power is investigatory only.
Humane-society officers perform law-enforcement functions
analogous to those of store security guards. In ASPCA v. City of New
York,1 26 for example, a Humane Society officer directed a police of-
ficer to a person whom the Society suspected had been cruel to a
horse. 27 The police officer, however, actually arrested the suspect
and presented him before a magistrate. 128 The Humane Society of-
ficers wore special uniforms, patrolled the streets, and reported any
124. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-33-6-1 to -5 (Burns 1985) (outlining circumstances in
which store employee may detain suspected shoplifter). An Indiana appellate court has up-
held the constitutionality of the predecessor statute sub silentio. Crase v. Highland Village
Value Plus Pharmacy, 176 Ind. App. 47, 52, 374 N.E.2d 58, 62 (1978) (remanding case to
determine whether "statutory defense" to false-imprisonment action applied, without discuss-
ing Act's constitutionality).
125. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-6-2(b) (Bums 1985) (limiting store security guards' au-
thority to temporarily detaining suspected shoplifter until police can come to make arrest).
126. 205 A.D. 335, 199 N.Y.S. 728 (1923).
127. Id. at 336, 199 N.Y.S. at 729.
128. Id.
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suspected violations of the state's humane laws. 129 The New York
appellate court characterized the Humane Society's law-enforce-
ment activities as "purely administrative,"' 30 and held that the state
government constitutionally could delegate the law-enforcement
functions at issue to the Humane Society. 1
3 1
In both the store security guard and Humane Society examples,
the private officers had no authority either to arrest suspects or
to adjudicate crimes. The private officers' only authority was to
identify suspected lawbreakers and facilitate their ultimate arrest
and prosecution by government officials. In both instances, in-
dependent, governmental decisionmakers ultimately decided
whether to arrest, prosecute, and sentence the wrongdoer. Thus,
the private entities performed only administrative, not adjudicative
functions.1
3 2
Moreover, in each of these examples of administrative delegation,
the private party had neither rule-making nor adjudicative powers,
but merely assisted a government agency in implementing its policy
decisions. The principles announced in these cases, therefore,
might allow private prison management under rules that the state
established. A state agency with authority to accept, reject, or mod-
ify administrative rules that the private-prison company proposed,
however, would have to review any proposed rule that would affect
the prisoners. Additionally, a state judicial or administrative officer
would have to determine whether an individual prisoner had vio-
lated an administrative rule. This would be necessary if the pris-
oner's incarceration were prolonged as a result of such a
determination. 33
Courts might not apply the principles established in the cases dis-
cussed in this section to the private-prison context, however. The
private delegates in these cases performed functions that states
129. Id. at 338, 199 N.Y.S. at 730.
130. Id. at 341, 199 N.Y.S. at 733.
131. Id. (citing Fox v. Mohawk & Hudson River Humane Soc'y, 165 N.Y. 517, 59 N.E. 353
(1901)).
132. See also Hogan v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 228 P.2d 554, 556 (1951) (rejecting
challenge on delegation grounds to state bar association's authority to recommend discipli-
nary action against attorney because recommendation was advisory and subject to de novo
review in state supreme court).
133. This would occur, for example, if an administrative infraction resulted in a loss of the
prisoner's good-time credits or affected his chance for parole. Mayer, supra note 76, at 320-21
(suggesting that the state might maintain ultimate control over disciplinary proceedings be-
cause they potentially could increase the length of a prisoner's incarceration by reducing his
chance for parole or good-time credits). Similar to store security guards or humane-society
officers, however, the private-prison company could perform an accusatory function in which
its agents acted as complaining witnesses at disciplinary proceedings. See id. at 320 (sug-
gesting this role for private-prison company).
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commonly permit private parties to perform. Private citizens typi-
cally have the right to identify and even arrest suspected lawbreak-
ers.' 3 4 Private railroads certainly may construct and operate
railroad terminals without first seeking state approval. Hence, none
of the delegates in the cases discussed performed functions that
were unique to government.
Incarcerating prisoners, however, unlike identifying lawbreakers
or managing railroad terminals, is a power that the states tradition-
ally have had to themselves. Thus, because this function is "intrinsi-
cally governmental in nature," the courts may distinguish the
administrative-delegation cases and enjoin private-prison opera-
tions on delegation grounds.1 35
b. Delegation of rule-making authority
Administrative delegations raise the policy concern of whether
government should allow a private company to manage a program
rather than have the government manage the program itself. A re-
lated concern is whether routine administrative decisions would
contravene the goals of the program. These concerns become more
pronounced when the legislature grants power to a private company
to make administrative rules that are binding on private persons.
The problem with this practice is that a private company can exer-
cise governmental power affecting a citizen's liberty or property in-
terest outside of any legislative or administrative control. This
practice is constitutionally suspect for two reasons: first, only the
legislature has express constitutional authority to exercise rule-mak-
ing governmental power in the public interest; and, second, a pri-
vate company might make rules that are repugnant to the public
interest for its own pecuniary or political gain.
Two common types of rule-making delegations are prevailing-
wage laws and statutes that adopt technical codes not yet in exist-
ence. The prevailing-wage laws typically provide that private con-
tractors who perform municipal contracts must pay the prevailing
wage established by a labor commissioner. They also typically pro-
134. See id. at 317-19 (discussing private citizens' common-law right to arrest felons).
135. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm'n, 644 F. Supp. 510, 520 (D.D.C. 1986)
(dictum) (noting, in case upholding private delegation, that "many responsibilities may be so
intrinsically governmental in nature that they may not be entrusted to a non-governmental
entity"). The court suggested "the powers to conduct foreign affairs or to establish military
and naval forces" as examples of nondelegable powers that are intrinsically governmental. Id.
at 520 n.24; cf. Brief for Appellee at 32, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (arguing that
Congress's power to spend government revenues was nondelegable because it was Congress's
core function).
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vide that the labor commissioner must adopt a union wage rate es-
tablished by collective bargaining.
Industrial Commission v. C & D Pipeline 136 is representative of the
cases holding prevailing-wage laws unconstitutional on delegation
grounds. 3 7 The Arizona Court of Appeals noted that the statute
granted no discretion "to the Commission to do anything other
than ascertain and record the union rate."'138 Accordingly, the court
held, under the Arizona Constitution, that the prevailing-wage law
unconstitutionally granted the power to determine the prevailing
wage to private unions and management. 39
Statutes adopting technical codes that a private trade association
drafts and periodically revises raise delegation issues that are similar
to those found in the prevailing-wage cases. If a state legislature
were to adopt prospectively an extant technical code, no delegation
problem would exist. In such a case, the legislature would merely
136. 125 Ariz. 64, 607 P.2d 383 (Ct. App. 1979).
137. The statute provided:
For the purpose of determining the general prevailing rate of per diem wages, the
industrial commission of Arizona shall ascertain and keep on record the rates or
scale of per diem wages required to be paid to each craft or type of workman belong-
ing to or affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, the Arizona State Federa-
tion of Labor, or any other state or national labor organization similarly constituted,
prevailing in the locality in which the public work is to be performed. If such method
of arriving at the general prevailing rate of per diem wages cannot reasonably and
fairly be applied in any political subdivision of the state for the reason that no such
organization is maintained in the political subdivision, the industrial commission
shall determine the prevailing rate to be the rate required to be paid to each craft or
type of workman of the same or most similar class, working in the same or most
similar employment in the nearest and most similar neighboring locality, and affili-
ated with any such labor organization.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 34-324(A) (1974) (emphasis added); see 125 Ariz. at 65-66, 607 P.2d
at 384-85.
138. 125 Ariz. at 67, 607 P.2d at 386. The court distinguished Baughn v. Gorell & Riley,
311 Ky. 537, 224 S.W.2d 436 (1949), a case cited by the Industrial Commission that upheld a
prevailing-wage law. 125 Ariz. at 66, 607 P.2d at 385-86. The statute challenged in Baughn
provided:
The wages paid for a legal day's work to laborers, workmen, mechanics, helpers,
assistants and apprentices upon public works shall not be less than the prevailing
wages paid in the same trade or occupation in the locality. The public authority shall
establish prevailing wages at the same rate that prevails in the locality under collec-
tive agreements or understandings between bona fide organizations of labor and
their employers at the date the contract for public works is made if there are such
agreements or understandings in the locality applying to a sufficient number of em-
ployees to furnish a reasonable basis for considering those rates to be the prevailing
rates in the locality.
311 Ky. at 540, 224 S.W.2d at 438 (emphasis omitted). The court in Industrial Commission
noted that, unlike the statute in Baughn, the Arizona statute granted no discretion to the Com-
mission to consider factors other than the union wage rate to determine the prevailing wage
rate. 125 Ariz. at 67, 607 P.2d at 385-86. The court concluded that the Arizona statute was
unconstitutional because it did not grant any discretion to the Commission to question the
union rate. Id. at 68, 607 P.2d at 386.
139. 25 Ariz. at 68, 607 P.2d at 386. For another case that held a prevailing-wage law
unconstitutional, see Schryver v. Schirmer, 84 S.D. 352, 357-58, 171 N.W.2d 634, 637 (1969).
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be exercising its right to adopt one political option over another. 140
A delegation problem would arise, however, if a statute were to
adopt prospectively any changes that the technical trade association
might make in the future. This type of statute would grant the trade
association power to make legally binding rules that affect the prop-
erty interest of private tradesmen.
Hillman v. Northern Wasco County People's Utility District 141 is typical
of the cases that hold such statutes unconstitutional. In Hillman, a
contractor injured himself after receiving an electrical shock from
exposed wiring in an old building while he was removing some
beams.' 42 Hillman fell from the wall after his shoe brushed against
the exposed wire.143 He later brought a tort action against the elec-
tric company that had originally installed the wiring.
144
In his complaint, Hillman alleged that the Northern Wasco
County People's Utility District had violated the National Electric
Code.' 45 Oregon's adoption of the Code included revisions and ad-
ditions "as they are published from time to time."' 146 After the trial
court instructed the jurors that violation of the Code would be neg-
ligence per se, 147 the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.148
Both plaintiff and defendant cross-appealed from the trial court's
order granting the defendant's motion for a new trial but denying its
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.'
49
The issue that the defendant raised in support of its motion for a
new trial was whether the statute that adopted the Code, including
revisions and additions not yet in existence, unconstitutionally dele-
gated legislative rule-making power to the American Standards As-
sociation, the private party that had drafted the Code. 150 The court
stated that the Oregon Constitution vested lawmaking power exclu-
sively in the legislature l5 and noted that neither the legislature nor
any other department of government had any control over the Asso-
ciation.152 As a result, the court held that the Oregon statute un-
140. Liebmann, supra note 52, at 680.
141. 13 Or. 264, 323 P.2d 664 (1958), overruled on other grounds, Maulding v. Clackamas
County, 278 Or. 359, 563 P.2d 731 (1977).
142. Id. at 273-74, 323 P.2d at 669.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 270-72, 323 P.2d at 668.
145. Id. at 275-76, 323 P.2d at 670.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 270-71, 323 P.2d at 668.
149. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. at 314-15,
323 P.2d at 688.
150. Id. at 275-83, 323 P.2d at 670-73.
151. Id. at 277-78, 323 P.2d at 671.
152. Id. at 278-81, 323 P.2d at 671-72.
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constitutionally delegated legislative rule-making power to the
Association. 1
5 3
Hillman also involved a similar private-delegation issue concern-
ing the National Electric Safety Code, issued and periodically re-
vised by the Bureau of Standards of the Department of
Commerce. 54 The court pointed out that the Bureau adopted
some of the Safety Code's provisions even though it did not agree
with them.' 55 These provisions were proposed by private commit-
tees composed of representatives of various private groups that the
Safety Code affected.' 56 The Bureau followed this procedure be-
cause it placed a higher priority on promoting broad-based accept-
ance of the Safety Code in the private sector than on agreeing with
all of its provisions.' 57
Oregon's Public Service Commission was statutorily authorized to
make safety rules for employers and common carriers concerning
the use of electrical equipment. 5 8 The Commission, in turn,
adopted the Safety Code as it existed at the time of its order, as well
as all of the Bureau's subsequent revisions and additions to the
Safety Code.' 59
The court distinguished the enabling statute from the Commis-
153. Id. at 281, 323 P.2d at 673. Because the statute adopting the Code was unconstitu-
tional, any Code provision adopted pursuant to the statute did not have any legal effect.
Thus, the defendant achieved its objective of overcoming a finding of negligence per se solely
because it did not comply with the Code. For other cases that held statutes that adopted
future technical codes unconstitutional on delegation grounds, see, e.g., Agnew v. City of Cul-
ver City, 147 Cal. App. 2d 144, 158, 304 P.2d 788, 799 (1956); State v. Crawford, 104 Kan.
141, 143, 177 P. 360, 361 (1919).
154. 213 Or. at 281-87, 323 P.2d at 673-75.
155. Id. at 284-85, 323 P.2d at 674.
156. Id. In support of its observation, the court quoted the following passage from the
preface of the Bureau's handbook:
In preparation of the first few editions of the code, the Bureau held meetings in
many parts of the country and welcomed suggestions from everyone concerned. It,
however, reserved to itself the final decision on all contested points. The procedure
followed in later revisions subsequent to the establishment of the American Stan-
dards Association differs essentially from the former practice in that final decisions as
to all details are made by the sectional committees formally approved by the Ameri-
can Standards Association and operating under their rules of procedure. The Bu-
reau, as sponsor for the work under this procedure, has given up its prerogative of
determining details in return for the implied understanding that the many parties
concerned will accept such a code as they can agree upon among themselves. All
such codes of practice necessarily include compromises between conflicting aims.
The Bureau has felt that decisions made by practically unanimous agreement among
the interests affected would, in general, be wiser than those at which it might arrive
after weighing the arguments of advocates for different views. It has, therefore, wel-
comed this procedure in spite of the fact that this involves the acceptance of some
details of which it might not itself approve.
Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 281-83, 323 P.2d at 673.
159. Id. at 282-85, 323 P.2d at 673-74.
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sion's order that adopted the Safety Code. The enabling statute was
constitutional, the court noted, because an administrative agency
such as the Commission may adopt an extant edition of the Code
after a hearing and a proper exercise of its discretion. 160 If the
Commission did not do so, the court observed, it would not perform
its duty to determine whether the Safety Code provisions that the
Bureau adopted were "necessary and proper for the protection of
the health and safety of the citizens of this state." 16 1 The court as-
serted, however, that the Commission abdicated its legislative power
when it adopted future Safety Code provisions without further
consideration. 162
The court in Hillman, as most state courts do, spoke in conclusory
terms of the unconstitutionality of private delegations, without spe-
cifically indicating the policy concerns that inspired the doctrine.
But it did make three assertions that evinced its real policy concerns.
First, the court explained that no department of government had
any control over a private organization.1 63 Second, the court stated
that, through the Constitution, the people vested the lawmaking
power in the legislature. 164 Thus, the people effectively prohibited
any group except the legislature from exercising lawmaking pow-
ers. 165 Third, the court noted that, when private parties adopt rules
that further their own interests, the rules may not reflect the best
judgment of an agency that is concerned only with the public inter-
est. 166 Thus, the court's underlying policy concern apparently was
that a private party, not subject to any political control, could im-
pose rules to further its own interest at the expense of the public
interest. 167
Industrial Commission and Hillman are examples of the state courts'
almost uniform condemnation of statutes delegating rule-making
power to private parties. Both cases addressed similar concerns
about whether private organizations would make rules that placed
personal gain ahead of public welfare and whether the absence of
neutral administrative-agency review of the private parties' determi-
nation would encourage self-serving policies. This latter aspect was
160. Id. at 284-85, 323 P.2d at 674.
161. Id. at 285-86, 323 P.2d at 674-75.
162. Id. at 286-87, 323 P.2d at 675.
163. Id. at 277-79, 323 P.2d at 671.
164. Id. at 280, 323 P.2d at 672 (quoting Marr v. Fisher, 182 Or. 383, 187 P.2d 966
(1947)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 285-86, 323 P.2d at 674-75.
167. But see Liebmann, supra note 52, at 682-84 (arguing that, because private rule-making
affects the community at large, any abuses are visible and likely to be corrected by the political
process).
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particularly troublesome, the cases noted, because the private par-
ties themselves were not subject to any political control. Both cases
indicated, however, that a rule that a private party proposes is not
constitutionally suspect if it is adopted by an administrative agency
that has power to accept, reject, or modify the rule.
168
In the private-prison context, the principles that these cases es-
tablish would not permit a legislature to authorize a private-prison
company to make rules governing the conduct of the prisoners who
are committed to its care. The prison company could propose rules
to an administrative agency, however, if the agency had authority to
accept, reject, or modify them. The agency would then have a con-
stitutional duty to exercise discretion concerning whether and in
what form it should adopt the rules.
It must be emphasized that the rules at issue in Industrial Commis-
sion and Hillman only affected the property interests of private
tradesmen. Any rules governing a private prison, however, likely
would affect the prisoners' life and liberty interests as well as other
fundamental constitutional rights. Because of these differences in
the constitutional importance of the interests affected, a court might
require the legislature or an administrative agency to take a more
active role in determining the rules by which private prisons gov-
erned the prisoners under the company's control. A court might
hold, for example, that a statute authorizing a private prison or jail
is unconstitutional on delegation grounds unless it specifies in detail
the rules governing the relationship between the private-prison
company and the prisoners under the company's control. 16 9 Alter-
natively, a court might require an administrative agency to create
the necessary rules. Neither of these holdings would prevent pri-
vate-prison companies from proposing their own rules. The legisla-
ture or administrative agency merely would draft the rules itself,
instead of passively reviewing the private party's proposals. Be-
cause of the life and liberty interests involved, however, a court
might bar the delegation altogether.
c. Delegation of adjudicative powers
When a private party exercises delegated administrative and rule-
making power, its actions generally affect a large number of persons
and entities. If a private party exercises delegated adjudicative
168. Cf. id. at 680 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that "freedom for private
'groups to seek their legislative ends is itself constitutionally protected").
169. Of course, a rule itself may be unconstitutional on other grounds, even though the
delegation is proper.
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power, however, its actions usually affect a single person or entity.
Because of the disproportionate effect of an exercise of adjudicative
power, an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of such power is not as
easily corrected through the political process. Therefore, courts
should scrutinize delegations of such power more carefully.'
70
State courts generally invalidate statutes and administrative regu-
lations that delegate adjudicative power to private parties when
there is no provision for judicial review of the private adjudications.
When there is provision for such review, however, the delegation
generally is upheld. DiLoreto v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 171 is an
example of the latter type of case. At issue in DiLoreto was a private
insurer's authority pursuant to a Massachusetts statute and imple-
menting regulations of the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Lia-
bility Policies and Bonds.1 72 The statute allowed a private insurer to
determine, in the first instance, whether an insured was at fault in an
accident, in order to assess a premium surcharge.' 73 The insured
retained the right, however, to both administrative 74 and judicial
75
review.
DiLoreto argued that the delegation of adjudicative authority to a
private insurer violated the Massachusetts Constitution.' 76 The
170. Liebmann, supra note 52, at 682-83. Liebmann explained several differences be-
tween rule-making and adjudicative power that suggest a greater need for judicial scrutiny of
the latter type ofpower. He noted that "abuses of rule making power are more visible, fall on
and thus give rise to reaction by the community at large, and may more readily be redressed
after the event." Id. at 682. Liebmann contrasted this with adjudicative powers because they
"bear more heavily on individuals, while abuses of them are less likely to be brought to public
view or be susceptible of easy correction." Id. at 682-83. Liebmann concluded that courts
should scrutinize carefully and, in most cases, invalidate delegations of adjudicative power.
Id.
171. 383 Mass. 243, 418 N.E.2d 612 (1981).
172. Id. at 244, 418 N.E.2d at 613.
173. Id. at 245-46, 418 N.E.2d at 614. The insurer's determination is binding on the in-
sured unless the insured appeals the insurer's decision to the Board of Appeal on Motor
Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 113P (Law. Co-op.
1977) (insured may appeal any determination of insurer within 30 days). Thus, the insurer's
authority in this situation is greater than the authority granted to store security guards, be-
cause the insurer's decision is a binding, albeit appealable, determination of the insured's
rights and the onus of challenging that decision is on the insured. See supra notes 124-125 and
accompanying text (noting that store security guards in Indiana have no authority to arrest or
charge suspected shoplifters but rather have authority only to hold suspected shoplifters until
police can come to make arrest).
174. See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § I13P (Law. Co-op. 1977) (insured may appeal in-
surer's determination to Board within 30 days of adverse decision).
175. See id. (insured may appeal Board's decision to superior court).
176. 383 Mass. at 245,418 N.E.2d at 614. The stipulated facts on which the insurer based
its decision to surcharge were as follows. DiLoreto parked his automobile along the right-
hand side of a street and opened the left front door to exit his automobile. After opening the
door and starting to get out of the automobile, DiLoreto noticed another automobile headed
toward his vehicle at an unsafe speed of approximately 30 miles an hour. The driver was not
paying attention to her driving, but instead was talking to a passenger. After observing the
approaching vehicle, DiLoreto got back into his automobile. At that point, the vehicle struck
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Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court first explained that the merit-
rating program was based on a detailed and comprehensive plan es-
tablished by the Board pursuant to statutory mandate. 177 It then
noted that Board regulations narrowly channeled the insurer's de-
termination. 178 Additionally, the insurer's determination was sub-
ject to administrative and judicial review.' 79 Thus, the court
asserted that the statutory scheme prevented the insurer from bene-
fiting from its decision to assess a surcharge in a particular case. 18 0
The court concluded, therefore, that the statute did not unconstitu-
tionally delegate adjudicative power to private insurers.' 8 '
In upholding the DiLoreto statute, the court distinguished its ear-
lier holding in Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc. 8 2 The non-
signer provision of the fair-trade law'8 3 in Coming Glass was
constitutionally defective because there was no standard to limit the
contracting parties' discretion to set the retail price that others must
charge.' 8 4 Furthermore, the statute at issue in Coming Glass did not
provide for administrative or judicial review of the private deci-
sion.' 8 5 Therefore, the DiLoreto court concluded that, because the
insurance statute provided an effective standard to channel the pri-
vate insurer's discretion and adequate review of private-party deter-
minations, the delegation was constitutional.8 6
The court in DiLoreto upheld a delegation of adjudicative power
because of the availability of judicial review. If review of a private
adjudication is not available, however, state courts generally invali-
his door. The insurer assessed a surcharge on DiLoreto pursuant to a regulatory presump-
tion that a person whose doors are opened at the time of a collision is at fault in excess of 50
percent. Id. at 244 & n.3, 418 N.E.2d at 613-14 & n.3.
177. Id. at 246-47, 418 N.E.2d at 614-15.
178. Id. at 247, 418 N.E.2d at 615.
179. Id.
180. Id. The statute created a system by which the insurer must offset all of its surcharges
with good-driver credits in an amount equal to its income from the surcharges, including the
insurer's income from investing the proceeds of the surcharge prior to distribution. MASS.
ANN. LAWs ch. 175, § 113P (Law. Co-op. 1977).
181. 383 Mass. at 247-48, 418 N.E.2d at 615.
182. 363 Mass. 409, 294 N.E.2d 354 (1973).
183. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 20, § 3.12, at 196. Davis explained the history and effect of
nonsigner provisions of fair-trade laws as follows:
The history of non-signer provisions of the so-called fair trade laws may have some
value. Such laws were enacted by 46 states. A non-signer provision of such a law
provides that a minimum resale price fixed in an agreement between a manufacturer
(or other distributor) and a retailer is binding upon other retailers. The effect is that
parties to such an agreement have the legislative power to fix the minimum resale
price at which nonparties may sell; any seller who sells at a price lower than the price
fixed in such an agreement is subject to suit by any person damaged.
Id.




date such delegations. International Service Agencies v. O'Shea 18 7 is typ-
ical of those cases. International Service Agencies (ISA) had
requested the right to participate in the annual solicitation of chari-
table contributions from New York state employees through the
State Employees Federated Appeals (SEFA).188 The statute in ques-
tion provided that the Commissioner of General Services must se-
lect one "federated community campaign"1 89 for each county or
area in which a solicitation took place.' 90 The Commissioner, in
turn, delegated to the United Way and the National Health Agencies
his authority to select the charitable nonprofit organization that
would have the right to participate in a local campaign. 19' ISA had
applied to both the Commissioner and the United Way for permis-
sion to participate in a local charitable drive.'9 2 Both entities re-
jected ISA's applications.1
9 3
ISA argued that the Commissioner unconstitutionally delegated
the power to select local federated community campaigns to private
charities. 94 The New York Supreme Court observed that the Com-
missioner admitted that he had no role in the decision concerning
ISA's participation in the federated campaign.' 9 5 The court
charged that, although the Commissioner was empowered to do so,
he failed to promulgate regulations establishing a procedure to de-
termine inclusion in a SEFA.' 96 As a result, the statutory delegation
unconstitutionally deprived ISA of a valuable interest in soliciting
funds directly from state employees' paychecks.' 9 7
The court's primary policy concern became apparent when it
noted three times in the opinion the likelihood that the United
Way's self-interest motivated ISA's exclusion from participating in a
187. 104 Misc. 2d 1071, 430 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
188. Id. at 1072, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
189. See id. at 1073, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226. The statute defined a federated community
campaign as "a charitable non-profit organization which solicits funds for distribution among
a substantial number of charitable non-profit organizations, which has been approved as such
by the Commissioner of General Services." Id. ISA solicited funds for seven different chari-
ties. Id. at 1072, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 225. Thus, ISA would have qualified under the statutory
definition if the Commissioner of General Services had approved its program.
190. Id. at 1073, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
191. Id. at 1074, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226-27.
192. Id. at 1076-77, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228. The Commissioner referred ISA to the United
Way which, in turn, referred ISA back to the Commissioner. The court described this process
as a "Ring around the Rosey." Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1073, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
195. Id. at 1074, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1076-78, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228-29. In so holding, the court rejected the argu-
ment that state employees remained free to make donations to ISA if they chose to do so. Id.
at 1076, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228. Instead, the court held that ISA had a due process interest in a
fair opportunity for inclusion in a SEFA. Id. at 1077, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
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SEFA. s98 On one such occasion, for example, the court observed
that "[o]ne can readily understand the reluctance of United Way to
permit ISA to join in. Their own self-interest would dictate a policy
of exclusion in order to maximize the amount of their own
contributions." 199
A case that raised similar issues was Group Health Insurance v.
Howell.200 In that case, Group Health Insurance of New Jersey
(GHI), a nonprofit corporation, proposed to offer a medical-services
plan 201 similar to the then-existing plan that Blue Shield offered.
202
A New Jersey statute provided, however, that before a company
could offer such a program it had to obtain prior approval from the
Medical Society.20 3 The Commissioner of Banking and Insurance
was powerless under the statute to certify a corporation's proposed
medical-services plan without the approval of Blue Shield.20 4 Be-
198. Id. at 1074, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 227 ("It is clear that delegations of public authority must
be carefully circumscribed to insure that self-interest does not become the overriding consid-
eration."); id. at 1077, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228 ("Fortunately, the reins of government cannot be
turned over to private interest groups to be utilized to preserve self-interests."); see infra text
accompanying note 199 (noting United Way's pecuniary interest in excluding ISA).
199. Id. at 1076-77, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
200. 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
201. See id. at 439-41, 193 A.2d at 105-06. The statute at issue defined a medical-services
plan as
any plan or arrangement operated by such a corporation under the provisions of the
Law whereby the expense of medical services to subscribers and covered dependents
is paid in whole or in part by such corporation to participating physicians of such
plans or arrangements and to others as provided in the Law. A subscriber is one to
whom a subscription certificate is issued by the corporation which sets forth the
kinds and extent of the medical services for which the corporation is liable to make
payment. A participating physician is any physician licensed to practice medicine
and surgery in NewJersey, who agrees in writing with the corporation to perform the
medical services specified in the subscription certificates issued by the corporation, at
such rates of compensation as shall be determined by its board of trustees, and who
agrees to abide by the corporation's rules. Medical service includes all general and
special medical and surgical services ordinarily provided by such licensed physicians
in accordance with accepted practices in the community. No subscriber or his cov-
ered dependents shall be liable for any payment to any participating physician for
medical services specified in the subscriber's certificate to be paid to the participating
physician by the corporation.
Id. at 441-42, 193 A.2d at 106 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48A-1 (West 1939 & Supp.
1962)).
202. Id. at 443, 193 A.2d at 107.
203. Id. at 444-45, 193 A.2d at 108. The statute did not, in so many words, require Blue
Shield's approval. Instead, it required approval of a recognized medical society with at least
2,000 members that was incorporated for at least 10 years. The court noted, however, that
the parties did not dispute that Blue Shield, a private organization, was the only organization
that met the statutory requirements. Thus, although the statute did not provide expressly
that Blue Shield's approval was a necessary prerequisite to having the state license a medical-
services plan, its effect was identical. Id.
204. Id. at 446, 193 A.2d at 109. Technically, the organization from which approval was
necessary was the "Medical Society." Although legally separate from Blue Shield, the Medical
Society formed Blue Shield, had four interlocking directors, and approved nominees to Blue
Shield's board of directors before they were elected. Thus, the court noted that, in practical
effect, the Medical Society represented Blue Shield's interests in licensing matters. Id. at 445,
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cause the statute in effect delegated to Blue Shield the power to
deny licenses to corporations proposing medical-service plans,
20 5
the court held that the delegation violated the New Jersey
Constitution.
2 0 6
The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically noted two policy con-
cerns with the delegation at issue. First, the statute contained no
standards or safeguards to guide Blue Shield's discretion. 20 7 Sec-
ond, the court declared that this deficiency was exacerbated because
"the Medical Society's self-interest might tend to color its determi-
nation whether to approve . ..an applicant which may become a
competitor of Blue Shield."
20 8
The state cases discussing delegation of adjudicative power to pri-
vate parties have established several principles. Ifjudicial review of
a private adjudication is available, as in DiLoreto, courts are more
likely to uphold the delegation even though the private determina-
tion is binding until reversed on appeal, and the onus of appealing
the action is on the affected party. Such a result is still more likely if,
as in DiLoreto, the statute limits the delegate's discretion so as to
preclude any pecuniary interest in adjudicative outcomes. Ifjudicial
review were not available, however, state courts would not uphold
the delegation.
d. Application of state law to private incarceration
Because prison privatization is in its infancy, no reported cases
193 A.2d at 107. Therefore, the terms "Medical Society" and "Blue Shield" are interchange-
able when discussing this case.
205. Id. at 446-47, 193 A.2d at 109.
206. Id. at 447, 193 A.2d at 109.
207. Id.
208. Id. As in International Service Agencies, the court in Howell noted its concern about the
self-interest of the licensor, Blue Shield, on several different occasions. See id. at 445, 193
A.2d at 108 (legislature may not empower private party to determine who has a right to en-
gage in an otherwise lawful enterprise if "exercise of such power is not accompanied by ade-
quate legislative standards or safeguards whereby an applicant may be protected against
arbitrary or self-motivated action on the part of such private body"); id. at 447, 193 A.2d at
109 (the "Medical Society... has an interest in promoting the welfare of the only existing
medical service corporation in this State"). For other cases that held delegations of licensing
power unconstitutional, see, e.g., Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 228 Kan. 579,
588, 618 P.2d 837, 842 (1980) (invalidating a statute that excluded graduates of pharmacy
schools not approved by private accrediting agency from taking the entrance examination
necessary to register as a pharmacist); Fink v. Cole, 302 N.Y. 216, 225, 97 N.E.2d 873, 876
(1951) (holding unconstitutional an act that allowed a private jockey club to license partici-
pants in horse races); Farias v. City of New York, 101 Misc. 2d 598, 604-05, 421 N.Y.S.2d 753,
757 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (invalidating statutory requirement that private Society for Prevention of
Cruelty to Children must approve any permit allowing children to perform); Union Trust Co.
v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 429-30, 211 P.2d 190, 192-93 (1949) (charging that a statute
requiring approval of existing banks in a community before a new branch bank could operate
unconstitutionally delegated power to a competitor whose private interest in excluding com-
petition may not coincide with the public interest).
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have ruled on a delegation challenge to a private prison's or jail's
operations. Therefore, the courts have not explicated the standards
that they would use to judge the constitutionality of such a delega-
tion. The principles announced in delegation cases in other con-
texts, however, provide some evidence of the delegation standards
that courts might apply.
First, the courts might uphold the constitutionality of delegations
of management functions to private-prison companies. This would
include activities such as cell assignment, scheduling, record-keep-
ing, and counting the prisoners. The courts might uphold such ac-
tivities even though they incidentally affected the liberty of the
prisoners. To avoid constitutional defect, however, the manage-
ment activities at the least would have to apply uniformly to all pris-
oners and could not unreasonably restrict constitutional freedoms,
such as religious freedoms, of any inmate.
Second, the courts might uphold the right of private-prison com-
panies to propose internal disciplinary rules. The rules could not
form the basis for disciplining inmates, however, unless they were
adopted by the state legislature or an administrative agency with au-
thority to accept, reject, or modify the proposed rules. The rules
would also be unconstitutional if they were so vague that they
granted too much power to the private companies to single out an
inmate for punishment arbitrarily.
Finally, the courts would not allow a private-prison company to
make a binding factual determination that an inmate had violated a
prison rule and was therefore subject to discipline. This is true be-
cause the private-prison company is not a neutral decisionmaker. If
the prison company's compensation were based on the number of
inmates it housed each day, for example, a decision to revoke an
inmate's good-time credits would inure to the company's financial
benefit. Even if the private prison's compensation were based on a
flat rate or were otherwise unrelated to the length of an inmate's
incarceration, however, the company nevertheless would have an in-
stitutional bias toward disciplining prisoners. A decision to deny
certain privileges or services, for example, would reduce the operat-
ing costs of the company and would promote its administrative con-
venience. Thus,, a private-prison company may decide to discipline
a prisoner to further its own interests at the expense of the interests
of both the inmate and the public. 20 9 Moreover, any exercise of
209. In DiLoreto v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 243, 418 N.E.2d 612 (1981), the
insurer was required totally to offset any income from surcharges it had assessed with good-
driving credits to other customers that it insured. Thus, the insurer had no financial incentive
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nonreviewable discretion by the company would be cheaper than
complying with due process constraints. Therefore, the only input
that a private-prison company constitutionally might have concern-
ing the decision whether a prisoner had violated a disciplinary rule
is that of a complaining witness before a judicial officer.
210
4. Conclusion
The delegation doctrine has developed differently at the federal
and state levels. At the federal level, the constitutionality of a dele-
gation to a private-prison company would likely turn on the struc-
ture under which the delegation occurred. If the corrections agency
both formulated disciplinary procedures and maintained control of
disciplinary proceedings, the courts might uphold the delegation on
the theory that the private corporation was employed in an adminis-
trative capacity to carry the law into effect. If a private-prison com-
pany formulated disciplinary rules, however, or if it had control over
disciplinary proceedings, the courts might then apply the three-pro-
nged Todd test to determine whether or not the delegation was con-
stitutional. But, even if the delegation were held to be
constitutional, the principles announced in Todd would require the
private company to comply meticulously with appellate procedure in
all of its disciplinary proceedings. Finally, federal courts neverthe-
less might not apply the reasoning in these cases to the private-
prison context because the courts have indicated that a different
analysis may apply to delegations affecting liberty, rather than prop-
erty, interests.
At the state level, legislatures might constitutionally adopt an ex-
tant disciplinary code proposed by a private company. If the private
party regularly amended the code, however, those amendments
could not constitutionally bind prisoners until the legislature or an
administrative agency specifically adopted them. Further, state
to assess a surcharge in any particular case. Indeed, the regulation requiring the insurer to
assess a surcharge was necessary, as the court pointed out, because the absence of any finan-
cial incentive to do so created a natural bias against assessing surcharges due to the insurer's
desire to promote good customer relations. Id. at 247-48, 418 N.E.2d at 615. In the private-
prison context, contrastingly, there is a natural bias ii favor of disciplining inmates. Thus, the
opinion in DiLoreto does not support the proposition that a private-prison company can con-
stitutionally perform the adjudicative function of determining whether an inmate has violated
a rule.
210. See Model Contract § 5(A)(3) (Discipline); cf. Mayer, supra note 76, at 320 (suggesting
this and other approaches). In practice, the system could operate in much the same manner
as the mental-commitment process in Fairfax County, Virginia. There, private mental hospi-
tals contract to detain temporarily persons alleged to be dangerous to themselves or others as
a result of mental illness. The private hospital's only role in the actual commitment, however,
is that of a complaining witness before ajudicial officer who travels to the hospital to conduct
the commitment hearing.
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courts generally invalidate statutes and administrative regulations
that delegate adjudicative power to private parties when there is no
provision for judicial review of the private determinations. When
there is provision for such review, however, the delegation generally
is upheld.
If a private-prison contract were structured so that the company
did not financially benefit from its decision to revoke a prisoner's
good-time credits, the principles announced in DiLoreto might per-
mit the prison company to adjudicate the prisoner's rights in the
first instance if judicial review were available. Even in such a case,
however, statutory or administrative rules would have to channel
the prison's discretion concerning its procedure for adjudicating a
prisoner's rights. However, because any adjudication by a private-
prison company would directly affect a prisoner's liberty rather than
merely his property, courts may distinguish cases such as DiLoreto
and hold that a private-prison company is not empowered at all to
decide whether a prisoner has violated a disciplinary rule.
Finally, any prison-privatization plan must take special account of
the policy concern that the delegate's private interests will prevail
over the interests of both the affected party and the public. When
such a conflict of interest exists, the courts may invalidate the dele-
gations whether or not judicial review is available.
Absent clear precedent, of course, good predictions about the di-
rection and application of the law are difficult to make. There are no
clear precedents regarding delegation of the incarceration function
to private corporations. In an important sense, though, the delega-
tion question is also a question of symbolism.
The American Correctional Association, in its 1985 policy state-
ment on prison privatization, began: "Government has the ultimate
authority and responsibility for corrections." 2 1' This should be un-
deniable. When a court enters a judgment of conviction and im-
poses a sentence, it exercises its authority, both actually and
symbolically. Does it weaken that authority, however - as well as
the integrity of a system of justice - when an inmate looks at his
keeper's uniform and sees an emblem that reads "Acme Corrections
Company," for example, instead of "Federal Bureau of Prisons," or
"State Department of Corrections"?212
In other words, apart from questions of cost, apart from questions
of efficiency, apart from questions of liability, and assuming that in-
211. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL CORRECTIONAL POLICY ON PRIVATE
SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN CORRECTIONS 1 (1985).
212. See Purveyors of Incarceration, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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mates will retain no fewer rights and privileges than they had before
the transfer to private management, who should operate our nation's
prisons and jails? It could certainly be argued that virtually any-
thing that is done in a total, secure institution by the government or
its designee is an important expression of government policy, and
therefore should not be delegated. Just as we would not likely
privatize our criminal courts, perhaps too we should not privatize
our prisons. And just as the inmate should perhaps be obliged to
know - day by day, minute by minute - that he is in the custody of
the government, perhaps too the government should be obliged to
know - also day by day, minute by minute - that it is its brother's
keeper, even with all of its flaws. One cannot help but wonder what
Dostoevsky - who wrote that "[t]he degree of civilization in a soci-
ety is revealed by entering its prisons" 2 13 - would have thought
about privatization of corrections.
But, while prison privatization arguably may be profoundly un-
wise as a matter of public policy, this does not mean that delegating
the incarceration function to a private company would necessarily
be unconstitutional. In deciding the constitutional question, there-
fore, the courts ultimately will be determining how we wish to be
perceived as a civilization.
B. The State-Action Requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and
42 U.S.C. § 1983
1. Introduction
The privatization of prisons and jails raises important issues with
respect to liability in suits brought by inmates. If a private company
operates a prison, for example, the state likely will be directly in-
volved in some aspects of prison life, such as using force when nec-
essary or making quasi-judicial decisions, but it may not be directly
involved in the day-to-day operation of the institution. This dichot-
omy of involvement may lead to confusion over responsibility and
accountability when a violation of rights is alleged to have occurred.
When a private party, as opposed to a government employee, is
charged with abridging rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, the plaintiff, in order to prevail under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,214 must show that the private party was acting
213. F. DOSTOEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 76 (C. Garnett trans. 1957).
214. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
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"under color of state law" - that is, that there was state action. 21 5
The reason for this is fundamental. The fifth and fourteenth
amendments, which prohibit the government from denying federal
constitutional rights and which guarantee due process of law, apply
to the acts of state and federal governments, and not to the acts of
private parties or entities.2 1
6
The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to
suit for violation of an individual's constitutional rights is whether
"the alleged infringement of federal rights [is] 'fairly attributable to
the State.' "217 A person acts under color of state law "only when
exercising power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possi-
ble only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.' "218
These concepts are crucial to prison and jail privatization. One
argument in favor of privatization is that it will reduce or eliminate
government liability. Yet an examination of the state-action issue
indicates that this will not happen. If the state-action requirement is
not met, then the private company will not be liable under the Civil
Rights Act. If the requirement is met, however, leading to the pri-
vate company's liability, then the company's costs will increase, re-
sulting in higher rates charged to the government. Privatization
thus will be less attractive, both to the government (due to increased
prices) and to investors (due to greater risk on their investment).
The thesis of this section of the paper is that, in the privatization
situation in which the operation of an entire institution is contracted
out to private hands, there is no doubt that state action is present. If
the answer to the delegation question is uncertain, the answer to the
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
215. The constitutional standard for finding state action is closely related, if not identical,
to the statutory standard for determining "color of state law." See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1982).
216. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11
(1883). Throughout this paper, the term "state action" refers to action at any level of govern-
ment. See, e.g., 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1729 (L. Levy, K. Karst & D.
Mahoney eds. 1986) (explaining that the term "state action" denotes action of any "unit or
element of government"); 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK &J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16.1, at 157 (1986) ("[A]ll problems relating to the existence of government action -
local, state or federal - which would subject an individual to constitutional restriction come
under the heading of 'state action.' "); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 18-1, at
1688 & n.2 (2d ed. 1988) (utilizing the term "state action" when denoting "action by any level
of government, from local to national") (emphasis in original).
217. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937).
218. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Clas-
sic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) ("[Wlhen
private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmen-
tal in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State .... ).
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state-action question is not: Privatization will neither eliminate nor
reduce the liability of the government or the private company for
violations of an individual's rights.
2. Overview of state-action doctrine
The progenitors of the fourteenth amendment 21 9 established the
state-action requirement as a constitutional limit on the govern-
ment, in order to protect individual rights. 220 Despite the framers'
efforts, however, the courts over the past half century have muddled
the meaning of state action, failing to apply a consistent analysis for
determining whether it is present.221 Perhaps not surprisingly, the
development of the state-action doctrine has depended on the com-
position of the United States Supreme Court and the interests that
were involved in a particular claim. 222 These interests included the
public expectation of equality and due process and, conversely, the
right to act without federal or state interference. 223 Because these
219. The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
220. See THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 178 (A. Hamilton) (C. Russiter ed. 1961) (stating that
federal and state governmental scheme is in place to check possible misdeeds); id. No. 46, at
294 (J. Madison) (positing that the rights reserved by the state governments were designed to
keep encroachment of federal government in check); id. No. 51, at 201 (J. Madison) (arguing
that rights of citizens are protected by double security system of separate federal and state
governments and three distinct governmental branches on both federal and state levels); id.
No. 47, at 300 (J. Madison) (arguing that absence of separation of powers is equal to tyranny);
see also Comment, Section 1983 and the Independent Contractor, 74 GEO. L.J. 457, 468 (1985) (ex-
amining constitutional limits on government and individual rights). The fourteenth amend-
ment is also the vehicle through which constitutional limitations restrain the states. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (mandating certain limitations on government interference); see also
Schneider, supra note 58, at 1153 (describing fourteenth amendment as limiting); Comment,
supra, at 468 (arguing that fourteenth amendment serves to restrain state governments as well
as federal government). In addition to the protection of federalism, state-action cases also
concern the competing constitutional claims of the actors. See Note, State Action AfterJackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.: Analytical Framework for a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DIcK. L. REv. 315, 343
(1977) (discussing conflict between the right to be free from governmental interference and
the fourteenth amendment).
221. See, e.g., Schneider, State Action - .aking Sense Out of Chaos - A Historical Approach, 37
U. FLA. L. REv. 737, 737 (1985) (stating that Supreme Court has not been able to articulate
consistent state-action doctrine).
222. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-43 (1982) (no state action found
for due process claims of vocational counselor who was terminated by private school that
received more than 90 percent of its operating budget from the state); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961) (finding state action where restaurant, which op-
erated in premises leased from an agency of the State of Delaware, refused to serve blacks
during civil-rights era); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (state action found be-
cause of preferred position of first amendment where company-owned town completely
barred the distribution of religious literature on its sidewalk).
223. See Note, supra note 220, at 343 (discussing conflict between the right to be free from
governmental interference and the fourteenth amendment); see also supra note 220 and accom-
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factors have caused inconsistencies in the doctrine, the state-action
inquiry has been labelled a "paragon of unclarity," a "protean con-
cept," an "impossible task,"'2 24 and a "conceptual disaster area." 225
a. Historical approaches to state action: four traditional tests
In the earlier cases, courts used several analyses to determine the
existence of state action. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,226
for example, the Supreme Court articulated a symbiosis test, declar-
ing that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attrib-
uted its true significance.1 227 It found that state action was present
because a symbiotic relationship existed between the private entity
and the state.228 The Court emphasized that the entity - a restau-
rant in a building complex that included a public parking garage -
was physically and financially integrated with the public activity such
panying text (positing question of whether due process or individual freedom ought to be
held as most important right or fundamental right).
224. See Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 765 F.2d 1278, 1283 n.8 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 89 (1967) (stating that "eight decades of metaphysical
writhing around the 'state action' doctrine have made it the paragon of unclarity"); Lewis, The
Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1960) (describing state action as a
"protean concept"); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967) (noting that the Supreme
Court has never attempted the "impossible task" of formulating an infallible test for deter-
mining what constitutes state action)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986).
225. Black, supra note 224, at 95.
226. 365.U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton, the plaintiff brought suit against a restaurant that
was located in a publicly owned and operated building and that refused to serve him solely
due to his race. Id. at 716. The plaintiff claimed that the restaurant violated his rights under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
227. Id. at 722.
228. Id. at 722-26. The Court used the least restrictive state-action test, finding state ac-
tion where a racially discriminatory restaurant leased space in a public parking garage. The
Court reasoned that the state and restaurant were in a position of interdependence. Id. at
725. This interdependence theory became known as the symbiosis analysis, and was em-
ployed frequently in state-action arguments. See, e.g., Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285,
289 (2d Cir.) (applying the "symbiotic relationship" analysis enunciated in Burton), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 892 (1975); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213,217 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that,
if the government so far insinuates itself into a position of interdependence, it must be recog-
nized as a joint participant in the challenged activity); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 392
F. Supp. 118, 125 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (concluding that the government insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with the university and that this was comparable to the symbiotic
relationship present in Burton), aft'd, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977). The symbiosis analysis
became so expanded that several commentators considered Burton to be an abandonment of
the state-action doctrine altogether. See Hemphill, State Action and Civil Rights, 23 MERCER L.
REv. 519, 533-34 (1972) (stating that several recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate
the "judicial burial" of the state-action doctrine); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx.
L. REV. 347, 382 (1963) (noting that the Court in Burton "for the first time opened the door to
the abandonment of the state-action concept"). For the symbiosis analysis to support a state-
action finding, there must be a nexus between the plaintiff's injury and the government's
gain. Holodnak, 514 F.2d at 289-90. The symbiosis analysis has not been used in recent deci-
sions, however, as the Supreme Court has moved in other directions for state-action analysis.
But see infra note 373.
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that it was an indispensable part of the state's operation of the pub-
lic facility.2
29
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,230 the Court discussed two
tests - the close-nexus test and the public-function test. The Court
stated that the inquiry under the close-nexus test was whether the
connection between the state and the challenged action was suffi-
ciently close for the action to be treated as that of the state.
231
Among the factors considered important to this analysis were state
funding and state regulation.23 2 Alternatively, under the public-
function test, the Court required "the exercise by a private entity of
powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."' 23 3 In Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,234 the Court reiterated this test and noted that,
although the government traditionally performed many functions,
few functions were exclusively reserved to the state.
23 5
A fourth test that the Supreme Court applied in its early decisions
involved state compulsion or significant encouragement. In Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co.,236 for example, the Court found that the state's
compulsion of the challenged conduct by a statutory provision or
custom having the force of law warranted a finding of state ac-
229. 365 U.S. at 723-24 (concluding that state was involved in and participated in discrim-
inatory action because state had obligations with respect to restaurant, benefits were mutually
conferred, and restaurant was integrated into building).
230. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). InJackson, the petitioner brought a section 1983 claim against a
utility that had terminated her service without providing notice, a hearing, or an opportunity
to pay amounts allegedly due. Id. at 347. The petitioner claimed that the utility's conduct
constituted state action because state law granted an entitlement to continuous electrical ser-
vice and because the termination was permitted by a provision in the utility's tariff that had
been filed with the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. Id. at 347-48. The petitioner also
argued that the state granted the utility a monopoly status, which therefore supported a find-
ing of state action. Id. at 351. She further urged that state action was present because the
utility provided an essential public service or public function. Id. at 352. Finally, the peti-
tioner argued that there was a symbiotic relationship between the utility and state. Id. at 357.
The Court rejected all of these arguments and concluded that state action was not present.
Id. at 358-59.
231. Id. at 351.
232. Id. at 350. The Court discussed only the state-regulation element of the close-nexus
test; other cases, however, have considered the importance of state funding to the nexus anal-
ysis. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982) (analyzing state funding and
regulation to determine existence of state action). The Jackson Court noted that mere regula-
tion was insufficient state involvement to create a close nexus. 419 U.S. at 350.
233. 419 U.S. at 352. The Court observed that the performance of a public service or
public function was not enough; the function had to be traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state. Id. at 352-53.
234. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
235. Id. at 158. The Court concluded that the holding of elections is one function that
traditionally has been reserved exclusively for states. The other circumstance that indicated a
traditional and exclusive function was when a private corporation controlled a town and pro-
vided necessary municipal functions. Id. at 158-59 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946)).
236. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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tion. 2 37 Similarly, in Flagg Bros., the Court found no state action be-
cause the state merely permitted the challenged conduct but did not
compel it.238 The compulsion test has rarely been applied alone; it
is usually applied in conjunction with another test. 23 9
b. The 1982 trilogy: an attempt at clarification
In 1982, the Supreme Court reevaluated the state-action analyses
in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. ,240 Blum v. Yaretsky, 241 and Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn,24 2 and attempted to articulate a clearer standard. In Lugar,
the Court found state action under an analysis that required the
challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the state.243 The
Court specified that conduct will be fairly attributable if it is "caused
by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by
a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the
State is responsible" and if the acting party is "a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor." 2
44
In Blum and Rendell-Baker, the Court used some of the "fairly at-
tributable" language, 245 but concentrated on the four traditional
analyses for determining state action, concluding that satisfaction of
any one of these analyses could lead to a finding of state action.
246
The Blum Court discussed the close-nexus test and noted that the
237. Id. at 171.
238. 436 U.S. at 164-66.
239. See Lombard v. Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center, 556 F. Supp. 677, 680 (D. Mass.
1983) (combining state-compulsion analysis with public-function analysis), discussed infra at
notes 359-364 and accompanying text.
240. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
241. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
242. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
243. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. The Court stated that in its previous decisions it "insisted
that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to
the State." Id.
244. Id. The Court further explained that a state actor is "a state official," a person who
either "acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials," or a person
whose "conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State." Id. According to the Court, the inquir-
ies involving whether the deprivation was caused by a right or privilege emanating from state
authority and whether the party charged with the deprivation was a state actor are separate
issues when the constitutional claim is directed against a party without apparent state author-
ity. Id.
245. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (noting the fair-attribution test but stating that the facts did
not support the use of this inquiry because the case did not involve the "enforcement of state
laws or regulations by state officials who are themselves parties in the lawsuit"); Rendell-Baher,
457 U.S. at 838 (stating that ultimate issue of whether person is subject to suit under section
1983 is whether infringement is fairly attributable to state). The Rendell-Baker Court, however,
believed that the Blum Court used the fairly-attributable analysis, id. at 839-40, and stated that,
in Blum, "[t]he Court considered whether certain nursing homes were state actors for the
purpose of determining whether decisions regarding transfers of patients could be fairly at-
tributed to the State, and hence be subjected to Fourteenth Amendment due process require-
ments." Id.
246. Blum. 457 U.S. at 1003-05; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839-43.
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relationship between the challenged conduct and the state must be
such that the state was responsible for the conduct - that the state's
exercise of coercive power or significant encouragement would war-
rant a finding that the state was responsible for a private decision.
247
In addition, if the private entity performed a function that was tradi-
tionally the exclusive prerogative of the state, a sufficient nexus
would exist.
2 48
The Rendell-Baker Court concluded that neither the receipt of sub-
stantial public funds nor extensive state regulation was sufficient to
establish a close nexus. 249 The Court also stated that a fiscal rela-
tionship with the state, similar to the relationship that exists be-
tween the state and a contractor performing services for it, was not
enough to establish state action by a symbiotic relationship, as in
Burton.2 50 Finally, the Court applied the public-function analysis
and concluded that the function must belong to the state tradition-
ally and that legislation providing for the state's performance of
services does not render those services within the exclusive preroga-
tive of the state.2 51 Instead, such legislation must explicitly state
that the function may only be performed by the state in order for the
"exclusive" requirement to be satisfied. 252
Despite the Court's attempt to clarify the state-action doctrine in
this trilogy of cases, it remains unclear what set of facts will establish
state action and which analysis will be most persuasive.253 One
point is clear, however: The 1982 trilogy established a restrictive
247. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05.
248. Id. at 1005.
249. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41. The Court expressed that "[a]cts of such private
contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or even total
engagement in performing public contracts." Id. at 841. The Court also stated that, unless
the extensive state regulation compelled or influenced the private party's decision, the deci-
sion would not be state action. Id. But see Schneider, supra note 58, at 1164 (stating that the
nexus analysis of Rendell-Baker is inappropriate where a state delegates a task that it is statuto-
rily required to provide).
250. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842-43; see also Schneider, supra note 58, at 1160 (noting
that in Rendell-Baker the Court summarily concluded that the state and the school did not
share a symbiotic relationship). At least one court has construed Rendell-Baker's discussion of
the symbiotic-relationship test as seriously impairing this test. See Frazier v. Board of Trust-
ees, 765 F.2d 1278, 1287 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986).
251. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842. The Court noted that, while the State of Massachu-
setts had made a legislative policy choice to provide education to maladjusted high-school
students at the public's expense, this decision in no way made these services the exclusive
province of the state. The services in question had not been traditionally provided by the
state, as evidenced by the fact that the state had only recently undertaken the service. Id.
252. Id. (the question is whether the function performed has been "traditionally the exclu-
sive prerogative of the State") (emphasis in original).
253. See Schneider, supra note 58, at 1177 (opining that it is unclear whether all analyses
must now be satisfied).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:531
standard for state action.254
3. Development of the state-action doctrine: the application to prison and
jail privatization
Federal and state cases shed light on three of the state action anal-
yses2 55 - public function, close nexus, and state compulsion - and
suggest the possibility of combining all of these analyses into a
fourth test for state action. In addition, the more recent cases illus-
trate how the courts have applied the holdings of the 1982 trilogy.
Most important, the recent case law can help to determine the fac-
tors that will be important to the application of the state-action re-
quirement in a private-prison or private-jail context.
a. Public-function test
The broadest application of the public-function test came in 1946,
in Marsh v. Alabama.25 6 In Marsh, the Supreme Court held the state
to be in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments when the
state enforced a privately owned town's regulation against the distri-
bution of religious literature on the streets of its business block.
2 5 7
In making its decision, the Court found that the private town served
a public function, as if it were a municipality.2 58 The public's expec-
tation regarding the constitutional protection of its first amendment
rights was an important factor in the Court's decision.2 59 Simply
because it was a privately owned town did not decrease the public
expectation that the first amendment would be protected.
2 60
This expansive analysis was restricted by the Court's 1974 opin-
ion in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 26 1 InJackson, the Court held
that a private utility can only be characterized as performing a pub-
lic-function if the activity traditionally is reserved exclusively to the
254. But see id. at 1166-70 (proposing new analyses for state action, shifting focus from
nexus approach to examination of the particular nature of the challenged conduct).
255. See supra note 228 (noting demise of symbiosis analysis).
256. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
257. Id. at 509.
258. Id. at 508.
259. Id. at 507. Thus, the Court's holding in Marsh illustrates both the public-expectation
and federalism concerns that are inherent in state-action litigation. Id. at 508 (the corporation
"cannot curtail the liberty of... these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitu-
tional guarantees, and a state statute ... which enforces such action by criminally punishing
those who attempt to distribute religious literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution").
260. Id. at 507. The Court stated that, "whether a corporation or a municipality owns or
possesses the town, the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the
community in such a manner that the channels of communication are free." Id.
261. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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state.262 Four years later, the Court in Flagg Bros. used the tradition-
ally exclusive notion with the public-function analysis. 263 The plain-
tiff in Flagg Bros. had been evicted and had her belongings placed in
a private warehouse for storage.2r4 Because the plaintiff did not pay
the storage costs, the warehouse threatened to sell the stored goods
to satisfy the debt.265 This sale was permitted pursuant to state stat-
ute.26 6 The plaintiff brought a section 1983 action against the pri-
vate warehouse, alleging violation of her fourteenth amendment
rights.267 Employing the traditionally exclusive language in con-
junction with the public-function test, the Court found that the set-
tlement of disputes between debtors and creditors was outside the
arena of state action.
268
The Court utilized a similar analysis in Lugar, one of the three
salient public-function cases decided by the Court on the same day
in 1982.269 In Lugar, a debtor filed a section 1983 action against a
private creditor who had invoked a state statute permitting prejudg-
ment attachment. 270 Pursuant to this statute, the state-court clerk
issued a writ of attachment and the sheriff sequestered plaintiff
debtor's property.271 Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme
Court held that the creditor, Edmondson Oil, acted under color of
state law by using the state-created attachment process. 272 The
Court posited that Flagg Bros. did not apply, as the court of appeals
had concluded, because both the state statute and the state's direct
action through its officials denoted state action.273 This analysis was
similar to that used in Flagg Bros., although there was no direct state
action through a state official in that case.274
262. Id. at 352; see Comment, supra note 220, at 469 (stating that public-function test was
limited in Jackson).
263. 436 U.S. at 157-61.
264. Id. at 153.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 151.
267. Id. at 153.
268. Id. at 161.
269. See supra notes 240-254 and accompanying text; see also Schneider, supra note 58, at
1153 (characterizing the three 1982 state-action cases as a trilogy).
270. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924.
271. Id. at 924-25.
272. Id. Justice Powell dissented, arguing that, when a state is not responsible for a pri-
vate decision, the private action ought not to be considered state action. Id. at 949 (Powell,J.,
dissenting).
273. Id. at 942.
274. 436 U.S. at 164-65. The Court in Lugar developed a two-pronged test to determine
state action: "First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the
state is responsible"; and "[slecond, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor." 457 U.S. at 937. The Lugar test was developed by
comparing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) with Flagg Bros., 457 U.S. at
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Unlike Lugar and Flagg Bros., which permitted a state-action find-
ing under a compulsion or public-function characterization, the
Court in Blum v. Yaretsky demanded satisfaction of the state-compul-
sion, public-function, and close-nexus analyses before a claim for
state action could prevail. 275 Blum considered whether a private
nursing home's transfer decisions denoted state action when the
nursing home operated under a state contract.276 In Blum, the
plaintiffs had been transferred to a unit rendering a lower level of
care.277 They claimed that these transfers were in violation of their
fourteenth amendment rights.
278
The Court in Blum established a three-part test to analyze whether
state action existed: There must be a close nexus between the state
and the regulated nursing home; the state must compel the private
nursing home's transfer decision; and the private nursing home
must function in a manner that was traditionally the exclusive pre-
rogative of the state.279 Using this tripartite test, the Court held that
the transfer decisions did not constitute actions under color of state
law because the transfers were premised on independent medical
standards that the state did not establish.
28 0
Neither Blum nor Lugar involved the delegation of activities that
937. In Moose Lodge, a private club licensed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to serve
alcohol practiced a racially discriminatory serving policy. 407 U.S. at 171. The Court found
that the government did not in any way effect this discrimination. Id. at 175-76. Hence, re-
garding the first prong, the Court in Lugar stated that government regulation does not neces-
sarily make all private entities' conduct state action. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938.
The Court then turned to Flagg Bros. to develop the second prong of its test. Id. at 938. To
be characterized as a state actor, according to Flagg Bros., one must have done something
more than act pursuant to a state statute. 436 U.S. at 164. The second prong focuses on the
question of whether a section 1983 defendant can correctly be classified as a state actor.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941. The Lugar Court held this element to be met because the defendant
received the aid of state officials. Id. at 942.
275. The Court referred to the three state-action tests as "requirements." 457 U.S. at
1004-05.
276. Id. at 1003.
277. Id. at 995. The Court did not permit the challenge of transfers to a higher level of
care. Id. at 1002.
278. Among other things, the plaintiffs claimed that they had not been afforded adequate
notice of the transfer decisions and the reasons supporting them or of their right to an admin-
istrative hearing to challenge those decisions. Id. at 996.
279. Id. at 1004-05.
280. Id. at 1012. The Court in Blum compared the independent professional standards
relevant to its holding to the adverse relationship that the lawyer has with the state due to the
lawyer-client relationship. Id. at 1008-09. The Court addressed the adverse lawyer-slate rela-
tionship in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In Polk County, the Court held that a
public defender's activities or functions did not constitute state action because the state had
not developed the professional standards that govern a lawyer's conduct. Id. at 321-22. The
Court's reference to Polk County in Blum is interesting, because the Court in Polk County con-
trasted the functions of the legal and medical professions. Id. at 320. The legal profession, as
described in Polk County, is in place to ensure protection from harmful state action, whereas
the medical profession, when institutional, assumes the same obligation and mission as does
the state. Id.; see infra notes 381-392 and accompanying text (discussing H'est v. Atkins).
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the state is normally obliged to perform. Because Rendell-Bake,
however, did involve such a delegation, and because its outcome is
at odds with the public expectation of the state's responsibility,28 l it
has an impact on state-action analysis with respect to the privatiza-
tion of state functions - the privatization of prisons, for exam-
ple.2 82 In fact, until recently Rendell-Bake was the most relevant
Supreme Court privatization case that involved state action. 283 This
case concerned a privately owned, legislatively established institu-
tion for maladjusted high-school students. 284 A vocational coun-
selor at the school filed a claim under section 1983 after being
dismissed for supporting a student petition. 285 In a consolidated
appeal of differing district-court judgments, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit ordered dismissal of the claim be-
cause the school did not act pursuant to color of state law in its
termination decision.286 The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed, using the public-function and close-nexus tests together for
the first time.287
The Court conceded that special education was a public function
that state law delegated to a private entity, but the question re-
mained whether special education was the traditional and exclusive
281. See Schneider, supra note 58, at 1167-69 (delineating role of public expectation for
finding of state action in privatization cases).
282. Privatization cases involve at least two sets of interests: the aggrieved party's civil
rights and the private defendant's interest in freedom from governmental intervention.
283. See West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988), discussed infra at notes 381-392 and ac-
companying text. Rendell-Baker presented two cases that were consolidated on appeal. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consolidated the cases after interlocutory
appeal had been granted to the defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 641 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1981), af'd, 457 U.S 830 (1982).
284. 457 U.S. at 834-35. Massachusetts law imposed responsibility on the state to provide
special education. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71B, §§ 3, 4 (West Supp. 1981). This same
statute permitted the delegation of special education to private schools. Id. § 3. The delega-
tion statute also required extensive regulation, including periodic reviews of each student's
progress, specific education programs for each student, and reviews of the original placement
decision. Id. The New Perspectives School that was involved in Rendell-Baker received 90 to
99 percent of its budget from public funds because of the large number of students placed
there pursuant to the Massachusetts delegation statute. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 832. But
the Court concluded that dependence on public funding did not make the private acts public.
Id. at 840.
285. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 834. The counselor, Rendell-Baker, requested a hearing or
reinstatement. The school decided to appoint a grievance committee to consider her claims.
Id. Several months later, five other teachers were dismissed due to their public statements
regarding New Perspectives' educational environment and the students' rights to free speech.
Id. at 835. The five teachers also brought suit pursuant to section 1983. Id.
286. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 26-27 (Ist Cir. 1981), aft'd, 457 U.S. 830
(1982).
287. 457 U.S. at 840-43. The Court in Rendell-Baker found that the fourteenth amendment
and section 1983 were functionally similar. Id. at 838. This finding is to be distinguished
from Lugar, in which the Court cautiously stated the differences between the two. Lugar, 457
U.S. at 927-28 & n.8.
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prerogative of the state.288 The Court held that the state delegation
statute, as well as the school's public function, were not enough to
prove that special education was an exclusive state prerogative.
28 9
The requirement of an exclusive state prerogative was first ap-
plied to the public-function test in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,290 reflecting the concern of increasing litigation under section
1983.291 In Jackson, the plaintiff brought a section-1983 action
against a monopolistic private utility, claiming a violation of due
process because service to her home had been terminated for failure
to pay.2 92 Under the test formulated by the Court, the plaintiff
could prevail if the utility functioned in a fashion traditionally and
exclusively reserved for the state. 293 Plaintiff's claim failed because
the Court held the utility provision to be neither the traditional nor
the exclusive function of the government.
29 4
Given its reliance on the Jackson holding, Rendell-Baker built upon
the Jackson exclusivity test, which required that the delegated func-
tion be traditionally provided by the state.29 5 Yet the Massachusetts
delegation statute, as well as the huge public school system, tended
to show that the provision of education was a traditional state func-
tion. Nevertheless, the requirement of exclusivity in Rendell-Baker
was said to follow from the Jackson decision.
Ignoring Jackson's requirement that a delegation of a traditional
government function be found before applying the exclusive state-
action test, the Rendell-Baker Court touched the issue as whether a
private school with public funding and regulation, when terminating
employees, acts under color of state law. 296 Given the statutory
duty to provide special education, if the state had provided the ser-
vice itself it would not be permitted to act outside the limits of the
Constitution. The state should not be permitted to distance itself
from its traditional and statutory duties through privatization.
Although cases in state courts and lower federal courts have ad-
288. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
289. Id. at 841-42. Using the exclusivity clause imposed in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974), the Court thus limited the public-function doctrine.
290. 419 U.S. at 352.
291. Compare ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TIiE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1983 ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR 135, at table 15 (reporting 19,735 civil-rights cases) with ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1960 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 232, at
table C2 (reporting only 280 civil-rights cases), cited in Comment, supra note 220, at 457.
292. 419 U.S. at 347-48.
293. Id. at 353.
294. Id. Still, it is clear thatJackson did not intend the exclusivity limitation to apply when-
ever the public-function test is used. Id.
295. Id.
296. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-42.
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dressed state action and the public-function analysis, 297 the number
of these cases diminishes considerably when limited to the privatiza-
tion issue involved in Rendell-Baker. The most pertinent post-
Rendell-Baker federal cas6 regarding privatization, especially of pris-
ons, is Medina v. O'Neill.298 The federal district court in Medina con-
sidered the issue of whether the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) was liable under state-action theory after it had
contracted for the incarceration of undocumented workers with a
private-detention corporation. 299 Prior to deportation, sixteen Co-
lombian inmates were incarcerated by that corporation for the
INS.300 After recapturing the prisoners following an escape at-
tempt, a private guard, untrained in the proper use of firearms, was
using his shotgun as a prod when it discharged, killing one of the
detained aliens and wounding another. 30' The plaintiffs claimed,
pursuant to section 1983, that they had been unconstitutionally de-
prived of due process and subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment.30 2 They argued that state action existed because the INS had
a duty to monitor their detention and had failed in this duty. The
INS responded that there was no state action because the detained
aliens were at all times in the custody of the private-detention
corporation. 3
03
The court held for the plaintiffs, finding "obvious state action" on
the part of both the INS and the private company. 30 4 The court
noted that, although there was no precise formula for finding state
297. Compare Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that private health-care provider to county jail may be liable under section 1983 for
inadequate medical services to prisoners) and Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105, 1107 (11th
Cir. 1986) (physician who contracts with state to provide medical care to inmates acts under
color of state law) with Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding no state action
where doctor merely cared for patients without a supervisory function or dependence on state
funds), cert. denied, 471 U.S 1132 (1985).
In a 1987 en banc decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit de-
clined to overrule Calvert. West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 994-96 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (7-
to-3 vote) (holding that physician who was under contract to provide orthopedic services to
inmates at a state prison hospital did not act under color of state law for purposes of section
1983 when he allegedly provided inadequate medical treatment to prisoner). The United
State Supreme Court reversed. West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988); see infra notes 381392
and accompanying text (discussing H'est).
298.- 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984), vacated in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 838
F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988). Because the government in Medina had control over the prison
conditions, a close-nexus analysis could also have been employed despite the fact that the
detention facility was privately operated.
299. Id. at 1038; see supra note 216 (indicating that state-action analysis applies to actions
of federal government).
300. 589 F. Supp. at 1031 n.6.
301. Id. at 1032 n.8.
302. Id. at 1038.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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action,305 the Supreme Court has recognized that the public-func-
tion concept includes whether the function performed has been tra-
ditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.306 The court in
Medina then stated: "[D]etention is a power reserved to the govern-
ment, and is an exclusive prerogative of the state .... [Thus,] it is
evident that the actions of all the defendants were state action within
the purview of the public function doctrine."
30 7
Indicative of most state cases involving state action is Rathbun v.
Starr Commonwealth for Boys.308 Like Rendell-Baker and Medina, Rath-
bun is a privatization case.30 9 In Rathbun, the plaintiff was an em-
ployee of a private institution that housed boys in the custody of the
Michigan Department of Social Services. 310 Because the plaintiff
had been raped by one of the detained residents, she brought suit
against the Department of Social Services under section 1983.
3 11
The Michigan Court of Appeals stated that a private entity acted
under color of state law pursuant to section 1983 when it performed
a function that is essentially and traditionally public.
312
This standard is obviously similar to the public-function analysis
that was employed in Rendell-Baker and Medina. Unlike Rendell-Baker,
but just as in Medina, the Rathbun court found state action. The
Rathbun holding is bothersome, however, because its fact pattern is
much closer to Rendell-Baker than it is to Medina. But Rathbun and
Rendell-Baker can be distinguished in that the facility in Rendell-Baker
was used principally for education. Education under Rendell-Baker
was not an exclusive public function, whereas the Rathbun facility
was concerned only with detention, a traditional and exclusive pub-
lic function.
A distillation of these cases thus leads to the conclusion that the
conduct of those who operate private prisons or jails will be held to
constitute state action under the public-function test.
b. Close-nexus test
The Burger Court primarily applied the close-nexus test during
its earlier years, perpetuating the prior Court's expansive view of
the state-action doctrine; the Court now uses this test much less fre-
305. Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
306. Id. (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842; and Jachson, 419 U.S.
at 353).
307. Id. at 1038-39.
308. 145 Mich. App. 303, 377 N.W.2d 872 (1985).
309. Id. at 312, 377 N.W.2d at 877.
310. Id. at 307, 377 N.W.2d at 874.
311. Id. at 308, 377 N.W.2d at 875.
312. Id. at 312, 377 N.W.2d at 877.
590
PRIVATE INCARCERATION
quently.313 State action is found under this test if a substantial con-
nection or nexus is established between the state and the private
entity's challenged actions.3 14 The critical question is whether the
private party's challenged action can be treated as that of the
state.315 Courts usually examine the extent of the state's funding
and regulation of the private entity to determine if the required
nexus is present.3 16 Although the determination of state action in a
private-incarceration context will turn on the facts of each case, the
trend in the courts may shed light on what is required.
Recently, state action has not been found under a pure close-
nexus test based on factors such as state funding and regulation;
courts have considered other factors important and have used the
nexus language in connection with other tests.317 The best example
of the use of the close-nexus test is in Milonas v. Williams.3 18 In this
case, former students brought a section 1983 claim against a private
residential school for youths with behavioral problems, alleging that
the school's behavior-modification program violated their constitu-
tional rights.319 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the school
administrators, acting under color of state law, had caused them to
be subjected to antitherapeutic and inhumane treatment, resuling
in violations of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.3 20 The court found that there was significant state reg-
ulation of the school's educational program and substantial state
313. Schneider, supra note 221, at 760. The close-nexus test is an "expansive approach to
state action, which was acceptable in the context of racial discrimination, [but] was not as
desirable in subsequent cases where race was not a factor." Id. at 741. The decrease in racial-
discrimination litigation explains the Burger Court's shift from reliance on this test to more
restrictive tests.
314. Id. at 760 n. 152. This source further states that the Burger Court used the nexus test
to "replace the cumulative totality approach of Burton." Id. It may be argued, however, that
the Burger Court, and recent federal district and appellate courts, have returned to the use of
a totality approach to state action, combining the exclusive-public-function test, the state-
compulsion test, and the close-nexus test. See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05 (stating that the
required nexus is present if the state is responsible for conduct because the conduct has a
sufficiently close nexus with the state, if there is evidence of the state's exercise of coercive
power or significant encouragement, or if a private party exercises power that traditionally
and exclusively has been that of state); Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 765 F.2d 1278, 1284-88
(5th Cir. 1985) (discussing nexus, public-function, and encouragement analyses), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1142 (1986); Thorn v. County of Monroe, 586 F. Supp. 1085, 1090-93 (M.D. Pa.)
(analyzing facts under various tests for state action), aff'd, 745 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1984).
315. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 351.
316. Id.
317. See, e.g., Woodall v. Partilla, 581 F. Supp. 1066, 1076 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (using nexus
language but public-function test).
318. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
319. Id. at 934.
320. Id.
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funding of its students' tuition.3 21 According to the court, however,
the critical factor was that the state, through juvenile courts and
other state agencies, placed the students at the school without the
students' consent.32 2 The court therefore concluded that state ac-
tion was present because the facts established a close nexus between
the state and the conduct of the school and school officials. 323
Similarly, state action was found in Woodall v. Partilla,3 24 a case
that involved a former inmate's labor claims against a private corpo-
ration that provided food service at a prison.325 The Illinois Depart-
ment of Corrections had contracted with a private food-service
corporation to prepare food for the prison using inmate labor.
32 6
The plaintiff alleged that his federal and state constitutional rights
had been violated because he worked for the food service in excess
321. Id. at 940.
322. Id. It was on this ground that the court distinguished Rendell-Baher. Rendell-Baker
involved a private school's allegedly wrongful termination of an employee. 457 U.S. at 834.
The United States Supreme Court found no state action sufficient to support a section 1983
claim, although there was state funding and regulation. Id. at 840-43. The involuntary nature
of the placement of students at the school in Milonas and the fact that Milonas involved stu-
dents, and not employees, allowed the court in Milonas to find that Rendell-Baker was not con-
trolling. 691 F.2d at 940; see also Schneider, supra note 221, at 742 n.27 (discussing Milonas
and distinguishing it from Rendell-Baker).
323. 691 F.2d at 939 ("[T]he state ha[d] so insinuated itself with the [school] as to be
considered ajoint participant in the offending actions."); see also Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens v. Conn, 510 F. Supp. 1233, 1250 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (upholding mentally retarded
citizens' class action under section 1983 against privately operated residential facility and con-
cluding that sufficient relationship existed between state and facility because state substan-
tially funded facility and facility undertook duties traditionally within province of state), aff'd,
674 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041 (1982).
324. 581 F. Supp. 1066, 1076 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
325. Id. at 1069. The plaintiffjoined another claim against the private corporation, one of
its employees, and certain prison officials, alleging that disciplinary proceedings that had been
brought against the inmate by an employee of the private corporation violated his constitu-
tional rights. Id. at 1070. The court concluded that the private corporation's employee did
not act under color of state law for the purpose of that claim, and that, as to the other defend-
ants, no cause of action was stated concerning authorization of the disciplinary action. Id. at
1072-73. Therefore, state action did not exist with respect to any party's conduct regarding
the disciplinary claim. Id.
This part of the holding in 11oodall may be incorrect. The inmate complained about the
conduct of an employee of the private corporation, or, as the court suggested, "a non-em-
ployee of the state," whose conduct was "analogous to that of a private citizen who acts as
complainant in a criminal prosecution." Id. at 1071. Thus, the court's conclusion would serve
to immunize the conduct of all employees of private corporations that contract with the state
to provide a state function. The employee in this case was not acting as a private citizen. Her
conduct instead was the product of work-related circumstances, and the work that was to be
done - supplying food service - was a function that the state was obligated to provide. If
the state had not contracted out its obligation, the employee would have been an employee of
the state, and the conduct would have been state action. The state does not shed its responsi-
bility for such conduct just because it contracts with a private party. See Frazier v. Board of
Trustees, 765 F.2d 1278, 1287 n.20 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that states cannot avoid constitu-
tional obligations by delegating to private entities), cert. denied, 476 U.S 1142 (1986); see also
infra text accompanying note 392; infra note 395 and accompanying text.
326. 581 F. Supp. at 1076.
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. of the number of hours and below the wage level required by law.3 27
The court analyzed the question of whether the private food service
acted under color of state law in order to support the plaintiff's sec-
tion 1983 claim. 328 It concluded that the requisite close nexus did
exist between the state and the private corporation because the cor-
poration paid the inmate's wages, directed the inmate's work, and
compelled the inmate to work allegedly excessive hours.329 There-
fore, the corporation exercised a typically state power and state ac-
tion was established because there was a sufficient nexus alleged in
the complaint.
330
In the event that such a claim is brought against a private prison
that contracted with the state for the operation of an entire institu-
tion, and not just for the provision of a single service, these cases
strongly suggest that state action would be found under a close-
nexus analysis. A privately operated prison would be significantly
funded and regulated by the state or federal government. In addi-
tion, state and federal courts would place prisoners at such prisons.
Moreover, courts using the nexus language, but applying the public-
function test, may find a close nexus because the private entity, in
operating the prison, would wield a typically state power, as in
Woodall.
Several recent cases, however, have not found state action under a
close-nexus test, even when the governmental involvement was al-
most as apparent as it would be in the private-prison or private-jail
context. In Graves v. Narcotics Service Counsel, Inc. ,331 for example, an
inmate brought a section 1983 claim against a halfway house for im-
proper treatment of his drug addiction. A private nonprofit corpo-
ration operated the halfway house, which served as a drug- and
alcohol-rehabilitation center and employment facilitator for federal
and state inmates.332 The federal district court determined that the
halfway house was subject to state regulation because it was re-
quired to have the certification of the Department of Mental Health
before it was entitled to receive state referrals. 333 The halfway
house also received substantial funding from both the state and fed-
eral governments: the federal government reimbursed the halfway




330. Id. Although the court believed that the allegations gave rise to a finding of state
action, the labor claims were determined to be without merit. Id. at 1077-78.
331. 605 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
332. Id. at 1286.
333. Id.
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the state paid ninety percent of the costs for state inmates.33 4 Nev-
ertheless, the court held that the plaintiff did not allege sufficient
facts to establish state action and support a claim under section
1983.335
In a short opinion, the court examined the analyses in Rendell-
Baker and Blum and concluded that public funding and regulation
were insufficient factors to establish a close nexus. 336 The court in-
terpreted the two cases to mean that the close nexus must exist be-
tween the state and the challenged activity, and not just the actor.337
Since there were no facts in Graves alleging that the government was
involved in the treatment policy or detoxification program, there
was thus no nexus between the state and the challenged activity.33 8
Other courts have reached a similar result under equally compel-
ling facts. In Gilmore v. Salt Lake Community Action Program,33 9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found no state
action under the close-nexus standard. In this case, a former direc-
tor of a community-action agency, organized as a private nonprofit
corporation, brought a section 1983 claim against the agency, chal-
lenging his termination.3 40 The plaintiff claimed that the termina-
tion decision constituted state action because there was extensive
state involvement in creating, funding, operating, and regulating
the agency.3 4 1 The court noted that, in light of recent United States
Supreme Court decisions, state funding and regulation were not
enough to establish state action.3 42
The plaintiff, however, stated that other factors supported a find-
ing of state action. For example, state officials substantially partici-
pated in the creation of the agency and the state chose to designate
the agency as a private organization rather than as a public organiza-
334. Id. In addition, the state reimbursed the halfway house for 60 percent of the costs of
treating non-inmate patients. Id.
335. Id. at 1287.
336. Id. The Graves court compared the halfway house to the private school in Rendell-




339. 710 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 1983).
340. Id. at 632-35. Gilmore also alleged that he was deprived of a property interest with-
out due process of law and that the termination constituted government action. Id. at 633. He
asserted that government action was established because of significant federal funding and
regulation. Id. at 636. The court analyzed this issue separately from the state-action issue and
concluded that these factors, in the absence of others, were insufficient to establish govern-
ment action. Id. The court found particularly important the fact that the federal government
did not exercise influence or control over the agency's employment decisions. Id.
341. Id. at 635.
342. Id. at 636. The court reviewed Rendell-Baker and Blum before reaching its conclusion.
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tion or a political subdivision. 343 More significantly, one-third of
the agency's governing board was composed of local public officials
who were extensively involved in operating the agency and who had
veto power over the agency's programs. 3 44 These facts, according
to the court, warranted a finding that the agency was a state actor
but did not necessarily mean that the conduct was state action.345
The court applied the two-part test established in Lugar, requiring
that there be a state actor and that the challenged activity be state
action.346 Although the agency was a state actor, the court con-
cluded that the termination decision did not result from "the exer-
cise of a right, privilege, or rule of conduct having its source in state
authority." 347 The court determined that no facts established that
the agency's personnel decisions were a product of state policy or
decision, even though members of the governing board were public
officials. 348
Gilmore represents a trend in the courts that sets an extremely high
standard for state action. Not only must the state fund and regulate
an entity, but it must also have a policy governing the challenged
decision or conduct; state action will not be established if the state
merely has officials participating in the decisionmaking process.349
Furthermore, the strict standards established by the holdings in
Graves and Gilmore imply that it may be difficult to establish state ac-
tion in a private-prison or private-jail context. This is probably a
false implication, however, because a claim that is brought in such a
context can be distinguished from both Graves and Gilmore in several
ways. First, the funding and regulation for a private prison or jail
will exceed the funding and regulation that were present in either
343. Id. at 637.
344. Id. (indicating that the board members who were public officials offered services and
assisted the agency and were not merely acting in an "honor-Ary or figurehead capacity").
345. Id. at 638-39. The Gilmore court recognized that not all of the actions of state actors
are state actions. Id.
346. Id. at 637. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, for the appropriate analytical framework for
assessing the relevance of involvement by public officials in nominally private activities.
347. 710 F.2d at 638.
348. Id. at 638-39; see also Krieger v. Bethesda-Chevy Chase Rescue Squad, 599 F. Supp.
770, 774 (D. Md. 1984) (noting that a public official's mere participation in private affairs does
not make entity the state; rather, there must be a nexus between one's capacity as an official
and the challenged activity), aft'd, 792 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1986).
349. This case may not be representative of the courts' position on state action, but rather
may indicate the direction in which the courts are moving. See Thorn v. County of Monroe,
586 F. Supp. 1085, 1090-91 (M.D. Pa.) (holding no state action for private corporation oper-
ating nursing home that terminated nurses, despite facts that public officials were on nursing
home board, state regulation existed, and county previously owned home), aft'd, 745 F.2d 48
(3d Cir. 1984). But see Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 940 (10th Cir. 1982) (finding state
action based on state funding, regulation, and placement of students at private schools), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
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Graves or Gilmore. The state or federal government will substantially,
if not totally, fund a privately operated facility. The government will
retain its responsibility for the treatment, physical environment, and
duration of confinement of the inmates; therefore, the government
will extensively regulate the private facility. Second, unlike the situ-
ations in Graves and Gilmore, the government will have policies that
address various aspects of the facility's operations, conditions, and
treatment of inmates because it is the state that is ultimately obli-
gated to protect these aspects of institutional life. Third, also unlike
the situations in Graves and Gilmore, the defendant entity will be a
for-profit company, thus raising important questions of accountabil-
ity. Fourth, the government will retain exclusive control over the
placement of inmates in private facilities. These factors, taken to-
gether, signify that Graves and Gilmore are not controlling. Even if
they were, however, a private-prison or private-jail case will be
strong enough to establish state action under a stricter test.
Therefore, under the traditional two-factor close-nexus test, the
private company will be a state actor and its operations will consti-
tute state action. The two-factor test, however, probably will not be
used frequently in the future. Additional factors will be required,
such as the state's placement of inmates at the institution and a sig-
nificant state role in overseeing certain policies and management of
the facility.
c. State-compulsion test
In addition to using the public-function and close-nexus tests,
many courts have recognized that state compulsion or significant
encouragement is an important factor in state-action analysis. 350
Few courts, however, have applied the state-compulsion test as the
sole determinant.35 1 In fact, the infrequency of the use of this analy-
sis indicates that state compulsion is difficult to establish and that
only in a rare case will this analysis alone support a finding of state
action.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.352 is one such case. In Adickes, a white
woman brought a section 1983 claim against a private party for re-
fusing to serve her in its lunchroom, allegedly because she was ac-
350. The United States Supreme Court has articulated that "a State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed
to be that of the State." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004; see also supra notes 236-238 & 247 and accom-
panying text.
351. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970) (indicating that state action
is present when state compels act); see also supra note 239 and accompanying text.
352. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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companied by blacks, and for conspiring with local police who
arrested her for vagrancy on the private party's premises after the
incident.3 53 The United States Supreme Court determined that the
fourteenth amendment, while clearly prohibiting the state from dis-
criminating, did not prohibit a private party from discriminating on
the basis of race unless that party acted "against a backdrop of state
compulsion or involvement. ' 3 54 The Court believed, however, that
the fourteenth amendment was offended if the state, by its law, com-
pelled the private party to discriminate on the basis of race.3 5 5 The
state-action requirement was satisfied whether the state compelled a
private party's racially discriminatory act by statute or "by a custom
having the force of law. ' 356 The Court concluded that state action
was present because the police, as state officials, gave the discrimi-
natory custom the force of law when they arrested the claimant.
357
A state-compulsion analysis may readily be applied in the private-
prison context as well. For example, if the private entity engages in
conduct that may be challenged as cruel and unusual punishment as
a result of the state setting unreasonably high standards to govern
how the entity may treat prisoners, 358 it may be argued that the state
has significantly encouraged or compelled the activity. If the facts
are sufficiently persuasive, this may be all that is necessary to estab-
lish state action.
Recent case law, however, indicates that state compulsion will be
considered in conjunction with other factors. In Lombard v. Eunice
Kennedy Shriver Center,359 for example, the federal district court dis-
cussed the state-compulsion analysis but ultimately relied on the
public-function test. In this case, the plaintiff, an involuntary resi-
dent at a state mental institution, brought a section 1983 claim al-
leging that he had received inadequate medical care from a private
organization that had contracted with the institution to provide
353. Id. at 146.
354. Id. at 169.
355. Id. at 171 (state may not discriminate on the basis of race " 'by direct action or through
the medium of others who are under State compulsion to do so' ") (quoting with emphasis Baldwin v.
Morgan, 287 F.2d 750, 755-56 (5th Cir. 1961)).
356. Id.
357. Id. at 172. The Court hypothesized that it could be established that the police gave
the discriminatory act the force of law because they made a false arrest of the claimant to
harass her for attempting to eat with blacks or because they tolerated the threats of violence
against those who violated the segregation custom. Id.
358. It is unlikely, of course, that the state's standards would be impossible to meet. But
they might be set at a higher level for private incarceration facilities than for public ones to
assure accountability and to hold private companies to their word that they can do a betterjob
than the government can at managing prisons and jails.
359. 556 F. Supp. 677 (D. Mass. 1983).
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medical services.360 In determining whether state action was pres-
ent to support the claim, the court recognized that the state must
compel the act and that "[a] private party's action or decision must
be required by a rule of decision imposed by the state before that
action or decision will be deemed state action. 3 61 Yet the court
also noted that state compulsion would not be required for a finding
of state action if the private party performed a traditional and exclu-
sive public function. 362 Here, the court considered it decisive that
the state had an affirmative duty to provide adequate medical serv-
ices for involuntarily committed residents of a state institution.363
Since the state delegated this duty, the private organization assumed
a public function; thus the court found that its acts constituted state
action.-3 ,4
Lombard indicates that, in the state-action determination, evidence
of state compulsion carries equal, if not greater, weight than that
which is accorded to the performance of a public function.
Although state compulsion or encouragement may be difficult to
prove if the state does not exercise it through a written law, the
courts have left open the possibility that the coercion or encourage-
ment of a decision may be exercised overtly or covertly. This analy-
sis can have major importance in the privatization area, in which the
state will likely retain a significant oversight function.
d. Multi-characterization analysis
The current state-action analysis, which combines the several
tests, has been most clearly articulated by the United States Court of
360. Id. at 678.
361. Id. at 679.
362. Id. at 680.
363. Id. "The critical factor in our decision is the duty of the state to provide adequate
medical services to those whose personal freedom is restricted because they reside in state
institutions." Id. at 678. In a statement that virtually summarizes the experiences of the
courts on the question of whether the acts of private entities performing functions that are
delegated by the state constitute state action, the court added:
[I]t would be empty formalism to treat the [private entity] as anything but the
equivalent of a governmental agency for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whether
a physician is directly on the state payroll ...or paid indirectly by contract, the
dispositive issue concerns the trilateral relationship among the state, the private de-
fendant, and the plaintiff. Because the state bore an affirmative obligation to provide
adequate medical care to plaintiff, because the state delegated that function to the
[private corporation], and because [that corporation] voluntarily assumed that obli-
gation by contract, [the private entity] must be considered to have acted under color
of law, and its acts and omissions must be considered actions of the state. For if [the
private entity] were not held so responsible, the state could avoid its constitutional
obligations simply by delegating governmental functions to private entities.
Id. at 680. See generally infra notes 381-392 and accompanying text (discussing Hest v. Atkins).
364. 556 F. Supp. at 678, 680.
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Frazier v. Board of Trustees. 65 No state
action was found in this case, in which a discharged employee of a
private corporation that provided respiratory-therapy services for a
county hospital brought a section 1983 claim against the hospital for
violating her free speech, due process, and equal protection
rights.366 Although the court described the state-action question as
a "paragon of unclarity," a "protean concept," and an "impossible
task,"'3 67 it believed that its path was "relatively well-marked" based
on the instruction of Rendell-Baker and Blum. 36 8 The court stated
that the critical inquiry was whether "the alleged infringement of
federal rights [was] 'fairly attributable to the state .... " 369
The court reviewed the case law and found several factors to be
important to a state-action analysis. It first recognized that the
state's financial involvement and regulation, although significant,
were not enough to create a sufficiently close relationship between
the hospital's conduct and the state.370 The court also found that
the performance of a traditional and exclusive state function and the
joint participation or symbiosis between the state and the hospital
were important, but dismissed both factors with respect to the facts
of the case.3 71 According to the court, "only when the state has had
some affirmative role, albeit one of encouragement short of compul-
sion, in the particular conduct underlying a claimant's civil rights
365. 765 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986).
366. Id. at 1288.
367. Id. at 1283 & n.8; see also supra notes 224-225 and accompanying text.
368. 765 F.2d at 1283-84.
369. Id. at 1283. This test originated in Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; see supra notes 243-244 and
accompanying text.
370. 765 F.2d at 1285-86. The Court'examined Rendell-Baker and Blum for this result. It
concluded that state funding did not make a private personnel decision state action and that
general regulation was not enough - the regulation must control the challenged decision
before state action can be found. Id.
371. Id. at 1286-87. The court discussed the public-function theory and inferred that the
Rendell-Baker Court required the delegation of a function before state action could be found.
Id. at 1285. Applying the test to its own facts, the Frazier court concluded that respiratory
therapy was not "an activity that has traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of the state."
Id. at 1286.
The court considered the joint-participation/symbiosis theory to be the best argument for
state action in this case. In light of Rendell-Baker and Blum, however, the court did not feel that
this theory, as developed in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), had as
much weight as it once had. In fact, it stated that "[t]he "joint' of 1961 does not the "symbio-
sis' of today make." 765 F.2d at 1287; see also supra note 228 and accompanying text. Never-
theless, the court used the joint-participation analysis and found that the private corporation
was located on the hospital's premises, that the hospital paid for the utilities and supplied
equipment, and that it profited from the services that the private corporation provided. 765
F.2d at 1287. The court concluded that the core of the relationship was missing - the state
did not play "some meaningful role in the mechanism leading to the disputed act." Id. at
1288 (footnote omitted). Therefore, there was no symbiotic relationship. Id.
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grievance," will private conduct be fairly attributable to the state.3 72
The state in this case played no such role.
3 7 3
Frazier indicates that the state's funding, regulation, delegation of
a public function, and symbiosis will be factors that warrant consid-
eration in the state-action analysis, but that the crucial factor is
whether the state was involved in, encouraged, or compelled the
challenged conduct or decision.3 74 Under this analysis, the claim
against a private prison will be supported by state action. To deter-
mine whether a nexus exists, a court should consider that the pri-
vate prison or jail would be substantially, if not totally, funded and
regulated by the government. It should also analyze the govern-
ment's policies or regulations, if any, that address the challenged
conduct. In addition, the operation of a prison orjail is traditionally
and exclusively a function of the government, and thus the delega-
tion of this task to a private entity would satisfy a public-function
analysis.3 75 Furthermore, in the event that the government fur-
nishes the facilities for the private entity and retains ownership over
the land and equipment, thereby remaining integrated with the fa-
cility, a court should find a symbiotic relationship. The establish-
ment of any of these factors will be considered significant to the
state-action determination.
State action will not be found under a multi-characterization anal-
372. 765 F.2d at 1286 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173, 176-77
(1972)).
373. Id. at 1288. The Supreme Court recently used a similar, albeit cursory, analysis in
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2984-
87 (1987). The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the Olympic Committee's enforcement of the
use of the word "Olympic," under a charter granted to it by Congress, was discriminatory in
violation of the fifth amendment. Id. at 2984. Rejecting this challenge, a majority of the
Court (5-to-4 vote on this issue) utilized the close-nexus test, the public-function test, the
state-compulsion test, and the symbiosis test. Id. at 2984-87.
374. See Comment, supra note 220, at 479 ("All of these traditional factors converge on
the common goal of discovering when private exercise of power presents the unique danger
to individual liberty posed by the exercise of governmental power."); see also Watkins v. Reed,
557 F. Supp. 278, 281 & n.9 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (suggesting that the factors that Bluni and Rendell-
Baker deemed important included state regulation, state financial assistance, symbiotic rela-
tionship, performance of traditional and exclusive public function, and state coercion or en-
couragement), aff'd, 734 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1984).
375. The court in Frazier noted that, if the state delegated its obligations in an attempt to
avoid its constitutional responsibilities, such a "sham delegation of state tasks would clearly
implicate both the state action and the under-color-of-law requirements of section 1983."
765 F.2d at 1287 n.20. Furthermore, "[i]f the state is allowed to delegate its responsibility,
• .. those persons who exercise governmental power are shielded, at least partially, from
political safeguards and political accountability." Comment, supra note 220, at 477 (footnote
omitted). This point is particularly significant with respect to the development of private pris-
ons and jails, because one argument is that states can avoid liability by delegating their obliga-
tion to maintain and operate the facilities. Privatization of Corrections: Hearings Before the
Subcomnm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofjustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciay,
99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 24 (1985 & 1986) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees).
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ysis unless the government specifically participated in the chal-
lenged conduct. Although direct participation may not be a
frequent occurrence in the privatization context, this point will
probably not be difficult to establish. The claims that inmates typi-
cally bring against the government involve infringement of rights
that the government plays a major role in protecting; consequently,
the government controls or at least participates in the challenged
conduct.3 76 The conditions of the prison or jail3 77 and the treat-
ment of inmates,378 for example, are obligations that belong to the
government, in spite of the delegation of operation to a private en-
tity.379 State action will thus be found for conduct in these areas
and others affecting the inmates under a multi-characterization anal-
ysis, even if it is the private party that engages in the conduct.38
0
Unlike the claims of inmates, the claims of a private entity's em-
ployees against the government may not fit easily within a Frazier
analysis. Although the government may fund and regulate the pri-
vate entity, it is not responsible for and does not control or influ-
ence decisions or conduct regarding the entity's employees to the
same extent that it regulates and is responsible for the treatment of
inmates and the conditions of their confinement.
4. The latest word: West v. Atkins
OnJune 20, 1988, the United States Supreme Court decided West
376. This statement is too obvious to require extensive citation. See generally Robbins &
Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Super-
vision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REv. 893 (1977).
377. See Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (challenging
confinement conditions where 16 detainees had been confined in windowless cell designed to
hold six), vacated in part &rev'd in part on other grounds, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988). In Medina,
state action was established under a public-function theory; a close-nexus theory could have
been used, however, because the government would have significant influence over the condi-
tions of the facility even though a private entity operated it.
378. See Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 702 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (challeng-
ing improper medical diagnosis and treatment). The court in Ancata used a public-function
analysis to find state action and believed that the state's involvement in this area of prisoners'
rights was well settled. Id. at 703. State action also could have been found under a close-
nexus test, because the treatment of inmates is the state's obligation and because the state has
control over the policies and regulations governing this area and therefore the challenged
conduct.
379. See supra note 363 (recognizing that state cannot sidestep its constitutional obliga-
tions through delegation); see also supra notes 11-213 and accompanying text (discussing con-
stitutionality of delegating incarceration function).
380. Under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, re-
spectively, the states must protect against cruel and unusual punishment and must protect a
prisoner's due process and equal protection rights. U.S. CONsT. amends. VIII & XIV. In
addition, the state controls parole decisions and sets standards for review. Conduct in these
areas will be considered state action. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 76, at 319-20 (suggesting
that, to avoid potential legal consequences, state might retain control over prison disciplinary
proceedings and decisions). See generally Note, supra note 9, at 1484-99.
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v. Atkins,38 ' the closest case to prison or jail privatization that the
Supreme Court has yet addressed. The Court considered the ques-
tion of "whether a physician who is under contract with the State to
provide medical services to inmates at a state-prison hospital on a
part-time basis acts 'under color of state law,' within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, when he treats an inmate"382 - that is, whether
state action is present when the state contracts out one facet of its
prison operation, in this case medical services. Presenting no major
surprises for state-action jurisprudence, the Court answered the
question in the affirmative, concluding that "respondent's delivery
of medical treatment to West was state action fairly attributable to
the State."
383
Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court on the state-ac-
tion question,38 4 found "unpersuasive" 38 5 the Fourth Circuit's reli-
ance on Polk County v. Dodson,386 in which the Supreme Court held in
1981 that a public defender's activities or functions did not consti-
tute state action because public defenders were in an adversarial re-
lationship with the state and because the state had not developed
the professional standards that govern a lawyer's conduct. "In con-
trast to the public defender," Justice Blackmun wrote, "Doctor At-
kins' professional and ethical obligation to make independent
medical judgments, did not set him in conflict with the State and
other prison authorities. Indeed, his relationship with other prison
authorities was cooperative." 38 7 Justice Blackmun stressed that the
Fourth Circuit had "misread Polk County as establishing the general
principle that professionals do not act under color of state law when
they act in their professional capacities":
38 8
381. 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988); see supra note 297 (citing cases creating split among the
circuits).
382. 108 S. Ct. at 2251.
383. Id. at 2260.
384. Justice Scalia wrote a one-paragraph concurring opinion, noting that the lower
courts had construed West's pro se allegation of inadequate medical attention as claiming an
eighth amendment violation. Justice Scalia instead saw a due process claim:
I agree with the opinion of the Court that respondent acted under color of state
law for purposes of § 1983. I do not believe that a doctor who lacks supervisory or
other penological duties can inflict "punishment" within the meaning of that term in
the Eighth Amendment.... I am also of the view, however, that a physician who acts
on behalf of the State to provide needed medical attention to a person involuntarily
in state custody (in prison or elsewhere) and prevented from otherwise obtaining it,
and who causes physical harm to such a person by deliberate indifference, violates
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against the deprivation of liberty without
due process.
Id. at 2260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
385. Id. at 2256.
386. 454 U.S. 312 (1981); see supra note 280 (discussing Polk County).
387. 108 S. Ct. at 2256.
388. Id. at 2256-57.
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The [Fourth Circuit] considered a professional not to be subject
to suit under § 1983 unless he was exercising "custodial or super-
visory" authority.... To the extent this Court in Polk County re-
lied on the fact that the public defender is a "professional" in
concluding that he was not engaged in state action, the case
turned on the particular professional obligation of the criminal
defense attorney to be an adversary of the State, not on the inde-
pendence and integrity generally applicable to professionals as a
class.
3 8 9
This distinction leaves little, if any, room for applying Polk
County's restrictive state-action holding to providers of other serv-
ices, such as prison or jail management. Concluding on this point,
Justice Blackmun stated: "Defendants are not removed from the
purview of § 1983 simply because they are professionals acting in
accordance with professional discretion and judgment. ' 3 9 0 Further,
the Court attached no importance to the fact that Dr. Atkins was a
contractor, rather than an employee of the state prison system:
It is the physician's function within the state system, not the pre-
cise terms of his employment, that determines whether his actions
can be fairly attributable to the State. Whether a physician is on
the state payroll or is paid by contract, the dispositive issue con-
cerns the relationship among the State, the physician, and the
prisoner.
3 9 '
Thus, if there was any ambiguity concerning the application of
state-action doctrine to privatization of corrections and detention
before West, the Supreme Court has now eliminated it: State action
will clearly exist in the prison- or jail-privatization context.
Although West v. Atkins provides little insight into the precise test to
be used in state-action analysis, the case is significant in the way in
which it distinguishes and restricts Polk County v. Dodson. West is also
significant because some of its language, albeit in the medical con-
text, summarizes well this paper's position on the state-action
requirement:
Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of
389. Id. at 2257.
390. Id. The Court did suggest, however, that professional discretion and judgment were
not "entirely irrelevant to the state-action inquiry. Where the issue is whether a private party
is engaged in activity that constitutes state action, it may be relevant that the challenged activ-
ity turned on judgments controlled by professional standards, where those standards are not
established by the State." Id. at 2257 n.10 (emphasis in original). Citing Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991 (1982), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982),Justice Blackmun indi-
cated that the requisite "nexus" with the state must be present for state action to exist. 108 S.
Ct. at 2257 n.10; see supra notes 313-349 and accompanying text (discussing close-nexus test
in private-incarceration context); see also supra notes 350-364 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing state-compulsion test in private-incarceration context).
391. 108 S. Ct. at 2259.
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its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to
those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State's prisoners
of the means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights. The
State bore an affirmative obligation to provide adequate medical
care to West; the State delegated that function to respondent At-
kins; and respondent voluntarily assumed that obligation by
contract.
392
If state action is present when the state contracts out its obligation
to perform one service, then state action is certainly present when the
government contracts out the entire operation of a prison or jail
facility.
5. Conclusion
One argument in favor of private incarceration has been that it
will eliminate, or at least reduce, government liability. This argu-
ment does not withstand examination. State action can be found in
the private-prison or private-jail context under any of the various
tests - public function, close nexus, state compulsion, and multi-
characterization. Although the Supreme Court has increasingly re-
stricted the application of the state-action doctrine, with many lower
federal courts following suit, the doctrine is certainly flexible
enough to be used with vigor in the "right" case, such as one involv-
ing the management of a private prison or jail. Indeed, to lessen
liability in that context would be to curtail accountability. Common
sense tells us that, if we delegate the incarceration function to pri-
vate hands, we would want just the opposite to occur. As Justice
Brennan has written in a different context,393 in language similar to
that used in West v. Atkins,3 94 "[t]he Government is free.., to 'priva-
tize' some functions it would otherwise perform. But such privatiza-
tion ought not automatically release those who perform government
functions from constitutional obligations.- 395 If there is a benefit to
be gained from prison or jail privatization, therefore, it will have to
come in some other form.
392. Id.; see also supra note 363 (quoting nearly identical language from Lombard v. Eunice
Kennedy Shriver Center).
393. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct.
2971, 2984-87 (1987) (holding that the fact that Congress granted a corporate charter to the
United States Olympic Committee does not render that Committee a government actor to
whom the fifth amendment applies).
394. See supra text accompanying note 392.
395. 107 S. Ct. at 2993 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also REPORT OF THE PRESIDErr's COM-
MISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 9, at 149 ("Prisons remain subject to the supervision
and regulation of the government - and, most important, subject to the rule of law -
whether they are run by government employees or by a private agency."); supra note 375.
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C. The Thirteenth Amendment
1. Introduction
Some interesting questions that are not addressed in the private-
incarcerat ion literature concern the application of the thirteenth
amendment. In particular: Does the thirteenth amendment's prohi-
bition against involuntary servitude preclude the confinement of
prisoners in private-prison facilities? If not, does the thirteenth
amendment bar such facilities from compelling prisoners to per-
form labor? Are there federal or state laws that prohibit such an
arrangement?
2. Analysis
No thirteenth amendment 396 issue arises when a person is con-
fined to prison after being duly convicted of a crime.3 97 The thir-
396. The thirteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 is the criminal statute that prohibits involuntary
servitude. Section 1584 provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any
condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within
the United States any person so held, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1982). In the earlier cases interpreting "involuntary servitude" under sec-
tion 1584, courts applied the provision primarily to slavery and peonage. United States v.
The Ship Garonne, 36 U.S. 73 (1837); United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
In Shackney, the Second Circuit narrowly interpreted "involuntary servitude" to include the
use or threat of physical punishment to enforce work and the use of state-imposed legal coer-
cion to make a debtor work for his creditor. Id. at 485-87. The applicability of section 1584
was gradually expanded to cover cases involving migrant laborers and child labor. United
States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.) (permitting proof of psychological coercion as evi-
dence of "involuntary servitude"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); United States v. Ancarola,
1 F. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1880) (finding that service can be involuntary when one is incapable of
giving valid legal consent).
The most recent word concerning the definition of "involuntary servitude" under the thir-
teenth amendment and section 1584 came from the United States Supreme Court onJune 29,
1988. In United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988), the Court for the first time
considered the reach of the statute, holding that "the term 'involuntary servitude' necessarily
means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the
use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion
through law or the legal process." Id. at 2765. The Court rejected the government's broad
interpretation of the term to include "compulsion through psychological coercion as well as
almost any other type of speech or conduct intentionally employed to persuade a reluctant
person to work." Id.
397. E.g., Omasta v. Wainwright, 696 F.2d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that,
when a prisoner is "incarcerated pursuant to a presumptively valid judgment and commit-
ment order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction and is forced to work pursuant to
prison regulations or state statutes, the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involun-
tary servitude is not implicated"); Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.) (holding that,
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teenth amendment expressly permits involuntary servitude as
"punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed."398 Thus, once a prisoner is convicted, it appears that the
"convict labor exception" applies without regard to the type of facil-
ity in which the confinement shall take place, whether public or pri-
vate. In fact, courts have rarely taken the thirteenth amendment
inside the prison gates.3 99 Specifically, courts have uniformly re-
jected claims that the prison-labor system imposes involuntary servi-
tude in violation of the thirteenth amendment.400 Likewise, courts
when a person is "duly tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned for crime in accordance
with law, no issue of... involuntary servitude arises"), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
398. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
399. The thirteenth amendment has been successfully employed in the prison context in
only a few instances. E.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911) (striking down peon-
age laws allowing state to "compel one man to labor for another in payment of a debt, by
punishing him as criminal if he does not perform the service or pay the debt"); Jobson v.
Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding that persons committed to mental institutions
cannot be forced to work unless the tasks meet certain requirements); Ex pare Lloyd, 13 F.
Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ky. 1936) (holding that prisoner's thirteenth amendment rights would be
violated if he were held at federal narcotic facility after expiration of period within which
Surgeon General had estimated that a cure would take place).
400. In United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914), the Court explained that
[t]here can be no doubt that the State has authority to impose involuntary servitude
as a punishment for crime. This fact is recognized in the Thirteenth Amendment,
and such punishment expressly excepted from its terms. Of course, the State may
impose fines and penalties which must be worked out for the benefit of the State, and
in such manner as the State may legitimately prescribe.
Id. at 149. Shortly thereafter, in Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916), the Court found that the
thirteenth amendment did not prohibit a state from requiring all of its male citizens to work
on public roads because the amendment was
adopted with reference to conditions existing since the foundation of our govern-
ment, and the term "involuntary servitude" was intended to cover those forms of
compulsory labor akin to African slavery which, in practical operation, would tend to
produce like undesirable results ... and certainly was not intended to interdict en-
forcement of those duties which individuals owe to the state.
Id. at 332-33; see also Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911) (concluding that the "State
may impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime"); Glick v. Lockhart, 759 F.2d
675, 676 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding general rule that thirteenth amendment does not prohibit
state law requiring prisoners to work); Mosby v. Mabry, 697 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir. 1982)
(holding that prisoners may be required to work without violating the thirteenth amendment);
Omasta v. Wainwright, 696 F.2d 1304, 1305 (11 th Cir. 1983) (finding that, when prisoner is
"incarcerated pursuant to a presumptively valid judgment and commitment order issued by
court of competent jurisdiction and is forced to work pursuant to prison regulations or state
statutes, the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude is not impli-
cated"); Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881, 882 (8th Cir. .1977) (finding that "[c]ompelling prison
inmates to work does not contravene the Thirteenth Amendment"); Marchese v. United
States, 453 F.2d 1268, 1271 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (explaining that "involuntary servitude is the es-
sence of incarceration and the Thirteenth Amendment by its very language excepts the con-
victed prisoner from its reach"); Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.) (finding that
"[t]here is no federally protected right of a state prisoner not to work while imprisoned after
conviction ... [and that] prison rules may require [prisoners] to work but this is not the sort
of involuntary servitude which violates Thirteenth Amendment rights"), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
915 (1963); Lindsey v. Leavy, 149 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1945) (invoking thirteenth amendment
exception because defendant had been "duly tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned as a
punishment for [a] crime in accordance with law"), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 783 (1946); Woodall
v. Partilla, 581 F. Supp. 1066, 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (noting that requiring prisoners to work is
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have unanimously upheld laws requiring prisoners to work, finding
no constitutionally protected right not to work.
401
Courts have interpreted the thirteenth amendment as neither pro-
scribing the use of prison labor nor restricting how that labor may
be used, as long as it is imposed as punishment for a crime of which
the prisoner has been duly convicted. Thus, it would seem irrele-
vant whether prisoners worked for publicly or privately owned facili-
ties. Historically, this appears to be the case. Judicial treatment of
the thirteenth amendment with respect to prison labor has remained
unaltered despite the private sector's presence or absence within the
prison-labor system. For example, the private sector participated
extensively in the nineteenth-century prison-labor system un-
hampered by the thirteenth amendment.40 2 When private-sector in-
volvement was eliminated in the early twentieth century it was not
due to the thirteenth amendment, but rather to strong public pres-
sure from trade unions and free laborers who feared unfair wage
permissible under the thirteenth amendment); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774,
792-93 (E.D. Mich.) (holding that "[l]awfully convicted criminals may be required to work by
prison authorities"), aft'd, 453 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972);
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 369-72 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (concluding that state convict-labor
system is not prohibited by the thirteenth amendment, since, when "Congress submitted the
Thirteenth Amendment to the States, it must have been aware of generally accepted convict
labor policies and practices, and the Court is persuaded that the Amendment's exception
manifested a Congressional intent not to reach such policies and practices"), aff'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1012 (N.D. Ga.) (concluding that "it
has long been held that hard labor as a penalty for crime is expressly permitted by the Thir-
teenth Amendment"), aff'd mem., 393 U.S. 266 (1968); Kent v. Prosse, 265 F. Supp. 673 (W.D.
Pa.), aft'd, 385 F.2d 406 (3d Cir. 1967); Blass v. Weigel, 85 F. Supp. 775, 781 (D.N.J. 1949)
(holding thirteenth amendment inapplicable when a person is held to answer for a violation of
a penal statute). See generally Comment, Involuntary Servitude: An Eighteenth-Century Concept in
Search of a Twentieth-Century Definition, 19 PAC. L.J. 873 (1988); Note, Minimum Wages for Prison-
ers: Legal Obstacles and Suggested Reforms, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 193, 204, 208-09 (1973) (stating
that all "[a]llegations that the prison labor system imposes involuntary servitude in violation
of the thirteenth amendment have been uniformly rejected").
401. See supra note 400 (collecting cases).
402. In the nineteenth century, prison labor was organized under four systems: (1) the
lease system, under which prisoners were placed in the custody of businessmen who paid the
state for the prisoners' services; (2) the contract system, under which the state retained cus-
tody and control of the prisoners and businesses contracted with the state for labor on a daily
basis, providing the prison with materials and supervisors and distributing the finished prod-
uct; (3) the piece-price system, which was similar to the contract system, except that employ-
ers paid a price based on completed items rather than paying daily wages; and (4) the state-
use system, under which the state controlled the manufacture and sale of goods. Note, Prison-
ers as Entrepreneurs: Developing a Model for Prisoner-Run Industry, 62 B.U.L. REV. 1163, 1168-70
(1982); Note, supra note 400, at 196-97; see also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJU TICE, PRIVA'rE SEC-
TOR INVOLVEMENT IN PRISON-BASED BusINESsEs: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 11 (1985) [herein-
after PRIVATE SECTOR REPORT]. See generally Cody & Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional
Institutions: The Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1987) (examining Tennessee's con-
vict-labor leasing practices of 19th century); McAfee, Tennessee's Private Prison Act of 1986: An
Historical Perspective with Special Attention to California's Experience, 40 VAND. L. REV. 851, 861-63
(1987) (discussing need for state control over convict labor because of historically high rate of
security breaks under profit-motivated system).
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competition and businessmen who feared unfair price competi-
tion.403 Obviously, this does not mean that the thirteenth amend-
ment could not now be employed to bar a private prison facility
from requiring its prisoners to work. A strong policy argument
could be made that such an arrangement would act as an incentive
for abusing and exploiting prisoners.
40 4
Although the thirteenth amendment does not appear to prohibit
privately operated prison facilities from requiring prisoners to work,
there is both federal and state law that may place restrictions and
prohibitions on such arrangements. In the 1930s and 1940s, Con-
gress passed a wave of restrictive legislation that totally prohibited
prisoner-made goods from entry into interstate commerce, thus se-
verely limiting possible markets for these goods. 405 Significantly, 18
U.S.C. § 436406 expressly prohibits the "contracting out" of federal
prison labor to individuals or corporations. 40 7 This statute arguably
would have to be confronted directly if the federal government dele-
403. See supra note 402 (collecting sources). In addition to labor and business concerns,
there was also concern that the contract and lease systems abused and exploited prisoners in
order to make a profit. See Note, supra note 400, at 196.
404. Such an argument would be supported by prisoners' experiences at the hands of
private employers in the nineteenth century. Note, supra note 402, at 1168-70; Note, supra
note 400, at 196-97; see also PRIVATE SECTOR REPORT, supra note 402, at 11.
405. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1982) (making it a federal offense to transport prisoner-made
goods in interstate commerce, and preempting state law permitting the transportation of pris-
oner-made goods for private use); 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1982) (prohibiting use of prison labor
to fulfill government contracts in excess of $10,000); 49 U.S.C. § 11507 (1982) (providing
that prisoner-made goods that move from one state to another are subject to the laws of the
importing state once the goods cross its borders). But see infra notes 414-415 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Justice Improvement Act and current legislative trend revealing willing-
ness to experiment with prison industry).
406. 18 U.S.C. § 436 (1982).
407. The statute provides:
Whoever, being an officer, employee, or agent of the United States or any depart-
ment or agency thereof, contracts with any person or corporation, or permits any
warden, agent, or official of any penal- or correctional institution, to hire out the
labor of any prisoners confined for violation of any laws of the United States, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Id. Free-market and free-labor concerns prompted the passage of section 436, as well as other
restrictive prison-labor measures of the early twentieth century. Senate Report 1691 noted
that section 436 was
designed to relieve the law-abiding laborers and producers of this country from the
burden of competition with the production now thrown upon the market by combi-
nation between private capital, assisted by the State, and cheap labor, made so by its
involuntary servitude for crime. It is not aimed at production which may be placed
upon the market by virtue of the employment on behalf of the State of criminals
whose support would otherwise be wholly charged upon the honest industry of the
country.
It is not meant to relieve criminals from hard labor, but to substitute employment
by the State itself, with its common interest, for all and its responsibility for the hu-
mane and reformatory policy toward the criminal classes for the abuses which are
invited, and which too often arise from the contract system of which there is such
general complaint.
S. REP. No. 1691, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1887).
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gated its authority to operate and manage a prison facility to a pri-
vate corporation. It would then be necessary either to repeal or to
amend section 436, or to include in the contract establishing such a
relationship specific language that would dispel, in both form and
substance, any suggestion that the government was "contracting
out" its prisoners.
40 8
Other pertinent restrictions include legislation that administers
Federal Prison Industries, Inc., the organization charged with pro-
viding meaningful employment opportunities and training for fed-
eral prisoners.40 9 Federal Prison Industries is authorized to
determine in what manner and to what extent industrial opera-
tions shall be carried on in Federal penal and correctional institu-
tions for the production of commodities for consumption in such
institutions or for sale to the departments or agencies of the
United States, but not for sale to the public in competition with private
enterprise.410
Furthermore, Federal Prison Industries must provide employ-
ment
for all physically fit inmates in the United States penal or correc-
tional institutions, diversify, so far as practicable, prison industry
operations and so operate the prison shops that no single private
industry shall be forced to bear an undue burden of competition from the
products of the prison workshops, and to reduce to a minimum compe-
tition with private industry or free labor.
4 1 1
These laws emphasize Congress's intent to promote fair wage and
408. For instance, the contract could clearly spell out that the private corporation receive
no profit from the prisoner's labor. This would be no simple matter, however, as the govern-
ment would have to devise a system to monitor the use of prisoner labor effectively and effi-
ciently, as well as account for the profits from such labor. In this respect, one commentator
offered an interesting discussion of the problems presented by the monitoring of private pris-
ons. Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE LJ. 353
(1986). The author's proposed solutions (fines and bonuses, public access, and monitoring
by prisoners), however, would be of questionable help in monitoring the financial activities of
the private corporation.
409. 18 U.S.C. § 4122 (1982).
410. Id. § 4122(a) (emphasis added).
411. Id. § 4122(b) (emphasis added). The text provides a general overview of relevant
federal prison-labor laws. To be sure, there are many other laws that affect federal prison
labor. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4125, for example, the Attorney General of the United States may
make available to the heads of the several departments the services of United States
prisoners under terms, conditions, and rates mutually agreed upon, for constructing
or repairing roads, clearing, maintaining and reforesting public lands, building lev-
ees, and constructing or repairing any other public ways or works financed wholly or
in major part by funds appropriated by Congress.
18 U.S.C. § 4125 (1982). With respect to federal prisoners confined in state institutions, 18
U.S.C. § 4002 provides that they may be employed "only in the manufacture of articles for,
the production of supplies for, the construction of public works for, and the maintenance and
care of the institutions of, the State or political subdivision in which they are imprisoned." 18
U.S.C. § 4002 (1982).
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price competition in conjunction with prison industry. As noted
above, the elimination of private-sector involvement in prison labor
during the early twentieth century was motivated primarily by eco-
nomic considerations. The focus of such legislation does not ap-
pear to be the prohibition of private profit or prisoner exploitation.
This explains, in part, why Congress began promoting private-sec-
tor involvement in the prison-labor system in the 1970s following
changing perceptions that prison labor does not pose a threat to
labor and business interests. 4 12 Thus, for example, Congress en-
acted 18 U.S.C. § 4082(c) 4 13 providing for a federal work-release
program that permits participating prisoners to work during the day
for local businesses.
Congress also enacted the Justice Improvement Act of 1979 to
test the feasibility of private-sector involvement in prison indus-
try.4 14 The law exempted seven pilot programs from the interstate-
commerce restrictions that have severely curtailed the economic ad-
vantages of using prison labor. Due to the program's success, Con-
gress increased the number of exempt projects to twenty in 1984.4 15
State laws regarding private-sector involvement in prison labor
vary considerably. In many respects, state laws have paralleled fed-
eral legislative efforts both in form and in rationale. 416 Many states,
for example, followed the federal lead during the 1930s and 1940s
and enacted laws prohibiting the open-market sale or importation of
prisoner-made goods within their borders, effectively barring the
private sector from prison industry.4 17 The current trend toward
increased integration of the private sector in prison industry, how-
ever, is more evident in state laws than in federal laws. 418 The status
412. See Note, supra note 400, at 224; see also PRIVATE SECTOR REPORT, supra note 402, at 12
(adding that inmate idleness and the potential of raising state revenues were also factors in
changing views on private-sector involvement); NATIONAL INSTrrUTE OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF
PRISON INDusTRY: HISTORY, COMPONENTS, AND GOALS 7 (1986) (noting that changes in correc-
tional theory - related to D. Glaser's 1963 study, The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System,
showing correlation between pre-release preparation, post-release employment, and recidi-
vism - also spurred interest in private-sector involvement); Burger, supra note 4.
413. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(c) (1982).
414. Pub. L. No. 96-157, § 827, 93 Stat. 1215 (1979) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1761 and 41
U.S.C. § 35) (amended by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 819).
415. Justice Assistance Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-5601 (1982).
416. See PRIVATE SECTOR REPORT, supra note 402, at 11-12; Note, supra note 402, at 1171
n.40.
417. PRIVATE SECTOR REPORT, supra note 402, at 11.
418. The Private Sector Report found that "[m]ore than twenty states have revised their stat-
utes over the last ten years to authorize and encourage private sector prison-based busi-
nesses." Id. at 105.
The following example of statutory language shows how one state legislature has addressed
the issue of private-sector employment of prisoners:
The commissioner may establish programs for the employment of offenders by
private persons. In establishing these programs, the commissioner may enter into
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of state laws is summarized in the National Institute ofJustice's Re-
port, Private Sector Involvement in Prison-Based Businesses:
4 19
Twenty-one states have statutes specifically authorizing the pri-
vate sector employment of prisoners or the contracting of pris-
oner labor by the private sector, or both. A majority of the
remaining states have no statutes that specifically authorize or
prohibit one or both of these activities. Eight states specifically
prohibit private sector employment of prisoners, and 14 prohibit
either the contracting of prisoner labor or contracting with private
firms for the production of goods or services. Six prohibit all
three forms of private sector involvement.
Open market sales of prisoner-made goods are prohibited in 25
states and authorized in 20, with only five states silent on the is-
sue. In some of the latter, silence can be interpreted as prohibi-
tion, while in others it probably should not be.
Only two states specifically authorize the use of incentives to
encourage private sector participation. Six have statutes designed
to protect the jobs of non-prison labor.420
This Report makes it clear that state law must be examined on an
individual basis to determine whether the private sector may be-
agreements with any private person under which that person establishes, by con-
struction, lease, or otherwise, facilities within the exterior boundary of any state
adult correctional facility, for the manufacture and processing of goods or any other
business, commercial, or agricultural enterprise.
IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-7-2 (Burns 1981). Minnesota addressed the issue of private-sector
contracting for goods and services with the following legislation:
No contracts for leasing the labor of prisoners confined in any such institution, at a
certain rate per diem, giving the contractor full control of the labor of the prisoners,
shall be made; but such prisoners shall be employed, under rules established by the
commissioner of corrections, in such industries as shall, from time to time, be fixed
upon by the officers in charge and the commissioner, or in the manufacture of arti-
cles by the piece, under the so-called "piece price system," by contracts with persons
furnishing the materials. The chief officer, under the direction of the commissioner,
shall purchase such tools, implements, and machinery as the officer shall deem nec-
essary for the work.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.61 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988); see PRIVATE SECTOR REPORT, supra note
402, at 52-55. Tennessee permits convict labor to be used to manufacture goods on the open
market, provided that free labor is not detrimentally affected. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-22-
116(c) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
The following statute is an example of how one state addressed the issue of open-market
sales:
Except as prohibited by applicable provisions of the United States Code, inmates
of state correctional institutions may be employed in the manufacture and processing
of goods, wares and merchandise for introduction into interstate commerce, pro-
vided that they are paid no less than the prevailing minimum wages for work of a
similar nature performed by employees with similar skills in the locality in which the
work is being performed.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.88 (West Supp. 1988); see PRIVATE SECTOR REPORT, supra note 402, at
55-58.
419. PRIVATE SECTOR REPORT, supra note 402.
420. Id. at 73.
1989]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:531
come involved, and to what degree, in that jurisdiction's prison-la-
bor system.
3. Conclusion
The thirteenth amendment does not bar the confinement of pris-
oners in private-prison facilities, nor does it prohibit such facilities
from compelling prisoners to work. There are, however, state and
federal laws that may prohibit or deter such arrangements. To be
sure, these laws appear to be changing in favor of private-sector in-
volvement. Nevertheless, in many instances "[s]tatutory authoriza-
tion of private sector involvement [will be] a fundamental
prerequisite" to further development in this direction. 42' Although
these laws are viewed by many as promoting the goal of prisoner
rehabilitation, it will nevertheless be important to keep concerns re-
garding prisoner exploitation in such a profit-motivated environ-
ment at the forefront of the privatization debate. 422
III. CONTRACTUAL DIMENSIONS
The Model Contract presented in this section responds directly to
the concerns raised in the constitutional-delegation section of the
paper.423 Indeed, the relationship between the delegation doctrine,
on the one hand, and the Model Contract and Model Statute, on the
other hand, may well be the most important feature of this study. If
privatization of prisons and jails cannot be insulated from a judicial
finding of unconstitutionality, then no other'questions need to be
asked; private incarceration will have no future. The Model Con-
tract, therefore, is founded on the premise that the interests of the
respective parties - the contracting agency, the contractor, 424 the
public, and the inmates - must be appropriately balanced with a
view toward preserving accountability in the private-incarceration
process.
To this end, the best provisions from existing contracts and re-
quests for proposals (RFP's) were incorporated or adapted, and
other provisions were formulated. The Model Contract is not in-
tended to be exhaustive, however, for particular contracts will have
421. Id. at 12.
422. See generally Model Contract § 5(D) (Inmate labor).
423. See supra notes 1 -213 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutionality of delegat-
ing incarceration function).
424. Throughout the Model Contract and Model Statute, the term "contracting agency"
refers to a jurisdiction's supervising body for corrections and detention, whether it be the
Department of Corrections, the Department of Social Services, or some other agency. The




to be tailored to the needs of the particular contracting agency.
Some contracts, for example, may include the responsibility for con-
struction of a facility, while others may include only the responsibil-
ity for operation and management. The contracting parties should
therefore negotiate for other provisions, within the parameters set
by the letter of the Model Contract and the spirit of its
commentary.
425
Due to the agency-specific nature of government procurement,
this section of the paper focuses more on the substance of the con-
tractual provisions than on the RFP and contracting process. Never-
theless, a word about that process is important. Most contracting
agencies solicit proposals from prospective contractors through an
RFP. The RFP describes the work being contracted out and, in
some cases, sets forth minimum requirements governing various as-
pects of a contractor's proposal. RFP's in the private-incarceration
context vary greatly in length and detail. One is as short as five
pages;426 others are quite lengthy and address with some specificity
most or all of the contractual issues.
427
A short, general RFP may reduce the complexity of the RFP pro-
cess and give prospective contractors more freedom in developing
their proposals. There are serious drawbacks to this approach, how-
ever. An RFP that does not address all of the major contractual is-
sues may not provide sufficient guidance for companies that are
preparing proposals. The substance of proposals submitted may
vary widely, may not address key issues adequately, and may con-
centrate unduly on the interests of the contractor. The failure to
draft an RFP that is specific enough may therefore result either in a
more prolonged and expensive solicitation and evaluation process
or in a contract that does not include significant provisions.
Ideally, an RFP should address every contractual issue, stating
minimum requirements when appropriate, but in general or open-
ended language that encourages the contractor to develop its own
innovative concepts in response to the RFP. The contracting agency
may, for example, establish a minimum staffing requirement in the
RFP and ask prospective contractors to submit a projected staffing
schedule. Structuring the RFP in this manner ensures that the pro-
425. Even if some of the Model Contract's provisions are not used, they should prompt
the parties to consider other ways of addressing the issues to their mutual satisfaction -
without neglecting the interests of the public and the inmates.
426. See Texas RFP.
427. See Federal Bureau of Prisons RFP (177 pages); INS RFP (98 pages); 1985 Kentucky
RFP (41 pages). Oklahoma's statute prescribes a detailed process for soliciting bids. See
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 561(C)-(J) (West Cum. Supp. 1988).
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posals will meet the contracting agency's needs, putting the respon-
sibility on the private contractor to address the details.
The process of evaluating proposals is at least as important as the
formulation of the RFP itself. Proposals should not be evaluated
solely on the basis of cost - i.e., awarding the contract to the lowest
bidder.428 Rather, they should be evaluated on the basis of other
factors that may be critical to the contracting agency, such as the
contractor's experience in operating correctional or detention facili-
ties, the contractor's financial stability, and the quality of the serv-
ices offered by the contractor.429 Legislation may be needed to
require a contracting agency to evaluate proposals with such criteria
in mind.430




* Agreement Between County of Ramsey, St. Paul, Minn. and Re-
entry Services, Inc., for the period ofJan. 1, 1987 through Dec.
31, 1987.
" Management and Service Contract and Lease Between Santa Fe
Board of County Commissioners and Corrections Corporation
of America, dated Aug. 6, 1986.
* Minnesota Department of Corrections Contract with Best, Inc.
for the provision of specialized services, for the period ofJuly 1,
1986 through June 30, 1987.
" State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations Department
for Children and Their Families ("Department") Contract for
Residential Care Services Between Department and RCA Ser-
vice Co., a division of RCA Corp., dated July 1, 1986.
" General Revenue/Federal Funds Contract Between State of
Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services and
Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives, Inc., dated June 26, 1986.
• Agreement Between County of Ramsey, St. Paul, Minn. and
Volunteers of America, dated June 16, 1986.
* Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, De-
partment of Public Welfare and RCA Service Company, dated
428. Indeed, at least one state so provides by statute, See MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-
2233(3) (1987) ("[I]n selecting a proposal and awarding a contract, a county need not accept
the proposal with the lowest cost.").
429. See INS RFP § I(M) (listing weight given to various factors in evaluation of
proposals).
430. Several states that have enacted statutes authorizing privatization of correctional fa-
cilities have included language specifying the factors that should be weighed in the evaluation
process. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 561(F) (West Cum. Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-2, §§ 3(b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
431. The titles of these contracts and RFP's were taken directly from the cover sheets of
the documents. Many other contracts and RFP's were requested but were not sent.
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Apr. 25, 1986, for operation of Weaversville Intensive Treat-
ment Unit.
* Agreement Between County of Allegheny, Pa. and 268 Center,
Inc., dated Sept. 10, 1985.
* Bay County Detention Facilities Contract Between Corrections
Corporation of America and Bay County, Florida, dated Sept. 3,
1985.
" Contract Documents & Specifications for Three-Party Contract
Among New Jersey Department of Corrections, County of At-
lantic, and RCA Service Co., Cherry Hill, NJ., dated Sept. 1,
1985.
" Agreement Between State of Washington Department of Cor-
rections and Social Treatment Opportunity Programs, dated
June 28, 1985.
" Agreement Between Florida Department of Corrections and
Prisoner Transport Service, Inc., for the period of Oct. 1, 1984
through Sept. 30, 1985.
" Hamilton County, Tennessee Corrections Facilities Agreement,
by and among Hamilton County, Tenn., Dalton Roberts,
County Executive, and Corrections Corporation of America,
dated Sept. 20, 1984, as amended by Hamilton County Board of
Commissioners Resolution No. 886-62, dated Aug. 18, 1986.
" Agreement for Professional Services Between RCA Service Co.,
Division of RCA Corp., and the Department of Public Welfare
for Penn., dated Dec. 9, 1983.
RFP's:
" Federal Bureau of Prisons RFP No. 100-134-7 NC, dated Mar.
26, 1987, for residential halfway-house services for federal
offenders.
" State of California Department of Corrections, Parole & Com-
munity Services Divisions RFP No. CCC 8/86.
" Immigration and Naturalization Service RFP, dated June 16,
1986.
" Santa Fe County RFP, dated Apr. 7, 1986.
* Texas Department of Corrections RFP for 500-Bed Pre-Release
Center, dated 1986.
• Kentucky RFP, dated Apr. 12, 1985, for 200-Inmate Correc-
tional Facility.
" Kentucky RFP, dated Oct. 23, 1984, for 200-Inmate Correc-
tional Facility.43
2
" 1985 State of New Mexico Corrections Department RFP for
Adult Inmates in the State Correctional Institutions of New
Mexico.
432. This RFP is similar in many, but not all, respects to the 1985 Kentucky RFP.
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A. Model Contract and Commentary
Section 1: Policy Statement - Goals and Responsibilities of the Parties
Commentary:
Advocates of privatization posit that its merits include cost savings
to the public and the provision of proper inmate treatment.4 33 The
private sector's assertion that private prisons will provide better,
less expensive corrections than will prisons operated by the con-
tracting agency is untested.43 4 Nevertheless, the contracting agency
should require that these assertions be incorporated in the contract
to ensure that the private contractor is obligated to fulfill its
promises. The contractor's failure to meet its contractual obliga-
tions could make it liable to the contracting agency for breach of
contract and, under the language of the Model Contract, to the pub-
lic and inmates as third-party beneficiaries. Although the possibility
of third-party-beneficiary claims increases the economic risk for the
contractor, the opportunity for such claims provides the contracting
agency with the necessary assurance that its risks - legal, social,
and economic - in handing over the prison or jail are justified.
Although it is obvious that the contracting agency should have
rights to sue under the contract to which it is a party, it is not as
obvious that either the public or inmates, as third-party benefi-
ciaries, should have rights to sue as well.43 5 Indeed, there is no re-
quirement that the contracting parties create such rights in these
third-party beneficiaries. In fact, it would be difficult to prove that
the public or inmates were third-party beneficiaries with the right to
enforce the contract unless it could be shown that (1) the con-
tracting parties intended to grant them legally enforceable rights, or
(2) there was a law mandating that certain persons be considered
third-party beneficiaries. 436 For the reasons discussed above, it is in
433. See, e.g., Crane, Should Prisons Be Privately Run?: A Business Like Any Other, A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 1, 1987, at 39; Nightline: H'ho Should Run Our Prisons? (ABC television broadcast, July 11,
1986) (transcript on file with author). Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), for exam-
ple, promises that "CCA will do the job of running a prison or jail more cheaply and so 'save
the taxpayers money,' "and that "every prison CCA runs will be of such high standards as to
be certified by the American Correctional Association." Davis, 2 "Model " Prisons Cast Doubt on
CCA Claims, Tennessean, May 15, 1988, at 1D, col. 1 [hereinafter 2 "Model" Prisons].
434. Although contracting for private-prison operations began more than three years ago,
information concerning the short- and long-term benefits of privatization has yet to be col-
lected and analyzed thoroughly. See, e.g., Durham, Evaluating Privatized Correctional Institutions:
Obstacles to Effective Assessment, FED. PROBATION, June 1988, at 65.
435. Under the Model Contract language, for example, third-party-beneficiary rights
would include public standing to sue the private contractor for failure to remain below a
specific maximum contract rate and inmate standing to sue for failure to provide the type of
care that the company contractually promised.
436. An inmate, for example, may be made a third-party beneficiary without regard to the
principal contracting parties' intentions by merely making third-party-beneficiary status for
616
PRIVATE INCARCERATION
the contracting agency's best interest (and thus the public's best in-
terest as well) that it secure an intention to create third-party-benefi-
ciary rights. While such an intention need not be expressly stated in
the contract in order to find such rights, the Model Contract recom-
mends that this intention unambiguously be stated in the contract to
put all parties on notice of their rights and obligations. Because of
the importance of third-party-beneficiary rights under privatization
contracts, a discussion of these rights follows. In addition, con-
tracting parties should make a careful study of third-party-benefici-
ary law in their jurisdictions.
Contracts that benefit third parties may create legally enforceable
rights in those parties. A third party whose benefit is merely "inci-
dental" to the performance of the contract has no contractual
rights.43 7 An "intended" beneficiary, on the other hand, is one to
whom "recognition of a right to performance... is appropriate to
effectuate the intention of the parties." 438 Significantly, an intended
third-party beneficiary need not be named specifically in the con-
tract,43 9 but instead can be determined from the circumstances sur-
rounding the contract.440 Thus, when the contract does not
expressly name a third-party beneficiary, a court may have to spend
considerable time deciding whether the parties intended to confer
contractual rights on that third party. Further, "[w]hen a third party
may enforce the contract, the scope of the promisor's duty is greater
than if the promise was enforceable only by the promisee. It would
be helpful to have some indication that the promisee bargained for
inmates an overriding statutory policy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 com-
ment d (1981). This policy could be expressly stated in a statute or implied from the case law.
See Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247-51 (2d Cir.) (holding that inmate who had been
beaten and injured while housed in county jail had third-party-beneficiary claim on contract
between federal and county government because federal government had statutory and con-
stitutional duty to provide safe care), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979). Failure to provide the
statutorily mandated care may also give rise to damage actions in state court. See, e.g., Blair v.
Anderson, 325 A.2d 94 (Del. 1974) (holding that federal inmate had third-party-beneficiary
claim against state for its failure to provide safe care, as it was contractually bound to do);
Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 102, 79 So. 2d 528, 529 (1955) (involving claim that inadequate
medical care led to inmate's death); Smith v. Slack, 125 W. Va. 812, 817, 26 S.E.2d 387, 389-
90 (1943) (holding valid inmate's complaint alleging that prison failed to provide adequate
food service).
437. An "incidental beneficiary" is one to whom the promisee neither owed money or
services, nor contracted for his direct benefit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 302(1), (2) (1981); Note, Third Party Beneficialy and Implied Right of Action Analysis: The Fiction
of One Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875, 877-78 (1985) (noting that, although not all juris-
dictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, it is the "generally accepted text for
beneficiary rights"). See generally Note, supra note 9, at 1502-03 (discussing other sources of
liability for contractor).
438. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981).
439. Id. § 308; see, e.g., Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
980 (1979).
440. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(b) (1981).
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this greater undertaking. ' 441 For this reason, express language
such as that used in the Model Contract's Policy Statement is
advisable.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "[a] promise in a con-
tract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to
perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the
duty.' 442 Thus, when the promisor intends to confer on the benefici-
ary a right to enforce the contract, recognition of this right rests on
the same ground as the promisee's right to enforce. 443 In cases of
doubt, the question of whether such an intention is attributed to the
promisee is influenced by whether recognition of the right "will fur-
ther the legitimate expectations of the promisee, make available a
simple and convenient procedure for enforcement, or protect the
[beneficiary's] reasonable reliance on the promise. '444
Government contracts pose unique problems in the area of third-
party-beneficiary rights because to some extent every member of the
public is intended to benefit from the contract.445 Consequently,
both courts and legislatures have taken a more narrow view of third-
party-beneficiary status in this context and have applied a stricter
test to determine whether the third party qualifies for beneficiary
status. Not only must the contracting parties have intended to bene-
fit the third party, but they must also have intended to confer a right
to enforce the benefit on the third party.4
46
441. S. BURNHAM, DRAFTING CONTRACTS 163 (1987).
442. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
443. Id. § 304 comment e.
444. Id.; see also id. § 304 comment e, illustration 9 (providing example of application of
rule). The case involves A, a common carrier that is required as a condition of its license to
maintain liability insurance covering claims for bodily injury arising out of A's operations. A
files a policy written by B. C claims to have been injured in circumstances covered by the
policy. C may maintain a direct action against B. Id.
445. Note, supra note 437, at 878.
446. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(2) comment a (1981). In Schell v. Na-
tional Flood Insurers Ass'n, 520 F. Supp. 150 (D. Colo. 1981), the court relied on section 145
of the 1932 Restatement of Contracts that a promisor
bound to the United States ... by contract to do an act or render a service to some or
all members of the public, is subject to no duty under the contract to such members
to give compensation for the injurious consequences of performing or attempting to
perform it, or failing to do so, unless
(a) an intention is manifested in the contract, as interpreted in the light of the
circumstances surrounding its formation, that the promisor shall compensate
members of the public for such injurious consequences ....
Id. at 157. Section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts also makes reference to the con-
cept of third-party beneficiaries. Section 313(1) provides that "[t]he rules stated in this chap-
ter apply to contracts with a government or governmental agency except to the extent that the
application would contravene the policy of the law authorizing the contract or prescribing
remedies for its breach." Section 313(2) applies to cases in which the government enters a
contract to secure advantages for the public, such as lower-cost services. Such contracts tend
to specify maximum rates and are enforceable by individual members of the public. Thus, for
example, some courts have recognized that public contracts with utilities and common carri-
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In the context of prison or jail privatization, part of the promised
performance of the private contractor should include the provision
of proper treatment for inmates and less expensive corrections for
the public. Providing the public with third-party-beneficiary rights
in this fashion is not unusual. In Ratzlaffv. Franz Foods,447 for exam-
ple, the court had to determine whether a downstream landowner
was an intended beneficiary under a contract that controlled a ferti-
lizer plant's use of the municipality's sewage system.448 In finding
that the landowner was an intended beneficiary, the court noted that
96a party who owes no obligation to third persons or the public in
general may by contract assume an obligation to use due care to-
wards such third persons or the public in general. ' 449 Likewise, in
Bush v. Upper Valley Telecable Co. ,450 the court found that a city resi-
dent was an intended third-party beneficiary under a franchise con-
tract between the city and the cable company because "[e]ven a
cursory examination of the [evidence] reveals the city's intent to
benefit a limited well defined class of people.
'451
Just as members of the public are third-party beneficiaries of the
private-prison contract, so too are members of the inmate popula-
tion. The rehabilitation of inmates, for example - including job
training, counseling, chemical abuse programs, medical treatment,
and education - should be one of the major concerns and goals of
a correctional facility. In addition, private contractors must address
the serious problem of overcrowding and safety in the prisons. Cer-
tain standards and conditions of confinement are constitutional or
statutory rights of the prisoners that simply cannot be contracted
away. In Owens v. Haas,452 for instance, a federal prisoner housed in
a county jail pursuant to a contract between the county and the
United States government brought an action under a third-party-
beneficiary theory, claiming that he had received an injury while he
ers with maximum rates create third-party-beneficiary rights in individual members of the
public. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CoNTRArs § 17-7 (3d ed. 1987) (citing Bush v. Upper
Valley Telecable Co., 96 Idaho 83, 524 P.2d 1055 (1974)).
447. 250 Ark. 1003, 468 S.W.2d 239 (1971).
448. Id. at 1005, 468 S.W.2d at 241.
449. Id.
450. 96 Idaho 83, 524 P.2d 1055 (1974).
451. Id. at 85, 524 P.2d at 1057. But see Schell v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 520 F.
Supp. 150, 157 (D. Colo. 1981) (finding that flood victims were only incidental beneficiaries
under contract between Department of Housing and Urban Development and flood insurer
and were therefore unable to recover damages for insurer's failure to perform under con-
tract); Feldman v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 430 F. Supp. 1324, 1328
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that tenants of federally financed apartment project could not claim
third-party-beneficiary status under regulatory agreement between HUD and private company
because parties did not intend to confer rights on the tenants).
452. 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.), reri. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979).
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was in the custody of county corrections officers. 453 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the pris-
oner could bring a third-party-beneficiary claim because of a policy
statement in the contract that provided for the safekeeping and pro-
tection of prisoners. 454 The statement read: "[P]risoners shall be
placed in contract facilities which provide a secure, humane and
orderly environment, and in which adequate attention is given to
the maintenance of each inmate's health, safety, and general
welfare."
455
All of the above-mentioned factors taken together show that a
member of the public or an inmate in a private facility may bring a
third-party-beneficiary claim against the company for damages at-
tributable to a breach of the contract to provide the correctional
services. Whether the right to bring such a claim will be express or
implied from the contract will depend on many factors, including
the existence of: statutory language creating such a right; legislative
history supporting a finding that such a right was intended; case law
concerning third-party claims; contractual language creating such a
right; and evidence indicating that the parties intended to grant
such a right. To avoid the problem of determining contractual in-
tent, it is recommended that the legislature create such third-party-
beneficiary status 456 and that the parties include the Model Con-
tract's language.
Model Contract provision:
This contract between the contracting agency and the contractor for
the operation and maintenance of incarceration facilities, entered for
the benefit of the public and inmates, is premised on the following
goals of privatization:
(A) to provide the public with prison or jail services that are cost
efficient and effective with respect to the purposes and goals of
incarceration;
(B) to provide inmates with proper care, treatment, rehabilitation,
and reformation; and
(C) to provide the public and inmates with prison or jail services that
meet the requirements of the American Correctional Association and
other such minimum standards that may be promulgated by the con-
tracting agency.
453. Id. at 1244-45.
454. Id. at 1250.
455. Id. at 1250 n.9.
456. See Model Statute § I (Enabling legislation).
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This contract is entered in consideration of these goals of
privatization.
Section 2: Private Financing and Physical Plant
Section 2(4): Private Financing
Commentary:
The issues concerning the financing of a correctional or detention
facility are distinct from the issues concerning the operation and
management of a facility.457 Many jurisdictions, under pressure to
expand their prison and jail capacities, 458 have found themselves
unable to finance the needed facilities through traditional means,
such as current appropriations or general-obligation bonds.459
Some of these contracting agencies have turned to private financing
to avoid the initial fiscal burdens of construction,460 and a few agen-
cies have combined this arrangement with a contract for the private
operation and management of the facilities.
461
The decision whether to use private financing rather than the vari-
ous methods of public financing necessarily depends on the finan-
cial and political circumstances of each individual jurisdiction.
4 62
Thus, the discussion and contract provisions presented in this sec-
tion address the issues concerning private financing in general
terms, highlighting matters that every jurisdiction should consider
when determining how to finance a facility. The discussion consid-
ers why some jurisdictions have used private financing instead of the
traditional methods of public financing. It then outlines several
types of private financing arrangements, the advantages of each ar-
rangement relative to the more traditional means of public financ-
457. See, e.g., DeWitt, Ohio's New Approach to Prison andJail Financing, NIJ Construction Bul-
letin 10 (Nov. 1986) (advising that issues that involve financing should be examined sepa-
rately from issues that involve operations and management).
458. See National Prison Project, Status Report: The Courts and Prisons, reprinted in PRISONERS
AND THE LAw app. B (I. Robbins ed. 1988) (listing jurisdictions that are under court order to
remedy overcrowding in correctional facilities).
459. See iufra notes 465-466 and accompanying text (explaining reasons that some con-
tracting agencies might not be able to use traditional methods of financing).
460. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS 38 (1985)
[hereinafter PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS] (describing private-sector involvement in leas-
ing correctional facilities to government agencies).
461. See, e.g., INS RFP at 9, § I(C)(2) (requiring prospective contractors to provide "nec-
essary physical structure, equipment, facilities, personnel and services"); 1985 KENTUCKY RFP
at 10-1, § 10.000 (requesting bids for "provision and operation" of facility); TEXAS RFP at I
(soliciting bids for contract to "construct, operate and manage" four pre-release centers).
462. See PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 48 (noting that the most ap-
propriate method of financing for a particular contracting agency may vary according to
circumstances).
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ing, and in what circumstances each type of private financing might
prove to be advantageous to a jurisdiction.
1. Private financing generally
a. Advantages and disadvantages
The decision to use private financing for the construction of a new
correctional or detention facility, for an addition to or renovation of
an existing correctional facility, or for the conversion of an existing
structure to a correctional or detention facility will be based on
those factors that are most important to a particular contracting
agency. One factor is cost. In most cases, a contracting agency
should not consider private financing if its primary goal is to use the
least expensive means of financing. Traditional public-sector fi-
nancing is generally less expensive than private-sector methods due
to the lower costs of governmental borrowing 46 3 and the recent re-
463. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE, CORRECTIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A NATIONAL
FORUM 11-14 (1985) [hereinafter CORRECTIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR]. The lower cost of
public financing is due mainly to the fact that interest rates on the various methods of tradi-
tional public financing are lower than those that are incurred by private contractors. A con-
tracting agency can avoid interest costs altogether by financing through current
appropriations, or the "pay as you go" approach. See PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra
note 460, at 33-36 (explaining mechanics of pay-as-you-go approach and when it is most ad-
vantageous for ajurisdiction to use this method of financing). If the contracting agency must
borrow, it can take advantage of interest rates that are lower than those that are available to
private investors. General-obligation bonds are considered to be the least expensive and
most secure type of governmental borrowing, and are the most often used form of public debt
financing for correctional facilities. Id. at 36. Assuming that the jurisdiction has a strong
bond rating, general-obligation bonds can be issued at a lower rate of interest for two rea-
sons. First, because they are full-faith-and-credit bonds secured by the taxing authority of the
jurisdiction, they are considered to be a more secure type of investment than are other forms
of lending. DeWitt, supra note 457, at 2-3; see M. GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DEBT FINANCING §§ 2:01, 2:03 (1986) (defining general-obligation bond and assurance of full-
faith-and-credit). Second, because the interest that taxpayers receive from the bonds is ex-
empt from taxation, the jurisdiction can pay lower interest rates and still provide the investor
with a return that remains competitive with other forms of taxable investments. This second
advantage, however, has been lessened slightly by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which lowered
individual tax rates. See I.R.C. § 1 (1986) (reducing maximum individual rate to 28%, with
certain qualifications).
Although general-obligation bonds may provide savings on interest costs, there are also
some hidden costs that are associated with these bonds. There may be significant costs that
are connected with the issuance of the bonds, for example, including underwriter fees, legal
fees, and printing and distribution fees. See DeWitt, supra note 457, at 3 (noting that issuance
costs may require the amount of the issue to be raised by 1.5% to 3%). In addition, delays
that are associated with the voter approval required for most bond issues often raise the cost
of construction. See PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 37 (citing California
study finding that referendum requirements delay prison construction by eight to ten
months).
Revenue bonds are another, less frequently used, method of financing incarceration facili-
ties. They are less secure investments because they are not backed by the full faith and credit
of the jurisdiction. Rather, they are repaid through revenues that are generated from the
project that they financed. In the case of a private prison or jail, the revenue would be the
rent payments made on the facility. As less secure investments, they may require a higher
interest rate. Thus, savings to the contracting agency may not be as great. They may still be a
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ductions in tax benefits for private investors.464
Considerations other than cost may be more important, however,
and lead the contracting agency to prefer private financing over
traditional public methods of financing. In some instances, a
shortage of current revenues, inability to obtain voter approval for
bond issuances, or debt ceilings may prevent a contracting agency
from financing a facility through current revenues or bonds.465 In
other cases, a contracting agency may find that the public financing
process does not allow it to construct a facility as quickly as one is
needed.46 6 In such circumstances, a contracting agency may decide
desirable method of raising revenue, however, because they are not subject to debt ceilings or
referenda requirements. PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 36. Again, this
apparent benefit raises other policy costs, such as eliminating the voters from the direct deci-
sionmaking process.
464. Under previous tax laws, when a facility was privately owned the investors received
tax benefits through depreciation and various forms of investment tax credits, such as the
rehabilitation tax credit. These savings were in part passed on to the jurisdiction in the form
of lower lease payments for the facility. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, however, re-
stricted the ability of private investors to take advantage of accelerated-depreciation deduc-
tions and eliminated the rehabilitation tax credit for property leased to a governmental
contracting agency. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
DESCRIPTION OF S. 2933 RELATING TO LEASING OF QUALIFIED CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES TO
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter STAFF DESCRIPTION];
CORRECTIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 463, at 11 (statement of John Peterson,
Municipal Finance Officers Association). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the invest-
ment tax credit entirely and instituted more restrictive rules on depreciation. See Uhlfelder &
Hanlon, The New Face of Privatization Under Tax Reform, 33 TAx NOTES 135 (Oct. 1986). These
changes are expected to force the restructuring of some current private-sector transactions
and lead to the complete demise of others. Id.
465. There are several reasons that a contracting agency may not be able to utilize tradi-
tional public-financing methods. Rising construction costs have made it impossible for many
contracting agencies to fund new facilities on a pay-as-you-go basis. See DeWitt, supra note
457, at 2 (observing that most state and local governments do not have the resources that are
necessary to fund a major capital expenditure, such as a prison or jail, on a cash basis). A
contracting agency's ability to issue general-obligation bonds may be limited by constitutional
or statutory debt ceilings or voter-referenda requirements. M. GELFAND, supra note 464, at
§ 2:04; see NATIONAL CRIMINALJUSTICE ASS'N, SPECIAL REPORT: PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
IN FINANCING AND MANAGING CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 3 (1987) (noting that many jurisdic-
tions have experienced difficulties in winning approval for bond issuance to support prison
and jail construction).
466. See CORRECTIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 463, at 14 (statement ofJohn
Gillespie, Correctional Facilities Finance Specialist, Shearson Lehman/American Express)
(stating that one benefit of private financing is the speed of planning and construction). This
reduction in construction time is due to several factors. Private financing provides a con-
tracting agency with a large amount of capital that might otherwise take several appropria-
tions periods to raise. Interview with Robert Schmidt, Supervisory Detention and
Deportation Officer, INS (Feb. 10, 1987) (noting that privatization allowed INS to complete
Houston facility in matter of months, instead of the two to three fiscal years that are normally
required to obtain necessary appropriations). It also eliminates the time that is typically re-
quired for voter referenda and bond issuance and distribution. Time may be an important
factor to a contracting agency whose overcrowding problem has reached crisis proportions or
that is under court order to improve prison or jail conditions. It can also reduce both the
impact of inflation on the cost of the facility and the time for conflicts, such as labor or zoning
disputes, to arise. CORRECTIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 463, at 11.
Some private firms are now offering what are termed "turnkey" packages, which further
enhance the time-saving advantage of private financing. Under such an arrangement, the pri-
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that privatization provides an attractive alternative means of
financing.
Contracting agencies should also consider, however, the negative
public-policy implications of privatization. Using private financing
to build a facility that voters have rejected or that does not fall
within constitutional or statutory debt limits thwarts the will of citi-
zens who still ultimately pay for the facility, albeit through a differ-
ent type of transaction. 467 Private financing may provide a short-
term solution to a jurisdiction's financial difficulties, but it does not
solve the long-term problem of funding. Money must still be found
to service the private debt. Thus, private financing may not advance
the ultimate goal of responsible fiscal management.
468
b. Tax aspects
The types of private financing arrangements that are discussed
below all involve various forms of lease arrangements between pri-
vate investors and a governmental contracting agency. Although
there is some variance in the tax treatment given to these different
types of leasing structures, there are some tax implications that are
common to all types of private/governmental leasing arrangements.
vate company contracts with the government agency to provide the financing, design, and
construction of the facility. See DeWitt, supra note 457, at 10 (describing structure of turnkey
arrangement); District of Columbia Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986: Hearings on H.R. 3067
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 327
(1986) [hereinafter District of Columbia Appropriations Hearings] (discussing types of private leas-
ing arrangements). The private company then leases the finished facility back to the govern-
ment agency. Id. Normally, a government agency must go through separate bidding
processes for the architectural, underwriting, and construction phases of a project. Such ar-
rangements may be subject to challenge, however, under ajurisdiction's competitive-bidding
laws. See id. at 327; Privatization of Prison Construction in New York: Hearing Before the Joint Eco-
nomic Comm.: Congress of the United States, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1984) [hereinafter Privatiza-
tion of Prison Construction in New York].
467. See PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 90 (discussing the possibility
that public opposition and new regulations may develop in response to the use of private
financing to avoid debt limits and voter referenda). Injefferson County, Colorado, for exam-
ple, the voters twice rejected a jail bond issue before E.F. Hutton underwrote a $30 million
issue for private jail construction. Rosenberg, HWho Says Crime Doesn't Pay?, JERICHO, Spring
1984, at 1, 4. A more egregious example concerns a proposal by a private firm in Penn-
sylvania to build a 720-bed medium- and maximum-security interstate protective-custody fa-
cility on a toxic-waste site, which it had purchased for $1. The spokesperson for the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is reported to have said: "If it were a state facility,
we certainly would be concerned about the grounds where the facility is located. [As for a
private prison, however, there] is nothing in our legislation which gives anyone authority on
what to do." Levine, Private Prison Planned on Toxic Waste Site, NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ., Fall
1985, at 10, 11. In the face of proposed legislation in Pennsylvania to place a one-year mora-
torium on the construction or operation of private prisons, the company reportedly aban-
doned its plan, attempted to sell the waste site for $790,000, and sought to open the facility in
Idaho. Elvin, Private Prison Plans Dropped by Buckingham, NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ., Winter 1985,
at 11.
468. District of Columbia Appropriations Hearings, supra note 466, at 294 (statement of Sen.
Specter).
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These factors affect the feasibility and desirability of privately fi-
nanced correctional facilities.
In a purely private leasing arrangement, the lessor enjoys the tax
benefits of ownership - depreciation and, until recently, the invest-
ment tax credit.469 In a leasing arrangement between a private les-
sor and a governmental lessee, however, there are restrictions that
significantly reduce the tax benefits accruing to the private lessor.
470
The most significant of these is the limitation imposed on deprecia-
tion deductions.471 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DRA) im-
posed special limitations on property that is leased to tax-exempt
entities, including government contracting agencies.472 This prop-
erty, termed "tax-exempt use" property, 473 is not eligible for accel-
erated methods of depreciation. Rather, the lessor must depreciate
the property on the straight-line method over a longer cost-recovery
period.474 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 continued these restrictions
on tax-exempt-use property. Thus, tax incentives that originally at-
tracted private investors to leasing transactions with governmental
units are no longer available, making privatization a less attractive
alternative method of financing a correctional facility.
2. Types of private financing
The following discussion provides a description of several types
of private leasing arrangements that are currently available, along
with a synopsis of advantages and disadvantages that are unique to
each particular arrangement. Because of the complexity of the is-
sues surrounding private-financing methods, it is strongly suggested
469. The investment tax credit was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). See PREN-
TICE-HALL INFORMATION SERVICES, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at
201 (1986) (explaining changes in tax law affecting depreciation and investment tax credit).
470. The private lessor must first qualify as the tax owner of the facility to receive the tax
benefits of ownership. For the purposes of the tax law, the Internal Revenue Service will look
to the facts and circumstances of each transaction in determining whether it is a lease or a
conditional sale. See Warren, Leases and Service Contracts with Tax-Exempt Entities After the DRA, 7
TAx ADVISOR 230, 232 n.4 (1985) (including cases defining what constitutes a lease or condi-
tional sale). Factors that the IRS will consider include: whether the lessor retains an interest
in the property at the end of the lease term; whether the lease term exceeds the useful life of
the property; whether the lessor retains the risks and benefits of appreciation or depreciation
in the value of the property; and the cost to the lessee of any option to purchase. M. GELFAND,
supra note 463, at § 3:32.
471. Under 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(5) (1982), property leased to governmental entities for their
use was not entitled to an investment tax credit. This distinction is no longer significant, as
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the investment tax credit. See supra note 469.
472. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1986) (now codified at I.R.C. § 168(g) (1986)).
473. 26 U.S.C. § 1686)(1) (Supp. III 1985) (defining tax-exempt-use property).
474. Previously, the lessor would pass on to the contracting agency that leased the prop-
erty a portion of the benefits that had been derived from accelerated methods of depreciation.
See supra note 464.
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that a contracting agency that is contemplating private financing
consult a professional who is familiar with the financing of correc-
tional and detention facilities.
a. Straight lease
One way of financing a facility privately is through a lease agree-
ment with a private entity.475 This type of financing is available in-
dependent of a contract for the private management and operation
of a facility.476 Under such an arrangement, the private entity fi-
nances the construction of the facility and leases it to the contracting
agency for a shorter term than its predicted useful life. 477 The lease
may contain a provision that the contracting agency has an option to
purchase the facility before the end of the lease term.478 The option
to purchase should be set at fair-market value at the time of the ex-
ercise of the option, with the option cost realized when it is exer-
cised. 479 This approach ensures that the transaction will be viewed
as a lease and not a long-term purchase, both for tax purposes and
for the purposes of calculating the jurisdiction's long-term debt that
is subject to a ceiling or referenda. 480 Also important for the pur-
pose of avoiding debt ceilings and voter referenda is a non-appro-
475. There are many different types of leasing arrangements that are available. This sec-
tion deals only with what is sometimes termed a "true lease" or an "operating lease," pursu-
ant to which the lessor retains a residual interest in the property at the end of the lease term
and carries the burdens and benefits of ownership. M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 3:02.
Other sections deal with sale/leaseback and lease-purchase transactions, pursuant to which
the government lessee is or will be the owner of the property at the end of the lease term. Id.
476. See infra notes 494-504 and accompanying text (discussing private ownership com-
bined with private operation of a correctional facility).
477. A. VOGT & L. COLE, A GUIDE TO MUNCIPAL LEASING 223 (1983). The shorter term is
one factor indicating that the transaction is a true lease and not merely a method to finance
the purchase of a facility.
478. See PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 42. In many cases, the option
gives the contracting agency an opportunity to buy the facility after each year of the lease
term. Id. The option to purchase may also come at the end of the lease term. Id. The option
to purchase may be particularly important in the context of private ownership and operation
of a facility. See infra notes 494-504 and accompanying text.
479. M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 3:02. The option to purchase adds to the already
high cost of leasing, particularly where the government lessee has made a number of lease
payments prior to exercising the right to purchase. In some cases, the lease provides that the
cost of exercising the option will decrease throughout the term of the lease, but at a slower
rate than that at which the rent payments accumulate. In effect, the private entity applies a
portion of the rent paid to reduce the cost of the purchase option. See PRIVATIZATION OF
CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 42. The total cost of a lease with an option to purchase
remains high. Id.; see also supra notes 463-464 and accompanying text (outlining the reasons
that leasing arrangements are generally more expensive than the pay-as-you-go or general-
obligation-bond financing methods).
480. See M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 3:02. Tax law looks in part to the price of
acquiring ownership of the property in determining whether a transaction is a lease or a fi-
nancing arrangement. See id. In a financing arrangement, the purchase price would corre-
spond roughly to the amount of payments remaining on the principal. See id.; see also supra
notes 469-474 and accompanying text (discussing tax implications of lease transactions with
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priation clause providing that lease payments are subject to periodic
appropriation by the legislature.
481
There are several reasons why a contracting agency might con-
sider leasing a prison facility from a private entity. As with all pri-
vate financing discussed in this section, a properly structured lease
will not be regarded as a long-term obligation of the jurisdiction,
but rather as a current expense. 4 2 Thus, ajurisdiction can lease the
facility without impairing its ability to borrow for other needs. It
also allows a contracting agency to forego the delay and expense -
not to mention the potential for voter rejection - that are associ-
ated with referenda requirements.
483
Another perceived benefit that is unique to the leasing alternative
is the flexibility without risk that it would provide the contracting
agency. 484 If the prison population declined sharply, for example,
or the facility became obsolete, the contracting agency would have
the option of simply terminating its lease agreement through non-
appropriation.
48 5
In reality, however, the amount of flexibility that a jurisdiction
would gain from a private-lease arrangement will in most cases be
minimal.486 Although the private contractor would retain the rem-
edy of foreclosure, it would certainly be reluctant to enter an agree-
ment that is subject to non-appropriation without some assurance of
a return on its investment. 48 7 Such protection may come in the
form of a non-substitution clause, which restricts the contracting
agency's ability to replace the leased property with property per-
contracting agencies). The price of the option itself is another factor that will be weighed in
characterizing the transaction for tax purposes.
It is also important that the lease be viewed as a current expense, and not as a purchase
agreement, in order to avoid debt ceilings or voter-referenda requirements. M. GELFAND,
supra note 463, at § 3:30.
481. A non-appropriation clause provides that, if funds have not been appropriated by the
end of the fiscal year, the contracting agency may terminate the lease. See Model Contract § 7
(Termination). Such a lease will not be classified as debt. M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at
§ 3:17.
482. See supra notes 475-481 and accompanying text (describing structure of lease
agreement).
483. See supra note 463 (observing, inter alia, that referenda requirement may delay con-
struction of facility from eight to ten months).
484. C. RING, CONTRACTING FOR THE OPERATION OF PRIVATE PRISONS: PROS AND CONS 23
(1987).
485. Id. at 22-23. The threat of non-appropriation may also put pressure on the private
contractor to perform well or risk losing its investment in the facility. See PRIVATIZATION OF
CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 40.
486. C. RING, supra note 484, at 23-24.
487. Under such an agreement, the lessor retains the right of foreclosure. In the context
of a lease for a correctional or detention facility, however, the risk of non-appropriation for
the lessor is minimal because use of the facility will usually be essential to the contracting
agency. Cole, Tax-Exempt Leasing: A Financing Option, 1985-1986 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 439,
440.
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forming the same function for a stated period of time.48 8 Other
means of protection may include higher lease payments 48 9 or a liq-
uidated-damages provision requiring the contracting agency to re-
imburse the private contractor for a stated percentage of its capital
investment in the event of a non-appropriation. 490 These types of
restrictions shift the financial risks of prisoner-population fluctua-
tion and obsolescence back to the contracting agency.
The most serious drawback of the private-lease arrangement is
cost. In addition to the higher cost of private borrowing that would
be passed on to the contracting agency,49' lease payments might
also be artificially high if the contractor felt that there was a signifi-
cant risk of non-appropriation. 492 A contracting agency that plans
to obtain a facility through an option to purchase will pay a higher
price than if it had obtained the facility through traditional or other
alternative methods of financing.
493
b. Leasing as part of contract for operation and management of a
correctional or detention facility
Contracting agencies have begun to combine private financing
with service contracts for the private operation and management of
correctional and detention facilities. 494 When a private contractor
finances and constructs a facility as part of a contract for operation
and management, what would ordinarily be a lease payment is incor-
porated in the cost reimbursement for the operation and manage-
ment contract.495 The reimbursement is structured to ensure that
the contractor receives a fair return on its capital investment in the
facility. 496 This combination of private financing and management
488. See PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 40. Private contractors should
be aware, however, that safeguards such as a non-substitution clause may be held unenforce-
able if they are challenged in court. M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 2:15.
489. See PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 40 (noting that private inves-
tors will probably consider the threat of non-appropriation in deciding how much rent to
charge); C. RING, supra note 484, at 23 (opining that contractor may seek to protect itself from
non-appropriation by demanding higher monthly lease payments).
490. But cf. M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 3:17 (observing that such a provision may be
unenforceable).
491. See supra note 463 (explaining why private financing may be more expensive than
public financing would be).
492. See supra note 489 (noting that the threat of non-appropriation may affect the amount
of rental payments).
493. See supra note 479 (describing the manner in which an option to purchase adds to the
already high cost of private financing).
494. See PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 45.
495. For an example of how transactions involving private ownership and operation of
correctional facilities can be structured, see STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, FI-
NANCIAL MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK FOR PRIVATE RETURN TO CUSTODY FACILITIES 12-13 (1985)
(describing policy for reimbursement of lease/use costs).
496. Id. at 12; cf. PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 38 (observing that in
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requires further discussion of several issues already discussed in
conjunction with lease transactions.
In most cases, the private contractor that provides a facility as part
of a service contract is considered to be the tax owner of the prop-
erty.497 The major issue that arises in relation to tax treatment is
whether payments for use of the property under the contract consti-
tute an integral part of the service contract or instead constitute a
lease to a contracting agency.498 The issue is important with respect
to the availability of accelerated-depreciation deductions for the tax
owner. 499 On the one hand, if the contract is deemed to be a service
contract, rather than a lease, then the restrictions that are applicable
to property leased to a contracting agency would not apply and the
property would not qualify for accelerated-depre ciation deduc-
tions.500 On the other hand, if the contract does not meet the defi-
nition of a service contract, then the private owner's tax benefits
would be determined in accordance with the rules governing tax-
exempt-use property. 501
The combination of private ownership and operation of a facility
may enhance the advantages of private financing. As with the lease
transactions discussed in the previous section, payments under ser-
vice contracts are normally exempt from constitutional and statu-
tory debt ceilings. 50 2 The cost of private financing is reduced
somewhat, as any additional tax benefits should be passed on to the
contracting agency in the form of lower lease/use payments.
One important disadvantage that must be addressed, however, is
the lack of flexibility that this arrangement affords. A contract that
combines the private ownership and operation of a facility could se-
verely limit a contracting agency's ability to replace an inadequate
provider if the contract does not provide the means for the con-
all private lease transactions it is important to allow the lessor a fair return on its capital
investment).
497. M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 3:40.
498. Id.; see I.R.C. § 7701(e)(1) (1986) (listing factors that determine whether a service
contract is actually a lease).
499. M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 3:40. Until recently, the issue was also important in
determining the availability of the investment tax credit. The investment tax credit was elimi-
nated, however, by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Star. 2085 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
500. I.R.C. § 168(a) (1986) (accelerated cost-recovery system). Whether the contract is
considered to be a service contract or a lease, the private owner as tax owner still retains
deductions for "ordinary and necessary expenses including taxes, maintenance, and insur-
ance." I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986): see M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 3:40.
501. I.R.C. § 168(g) (1986) (alternate depreciation system encompassing tax-exempt-use
property).
502. M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 9:17. Such contracts are generally subject to non-
appropriations. Therefore, they are not considered long-term debt for the purposes of calcu-
lating the debt ceiling. See supra note 481 (describing non-appropriations clause).
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tracting agency to obtain possession or ownership of the facility on
short notice. Thus, the contracting agency should not enter an
agreement that does not include an option to purchase the facility in
the event of default or other circumstances that are enumerated in
the contract. 50
3
Another solution may be to contract separately for the ownership
and operation of the facility, either with the same party or with two
separate providers. This would allow the contracting agency to
change operators as frequently as necessary and still enter a long-
term lease with the private owner that would provide the owner with
greater security and thus encourage lower lease payments. The
problem with such an arrangement, however, is that the facility's
owner probably would not qualify for the same tax benefits as a
combined service otherwise would.
50 4
c. Sale/leaseback
Another financing technique that allows a contracting agency to
utilize private resources is the sale/leaseback arrangement. In this
type of transaction, private investors purchase property from a con-
tracting agency and immediately lease it back to the governmental
unit for its use.50 5 In the typical sale/leaseback transaction the con-
tracting agency maintains control over the operation and manage-
ment of the facility being built.50 6 It is conceivable, however, that
sale/leaseback could be used in conjunction with a contract for op-
eration and management of a correctional or detention facility. But
interest in sale/leaseback transactions in general has decreased sig-
nificantly due to the numerous restrictions on tax benefits that are
available to lessors who have obtained property through
sale/leaseback transactions.
50 7
503. At least one state statute requires that the contracting agency have the option to
purchase a privately owned and operated facility. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 561(R)(4)
(West Cum. Supp. 1988).
504. See supra notes 497-501 and accompanying text (noting that an important factor in
determining whether property will qualify for special tax treatment is whether payments for
use of the property are an integral part of the service contract). Third-party ownership of the
facility may also raise other issues that will need to be addressed in the operations contract,
such as right of possession, responsibility for damage or repairs on the owner's property, and
responsibility for property taxes.
505. See M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 3:37. The lease payments generally correspond
to the finance payments that are due on the property. The agreement provides a mechanism
whereby the contracting agency becomes the owner of the property at the end of the lease
term.
506. District of Columbia Appropriations Hearings, supra note 466, at 296 (statement of T. Don
Hutto, President, American Correctional Association, and Executive Vice-President, Correc-
tions Corporation of America).
507. See CORRECTIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 463, at 15 (statement ofJohn
Gillespie, Correctional Facilities Finance Specialist, Shearson Lehman/American Express).
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Sale/leaseback arrangements provide many of the same benefits
to a contracting agency that other forms of private lease arrange-
ments provide.508 For example, they provide a contracting agency
with a means to finance a facility that it might not otherwise be able
to construct or renovate. 50 9 Because lease payments are subject to
non-appropriation by the legislature, they are not subject to voter-
referenda requirements or debt ceilings. 510 Moreover, construction
costs may be reduced because the private investors do not need to
abide by the same procedural and purchasing requirements as does
a governmental unit, thus accelerating the construction process.51'
The contracting agency usually becomes the owner at the end of the
lease term, thus allowing it to regain its capital investment.
51 2
The major drawback of the sale/leaseback transaction is that, in
most cases, it is no longer economically feasible. One of the main
attractions of the arrangement to both the private investor and the
contracting agency had been the tax benefits that accrued to the pri-
vate investor and which were passed on to the governmental lessee
in the form of lower lease payments.51 3 In addition to the general
restrictions placed on deductions that are available to owners of tax-
exempt-use property under the DRA and the Tax Reform Act of
1986,514 these legislative actions impose additional stringent restric-
tions on tax benefits that may accrue to owners of property acquired
through sale/leaseback transactions. 51 5 For example, the DRA sets
forth several technical rules regarding the characterization of prop-
erty as tax-exempt-use property that make it even more difficult for
the purchaser/lessor of sale/leaseback property to take advantage of
any of the traditional benefits of property ownership. 516 In 1985,
508. See supra notes 463-468 and accompanying text (describing advantages and disadvan-
tages of private financing generally).
509. See supra notes 465-466 and accompanying text (explaining why jurisdictions may not
be able to construct or renovate needed facilities through traditional methods). In the past,
sale/leaseback transactions have been favored by contracting agencies for financing the reno-
vation of older facilities. PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 42.
510. See supra note 481 and accompanying text.
511. Tolchin, Companies Easing Crowded Prisons, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1985, at A29, col. I
(providing examples of sale/leaseback transactions used by various jurisdictions).
512. CORRECTIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 463, at 42. If the sale/leaseback
transaction is so structured, then the lessor may also enjoy the benefits of capital appreciation
on its property. Id.
513. M. GELFAND, supra note 463, at § 3:37. These tax incentives acted as a federal sub-
sidy for state and local prison construction. See Privatization of Prison Construction in New York,
supra note 466, at 2 (statement of Sen. D'Amato); STAFF DESCRIPrION, supra note 464, at 6.
514. See supra notes 471-474 and accompanying text.
515. Congress has also passed several other pieces of legislation that have a negative ef-
fect on tax benefits that are associated with sale/leaseback transactions. See Pollack, Sale-Lease-
back Transactions Adversely Affected by a Variety of Recent Developments, 64 J. TAx'N 151, 151 (Mar.
1986).
516. Id. at 151-53. Under the DRA's tax-exempt-use restrictions, there is a provision list-
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Senator D'Amato introduced the Prison Construction Privatization
Act, which would have restored many of these tax benefits to inves-
tors who purchased correctional facilities in sale/leaseback transac-
tions. 517 Congress never passed the bill; the lessors in these
transactions therefore remain subject to restrictions imposed by the
1984 Act.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 further diminished tax incentives for
sale/leaseback investors by placing restrictions on the use of tax-
exempt private-activity bonds.518 Thus, the tax-shelter character of
the sale/leaseback transaction that made it a viable private-financing
technique has been removed, and there is no longer any economic
incentive for the investor or the contracting agency to enter such an
arrangement. 51 9 It is expected that sale/leaseback arrangements
will be used less frequently in the future due to the negative impact
that recent tax law has iad on this type of transaction.
520
The sale/leaseback technique may still be used, however, byjuris-
dictions that have poor or non-existent bond ratings, or that for
other reasons find that this type of financing is the only possible
method for providing for a badly needed facility. But it is being
replaced with other types of transactions that are structured in a
more economically attractive manner.52 1
ing exceptions whereby 19-year real property may be excluded from the definition of tax-
exempt-use property. Otherwise qualified property that was acquired by the owner as part of
a sale/leaseback transaction, however, must meet further requirements before qualifying for
available exemptions. Id. Other examples of especially stringent treatment for sale/leaseback
property include rules regarding the computation of imputed interest, I.R.C. § 1274 (1986),
and rules regarding stepped rental leases where lease payments at the end of the lease term
are substantially higher than those at the beginning of the lease term. Id. § 467 (1986).
517. STAFF DESCRIPrIoN, supra note 464; see Tax Treatment of Property Leased by a Tax Exempt
Entity to Certain Correctional Facilities: Hearing on S. 2933 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation & Debt
Management of the Comm. on Finance of the United States Senate, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Sena-
tor D'Amato introduced the bill in an attempt to generate interest in this form of privatiza-
tion; in effect, he was proposing a federal subsidy to aid state and local governments
struggling to raise the capital necessary to meet the demand for prison space. Under the
proposed bill, private investors who purchased qualified prisons, jails, or other incarceration
facilities through a sale/leaseback transaction would again be eligible for accelerated depreci-
ation and rehabilitation tax credits. In addition, the bill would have assured investors that, if
they characterized their transaction as a lease, it would be regarded as such even if, under the
tax law, the. transaction would otherwise have been regarded as a conditional purchase.
518. See supra note 464 and accompanying text (discussing in greater detail the impact of
the 1986 Act on private-activity bonds).
519. But see supra notes 511-512 and accompanying text (discussing other ways in which
sale/leaseback transactions may save a governmental unit money).
520. Privatization of Prison Construction in Yew York, supra note 466, at 3 (statement of Sen.
D'Amato).
521. Cf. Uhlfelder & Hanlon, supra note 464, at 135-36 (noting that the loss of tax incen-
tives will probably result in the restructuring of some private-financing transactions).
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3. Other types offinancing for incarceration facilities
In response to the shortage of capital that is available for the con-
struction of additional space for correctional and detention facili-
ties, financial institutions have developed other alternative methods
of financing that entail some of the same benefits and drawbacks as
privatization, but which do not involve private ownership of a facil-
ity. These transactions generally have been utilized by contracting
agencies that intend to operate and manage their own facilities, but
they can also be used in conjunction with contracts for the private
operation and management of a facility.
The lease-purchase agreement is an example of an alternative fi-
nance technique that is receiving a great deal of attention from con-
tracting agencies throughout the country. 522 Under the typical
lease-purchase agreement, a special legal entity, such as a public
building authority or a nonprofit corporation, issues to private in-
vestors certificates of participation or revenue bonds on behalf of a
contracting agency. 523 Because the bonds are issued on behalf of a
governmental entity, investors receive tax-free interest on their in-
vestment.524 The money that is raised from these sales is used by
the special entity to finance the needed construction.525 The special
entity is considered the nominal owner of the facility. The entity
transfers all of the obligations of ownership to a trustee through
whom all subsequent transactions are carried out.526 The entity
then leases the new space to the contracting agency, which agrees to
make monthly payments, subject to non-appropriation by the juris-
diction's legislature, until the bond issue is paid. At the end of this
period, the contracting agency receives title to the facility.
Lease-purchase agreements provide many of the same benefits as
the privatization alternative does. Because lease payments are sub-
ject to non-appropriation by the legislature, they are not classified
as long-term debt of the jurisdiction and are not subject to statutory
or constitutional debt ceilings. Further, because the bonds are is-
sued as part of a lease-purchase transaction and are not secured by
the taxing authority of the jurisdiction, they are not generally sub-
522. See NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE Ass'N, supra note 465, at 3 (noting increasing popu-
larity of various types of lease-purchase arrangements); PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra
note 460, at 142-43 (providing examples of jurisdictions that have used or are considering
using lease-purchase arrangement to finance correctional or detention facilities).
523. PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 43.
524. See E.F. Hutton, Innovative Alternatives to Traditional Jail Financing 6 (undated)
(pointing out that, as with municipal bonds, interest on bonds that are used in lease-purchase
agreement is tax exempt).
525. PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 43.
526. Id. at 45-46.
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ject to voter-referenda requirements. Like privatization, a lease-
purchase arrangement may allow a contracting agency to construct
necessary space more quickly than is possible using traditional
methods of financing.
As with the privatization alternative, however, a fixed-rate lease-
purchase arrangement in most circumstances would be more expen-
sive than the traditional general-obligation bond would be. Bonds
that are issued pursuant to a lease-purchase arrangement are not
considered as secure an investment as general-obligation bonds be-
cause they are not backed by the full faith and credit of the jurisdic-
tion on whose behalf they are issued. Therefore, interest on a lease-
purchase issue may be as much as a full percentage point higher
than interest on general-obligation bonds that are issued at the
same time. Some jurisdictions have begun to use variable-rate de-
mand instruments in connection with a lease-purchase transaction.
The initial interest rate on such securities may be much lower than
on even a comparable issue of general-obligation bonds, but juris-
dictions that are considering this option should become fully aware
of the potential risks should interest rates rise.
Alternate types of financing allow a contracting agency to con-
struct a facility when it might not otherwise have the funds to do so.
As is true of the privatization alternative, however, appropriations
must be made from the jurisdiction's current operating budget or a
source of revenue other than property taxes must be found to cover
monthly lease payments. In essence, most alternative financing
techniques are methods of circumventing checks on government
spending, and do not actually remedy the shortage of capital that is
available to fund needed correctional and detention facilities.
4. Conclusion
Many jurisdictions are under increasing pressure to enlarge
prison and jail capacities. They are also under pressure to decrease
their spending and balance their budgets. These competing obliga-
tions have prompted the development of transactions that utilize
private-sector capital to finance incarceration facilities. Privatization
may, in some cases, be the only solution for a jurisdiction that must
increase space but has insufficient revenue or borrowing capacity to
finance the facility. Contracting agencies should be aware, however,
that such transactions merely postpone the cost of a new facility.
The contracting agency will still need to find the funds that are nec-
essary to service the private debt. Moreover, privatization provides
a means to thwart the will of citizens who may have already defeated
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a voter referendum or supported a constitutional or statutory debt-
ceiling requirement.
Additional concerns come into play when ajurisdiction chooses to
contract out for the private ownership and operation of a correc-
tional facility. Perhaps the most important of these concerns is the
jurisdiction's ability to regain possession and/or ownership of the
facility. Ajurisdiction that has relinquished both the ownership and
operation of a facility must provide in the contract that it has the
right to take possession of and operate the facility. Otherwise, it will
risk being unable to replace an inadequate provider because that
provider would maintain control of the physical plant.
There are several ways in which a jurisdiction can approach the
structuring of a finance plan. It may wish to go to a financial advisor
itself and have a financial plan arranged prior to circulating an RFP
to potential contractors. The advantage of this approach would be
that the jurisdiction would be sure to have a plan that is most
favorable to it. It may be more efficient, however, to allow the pri-
vate contractor to procure its own financing plan, subject to broad
outlines that are set forth in the RFP and final approval by the juris-
diction or contracting agency. The jurisdiction will thus save the
time and expense of putting together its own financing plan. If a
jurisdiction chooses this approach, however, it should make certain
that the RFP requires the private contractor to submit a detailed
plan that includes information sufficient to allow for a knowledgea-
ble evaluation. The plan should be reviewed by the jurisdiction's
own experts, to ensure that its own interest will be well served by
the plan.
Model Contract provision:
The private contractor will provide financing for the facility under
this contract in accordance with the financing plan that has been ap-
proved by the contracting agency. Any financial obligation of the con-
tracting agency under this plan is subject to the annual appropriation
of funds by the legislature.527
If this contract is terminated at any time under any of the termina-
tion clauses provided in Section 7, the contracting agency shall have
the right to take possession of the facility immediately for the purpose
of operating the facility. It shall also have the option to repurchase
the facility within ninety (90) days of the termination of the contract.
527. See Model Contract § 3(A) (Term); Model Statute § 3 (Contract Term and Renewal).
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Section 2(B): Physical Plant
Commentary:
Both the RFP and the contract should set forth minimum stan-
dards governing the design and construction of the physical plant
when the private contractor is responsible for providing a new or
additional facility, or plans to renovate or convert an existing facil-
ity. The American Correctional Association (ACA) has formulated
comprehensive standards governing the physical plant.528 The ACA
Standards address basic questions - for example, how many in-
mates should be allowed per unit, 529 what amount of space should
be provided for each prisoner, 530 and how many and what types of
sanitation facilities should be available for inmate and staff use. 53'
These Standards should be incorporated in both the RFP and the
contract to ensure that the private contractor provide an acceptable
facility.
The RFP and the contract should also require that private con-
tractors comply with state and local building codes. Under the ACA
Standards, compliance with state and local codes is not mandatory,
only essential. 53 2 Most contracting agencies, however, require the
contractor to comply with all applicable building codes. 533 Addi-
tionally, the contracting agency should include any other architec-
tural standards that are essential to ensure that the structure
adequately meet the jurisdiction's needs. A contracting agency may
include specific requirements relating, for example, to the size of
the facility or the type of inmates the facility will house.
34
In addition to listing standards, the RFP should require potential
contractors to submit a detailed description of the physical plant as
a part of their proposal, to be incorporated in the contract, prefera-
bly including architectural designs as well as plans and specifica-
tions. 535 This would enable contracting agencies to evaluate
528. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTI-
TTrrIONS, Standards 2-4127 to 2-4161 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1986).
529. ACA Standards 2-4127 and 2-4128.
530. ACA Standards 2-4123 to 2-4132, 2-4135, and 2-4157 to 2-4159.
531. ACA Standards 2-4130 to 2-4132, 2-4135, and 2-4144.
532. See infra notes 658-665 and accompanying text (explaining distinction between
mandatory and essential compliance with ACA Standards).
533. See INS RFP at 21, § I(C)(5)(G); 1985 Kentucky RFP at 30-3, § 30.4 10. The recent
report issued by the Council of State Governments also recommends that private contractors
be required to comply with all applicable local and state codes. See TiE COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS AND THE URBAN INSTITUTE, ISSUES IN CONTRACTING FOR THE PRIVATE OPERA-
TION OF PRISONS AND JAILS xiii (1987) [hereinafter CSG REPORT].
534. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 54, 61 (noting that maximum-, medium-, and
minimum-security facilities require different types of architectural features, and that these fea-
tures should be spelled out in RFP and contract).
535. See, e.g., INS RFP at 97, § I(M) (including physical plant in "Evaluation Factors for
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contractor compliance with minimum standards. It will also en-
courage prospective contractors to utilize the most efficient and
cost-saving design and construction techniques available. Propo-
nents of privatization in the corrections field often argue that pri-
vate-sector competition will encourage the development and
utilization of cost-saving innovations in the field. The design of a
facility, particularly a new facility, is one area in which the incorpora-
tion of new techniques in a privatization contract may result in sav-
ings for the contracting agency.536 In addition, new construction
techniques may save construction time, thereby further reducing the
cost of the facility.
53 7
Another important issue that will arise regarding the provision of
a prison or jail facility is the location of the facility. In some cases,
the government may already have acquired or selected the site, in
which case the contracting agency will need to provide in the RFP
that the facility shall be constructed on that site. Alternatively, a
jurisdiction may choose to allow the private contractor to select and
acquire the site for the facility, within general guidelines set forth in
the RFP.5 3 8 In these situations, site selection requires greater atten-
tion. Because this is an issue that affects the interests not only of the
contracting parties but also of local communities, however, it is a
matter that should be addressed by statute, rather than left to nego-
tiation between the parties. The Model Statute sets forth the crite-
ria for the evaluation of sites for private facilities and approval by
the contracting agency and the legislature, including the considera-
tion of community and local-government opinion.53 9 The contract
should therefore incorporate the site that has been selected through
this process.
Model Contract provision:
The contractor shall provide a facility in accordance with the final
Award"); 1985 Kentucky RFP at 60-1, § 60.000 (requiring description of physical plant);
Texas RFP at 2, § 2 (requiring prospective contractors to submit designs and specifications,
including information regarding size of compound, nature of exterior and interior security
program, extent of area devoted to programs and services, and type of construction).
536. For example, the cost of operating a facility, particularly a secure facility, depends to
a certain extent on how efficiently the design utilizes space. A design that minimizes the use
of multiple layers and instead uses configuration to provide security may result in substantial
savings for a contracting agency. Privatization of Prison Construction in Xew York, supra note 466,
at 16-17 (statement of Paul Silver, architect, Gruzen Partnership). Use of more efficient
materials may also result in overall cost savings. Id.
537. See generally DeWitt, Xew Construction Methods fjor Correctional Facilities, NIJ Construction
Bulletin (March 1986) (providing various sources of information on new cost-saving construc-
tion techniques available to state and local contracting agencies).
538. See, e.g., Texas RFP at 1, § 1.
539. See Model Statute § 2 (Site Selection).
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architectural designs and the final plans and specifications that have
been [will be] submitted by the contractor [by (date)] and approved by
the contracting agency. The facility shall conform to all standards set
forth in the contract, including all applicable ACA Standards regard-
ing the physical plant. Compliance with all applicable state and local
building codes, including [list, if desired], in accordance with ACA
Standard 2-4153, is mandatory. In the event that there is a conflict
among state, local, and/or national codes, the more stringent stan-
dard(s) shall apply.
Section 3: General Contract Terms
Section 3(4): Term
Commentary:
The term of a contract will vary in accordance with a wide variety
of factors, including the type and scope of services provided by the
private contractor and whether the contractor will build a new
prison facility or simply occupy an existing facility. These factors
determine whether the contracting parties will choose a short-term
(one-to-three-year) or long-term (ten-to-twenty-year) arrangement.
Thus, for example, the Bay County Contract has a twenty-year term
and provides for the contruction of a new facility.540 The Santa Fe
Contract, on the other hand, has a three-year term and provides for
the use of an existing facility.
541
The term of the contract should be determined in light of several
considerations, many of which will be unique to each contract. A
uniform concern for all parties, however, should be to maximize
competition. More specifically, if privatization is deemed desirable,
market forces should be used to create a competitive environment in
which private contractors attempt to provide the best and most eco-
nomical corrections. 542 The term of the contract should therefore
be long enough for the private contractor to recoup its front-end
capital investment and become economically efficient, and yet short
enough to ensure flexibility to deal with new problems, prevent
market entrenchment, and encourage other contractors to enter the
market on a competitive basis.
These issues will arise in the renewal and bidding contexts as well
540. Bay County Contract at 25, § 7. It appears that this 20-year term has caused many
problems for the Bay County community, and even the National Sheriffs' Association has
come out against this extended long-term provision. National Sheriffs' Association Position on
Privatization of Adult Local Detention Facilities, National Sheriff, June-July 1985, at 38.
541. Santa Fe Contract at 3, § 2.1.
542. See C. RING, supra note 484, at 24 ("The raison d'etre for virtually all proposals ... is
that the introduction of competitive forces will produce superior services at less cost."); Note,
supra note 408, at 368.
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as in negotiating for term. For example, a private contractor who
wins the initial contract will be in a stronger position to compete for
future contracts than its competitors will be. This private contractor
may own the prison facility and have a lease arrangement as well as a
management relationship with the contracting agency, or it may
have employed, and created loyalties with, the only experienced cor-
rections labor force in the community. 543 Thus, although there is a
real danger that a state-sanctioned monopoly might develop, it need
not be inevitable provided that the contracting agency organize its
bidding to encourage real competition.544 The contracting agency,
for instance, can reduce the concern that entrenchment will occur
and encourage competition even when it leases the facility from a
private contractor by executing a lease that is separate from the con-
tract for the management and operation of the facility. Thus, theo-
retically, a different private contractor could be hired to run the
prison at some later time without affecting the underlying lease. 545
The benefits and drawbacks of both short- and long-term con-
tracts have been discussed at length elsewhere. 546 The advantages
of the short-term contract lie primarily in the triggering of competi-
tive bidding on a fairly frequent basis. 547 Arguably, frequent com-
petition creates incentives to provide low-cost, high-quality care in
an efficient manner because the contractors will not want to risk los-
ing the contract. Short-term contracts will also help prevent crony-
ism and market entrenchment as long as the bidding process is
conducted properly. In addition, short-term contracts reduce the
need for the parties to anticipate all of the issues and problems that
might arise in the future. Finally, short-term contracts may be nec-
essary because many contracting agencies are subject to "availability
of funds" restrictions that prohibit contracting beyond a certain
budget period.54
8
Nevertheless, short-term contracts may pose many problems.
They may increase the contractor's risk in private management -
543. See Note, supra note 408, at 357.
544. See 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 329 (1985).
545. See Note, supra note 408, at 370 n.102.
546. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 98-100; C. RING, supra note 484, at 44; Hackett,
Hatry, Levinson, Allen, Chi & Feigenbaum, Contracting for the Operation of Prisons and Jails, NIJ
RESEARCH IN BRIEF 5 (une 1987) [hereinafter NIJ REPORT]; see also PRIVATIZATION OF CORREC-
TIONS, supra note 460, at 37-48; Note, supra note 408, at 368-69.
547. There are, of course, significant costs that are associated with frequent rebidding.
The bidding process requires a commitment of time, money, and personnel from both the
contractor and the contracting agency. See NIJ REPORT, supra note 546, at 5. These costs, as
well as the psychological costs related to business uncertainty and instability, must be factored
into the decisionmaking process.
548. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 98-100; C. RING, supra note 484, at 44; see Model
Contract § 2(A) (Private Financing); Model Statute § 3 (Contract Term and Renewal).
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particularly with respect to private construction and ownership.
Specifically, contractors may be concerned that their innovation and
investment will not pay for themselves before the contract period is
over. They may thus be less inclined to bid for the contract, thereby
reducing the benefits of competition. Short-term contracts may also
help to hide abuses that would not manifest themselves until after
the contract term had elapsed and the private contractor had left the
facility.549 This problem does not necessarily require a longer con-
tract period, however. The contracting agency could, for example,
require a hold-over-period performance bond instead, to make sure
that funds would be available for such problems.
The negative effects of the short-term contract are less severe
when construction of a facility is not an aspect of the privatization
project. When construction is a part of the project, however, sepa-
rate construction and management contracts should be used.
Under this arrangement, the operation of the facility can be rebid in
the short term without any interference with the underlying lease
arrangement. 550 Thus, long-term lease agreements can still be used
in the limited area of construction, so that innovation and invest-
ment in this area are not sacrificed.
Many problems that are associated with short-term contracts can
be solved with longer terms. Long-term contracts can reduce bid-
ding costs, increase the likelihood that the private contractor will
recoup its investment, and create market stability that can affect the
contractor's financial prospects favorably. 55' In addition, continuity
in management may benefit the prison population and the neigh-
boring community that provides labor and services to the prison. A
constant turnover in management could cause too much flux in the
system.5 52 Some of the benefits of a long-term contract can be
achieved, however, by using a short-term contract with a renewal
provision that affords the contractor some of the security and stabil-
ity that it needs.
553
549. Cf. Note, supra note 408, at 368-69.
550. It must be considered, however, how well the privatization arrangement will work
with a new third party managing the prison. At the very least, careful planning will be re-
quired in determining the contracting agency's right as lessor to sublease the facility to a new
contractor.
551. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 98-100; C. RING, supra note 484, at 44.
552. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 98. Frequent management changes could also work
against solving the prison's problems. Contractors, faced with a short-term contract and the
risk of nonrenewal, might cut their losses and make minimal efforts to improve prison condi-
tions, thus continually passing on problems to new contractors. That is, no contractor will
have sufficient tenure under the contract to be held accountable for solving problems. Thus,
in this example, competition will have worked results contrary to those sought: high-quality
care for inmates at the lowest reasonable cost.
553. See Model Contract § 3(B) (Renewal).
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Thus, the contracting parties should seek a workable balance be-
tween the competing benefits and drawbacks of the long-term and
short-term contracts. The three-year term recommended in the
Model Contract provision reflects the positions that - considering
the importance of the contractor's accountability - the short-term
contract will more satisfactorily balance the needs and interests of
all of the parties.
Model Contract provision:
The term of this contract shall be for a period of three (3) years
commencing on [time and date] and terminating on [time and date],
subject to the availability of funds and unless earlier terminated in
accordance with the relevant provisions of this contract.
Section 3(B): Renewal
Commentary:
The Renewal provision, like the Term provision, should be
closely examined and carefully negotiated by the parties. There is
wide variation among renewal provisions in existing contracts. 554
While the terms of a renewal provision will necessarily vary among
contracts due to differing individual circumstances, some general
recommendations can be made with regard to the issues that should
be addressed in this provision and the factors that contracting agen-
cies should consider in addressing these issues.
The renewal provision should address the number and duration
of renewal periods allowed under the contract. The parties should
consider these issues in light of the discussion regarding length of
contract term.555 With regard to the duration of renewal periods,
shorter, rather than longer, periods are most consistent with the
overall purpose of the renewal option. Renewal periods of one to
two years will serve to maintain incentive for efficient contractor
performance and preserve the contracting agency's flexibility in
changing contractors, while providing a mechanism whereby a suc-
cessful contract arrangement may be extended without incurring the
expense associated with the competitive bidding process. 556 The
554. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 99 (describing how various contracting agencies
have addressed the issues of term, renewal, and price adjustment in contract provisions).
555. See Model Contract § 3(A) (Term).
556. Cf. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 98-100 (discussing benefits and drawbacks of
shorter versus longer contract terms); C. RING, supra note 484, at 44 (discussing implications
of shorter and longer contract terms in context of statutory provisions). Contracting agencies
should also keep in mind, however, the disadvantages of short renewal periods discussed in
the earlier section on contract term. See Model Contract § 3(A) (Term).
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parties should also note that most renewal periods of long duration
would be subject to non-appropriation by the legislature.557
It is also recommended that the contract limit the number of re-
newal options and require the contracting agency to open the bid-
ding to all competitors after a specified period of time. 558 Again,
the number of options should be determined after the parties have
balanced the considerations discussed in reference to shorter or
longer terms. 559 The parties should also keep in mind that laws in
their jurisdiction may require competitive bidding of government
contracts within a specified period of time. 560
The Model Contract provides for renewal at the option of the
contracting agency on like terms and conditions, but allows for re-
negotiation of the contract price upon renewal. Such a provision
ensures that the private contractor receives a fair price for the re-
quired services throughout the duration of the contract. 56' This
benefits both the contractor and the contracting agency. 562 Setting
a cap on the maximum price increase allowable under the contract is
strongly recommended, however, to ensure that contracting agen-
cies will not be forced to agree to artificially high price increases. In
addition, or as an alternative to price renegotiation, the parties may
want to include an automatic cost-of-living increase based on an
agreed upon measure, such as the Consumer Price Index.563 This
price increase would take effect periodically throughout the dura-
tion of the contract, according to the terms negotiated by the
parties.
The parties should also agree on a timetable to ensure that the
private contractor will have adequate notice of the contracting
agency's intent to exercise its renewal option and ample opportunity
to respond with a price proposal when appropriate, if it intends to
557. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 98 (noting that state/local legislature may not
have the authority to appropriate funds for government contracts beyond the biennial budget
period); PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 77 (noting that state statutes gen-
erally limit government contracts to period of one to three years).
558. This recommendation is in accordance with the Council of State Governments' rec-
ommendation that contracts limit automatic renewals to five years. CSG REPORT, supra note
533, at 100.
559. See Model Contract § 3(A) (Term).
560. See C. RING, supra note 484, at 44 (citing statutes in New Mexico and Tennessee
limiting duration of contracts for private prisons); Model Statute § 3 (Contract Term and
Renewal).
561. Many multi-year contracts provide for adjustment of the contract price at some inter-
val throughout the contract term. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 98 (stating that price of
multi-year contracts is usually adjusted annually).
562. McAfee, supra note 402, at 859 (providing historical background to illustrate that
both parties benefit from contract that allows for necessary price adjustments).
563. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 98.
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remain under contract. In negotiating the length of the notice pe-
riod, the parties will want to ensure that the contracting agency will
have enough time to make the transition to another contractor, if
that becomes necessary. If the private contractor does not notify
the contracting agency of its intent regarding renewal within a rea-
sonable period of time, the contracting agency should be free to
rebid the contract and the contractor's retainage account may be
forfeited to the contracting agency.
Model Contract provision:
An option to renew this contract for an additional [number]
(C.) year term shall be exercisable by the contracting agency on
like terms and conditions except with respect to compensation paid to
the contractor. The contracting agency may exercise its option to re-
new the contract [number] (. ) times, after which the contracting
agency will reopen the contract for competitive bidding.
Compensation shall be negotiated between the parties before each
renewal period. The price shall not increase more than [number]
(...) percent over any one renewal period, nor shall the price rise
more than [number] L ) percent over the entire duration of the
contract.
Should the private contractor desire to renew this contract, it shall
notify the contracting agency in writing and submit a written price
proposal at least [number] (L days prior to the termination date
of this contract. Should the private contractor not desire to renew this
contract, it shall notify the contracting agency in writing no later than
[number] (L days prior to the termination date of this contract.
Failure to so notify shall be a valid basis for forfeiture of the retainage
account balance then held by the contracting agency and subsequent
retainage amounts, until the termination of this contract.
Section 3(C): Compensation
Commentary:
Compensation provisions must explicitly set forth the following
items: which services are being contracted out (e.g., supervision,
medical care, transportation, rehabilitation, education, and training
of inmates, construction of a facility, or maintenance of a facility);
how much will be paid for these services (e.g., whether the contrac-
tor must keep its cost below present cost levels and whether and on
what conditions services may be subcontracted out); how payment
for those services will be calculated (e.g., under a flat-fee or per-diem
arrangement); when payment will be made during the term of the
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contract; and how payments may be adjusted during the term of the
contract.
As several commentators have noted with respect to the first item,
for instance, many prison contracts have failed adequately to specify
the cost elements of the contract. 564 This failure can result in con-
siderable confusion as well as unanticipated and increased costs to
both parties. Therefore, the contract must be quite specific regard-
ing which party is responsible for which services and costs that are
associated with operating and maintaining the facility. 56 5
The contractor's compensation will depend, of course, on the
number and types of services that it provides. Undoubtedly, most
contract negotiations will begin with the premise that privatization
will cost less than the contracting agency currently spends on incar-
ceration. This premise follows from what advocates of privatization
have been claiming all along: Competition will produce superior
services at less cost. 566 Therefore, to the extent that the provision
of services is comparable, the contracting agency's costs should be a
starting point for deciding contract price. 567
An important and complex issue is how payment for services will
be calculated. Most existing contracts use some variation of a per-
diem (i.e., cost per inmate day) compensation scheme, rather than a
flat-fee arrangement. 568 This choice is preferable if the parties want
to have the flexibility of using contract cost fluctuations to keep
costs in line with actual expenses.569 That is, contract costs consist
564. See, e.g., CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 85-87; NIJ REPORT, supra note 546, at 5.
565. The issue of "hidden costs" must also be addressed by the parties. See, e.g., Durham,
supra note 434, at 70 (stating that "there are hidden costs [in privatization of corrections] that
have yet to receive adequate attention"). Hidden costs are all items that are associated with
the contracting out of the facility but which are not apparent from the face of the contract
between the contracting agency and the private contractor. Such costs may include, but are
not limited to: the cost of monitoring compliance with the contract; the cost of attorney,
consulting, and other professional fees for developing and executing contracts as well as for
securing approval of site selection by the legislature; the costs that are associated with in-
creased liability resulting from the contractor's lack of immunity in situations in which the
contracting agency would have been fully protected; and new layers of liability that arise from
the contracting-out arrangement, such as liability arising from the agency's failure to monitor
the facility adequately or from third-party-beneficiary contract claims that are available to in-
mates and the public.
566. See C. RING, supra note 484, at 24-26, 34-38.
567. The contractor's promise of higher quality care should also be factored into price
negotiations.
568. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 83; NIJ REPORT, supra note 546, at 5; C. RING, supra
note 484, at 31.
569. Because these cost fluctuations can include increases as well as decreases, the con-
tracting agency must protect itself by placing a cap on the number of inmates for which it will
pay the private contractor. Unexpected increases in the inmate population can result in huge
cost overruns. See Tolchin, Privately Operated Prison in Tennessee Reports S200,000 in Cost Over-
runs, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1985, at A14, col. 1 (noting that increase in inmate population in
Hamilton County, Tennessee resulted in 1985 cost overruns of at least $200,000 at CCA's
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of both fixed and variable costs. Fixed costs do not vary in relation
to the inmate population, and include such items as capital costs
(e.g., building improvements) and some operating and management
costs (e.g., minimum required labor force). By contrast, variable
costs will increase as the inmate population grows and decrease as
population shrinks. The parties may want to take advantage of these
fluctuations; they will therefore need to choose a compensation
scheme that is sophisticated enough to accommodate all of the nec-
essary variables. 5
70
A variable per-diem arrangement, with established minimum and
maximum inmate population levels, can account for cost fluctua-
tions. Under this scheme, contractors are paid a predetermined fee
based on the cost per inmate day. A maximum population level is
established to prevent contractors from increasing the number of
inmates and/or the duration of their confinement in order to receive
greater compensation. 57 1 A minimum population level is also estab-
lished to provide the contractor with a guaranteed income.
57 2
The flat-fee arrangement, which sets the price at the outset of the
contract term by predicting cost and adding a profit margin, is un-
suited for taking advantage of cost fluctuations. This arrangement
does, however, offer the contracting parties security and stability be-
cause the negotiated amount cannot be changed during the course
of the contract. In addition, the flat-fee approach protects the con-
tracting agency from future cost overruns.
573
Silverdale facility); see also 2 "Model" Prisons, supra note 433, at 4D, col. 4 (reporting in 1988
the finding of Hamilton County auditor's cost study that CCA operation of the Silverdale
facility not only did not save the taxpayers money, but it also cost the county more than when
the county ran the facility). But see Morgan, Hamilton Officials, CCA Head Say Author Twisted
Infonnation, Chattanooga Times, May 21, 1988, at B2, col. I (stating that auditor denies accu-
racy of comments in 2, "'Model" Prisons). These persistent difficulties at one facility may indi-
cate that the problems inherent in private incarceration are intractable.
570. The parties' ability to take advantage of these variable costs will be determined by
the type of cost and the speed with which the contractor can respond to inmate population
changes. If the population decreases, for example, it will be much easier to reduce weekly
food expenses than it will be to reduce labor costs.
571. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 84; see also supra notes 170-210 and accompanying
text (discussing constitutionality of delegating quasi-judicial functions to private contractor);
Model Statute § 11 (Nondelegability of Contracting Agency's Authority).
572. But see infra note 850 and accompanying text (discussing potential danger in parole
context arising from guaranteed minimum income, and suggesting solution that contractor's
employees not participate in parole recommendations). The CSG Report recommends a hy-
brid approach, using a variable daily-rate system. Under this arrangement, the daily rate paid
to the contractor decreases when the inmate population increases because "certain fixed costs
don't change and ... some economies of scale [are] available to contractors." CSG REPORT,
supra note 533, at 90.
573. Or perhaps it will not. It is arguable that the contracting agency will have to pay cost
overruns if the private contractor cannot, such as if the contractor is bankrupt. In that case,
the contracting agency will have no choice but to reassume operation of the facility, with its
attendant costs.
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The contracting parties must also address the timing and fre-
quency of payments under the contract.574 Some contracting agen-
cies will be bound by a prompt-payment statute, which will serve as
adequate protection for the private contractor who is concerned
about prompt and regular payment.57 5 Otherwise, the parties will
have to negotiate these terms.
Another question concerns provision for adjusting the contract
price during the term of the contract. Reopening the contract
should be a highly unusual occurrence, limited only to unforeseen
circumstances. Thus, with the exception of annual cost-of-living ad-
justments, the provision should be a strict one.576 Price-adjustment
provisions become increasingly important as the term of the con-
tract increases. Therefore, long-term contracts may require more
than an annual-adjustment provision. It may be necessary to pro-
vide for price negotiations and adjustment at some set point during
the term of the contract to allow both parties the opportunity to
change price terms to reflect current economic conditions.
Model Contract provisions:
(1) Per-Diem Rate
The contracting agency shall pay the contractor every [number]
(.) days (payment period) a per-diem charge of [number]
L(..) dollars per inmate day (per-diem rate). For purposes of es-
tablishing an inmate day, the inmate's arrival and departure days will
count as one inmate day. On or before [number] (. ) days after
the payment period, the contractor shall provide the contracting
agency with a statement showing the number of inmate days charged
for the prior payment period.
(2) Minimum and Maximum Inmate Population
The contracting agency shall pay the contractor a minimum of
[number] (.) dollars per payment period, which shall be deter-
mined by multiplying the cost per inmate day times [number] (L )
(guaranteed minimum inmate population). In no event shall the con-
tracting agency pay the contractor in excess of [number] (L ) dol-
574. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 85; NIJ REPORT, supra note 546, at 5.
575. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 88; PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460,
at 31.
576. Annual adjustments are commonly contracted for and permit increases based on
some variation of the Consumer Price Index. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 88; C. RINc,
supra note 484, at 31. For their mutual protection, the parties might consider including a
provision that sets both a floor and a cap on inflation adjustments. See, e.g., Bay County Con-
tract at 21, § 6.7(A) (setting a 2% floor and a 5% cap); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-
104(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("If any adjustment is made pursuant to terms of the contract, it
shall be applied to total payments made to the contractor for the previous contract year and
shall not exceed the percentage of change in the average consumer price index .... ).
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lars, which shall be determined by multiplying the cost per inmate day
times [number] (.J (maximum inmate population).
(3) Annual Adjustments to Per-Diem Rate
The per-diem rate shall be adjusted at the beginning of each fiscal
year. The adjustment shall be based on increases or decreases in the
Consumer Price Index. The adjustments, which are intended to reflect
changes in the purchasing power of a given amount of money ex-
pressed in dollars, shall not be greater than five percent (5%).577
(4) Unforeseen-Circumstances Adjustment
Although the parties intend to fix the per-diem rate subject to an-
nual adjustments, the parties recognize that unforeseen circumstances
may arise during the term of this contract. Therefore, the parties
agree that within [number] L days after the end of the [ordinal
number] full fiscal year of the term of this contract, either party may
elect to request in writing a change in the per-diem rate to reflect any
change in the cost of operating and maintaining the facility.
578 If
there is an irreconcilable breakdown in negotiations, the parties should
refer to Section 7 of this contract for termination procedures.
Section 3(D): Performance Bond
Commentary:
The Model Contract provides for a performance bond to ensure
that the private contractor comply with the terms of the contract and
that the contracting agency have adequate funds in the event that
the contractor is unable to perform. The performance-bond re-
quirement imposes an additional cost on the private contractor that
it will undoubtedly pass on to the contracting agency. Thus, the
contracting agency will need to assess whether a bond is warranted
in its particular situation.579 With a performance bond, the con-
tracting agency will be protected in the event of bankruptcy, default,
strikes, or takeover by or transition to a new firm. The perform-
ance-bond provision should specify a dollar amount that will ade-
quately cover the contracting agency's costs if these events occur,
including transitional costs related to hiring a new firm to provide
services or transportation costs of transferring the prisoners to a dif-
ferent facility.
577. This provision is derived from the Bay County Contract at 21, § 6.7(A) (providing
minimum and maximum adjustments of 2% and 5%, respectively).
578. This provision is derived from the Bay County Contract at 22-23, § 6.7(C). Such a
provision would be necessary only in a long-term contract. The Bay County Contract, for
example, provides for a 20-year term.
579. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 91-94 (recommending performance bond to pro-
tect government when benefit exceeds cost of bond); NIJ REPORT, supra note 546, at 5 (sug-
gesting use of performance bond if added protection to the government is worth the cost of
the bond).
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The formula for determining the amount of the performance
bond will vary with the needs of the particular facility. Some con-
tracts impose a flat rate for the duration of the contract, 580 while
others employ a per-diem formula that multiplies the number of in-
mates by the rate charged per inmate per day.581 Whichever
method is used, the contracting agency must ensure that the bond
be posted for the duration of the contract and, if not, that it be sub-
ject to renewal. Furthermore, the contracting agency should re-
quire that its approval of the bond term and conditions be obtained
before the contract is executed.
Model Contract provision:
A performance bond in the amount of [number] ... dollars (or
[number] (. ) percent of the contract price) is required to assure
the contractor's faithful performance of the specifications and condi-
tions of this contract. The bond is required throughout the term of this
contract. The terms and conditions of the bond must be approved by
the contracting agency, and such approval is a condition precedent to
this contract taking effect.
Section 3(E): Indemnification, Immunity, and Insurance
1. Indemnification and immunity
Commentary:
The goal of the Model Contract's Indemnification section is to
hold the private contractor fully accountable for its acts. From the
contracting agency's point of view, it is essential that it not be held
liable for the actions of the contractor. Indeed, the cost effective-
ness of prison and jail privatization would be cast in doubt if this
were not the case. Accordingly, the Model Contract provides that
the private contractor must indemnify the contracting agency if the
agency is held liable for the actions or omissions of the private con-
tractor. This indemnification should encompass liability arising out
of tort, contract, or civil-rights actions. 58 2 To guarantee this indem-
580. E.g., Santa Fe Contract at 23, § 7.4 (charging flat fee of $325,000).
581. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 92 ("the State of Kentucky contract contains a
provision requiring a performance bond 'equal to 70% X 200 (inmates) X 365 (days) X rate
per inmate per day' ").
582. Such actions pose the risk of substantial financial loss. See, e.g., CSG REPORT, supra
note 533, at 27 (stating that "one of the most serious questions on the agenda of state and
local governments today is that of government liability and the inability to adequately insure
(at a reasonable price) against massive judgments"); REPORT OF THE PRIVATE PRISON TASK
FORCE, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, JOINT STATE GOVERN-
MENT COMMISSION 35 (1987) ("It is not uncommon for [attorneys' fees arising out of civil-
rights] litigation to exceed six and occasionally seven figures.") (quoting statement of Stefan
Presser, Legal Director, ACLU of Pennsylvania, to the Pennsylvania HouseJudiciary Commit-
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nification, the Model Contract requires the contractor to purchase
sufficient insurance to indemnify the contracting agency fully for any
possible liability arising out of the contractor's operation of the
prison or jail.
The Immunity section of the Model Contract raises the question
of whether contractors should be extended the same immunity
defenses that are available to public actors, and thus presents sub-
stantial issues regarding the rights of prisoners and detainees, on
the one hand, and the responsibilities of private contractors and the
contracting agency, on the other hand, under a private
arrangement.
Under the Model Contract, contractors are required to waive any
immunity that may extend to them by operation of law. This waiver
provision is considered an essential tool to ensure the accountability
of the contractor. As one commentator has noted, "[o]ne of the at-
tractions of prison privatization for state and local governments is
tee, Mar. 28, 1985); Woolley, Prisons for Profit: Policy Considerations for Government Officials, 90
DICK. L. REV. 307, 330 (1985) (stating that section 1983 litigation costs are commonly in
excess of six-figure amount) (quoting S. Presser, Legal Director of ACLU of Pennsylvania); C.
Thomas & L. Calvert-Hanson, Evaluating Civil Liability Risks in "Privatized" Correctional
Facilities 22 (1986) (unpublished manuscript) ("[T]he litigation costs alone can be substantial
- especially when plaintiff attorney fees are recovered under the fairly liberal interpretations
being accorded 42 U.S.C. § 1988."). The need for indemnification of the contracting agency
has been generally recognized. Comment, Private Prisons, 36 EMoRY LJ. 253, 260 (1987) (stat-
ing that the "issue of overriding importance to state and local governments considering priva-
tization... is whether the government will also be held liable in civil suits brought by inmates
against the private prison operators"); see also NATIONAL CRIMINALJU TIcE ASS'N, supra note
465, at 12-13 (noting that at least three states have required private contractors to purchase
insurance and indemnify the government for liability arising from prison operations, but
questioning legality of shifting liability and heavy economic burden it places on contractor
which "could inhibit the [contractor's] competitive edge"); C. RING, supra note 484, at 46
(stating that governments must "make sure that the contractors have adequate insurance to
protect themselves and the sponsoring government in the event of a suit or other claims for
compensation"); Comment, supra, at 29 (noting that, "[w]hile indemnification is not the per-
fect answer, it is the best available option to insure against the costs of a negative judgment;
the contractor must have adequate self-insurance or outside coverage"). Corrections Corpo-
ration of America also recognizes the crucial role that indemnification plays in obtaining con-
tracts. 2 "Model" Prisons, supra note 433. In fact, CCA promises that it "will protect every
political figure associated with the prison system by means of a multi-million dollar insurance
policy which will be sufficient, [company chairman] Beasley says, to finance all litigation, pay
all claims and judgments, and in general insulate those officials from personal liability." Id.
Officials involved with both the Hamilton County, Tennessee and Bay County, Florida con-
tracts cite "fear of lawsuits" as the main reason for negotiating and contracting with CCA. Id.
(reporting on comments made by Chattanooga, Tenn. County Executive Dalton Roberts and
former Bay County, Fla. Commission Chairwoman Helen Ingram). But see Morgan, supra note
569 (reporting that Dalton Roberts now denies having made this statement). One reporter
wrote that, within a year of the September 1984 Hamilton County contract date, CCA failed to
comply with its promise to supply a $25-million insurance policy. Davis, CCA Falls Short on
Accreditation, Insurance f'ows, Tennessean, May 16, 1988, at 4E, col. I [hereinafter CCA Falls
Short]. The reporter stated that, because such a policy was "too expensive," CCA unilaterally
decided instead to keep a $5-million escrow account to cover its liability. Id. The Hamilton
County Contract was amended on August 18, 1986 to reduce general liability insurance to $5
million.
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the belief that contracting prison management to private firms will
relieve the government of the burden of defending [actions] and the
expense of complying with comprehensive and often financially bur-
densome court orders." 583 Although this may be true,5 84 the em-
phasis should not be on shifting responsibility, but rather on creating
an adequate accountability mechanism to ensure that inmates re-
ceive proper care and treatment. Because of the provision's impor-
tance to both contracting parties, an extended discussion of the
immunity issue is presented below.
The immunity issue has arisen in almost all privatization material,
including contracts, statutes, and secondary literature. "Immunity"
covers a broad array of complex legal issues; therefore, it is impor-
tant that a clear understanding of its various elements be established
at the outset of this discussion. Specifically, the contracting parties
must distinguish the various claims giving rise to an immunity de-
fense - physical-injury or personal-injury claims arising under fed-
eral and state tort-claims acts, and civil-rights claims arising under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 - from the immunities that may be available to
them - sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and absolute
immunity.
a. The eleventh amendment, sovereign immunity, and federal/state
tort-claims acts
The Supreme Court has interpreted the eleventh amendment to
provide that federal courts do not have the authority to hear claims
brought against a state by a citizen of that state or any other state.5 85
Whereas the eleventh amendment acts as.a jurisdictional bar to suits
against states and their departments or agencies in federal courts,
586
counties, cities, and other state subdivisions are not covered by the
eleventh amendment, and therefore are subject to suit in federal
courts.
58 7
583. Kay, The Implications of Prison Privatization on the Conduct of Prisoner Litigation Under 42
UtS.C. Section 1983, 40 VAND. L. REV. 867, 868 (1987).
584. But see Cody & Bennett, supra note 402, at 848 (stressing that "[p]rivatization will not
lessen the burdens on the State's attorneys or reduce the need for them[; indeed], privatiza-
tion itself may give rise to extremely complicated lawsuits").
585. Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). This rule applies to suits seeking injunctive
relief as well as damages. Id. The eleventh amendment actually provides: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
586. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (applying elev-
enth amendment to state agency); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (construing eleventh
amendment to bar claims against a state).
587. Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
650.
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The federal government is protected under the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity from suits brought by citizens. The doctrine pre-
vents suits against the federal government and its agencies unless
the government has consented to be sued under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.5 8 8 Similarly, state governments may not be sued in state
courts unless they have waived their sovereign immunity in a state
tort-claims act, as many states have, or it has been abolished by case
law.
5 8 9
The question of whether a private contractor could assert these
defenses or jurisdictional bars has not been addressed by the
courts. 590 Thus, the contracting parties should be aware that the
availability of defenses is complex, and will depend on the operation
588. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (allowing claims against federal government for property
loss, personal injury, or death resulting from negligent or wrongful act of government em-
ployee acting within scope of his employment when United States, if a private person, would
be liable under laws of place where act occurred); see United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,
399 (1976) (stating that, as sovereign, United States is immune from suit unless it has un-
equivocally waived immunity).
589. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 25.00 (Supp. 1980) (noting that 33
states have abolished several areas of immunity by judicial decision). The New Mexico
Supreme Court, for example, abolished sovereign immunity as a defense in tort actions in
1975. Hicks v. New Mexico, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975). See generally Kovnat, Constitu-
tional Torts and the ,ew Mexico Tort Clains Act, 13 N.M.L. REV. 1 (1983). During the next legisla-
tive session, the legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -29
(current codification in 1987 Code), to re-establish the defense. The Act immunizes a govern-
mental entity and any public employee acting within the scope of duty from liability, id. § 41-
4-4(A), except as waived by eight enumerated provisions of the Act. Id. §§ 41-4-5 to -12.
Under these exceptions immunity is waived for certain governmental entities and their em-
ployees, including the statutory waiver of immunity for law-enforcement officers. Id. § 41-4-
12. In Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980), the court held that
section 41-4-12 applies to injuries caused by the negligence of a sheriff, his deputies, and city
jailers.
The Arizona Supreme Court abolished sovereign immunity in 1963, in Stone v. Arizona
Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963). Arizona has no tort-claims act. The
court in Stone stated that "the rule is liability and immunity [is] the exception." Id. at 392, 381
P.2d at 112. Although the court did not eliminate judicial or legislative immunity, and did not
subject executive-level, policy-formation activities (i.e., discretionary activities) to tort liability,
the state courts have consistently held the state liable for the negligent acts of its officers,
agents, and employees. E.g., Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982); Grimm v.
Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977). In Grimm, for
example, the court held that members of the Board of Pardons and Paroles have only partial
immunity from suit and can be held liable for grossly negligent or reckless acts. Id. at 265-68,
564 P.2d at 1233-35. Arizona's approach to questions of immunity was more recently stated
in Ryan v. State:
Employing the spirit of the Stone decision, we propose to endorse the use of gov-
ernmental immunity as a defense only when its application is necessary to avoid a
severe hampering of a governmental function or thwarting of established public pol-
icy. Otherwise, the state and its agents will be subject to the same tort law as private
citizens.
134 Ariz. at 311, 656 P.2d at 600. This short discussion on Arizona and New Mexico immu-
nity law illustrates the diversity and complexity of states' handling of the immunity question.
590. One commentator has concluded that a private contractor that manages a prison
"could not assert the eleventh amendment defense" because the "eleventh amendment, by its
very terms, protects only the state and those officials whose actions are considered to be the
state's actions." Kay, supra note 583, at 882.
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and applicability of federal or state sovereign-immunity laws, which
will be based on either a tort-claims act or judicial decision. The law
in this area should be carefully examined before contract negotia-
tions begin, so that the parties fully understand their rights and
obligations.
b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The main source for civil actions brought to remedy violations of
prisoners' constitutional rights is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.591 Section 1983
actions can be brought in either state or federal courts. 59 2 Section
1983 claims may not be brought against states or their agencies due
to their eleventh amendment immunity and because they are not
deemed to be "persons" under the statute.593 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has permitted claims against state officials in their
individual capacities. 59 4 In addition, section 1983 claims may be
made against local governments, counties, cities, and municipali-
ties. 59 5 There are no section 1983 claims against federal officials
because of the statute's "state action" requirement. 59 6
In order to maintain a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must be
able to prove that: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law,
and (2) the interest infringed is secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.59 7 With respect to the state-action require-
ment, the Supreme Court has held that a finding of state action
under the fourteenth amendment will satisfy the same requirement
under section 1983.598 Assuming arguendo that contractors and their
employees are found to be state actors, and that the eleventh
amendment or common-law immunities do not apply, 59 9 the con-
591. See id. at 867-68; supra note 214 (providing pertinent text of section 1983). For a
thorough and detailed analysis of section 1983 and its ramifications in the prison-privatization
context, see C. Thomas & L. Calvert-Hanson, supra note 582; see also Kay, supra note 583, at
881-83 (discussing eleventh amendment immunities available to private contractors).
592. E.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
593. Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
594. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
595. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
596. There is an implied right of action for violations of the Constitution by federal offi-
cials. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (eighth amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment).
597. A section 1983 action may be brought even though there is an independent state tort
remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The federal remedy is supplementary to the
state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal remedy is
invoked. Id. In addition, a plaintiff is not required to exhaust its administrative remedies
before pursuing section 1983 relief. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
598. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934-35 (1982).
599. See supra notes 214-395 and accompanying text (concluding that courts will find state
action in prison-privatization context). Some advocates of prison privatization have sug-
gested that private corporations are not subject to suit under section 1983, a suggestion that
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tractors could be held liable under section 1983 for monetary dam-
ages, 600 injunctive relief,60 1 or declaratory relief for violations of
prisoners' constitutional rights.
With respect to the second requirement, local governments may
be held liable under section 1983 if it is established that constitu-
tional rights were violated as a result of an officially adopted and
promulgated government regulation, policy, or decision. 60 2 How-
ever, evidence of the wrongful actions of a single employee not au-
thorized to make policy will not establish the necessary causal link to
hold a government liable.60 3 In addition, the mere fact that a gov-
ernment employee commits a constitutional violation would not
necessarily make the government liable, because the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior does not apply in this context.60 4 Significantly,
several courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have
held that, if a government entrusts one of its traditional functions to
a private contractor, the contractor's actions will be treated as the
government's own, thereby subjecting both parties to section 1983
liability.60 5 Thus, the contracting parties should be aware that sec-
tion 1983 poses a significant risk that cannot be "privatized away";
indeed, the risk should be borne by the private contractor.
c. Available immunities
Immunity laws are designed to strike a balance between a desire
to compensate the victim and an interest in protecting both the pub-
lic treasuries and the governing process itself.60 6 The contracting
makes privatization attractive, but which is not supported by the law. Woolley, supra note 582,
at 327; C. Thomas & L. Calvert-Hanson, supra note 582, at 23.
600. United States cc rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975).
601. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931,940-43 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069
(1983).
602. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
603. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
604. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978). Butsee Isaac v.Jones, 529 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(holding that doctrine
of respondeat superior applies in section 1983 injunctive cases); CSG REPORT, supra note 533,
at 29 (stating that common-law doctrine "can result in considerable civil liability" for the
government).
605. West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988) (holding that a physician who is under con-
tract with the state to provide medical services to inmates at state-prison hospital on part-time
basis acts "under color of state law," within meaning of section 1983, when he treats an in-
mate); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11 th Cir. 1985) (finding state action
where private entity contracted to provide care to inmates in county jail); Woodall v. Partilla,
581 F. Supp. 1066, 1076 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (denying dismissal of section 1983 case brought
against private entity involved in scheduling and supervising inmate laborers); Lombard v.
Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center, 556 F. Supp. 677, 680 (D. Mass. 1983) (finding private entity
and government both liable under section 1983 when private entity assumed state's obliga-
tion to provide medical service to state facility).
606. The oft-stated policy argument is that subjecting a government official's decision-
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:531
parties should recognize how these policy choices will affect the
availability of immunity to either party.
Although governments are protected from suits by the eleventh
amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, government
officials are subject to suit as individuals acting in their individual
and official capacities. 607 Absolute immunity from damages liability
is generally reserved for those acting in a legislative, judicial, or
prosecutorial capacity, 608 and for federal officials exercising discretion
within the scope of their official duties. 60 9 Most government offi-
cials and employees (including prison officials) who are sued in their
individual capacities are entitled only to qualified immunity in dam-
age suits.6 10 Qualified immnunity generally extends to actions that
are performed in "good faith." 611 As the Supreme Court stated in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald:6 12
government officials performing discretionary functions... gen-
erally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.6 13
Courts have often relied on these common-law tort doctrines of
absolute and qualified immunity to resolve immunity questions in
section 1983 actions. In Pierson v. Ray,6 14 for example, the Supreme
making process to fear of damage suits might cause him to make decisions that are in his best
interest and not in the best interest of the public.
607. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-58 (1908).
State officials can be sued in their official capacity, but only for injunctive and declaratory
relief. Damages are obtained only by suing state officials in their individual capacity.
608. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (stat-
ing that legislators are generally immune for their legislative acts); Stump v. Spark, 435 U.S.
349 (1978) (invoking absolute immunity for acts taken in judicial capacity); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1975) (granting prosecutors absolute immunity for acts
taken in "initiating a prosecution and presenting the State's case"). See generally S. NAIMOD,
CIVIL RIGrrs AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 390-449 (2d ed. 1986). Legislators have abso-
lute immunity from both damages liability and injunctive relief, whereas judges and prosecu-
tors only are granted absolute immunity from damages liability. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.
522, 541-43 (1984); Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 732-33.
609. This immunity extends to liability arising from common-law torts. E.g., Granger v.
Marek, 583 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1978).
610. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555
(1978). But see Arteaga v. New York, 72 N.Y.2d 212, 527 N.E.2d 1194, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57
(1988) (4-to-3 decision) (concluding that corrections-department employees "commencing
and conducting formal disciplinary proceedings" under the "authority of and in full compli-
ance with the governing statutes and regulations" engage in quasi-judicial conduct deserving
ofabsolute immunity from tort liability). Qualified immunity is unavailable in injunctive suits.
E.g., Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975).
611. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555
(1978).
612. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
613. Id. at 818 (emphasis added). The question is whether the individual "knew or should
have known" that he or she was violating "clearly established constitutional or statutory rights
of which a reasonable person would have known" at the time of the act in question. Id.
614. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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Court extended the common-law qualified-immunity defense to
Jackson, Mississippi police officers who had been sued for allegedly
unconstitutional arrests in violation of section 1983.615 The Court
in Pierson also held that the state judge who had found the petition-
ers guilty enjoyed absolute immunity for actions taken in his judicial
role.6 16 In Tenney v. Brandhove,6 17 the Supreme Court relied on the
common-law tradition of granting absolute immunity to state legis-
lators acting within the scope of legislative authority in order to sup-
port that immunity's extension to section 1983 actions. 618
d. Immunity for private-incarceration contractors
The principal question that the contracting parties must address
is whether contractors and their employees will be able to avail
themselves of the qualified-immunity doctrines that public officials
enjoy under federal and state tort law and section 1983 case law.6 19
615. Id. at 555-57.
616. Id. at 553-55.
617. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
618. Id. at 372-76.
619. There is precedent for granting qualified immunity to private persons liable under
section 1983; to date, however, it has only been granted to individuals who have relied on
presumptively valid state laws that were later found to be unconstitutional. Buller v.
Buechler, 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding that private party is entitled to qualified im-
munity ifit invoked state garnishment statute prior to declaration of unconstitutionality); Fol-
som Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that private party who invoked
a presumptively valid state attachment statute later held to be unconstitutional is entitled to a
good-faith immunity from monetary liability under section 1983); see Alaska Pac. Assurance
Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984) (holding that private entity that relies in good faith
on validly enacted law cannot be held legally responsible for constitutional defects in the law).
See generally S. NAHMOD, supra note 608, at 512-14 (reviewing case-law development of quali-
fied immunity for private persons); Kay, supra note 583, at 883-88 (discussing development of
case law extending qualified immunity to private persons). Because of the courts' heavy reli-
ance on a policy argument grounded in a desire to protect innocent, law-abiding persons from
subsequent judicial determinations, it is unclear whether private persons in different circum-
stances will also be granted use of a qualified-immunity defense. See Little, McPherson &
Healy, Section 1983 Liability of Municipalities and Private Entities Operating Under Color of Municipal
Law, 14 STETSON L. REV. 565, 603-06 (1985) (asserting, without explaining, that "private ac-
tors should be treated the same as corresponding state actors"); Note, supra note 9, at 1500
n.176 (opining that "private prison personnel may be able to benefit from the qualified immu-
nity that public corrections officers enjoy").
The Supreme Court, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., originally suggested that qualified immu-
nity could be extended to private individuals. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
942 n.23 (1982); see also id. at 956 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting) (concurring with the majority's
suggestion that good-faith immunity would solve the problem of holding liable private indi-
viduals who "innocently make use of seemingly valid state laws"). The Fifth Circuit relied on
Lugar in Folsom Inv. Co., when it held that a private party who invokes a presumptively valid
state attachment statute later held to be unconstitutional is entitled to good-faith immunity
from monetary and personal liability. 681 F.2d at 1037-38. The court reasoned that
[tihe private party who invokes a presumptively valid attachment law is not entitled to
an immunity because the officer executing it is. Rather, quite independently, the private
party is entitled to an immunity because of the important public interest in permitting
ordinary citizens to rely on presumptively valid state laws, in shielding citizens from
monetary damages when they reasonably resort to a legal process later held to be
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Although no body of case law has yet developed concerning im-
munities for contractors employed by the government,620 there have
been attempts to deal with the issue by statute and by contract. 621
Tennessee, for example, has enacted a statute stating that private-
prison operators are not entitled to the defense of sovereign immu-
unconstitutional, and in protecting a private citizen from liability when his role in any
unconstitutional action is marginal.
Id. at 1037 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit used the same rationale in Butler, when it,
too, granted private individuals a qualified-immunity defense after they had relied on a pre-
sumptively valid garnishment statute later found to be unconstitutional. 706 F.2d at 850-52.
The court noted that
[t]here is a strong public interest in permitting private individuals to rely on pre-
sumptively valid state laws and in shielding those citizens from monetary damages
when they resort to a legal process which they neither know, nor reasonably should
know, is invalid.... Moreover, it would be anomalous to hold that private individu-
als are state actors within the meaning of section 1983 because they invoke a state
garnishment statute and the aid of state officers; but deny those private individuals
the qualified immunity possessed by the state officials with whom they dealt because
they are not state employees.
Id. at 851 (footnote omitted).
620. See Little, McPherson & Healy, supra note 619, at 603-06 (finding that "no complete
"scenario' of liabilities and immunities for private entities has been enumerated"); Note, supra
note 9, at 1500 n. 176 (concluding that "no body of caselaw has emerged concerning immuni-
ties for contractors employed by the government"). Recently, however, the United States
Supreme Court, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988), upheld the
"military contractor defense," which immunized military contractors from liability under state
tort law for injury caused by design defects "when (1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the sup-
plier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known
to the supplier but not to the United States." Id. at 2518. This decision is not likely to be
important in the private-incarceration context, for two reasons: first, Boyle is limited to the
issue of federal immunity, whereas private-prison and private-jail arrangements typically will
involve state immunity law; and, second, Boyle expressly addressed the provision of goods
rather than services, the latter of which is paramount in the context of private corrections and
detention.
621. The contract between Santa Fe County and Corrections Corporation of America
contains the following language:
However, nothing herein is intended to deprive the County or CCA of the benefits
of any law limiting exposure to liability and/or setting a ceiling on damages, or any
laws establishing defense(s) for them. By entering this Agreement, the County does
not waive its sovereign immunity, nor does CAA waive any immunity which may ex-
tend to it by operation of law.
Santa Fe Contract at 22, § 7.1. It is unclear whether CCA would fall within the purview of the
New Mexico State Tort Claims Act as a "local public body" which "means all political subdivi-
sions of the state and their agencies, instrumentalities and institutions .... " N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-4-3(C) (1987). In Cole v. City of Las Cruces, 99 N.M. 302, 657 P.2d 629 (1983), a case
that involved a natural-gas association that had entered into a cooperative-services agreement
with the city, the court held that a private corporation is generally not the type of "instrumen-
tality" that the legislature had contemplated as coming within the scope of the Tort Claims
Act. The court found, however, "[t]hat there may be situations where a private corporation
may be so organized and controlled, and its affairs so conducted, as to make it merely an
adjunct of a municipality under the terms of the act." Id. at 305, 657 P.2d at 632.
It should be noted, however, that, under the New Mexico statute, private-contractor em-
ployees are deemed to be law-enforcement officers for purposes of the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-28 (1987), and immunity for law-enforcement officers
is waived under the Act. Id. § 41-4-12; see supra note 589 (discussing New Mexico immunity
law).
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nity.622 The Arizona legislature, on the other hand, has passed a
statute extending qualified immunity to correctional employees;
623
the Governor vetoed the bill twice. With increasing privatization,
there are likely to be more such statutes and contractual language.
Their exact meaning and parameters will ultimately be decided in
the courts.
It is uncertain, for example, whether courts will grant private ac-
tors immunities that have been traditionally reserved for public ac-
tors. Assuming arguendo that the immunities can flow to the private
contractor, the parties must then determine whether it is in the best
interest of all of the parties - i.e., the inmates, the community, the
governmental entity, and the private contractor - to contract for
the waiver of the extension of such immunities. 624 For the reasons
set out above, it is recommended that the government should only
enter a contract that provides for the waiver of such immunities.
Proponents of prison privatization argue that private prisons
would perform better and more economically than public prisons
would.625 As one commentator has noted, however,
[t]he promised economies [of prison privatization] present power-
ful temptations to change. In general, as Bentham observed, it is
always preferable to have a manager in whom duty and interest
are united. Private management does not, however, necessarily
unite duty and interest. Two characteristics of prison operation,
its inaccessibility to the public and its typical arrangement in mo-
nopolistic form, will, in combination with the profit motive, cause
the firm's interest to diverge from its duty to implement societal
preferences. Unchecked, the very forces that allow private firms
622. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-107(b) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
623. See proposed Arizona S.B. 1039 (1985). As eventually enacted, Arizona made no
provision for granting qualified immunity to correctional employees.
624. See Kay, supra note 583, at 887-88 (discussing policies underlying qualified-immunity
defense in context of privatization). Kay suggests that these policies may not apply to the
privatization situation because the private contractor is responsible to its shareholders, and
such a defense might encourage it "to cut corners to maximize profits." Id. at 887. She notes,
on the other hand, that withholding the qualified-immunity defense may "deter good private
individuals from providing services to the public." Id. at 888.
625. See, e.g., M. WOLFGANG, PRISONS: PRESENT AND POSSIBLE 35-38 (1979) (stating that
private contractors will be "far more efficient" than government agencies) (cited in Note,
supra note 9, at 1477 n.15); Krajick, Prisons for Profit: The Private Alternative, STATE LEGIS., Apr.
1984, at 11-12 (quoting private contractor as saying that his company can reduce prison costs
15-25%o because it is free from political considerations and need not hire union labor); Note,
supra note 9, at 1477 (stating that companies have promised reduced prison costs by eliminat-
ing government red tape and hiring non-civil-service employees, and concluding that some
savings have been realized); Comment, supra note 582, at 257-58 (noting that proponents of
privatization argue "that private prisons are more insulated from public pressures, and are
free from political interference, patronage, and the statutorily mandated high salaries and
pensions of public employees"). But see J. KEATING, SEEKING PROFIT IN PUNISHMENT: THE
PRIVATE MANAGEMENT OF CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 46 (1984) (suggesting that costs of
monitoring contract will affect any cost savings realized by privatization).
1989] 657
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:531
to offer pecuniary savings can drive them to sacrifice prison condi-
tions, and even efficiency, in ways that public stewards will not.626
To be sure, if the government is going to contract, it should do so
for the highest standard of care and responsibility that it can, to en-
sure that prisoners are afforded all of their rights and protections,
pursuant to both the Constitution and sound policy. Because the
state role in privatization will be limited to that of a monitor, how-
ever, it will be equally important that it use every means available to
ensure that the private contractor comply with its contractual re-
sponsibilities, including strict immunity provisions that impose the
highest standards of private-actor accountability. 6
27
The thrust of the accountability argument is that the contractor
will be forced to maintain the requisite levels of care and conduct
due to the threat of increased litigation and liability created by the
withholding of immunity. Yet contractors might contend that it
would be anomalous to charge them with additional liability in their
role as state actors and yet deny them the defenses that would be
accorded to the government. 628 This contention must fail, however,
in light of the government's primary responsibility and obligation to
protect the prisoners' rights and privileges and promote society's
correctional goals. The government cannot adequately perform
these functions acting solely as a monitor of private business. It
must therefore institute these additional accountability measures to
further ensure compliance and performance under the contract.
629
Although these measures may impose additional costs and burdens
on the contractor and perhaps, therefore, on the government, they
are nevertheless a crucial safeguard of the government's, the pub-
lic's, and the inmates' interests.
Model Contract provisions:
Section (A) is intended to ensure that the contractor will indem-
626. Note, supra note 408, at 355-56 (footnotes omitted).
627. See PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 6-14 (stating that government
can expect only indirect influence over private prisons through a monitoring system and
therefore quality control is made more difficult than in public institutions); Anderson, Davoli
& Moriarty, Private Corrections: Feast or Fiasco?, PRISONJ., Autumn-Winter 1985, at 32, 37 (con-
cluding that meaningful oversight is difficult because private proprietary entities are very pro-
tective of their confidentiality and privacy); Note, supra note 408, at 359 (suggesting that
"state as monitor will be less reliable than the state as administrator").
628. See Little, McPherson & Healy, supra note 619, at 604 (stating that private actors
should be given the same immunities available to public actors).
629. See Note, supra note 408, at 358-60 (concluding that other measures besides adminis-
trative monitoring of private prisons will be necessary for successful privatization); Note,
Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 815, 829-31 (1987)
(arguing that strict contractual provision alone cannot adequately regulate prison privatiza-
tion, but must be accompanied by greater judicial willingness to review prison practices).
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nify the contracting agency for any and all property damage in-
curred while the contractor operates the prison or jail facility. Both
real and personal property are within the scope of Section (A), in-
cluding structures, buildings, equipment, inventory, and other items
that belong to the contracting agency and that the contractor uses in
its daily operation of the facility.
(A) The contractor assumes full responsibility for and shall indem-
nify the contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and repre-
sentatives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the
Superintendent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and
their respective legal representatives, heirs and beneficiaries, and shall
pay all judgments rendered against any or all of them for any and all
loss or damage of whatever kind and nature to any and all contracting-
agency property, real or personal, including but not limited to any
buildings, structures, fences, equipment, supplies, accessories, inven-
tory, or parts furnished, while in the contractor's custody and care for
use or storage, resulting in whole or in part from the acts, errors, or
omissions of the contractor or any officer, agent, representative, em-
ployee, or subcontractor thereof for whatever reason.630
Section (B) is intended to ensure that the contracting agency is
indemnified for any liability that it might incur as a result of the
contractor's operation of the facility. The contracting agency
should be protected against all liability and claims against it arising
out of physical or personal injury to prisoners, prison employees, or
other individuals, including claims arising out of civil-rights actions,
property-damage actions, and breach-of-contract actions. One of
the purposes of having a contractor operate the facility arguably is
to relieve the contracting agency of all concerns and responsibilities
that are associated with operating these institutions. Consequently,
in order to maximize the benefits of privatizing, the contracting
agency should be able to leave the complete operation of the facility
to the contractor, subject only to the monitoring procedures that
are set forth elsewhere in the Model Contract. If the private con-
tractor is not held completely responsible for all property damage,
personal injury, and damages for breach of contract, the contracting
agency will lose one of the most significant benefits of having con-
tracted out the prison operation. The agency will not benefit from
using the private contractor if the agency is constantly subject to
litigation arising from the private contractor's operation of the
facility.
630. Section (A) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract at 25-26, § 10(a).
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(B) The company shall save and hold harmless and indemnify the
contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and representa-
tives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries, and shall pay
all judgments rendered against any or all of them for any and all loss
or damage of whatever kind against any and all liability, claims, and
cost, of whatever kind and nature, for physical or personal injury and
any other kind of injury, including, specifically, deprivation of civil
rights, and for loss or damage to any property or injury resulting from
a breach of the terms of this contract occurring in connection with or
in any way incident to or arising out of the occupancy, use, service,
operation, or performance by the company, its agents, employees, or
representatives of any of the provisions or agreements contained in
this contract, including any Appendices, for which the contracting
agency or any of the hereinabove-mentioned indemnified parties, who
may become legally liable resulting in whole or in part from the acts,
errors, or omissions of the company, or any officer, agent, representa-
tive, employee, or subcontractor thereof for whatever reason. 63 '
Section (C) is intended to make the contractor accountable to the
public insofar as it requires the contractor to indemnify the con-
tracting agency for any liability arising from a prisoner escape. This
Section provides a necessary incentive to ensure that the private
contractor will take all possible measures to prevent prisoners from
escaping from the facility. One of the main concerns of any prison
operation is the security measures that are used to prevent prisoners
from escaping. Section (C) attempts to ensure that the prison is at
all times properly and adequately staffed, and that the private con-
tractor has established preventive measures for discouraging es-
capes as well as procedures for handling and coordinating searches
in the event of a prisoner escape. These procedures should include
steps for involving local and state law-enforcement personnel. Of
course, once the local and state governments are brought in to help
find the escaped prisoner, there is an increase in the amount of tax-
payers' money being used to assist the contractor in its duties under
the contract. These costs, plus the potential heightened exposure
to liability arising from the escape, must be recognized and ac-
counted for by the contracting parties. Under the Model Contract,
Section (C) provides that the private contractor take responsibility
for security at the facility and any liability that arises out of the con-
tractor's failure properly to maintain the prisoners in the facility.
631. Section (B) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract at 26-27, § 10(b).
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(C) The company shall save and hold harmless and indemnify the
contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and representa-
tives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries who may be-
come legally liable resulting in whole or in part from any inmate who
escapes from the facility.
63 2
Section (D) is intended to cover any possible privacy, copyright,
trademark, patent, or trade-secret liability that may arise out of the
operation of the prison. While this is a rather unique provision with
respect to the operation of a prison, situations may arise that re-
quire such protections. For example, for what purposes may the
private contractor use an inmate's prison record or publish research
studies on the basis of their experience? This Section ensures that
the contracting agency will be held harmless and indemnified for
any misconduct by the private contractor in these areas.
(D) The company shall save and hold harmless and indemnify the
contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and representa-
tives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries who may be-
come legally liable resulting in whole or in part from damages to any
person or firm injured or damaged by the company, its officers, agents,
representatives, or employees, by the publication, translation, repro-
duction, delivery, performance, use, or disposition of any data
processed under this contract in a manner not authorized by the con-
tract or by federal or state statutes, rules, regulations, or case law.63 3
Section (E) requires that the private contractor indemnify the con-
tracting agency for any liability arising from the contractor's failure
to comply with federal or state laws. With respect to labor-law is-
sues, for example, Section (E) emphasizes that the private contrac-
tor's actions vis-a-vis its employees are matters that involve only the
contractor and its employees, and that the contracting agency is not
an interested party in any dispute that might arise between the two
parties nor should it be held liable for the contractor's actions.
(E) The company shall save and hold harmless and indemnify the
contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and representa-
tives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
632. Section (C) is derived from the 268 Center, Inc. Contract at 4, § 4(A).
633. Section (D) is derived from the 1985 Kentucky RFP at 40-7 to 40-8, § 4 1.000.
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respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries, for any fail-
ure of the company, its officers, agents, representatives, or employees
to observe state and federal laws, including but not limited to labor,
minimum-wage, and unfair-employment laws.
Section (F)(1) simply requires the private contractor to pay the
contracting agency's costs that are associated with enforcing its in-
demnification rights under the contract.
(F) The company agrees to pay losses, liabilities, and expenses
under the following conditions:
(1) The parties who shall be entitled to enforce this indemnity
of the contractor shall be the contracting agency, its officials,
agents, employees, and representatives, including attorneys, other
public officials, and the Superintendent/Warden, any successor in
office to any of the foregoing individuals, and their respective
legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries. 6 34
Section (F)(2) is intended to ensure that the contracting agency is
indemnified for any and all costs of litigation in which the con-
tracting agency is a party to the action as the result of the private
contractor's conduct.
(F) The company agrees to pay losses, liabilities, and expenses
under the following conditions:
(2) The losses, liabilities, and expenses that are indemnified
shall include judgments, court costs, legal fees, the costs of expert
testimony, amounts paid in settlement, and all other costs of any
type whether or not litigation is commenced. Also covered are
investigation expenses, including, but not limited to, the costs of
utilizing the services of the contracting agency incurred in the
defense and handling of said suits, claims, judgments, and the
like, and in enforcing and obtaining compliance with the provi-
sions of this paragraph whether or not litigation is commenced.0 35
Section (F)(3) is intended to ensure that any insurance coverage
to which the contracting agency may be entitled with respect to ac-
tions brought against the contracting agency is not waived or subro-
gated as a result of its contract with the private contractor.
(F) The company agrees to pay losses, liabilities, and expenses
under the following conditions:
634. Section (F)(1) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract app. C at 2, § (a).
635. Section (F)(2) is derived from Hamilton County Contract app. C at 2, § (b); 268
Center, Inc. Contract at 4, § 4(C).
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(3) Nothing in this contract shall be considered to preclude an
indemnified party from receiving the benefits of any insurance the
contractor may carry that provides for indemnification for any
loss, liability, or expense that is described in this contract.
63 6
Section (F)(4) is intended to ensure that the private contractor
fully cooperates with the contracting agency in any action brought
by the agency arising out of the operation of the facility, whether the
agency or the contractor operated the facility at the time of the
action.
(F) The company agrees to pay losses, liabilities, and expenses
under the following conditions:
(4) The company shall do nothing to prejudice the contracting
agency's right to recover against third parties for any loss, de-
struction of, or damage to the contracting agency's property.
Upon the request of the contracting agency or its officials, the
company shall furnish to the contracting agency all reasonable
assistance and cooperation, including assistance in the prosecu-
tion of suits and the execution of instruments of assignment in
favor of the contracting agency in obtaining recovery.
637
Section (F)(5) provides that the contracting agency's consent is
necessary before any settlement adverse to the government is en-
tered. This provision prevents the contractor from settling a case
adverse to the contracting agency's interests that might have nega-
tive implications for the government and which the government
might prefer to resolve in a different manner. There are times when
the contracting agency might find it better to litigate a matter rather
than settle a case for economic reasons or admit wrongdoing. This
is particularly true when an action involves a prisoner suing the con-
tracting agency. The contracting agency may desire to risk the costs
of a lawsuit rather than imply that the contracting agency and/or its
employees compromised the prisoner's rights. Thus, Section (F)(5)
ensures that the contracting agency's interests in adverse settlement
decisions will be protected by requiring that the contracting
agency's consent be secured.
(F) The company agrees to pay losses, liabilities, and expenses
under the following conditions:
(5) The settlement of any claim or action involving a monetary
amount covered by insurance shall require the written consent of
636. Section (F)(3) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract app. C at 3, § (e).
637. Section (F)(4) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract app. C at 3, § (0.
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each indemnified party to this contract against whom a claim is
made or action commenced. No such settlement shall be effective
without such written consent. The indemnified party or parties
shall not unreasonably withhold such consent.
Section (F)(6) requires the private contractor to obtain the con-
tracting agency's approval in cases in which the settlement of a suit
will be in excess of insurance limits and will necessitate that the con-
tracting agency pay from the treasury amounts in excess of the in-
surance coverage. In this case, the contracting agency should be
able to determine whether it wants to enter such a settlement and
what the terms of such settlement should be. This Section is neces-
sary because such relief could be binding on the contracting agency
beyond the term of the contract. Section (F)(6) also serves an im-
portant notice function for the agency. The need for nonmonetary
relief may indicate that the operation of the facility is not effective or
that the contractor is in breach of the contract.
(F) The company agrees to pay losses, liabilities, and expenses
under the following conditions:
(6) The settlement of any claim or action involving a nonmone-
tary amount, or the settlement of an amount of damages in excess
of or not otherwise covered by insurance, shall require the written
consent of each indemnified party to this contract against whom a
claim is made or action commenced. No such indemnified party
shall be liable for any settlement of any such claim or action ef-
fected without his, her, or its written consent.
6 38
Section (G) enables the legislature to protect the contracting
agency from any liability exposure in excess of what the legislature
deems appropriate for tort and contract damages. The legislature
obviously has a strong concern for the contracting agency's funds.
Moreover, the legislature and the courts may establish defenses that
may be used by the agency in any actions involving the operation of
the facility. These defenses might include qualified immunity and
sovereign immunity, as well as other restrictions on the liability of
the contracting agency and its employees.
(G) Nothing herein is intended to deprive the contracting agency of
the benefits of any law limiting exposure to liability and/or setting a
ceiling on damages, or any laws establishing defense(s) for the con-
tracting agency.
6 39
638. Section (F)(6) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract app. C at 4, § (h).
639. Section (G) is derived from the Santa Fe Contract at 22, § 7.1.
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Like Section (G), Section (H) is intended to reiterate that the con-
tracting agency may invoke any immunity to which it is entitled
under the law as determined by the legislature or by case law. This
includes cases arising out of tort, contract, or civil-rights litigation.
(H) By entering this contract, the contracting agency does not
waive any immunity that may extend to it by operation of law.640
Section (I) is discussed in the section of this paper dealing with
waiver of immunity, above.
(I) By entering this agreement, the company expressly waives any
immunity that may extend to it by operation of law.
2. Insurance
Commentary:
The Insurance section of the contract should be very detailed and
specific. The contracting parties should attempt to cover all possi-
ble liabilities arising from the operation of the facility, including
damage to property and injury to persons resulting from fire, es-
cape, and other such incidents.
The amount of insurance should also be an issue of major con-
cern. The private contractor should be required to provide per-
sonal-liability insurance in excess of one-million dollars per claim
and well in excess of an aggregate amount of twenty-five-million
dollars. In class-action cases, the aggregate cost or liability to the
private contractor could easily exceed twenty-five-million dollars,
particularly when a major overhaul of the facility or system is man-
dated. It is important that this insurance cover both personal-injury
claims that are brought under state tort law as well as claims arising
out of civil-rights actions that are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the fourteenth amendment.
641
As a practical matter, the cost of insurance, like other costs of do-
ing business, will factor into the price that the private contractor
charges the contracting agency to operate the facility. Because of
640. Section (H) is derived from the Santa Fe Contract at 22, § 7.1.
641. CCA Chairman Thomas Beasley has stated that "95% of the cases against [CCA] are
filed under the Civil Rights Act, and you are only liable if you violate their civil rights. By
subscribing to ACA standards we are prima facie not in violation of constitutional issues."
CC4 Falls Short, supra note 582. This statement is incorrect, and vividly demonstrates why
contracting agencies must have a clear understanding of the legal issues surrounding liability
in the privatization context. In this example, the misstatement of law operates to reduce the
perceived insurance needs of the contractor, and thus increases the contracting agency's risk
of liability.
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the difficulty that many private contractors presently face in securing
insurance and the high rates that are charged for such insurance,
6 42
the insurance costs may be a very important element in a
cost/benefit analysis of the privatization of prison and jail opera-
tions. It is essential, therefore, for the contracting agency to ensure
that it is not subject to any extra costs merely because it has chosen
to contract out the operation of a facility to a private contractor who
either must pay higher insurance rates than the contracting agency
did when it operated the facility, or is unable to obtain sufficient
coverage and consequently places the contracting agency at risk of
paying the difference between what the contractor can afford to pay
and the amount of money that is due.
Acquiring sufficient "affordable" insurance may be very difficult
for the private contractor. Nevertheless, the contracting agency
cannot underestimate the importance of requiring this insurance.
The taxpayers should not be subjected to additional liability when
the contracting agency contracts out to the private sector.
In order for the contracting parties to achieve these goals, some
hard negotiations and novel financing arrangements may be re-
quired. The parties may consider: using the contracting agency's
insurance program and charging the costs to the private contrac-
tor;643 requiring a yearly set-aside of funds, a "reserve fund," to en-
sure the contractor's performance under the insurance provisions;
and, if financing is arranged through a bond issuance, requiring the
contractor to set aside a certain percentage of the bond proceeds to
create a reserve fund. Allowing self-insurance by the private con-
tractor is not advisable because of the increased risk to the con-
tracting agency that the contractor will be unable to cover its
potential liability. Pursuant to the position that the contracting
agency should adopt a strategy of limiting its exposure to liability
arising from the contractor's conduct to the fullest extent possible,
such protection is most appropriately provided by an independent
third-party insurance company.
644
642. See CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROSPECTUS 5, 19 (Oct. 1, 1986)
("Although the Company maintained $25 million in general liability coverage in 1985, it was
able to secure only $5 million in coverage for 1986, despite the fact that it [had] never filed
any general liability claims.").
643. See infra Proposed Insurance Provision (E).
644. See Model Statute § 9 (Insurance) (providing statutory language prohibiting self-in-
surance by the contractor). The problems associated with self-insurance are suggested in the
facts surrounding CCA's Hamilton County Contract, where, according to one report, CCA,
without informing county officials, unilaterally withdrew its promise to provide a $25-million
insurance policy and substituted a $5-million escrow account. CCA Falls Short, supra note 582.
Not only is this a drastic reduction in the amount of a previously agreed-upon level of neces-
sary insurance funds, but there appears to be a question concerning whether the $5-million
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It is important to note that none of the monetary amounts used in
the Model Contract are necessarily recommended for any particular
contract. These amounts are suggested minimum levels of coverage
that are intended to account for any possible claim or liability aris-
ing out of the operation of the facility under this contract.
The Model Contract does not address the situations in which the
state is self-insured or has operated the facility itself. In these cases,
there would be no prior coverage and therefore no amount on
which to base the contract amount of required coverage. Thus, the
parties would have to use other methods for devising a satisfactory
level of coverage.
Model Contract provisions:
Section (A) is a logical extension of the Indemnification/Hold
Harmless Section in that it requires that the contracting agency be
named as an insured on any and all insurance policies written for
the private contractor on the prison or jail facility. The contracting
agency must be named as a co-insured, rather than as a third-party
or intended beneficiary, to ensure that there will not be any litiga-
tion on whether the state will be indemnified for any liability that it
may be assessed as the result of the contractor's operation of the
facility.
(A) The contracting agency shall be named as an insured on any and
all insurance policies taken by the contractor for the construction, op-
eration, or management of a facility or facilities, and the coverage
shall extend to its officials, agents, employees, and representatives, in-
cluding attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries.
645
It is essential that the contracting agency and its appropriate offi-
cials are given adequate notice in the event that an insurance policy
is canceled. Cancellation of one or more policies could constitute a
breach of the contract and would make this contract voidable by the
contracting agency. The potential cost to the contracting agency
would clearly be too great if the contractor were allowed to operate
account is actually available for such use. See id. (citing account executive in charge of CCA's
insurance affairs as stating that " 'to say [CCA] stuck some money in a bank is not accurate.
They may have $5 million in a general sense, but it's a complex transaction, [CCA pays] some-
thing, other companies pay something.' "). In August 1986, the Hamilton County Board of
Commissioners passed a resolution amending the contract to require only $5 million in gen-
eral-liability insurance. Hamilton County Bd. of Comm'rs. Resolution No. 886-62 (Aug. 18,
1986).
645. Section (A) is derived from the Santa Fe Contract at 23, § 7.2.
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the facility without adequate insurance protection. The parties
might consider increasing the thirty days' advance notice so as to
enable them to resolve the problem prior to the cancellation of any
such insurance.
(B)(1) All insurance or other certificates required under this con-
tract must provide no less than thirty (30) days' advance notice to the
contracting agency of any contemplated cancellation. 6
46
Section (B)(2) is intended to prevent the private contractor from
canceling any insurance policy or from allowing any insurance pol-
icy to be canceled or terminated. As discussed in Section (B)(1),
above, the economic risk to the contracting agency if the contractor
is allowed to operate the prison without adequate insurance is too
great to permit. In no circumstances should the contracting agency
allow the contractor to operate the facility without adequate insur-
ance. Section (B)(2) also provides that the contracting agency has
the final word concerning whether the contractor has met the re-
quirements set forth in the contract for liability insurance. In effect,
then, a condition precedent to the contract going into effect is the
requirement that the contractor have insurance that is satisfactory to
the contracting agency. The contracting agency should have the last
word over whether such insurance is adequate; that decision should
not be reviewable by any legislative or judicial body.
(B)(2) The company will not cancel, or allow to be canceled, any
policy of insurance without contracting-agency approval. Each policy
shall be approved by the contracting agency prior to the effective date
of this contract. The contracting agency reserves the right, in its dis-
cretion, to reject any policy issued by an insurer that is deemed to be
not fully reliable or otherwise deemed to be unsuitable.
647
Section (B)(3) permits the contracting agency, in its own discre-
tion, to pay any insurance premiums that the private contractor is
unable or unwilling to pay, and which are necessary to prevent the
insurance coverage from lapsing. The contracting agency is under
no requirement to make such advancements of funds, and thus the
contractor cannot rely on such advancements of funds, regardless of
how often this arrangement is used. In the event that the con-
tracting agency decides to advance the funds for the insurance pay-
ments, the contractor must repay the contracting agency such
amounts plus interest at the maximum rate allowable by law. More-
646. Section (B)(1) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract at 30, § 1 (a).
647. Section (B)(2) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract at 31-32, § I I(b)(6).
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over, this total amount due to the contracting agency from the pri-
vate contractor may be set off and deducted from any amounts due
to the private contractor from the contracting agency under the con-
tract. Finally, the contracting agency's election to pay the insurance
premium does not operate to cure the contractor's default nor to
foreclose the agency's right to take any other action provided under
the contract.
(B)(3) The contracting agency shall have the right, but not the obli-
gation, to advance an amount of money as required to prevent the in-
surance required herein from lapsing for nonpayment of premiums. If
the contracting agency advances such amount, then the company shall
be obligated to repay to the contracting agency the amount of any ad-
vances plus interest thereon at the maximum rate allowable by law,
and the contracting agency shall be entitled to set off and deduct such
amount from any amounts owed to the company pursuant to this con-
tract. No election by the contracting agency to advance insurance pre-
miums shall be deemed to cure a default by the company of its
obligation to provide insurance. 648
Section (C) simply reiterates that the private contractor must ful-
fill the requisite insurance demands of the contract as a condition
precedent for this contract to go into effect. Insurance claims
should be the sole responsibility of the private contractor, and not
the contracting agency. This insurance provision will ensure that
the contractor has the necessary resources to pay such claims if they
arise.
Section (C)(1) provides that the contractor must have insurance
covering all workers' compensation claims and other claims that are
brought by the contractor's employees. Insurance must also be
maintained for any injuries to employees of subcontractors or other
individuals who are directly or indirectly employed by the contrac-
tor or subcontractor. In addition, the contractor must have insur-
ance for any personal or physical injuries to inmates. All insurance
under this section must cover, at a minimum, personal-injury liabil-
ity, professional (malpractice) liability, and contract liability claims
arising out of the operation of the facility.
(C) This contract shall not become effective until the contractor
provides the contracting agency with policies of insurance of the fol-
lowing types, for the following purposes, and in the following amounts:
(1) Insurance protecting it under workers' compensation acts
648. Section (B)(3) is derived from the Bay County Contract at 29-30, § 9.1.
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and from other claims for damages for physical or personal in-
jury, including death, to inmates or prison employees, which may
arise from operations performed by the contractor, by a subcon-
tractor, or by a person directly or indirectly employed by either
of them. Such insurance will cover, but is not limited to, claims
arising out of personal-injury liability, professional liability (mal-
practice), and contractual liabilityf.4 9
Section (C)(2) requires that the deductible amount for any claims
under the private contractor's insurance policies must not be
greater than $10,000 and that, in the event of a loss, the contractor
shall pay all such deductible amounts. The purpose of this provi-
sion is to ensure that the contractor will take full responsibility for
all liability arising out of its operation of the facility. This Section
also sets forth the requirement that the private contractor maintain
insurance on the real and personal property of the facility as dis-
cussed elsewhere in the contract. Such coverage must provide for
loss by fire, theft, or other hazard whether such property is de-
stroyed in whole or in part.
(2) Insurance in an amount not less than current coverage as
maintained by the contracting agency as of the effective date of
this contract with a deductible not greater than ten-thousand dol-
lars ($10,000), protecting the facility, and any other real or per-
sonal property described in or used pursuant to this contract,
against loss by fire, theft, or any other hazard, including destruc-
tion in whole or in part. Future additional coverage shall be de-
termined in accordance with reasonable valuation less the
deductible stated above. In the event of a loss, the contractor
shall pay all deductible amounts.
6 50
Section (C)(3) provides that the private contractor shall maintain
general liability insurance in an amount not less than $25,000,000
for each occurrence. This coverage should specifically include lia-
bility arising out of civil-rights matters. Each occurrence should be
distinguished from an aggregate amount in that the aggregate
amount arising out of a single incident should be in excess of the
$25,000,000. Thus, if a class-action suit is brought, each of the
plaintiffs must be entitled to $25,000,000 rather than limiting the
entire class to $25,000,000. This insurance coverage must also pro-
649. Section (C)(1) is derived from Bay County Contract at 30, § 9.2(1); Hamilton County
Contract at 30-31, § II(b)(1); 268 Center, Inc. Contract at 5. § 5.
650. Section (C)(2) is derived from Bay County Contract at 30, § 9.2(2); Hamilton County
Contract at 31, § 1 (b)(2).
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vide for the contracting agency's cost of litigation, including cover-
age for officials who are to be indemnified under this contract.
(3) General liability insurance, which shall specifically include
civil-rights matters, in an amount not less than twenty-five-mil-
lion dollars ($25,000,000) for each occurrence. Such insurance
shall also include coverage for the cost of defense for all con-
tracting-agency officials and others indemnified pursuant to this
contract.6
5'
Section (C)(4) provides that the private contractor must maintain
insurance for any injuries to prisoners or employees who are injured
while traveling to or from the prison facility. This insurance should
include coverage for all possible forms of transportation, regardless
of the type of vehicle used in any particular instance. The amount of
insurance required is large because the number of inmates and/or
officials involved in any single incident of transportation involving
prisoners often includes more than one prisoner and certainly more
than one prison or jail guard or official.
(4) Automobile and other vehicle liability insurance in an
amount not less than two-million dollars ($2,000,000) for each
occurrence and ten-million dollars ($10,000,000) for all
occurrences. 6
52
Section (C)(5) is necessary in the event that an inmate or official
or guard is determined to have defrauded, stolen, or absorbed
money from the prison facility.
(5) Insurance in an amount not less than fifty-thousand dollars
($50,000) relating to instances of dishonesty.
653
Section (D) is included to ensure that, if the contracting agency
can procure insurance for the facility at a rate better than that which
the private contractor can procure on its own, the contracting
agency will make its best efforts to help the contractor get such fire-
and property-insurance coverage. Because of the great expense in
building, developing, and maintaining the facility, this Section pro-
vides that the contracting agency must maintain any such insurance
651. Section (C)(3) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract at 31, § 1 1(b)(3). This
provision has since been amended to reduce the amount of general liability insurance to $5
million. See Hamilton County Bd. of Comm'rs. Resolution No. 886-62 (Aug. 18, 1986).
652. Section (C)(4) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract at 31, § 1 l(b)(4). This
provision has since been amended to reduce automobile and other vehicle liability insurance
to $1 million. See Hamilton County Bd. of Comm'rs. Resolution No. 886-62 (Aug. 18, 1986).
653. Section (C)(5) is derived from the Hamilton County Contract at 31, § I1 (b)(5).
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on the facility as required by state law. The fact that the contractor
must also maintain insurance on the facility does not relieve the con-
tracting agency of its obligations under the law.
(D) The contracting agency shall exercise its best efforts to allow
the contractor to maintain insurance for the facility at the contractor's
expense under the contracting agency's fire and property insurance.
The contracting agency shall maintain fire and property insurance in
accordance with state law.654
Section (E)(1) provides that the private contractor will provide de-
fense counsel for any action brought under this contract that con-
cerns any provision requiring insurance coverage. The contracting
agency, however, reserves its power to participate in the defense of
any such action as it deems necessary and proper.
(E)(1) The contractor shall assume the defense for any action for
which there is insurance coverage with counsel selected by the con-
tractor, but the contracting agency may participate in the defense if it
chooses to do so.65 5
Section (E)(2) provides that the contracting agency shall make a
good faith effort to notify the private contractor of any action
brought against the contracting agency or any employee thereof.
The failure to notify the contractor within the fifteen-day period
does not relieve the contractor from any liability under the contract
unless such failure results in the entry of a judgment against the
contractor or the contractor suffers any irreparable injury as a result
of the failure to notify the contractor within the notice period. As-
suming that the contracting agency and/or its employees notify the
private contractor within the notice period (or other reasonable pe-
riod in the circumstances), the contractor has the right to participate
in and assume the defense of any such action. The contractor also
has the right to select counsel for any such defense, subject to the
reasonable satisfaction of the contracting agency's counsel.
(E)(2) Within ten (10) days after receipt by an indemnified party of
written notice of the commencement of any action against him, her, or
it, such party shall notify the contractor in writing of the commence-
ment thereof. Failure to so notify the contractor within such period
shall not relieve the contractor from any liability that it may have to
654. Section (D) is derived from Bay County Contract at 31, § 9.2(7); Santa Fe Contract at
24, § 7.5.
655. Section (E)(1) is derived from Hamilton County Contract app. C at 4, § (g); Santa Fe
Contract at 24, § 7.6.
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the indemnified party otherwise hereunder unless a judgment shall
have been entered against the contractor, or the contractor shall other-
wise have suffered irreparable injury, on account of such failure. In
case any such action shall be brought against an indemnified party,
and if the indemnified party shall notify the contractor of the com-
mencement thereof, the contractor shall be entitled to participate in
and assume the defense thereof, with counsel selected by the company
who is reasonably satisfactory to the contracting agency's counsel.656
Section (F) provides that any action brought as the result of the
contracting agency's operation of the facility prior to the effective
date of the contract shall remain the sole responsibility of the con-
tracting agency. The agency will be responsible for the losses or
costs resulting from any litigation of such matter. The private con-
tractor is obligated to cooperate with the contracting agency in the
defense of these actions and must comply with any court orders or
settlement agreements that affect the operation of the prison
facility.
(F) The contracting agency shall remain solely responsible for any
losses or costs resulting from claims or litigation pending at the time
that this contract first becomes effective or arises thereafter from an
occurrence prior to the time that this contract first became effective.
The contractor agrees to cooperate with the contracting agency in the
defense of these suits and conform its operation of the facility or facili-
ties to any court orders or settlement agreements resulting from such
claims or litigation.
657
Section 3(F): Operating Standards and Accreditation
Commentary:
1. Operating standards
In any contract for the private ownership and/or operation of a
correctional or detention facility, it is vitally important that there be
reasonably specific and objective standards by which the contrac-
tor's performance can be measured. The contracting agency will, of
course, want to require that the facility be maintained and operated
in accordance with the Constitution and all applicable federal, state,
and local laws, regulations, and certification requirements. 658 The
contractor must also comply with any new laws, regulations, or
656. Section (E)(2) is derived from the Santa Fe Contract at 24, § 7.6.
657. Section (F) is derived from the Santa Fe Contract at 25, § 7.7.
658. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 95 (recommending that states require contractors
to conform to all applicable state laws, regulations, and policies).
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amendments to existing laws or regulations that become effective
during the contract term.659 A contract provision should also re-
quire compliance with any court orders that are rendered after the
starting date of the contract that apply to facilities under the juris-
diction of the contracting agency.
6 60
Moreover, the contract should require that the contractor operate
and maintain the facility in accordance with Standards published by
the American Correctional Association. 66' The ACA Standards rec-
ommend minimum guidelines that govern all aspects of prison life.
Adult correctional institutions must meet these Standards in order
to receive accreditation. The Standards are characterized as either
mandatory, essential, or important. The ACA requires for accredi-
tation compliance with one-hundred percent of the mandatory Stan-
dards and ninety percent of the other Standards. 66 2 The ACA
Standards are strict; at present, most public facilities have not met
the percentages that are required for accreditation.6 63 Thus, incor-
porating ACA Standards into the contract ensures that the contrac-
tor will be held to the highest industry standards practicable.
664
Several issues arise in applying the ACA Standards to private pris-
ons. The first question is whether, under the contract, private pris-
ons should be required to comply with the same percentage of
nonmandatory standards as is required for accreditation, or whether
instead they should be required to meet all ACA Standards, both
659. The parties may want to negotiate a provision that would allow for cost adjustments
where necessary to achieve compliance with the new standards. See Model Contract § 3(C)
(Compensation). The Bay County Contract provides that the contractor may apply to the
county for an increase in compensation equal to the cost of complying with the change in law
or with new standards required by court order. If the parties cannot agree on an amount
within 60 days, the contractor may take the matter to arbitration. Bay County Contract at 22,
§ 6.7(B).
660. Cf. Bay County Contract at 22, § 6.7(B) (providing that the contractor may apply for
cost adjustment for increased costs associated with court orders rendered after the com-
mencement of the contract).
661. For examples of contracts and statutes that require compliance with ACA Standards,
see Bay County Contract at 14-15, § 5.1(A); Santa Fe Contract at 7, § 3.5; American Legisla-
tive Exchange Council, Nongovernmental Corrections Facilities, Programs and Services Act
§ 10(B) (proposed 1987).
662. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL AsSOCIATION, supra note 528, at ii (Supp. 1986). Previ-
ously, the ACA had required different levels of compliance for essential and important stan-
dards; a facility had to meet 90% of the essential standards and only 80% of the important
standards. Id. at xvii (2d ed. 1981).
663. Some 150 of the more that 700 state and federal prisons in the United States have
achieved accreditation. Another 40 to 60 are expected to achieve accreditation within the
next year. Telephone interview withJohnJ. Greene, Administrator of Standards and Accredi-
tation, Commission on Accreditation for Corrections (Oct. 9, 1987).
664. Corrections Corporation of America, although it has promised to back up its claim
that it can provide higher quality facilities by attaining compliance with the percentage of
ACA Standards required for accreditation, reportedly has yet to obtain accreditation for at
least two of its facilities, Bay County and Silverdale - even though these facilities have been
in operation for several years. CCA Falls Short, supra note 582.
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mandatory and nonmandatory. Requiring private prisons to meet
all of the ACA Standards may enhance the quality of the facility.
Such a requirement could impose an unreasonable burden on the
contractor, however, and make the project financially unattrac-
tive.6 65 In addition, only the mandatory ACA Standards "address
conditions or situations which could become hazardous to the life,
health and safety of offenders, employees and/or the public." 666
The "important" and "essential" Standards are not as critical as are
the mandatory Standards. In general, therefore, compliance with
the current required percentage (90%o) of nonmandatory Standards
should result in better prisons without deterring contractors from
entering the industry.
There are instances, however, when particular Standards may be
so important that compliance should be mandatory for purposes of
the contract even though the ACA has classified the Standards as
nonmandatory. Various provisions of the Model Contract expressly
provide that the applicable ACA Standards should be incorporated
as mandatory regardless of whether compliance is mandatory for the
purposes of accreditation. The contracting agency should also re-
view carefully all nonmandatory Standards and expressly incorpo-
rate as mandatory those that it deems to be necessary or desirable.
A related issue is whether, in some instances, private prisons
should be held to standards that are higher than those formulated
by the ACA. The ACA Standards were intended to provide prison
administrators with "a set of reasonable and meaningful guidelines"
to operate correctional facilities "in a manner consistent with mini-
mum constitutional and human rights standards." 667 However,
some ACA Standards were intended as a minimum that "should be
exceeded whenever possible." 668 The contract provides an oppor-
tunity to address situations and conditions that demand more strin-
gent standards than those set forth by the ACA. If there is sufficient
competition among private contractors, for example, the con-
tracting agency may be able to negotiate standards that exceed
those that are required for accreditation. 6
69
665. Telephone interview, supra note 663 (acknowledging that most existing facilities do
not meet the percentage of requirements necessary for accreditation).
666. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL AssOCIATION, supra note 528, at xvii (2d ed. 1981).
667. Id. at xiii.
668. Id. at xvii. Contrary to claims by some prison-privatization advocates, such as
Thomas Beasley, chairman of CCA, see CCA Falls Short, supra note 582, compliance with ACA
Standards is not necessarily the equivalent of compliance with minimum constitutional
standards.
669. The Council of State Governments' Report makes a generally positive recommenda-
tion with regard to incorporation of ACA Standards in the contract. The Report suggests,
however, that those contracting agencies that choose to utilize ACA Standards should
1989] 675
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:531
In the event that a federal, state, or local law conflicts with an
ACA Standard, an issue appears to exist concerning which shall gov-
ern. The Bay County Contract states, for example, that, in the event
of such a conflict, it should be resolved in favor of the applicable
law. 670 The Santa Fe Contract, however, resolves the conflict in
favor of the more stringent standard.67' This issue is illusory if the
contractor is held to the higher requirement. Under this approach,
the contractor will always be in compliance with the law because the
law - which typically defines only minimum standards for prisons
and jails - will either be more stringent than the ACA Standards, in
which case there will be no conflict, or less stringent, in which case
adherence to the higher requirement will not violate the law.
672
Thus, the Santa Fe provision is the better one.
There is also an issue regarding whether the contractor will be
required to meet ACA Standards immediately, or whether it will be
given time under the contract to bring the facility into compliance.
It has been argued that, because ACA Standards are so high, it is
unrealistic to expect a contractor to be able to meet the percentages
required for accreditation upon commencement of the contract.
673
The Model Contract provision requires, however, that the facility be
in compliance with all contractual provisions, including ACA Stan-
dards, throughout the term of the contract. The only exception is
contracts involving the privatization of an existing facility. Because
this situation may present special problems, 674 the Model Contract
allows an additional ninety days from the starting date of the con-
tract for the contractor to achieve compliance with those ACA Stan-
dards relating to physical plant that are not essential to the health
strengthen and modify them according to the individual needs of each facility. It also warns
contracting agencies to place sufficient emphasis on the implementation and outcome of the
policies and procedures embodied in the ACA Standards; the mere existence ofwritten policy
and procedure in a given area does not necessarily ensure that those policies and procedures
are being satisfactorily implemented. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 97; see Note, supra note
9, at 1494 (criticizing ACA Standards for their emphasis on general written policy and proce-
dure requirements).
670. Bay County Contract at 14-15, § 5.1(A).
671. Santa Fe Contract at 7, § 3.5.
672. One conceivable case that would create a real, and not illusory, conflict between
applicable law and ACA Standards would be where, for example, ACA Standards provided
that prisoners be paid the prevailing hourly wage for their labor, but applicable law set a cap
on prisoner wages that was below the prevailing wage for nonprisoner labor. Although such a
situation is highly unlikely, were the contractor to follow ACA Standards it would violate the
law.
673. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 97 (acknowledging that it may be difficult for
contractors to meet ACA Standards unless they are provided adequate time and funding);
Santa Fe Contract at 7, § 3.5 (stating that it would be impossible for contractors to meet
percentage of ACA Standards necessary for accreditation immediately).
674. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 97.
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and safety of inmates. 675
A final issue is whether the contractor should be bound only by
current ACA Standards or by future Standards as well. The ACA
Standards continually evolve as societal interests, prison needs, and
technology change. During the contract term, ACA Standards may
be modified. The question thus arises whether the contractor will
be bound by these modifications. The Bay County Contract states
that the contractor must operate in accordance with the "then cur-
rent" ACA Standards, making clear that future standards are not
binding.6 76 On the other hand, the proposed Nongovernmental
Corrections Facilities, Programs and Services Act demands compli-
ance with the most current ACA Standards. 677 In light of the evolv-
ing nature of the ACA Standards and the fact that the term of the
contract may extend for a lengthy period, requiring compliance with
the most current Standards is the better approach. 678 The applica-
tion of future Standards to the private facility may, however, impose
a burden on the contractor. Therefore, ample time should be af-
forded the contractor to make the appropriate adjustments. The
parties may wish to provide for cost adjustments when the cost of
compliance with new ACA Standards is substantial.
679
2. Accreditation
The accreditation process has been used by correctional and de-
tention facilities as a voluntary, independent, third-party evaluation
of performance. 680 While such a process would, in the context of a
private facility, provide an additional check on the contractor, given
the controversy surrounding the accreditation process, 681 it is un-
675. This could include, for example, ACA Standards 2-4127 through 2-4133, 2-4135
through 2-4141, and 2-4143 through 2-4151. The contracting agency should examine these
Standards carefully to determine whether, given its particular circumstances, an extension of
time is warranted with regard to some or all of them.
676. Bay County Contract at 14-15, § 5.1(A).
677. American Legislative Exchange Council, Nongovernmental Corrections Facilities,
Programs and Services Act § 10(B) (proposed 1987).
678. To avoid a possible constitutional problem, the contractor would be bound only by
those subsequent Standards that were approved by the contracting agency. See Model Statute
§ 4 (Standards of Operation).
679. See Model Contract § 3(C) (Compensation).
680. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 528, at xviii (2d ed. 1981). The
accreditation process initially requires the facility to evaluate and document its own level of
compliance with ACA Standards. Id. at xvii. If the facility's performance falls below ACA
Standards in any area, it must also formulate a plan that is designed to bring these areas into
compliance. Id. If the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections accepts the self-evalua-
tion it may, upon the request of the facility, conduct an on-site inspection to verify compli-
ance. Id.
681. See PRISONERS AND THE LAw ch. 18 (I. Robbins ed. 1988) (presenting arguments for
and against accreditation process); CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 12 (noting that there is
disagreement on effectiveness of accreditation process).
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wise to rely on accreditation as a measure of the quality of a private
facility, especially when privatization itself is controversial. There-
fore, the Model Contract utilizes full-time, on-site monitoring to en-
sure compliance with ACA Standards 68 2 and does not include a
provision requiring the facility to secure accreditation. 683
Model Contract provision:
The contractor shall [construct,] operate and maintain the facility in
accordance with all applicable constitutional standards, federal, state,
and local laws, rules, regulations, and ordinances, and certification or
licensing requirements that are effective or become effective during the
contract term,684 as well as court orders rendered during the contract
term [including, but not limited to, 685]. The contractor shall
also comply with one-hundred percent of the mandatory ACA Stan-
dards and ninety percent of the nonmandatory ACA Standards.
When the contract expressly provides that a Standard is incorpo-
rated as mandatory, compliance with that Standard is mandatory for
purposes of the contract despite the fact that it may be classified as
nonmandatory by the ACA.
If any provision of this contract is more stringent than the applica-
ble ACA Standard(s), the contract provision shall govern and must be
complied with by the contractor.
If any applicable federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation is in
conflict with the ACA Standards, the more stringent requirement shall
govern and must be complied with by the contractor.686
The contractor must maintain compliance with the required percent-
ages of mandatory and nonmandatory ACA Standards, as well as all
other contractual provisions and standards, from the date the contract
commences to the date the contract terminates [except that, when the
contractor assumes operation of an existing facility, it shall have
ninety (90) days from the date the contract commences to achieve com-
pliance with applicable ACA Standards relating to the condition of the
physical plant]. In the event that the ACA Standards are modified
during the contract term, including any renewal period, the contractor
shall have [number] (___) months to bring the facility into compli-
682. See Model Contract § 6 (Monitoring).
683. If the parties have agreed to incorporate ACA Standards and wish to include an addi-
tional third-party check on the contractor's performance, requiring the facility to achieve ac-
creditation may provide an effective means for doing so. For an example of a contractual
provision requiring facility accreditation, see Bay County Contract at 15, § 5.1(B). For an
example of a statute requiring facility accreditation, see TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-
2, § I(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
684. See County of Ramsey Contract at 5, § IV.
685. The contracting agency may want to cite directly to the applicable legal standards.
This reference will aid both parties in ascertaining exactly what is required of the contractor.
686. Bay County Contract at 14-15, § 5.1(A).
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ance with the new Standards, provided that the new Standards have
been approved by the contracting agency.
Section 3(G): Subcontracts and Assignments
Commentary:
A contract for the private ownership and operation of a correc-
tional facility requires the contractor to perform a wide range of
functions. As a result, the contractor may find it necessary or more
efficient to assign or subcontract various portions of the work to
other providers. 687 While such agreements may be beneficial to
both parties, it is essential that the contracting agency maintain con-
trol over the use of such agreements. It must ensure, for example,
that the quality and cost of the assigned or subcontracted work meet
the same standards as those that were originally agreed on in the
contract.
In order to ensure that the contracting agency maintains control
over agreements entered by the contractor, the Model Contract in-
cludes a general provision prohibiting subcontracts or assignments
without the prior express written approval of the contracting
agency. 688 If the contracting agency grants the contractor permis-
sion to subcontract or assign work and all or any portion of the work
is contracted out, the Model Contract expressly holds the subcon-
tractor or assignee to the same standards as those that apply to the
contractor.689 In addition, the employees of the subcontractor or
687. It is conceivable that the contractor might want to assign or contract out all of the
work under the contract if it is experiencing financial difficulties, or if such an arrangement
would prove to be more profitable for the contractor. The Model Contract allows agreements
of this scope, as do the Kentucky RFP and the Eckerd Foundation Contract, provided that the
contracting agency has given prior approval to the terms and conditions of the agreement.
The contracting agency should consider, however, whether its individual needs would be best
served by an absolute prohibition of such arrangements. Thus, if the contractor were unable
or did not wish to continue work under the contract, its only alternative would be to end the
contract according to conditions set forth in the termination provisions. The agency would
then be free to rebid the contract.
688. See Eckerd Foundation Contract at 2, §J; 1985 Kentucky RFP at 40-7, § 40.850;
Weaversville Contract at 1, § 5. This requirement does not extend to contracts between the
contractor and individual consultants or professionals providing services at the facility. See
1985 Kentucky RFP at 40-7, § 40.850. Contract employees are governed by the requirements
set forth in Model Contract § 4(C) (Personnel Policy).
In addition to addressing subcontracts and assignments in the contract, the contracting
agency may want to state in the RFP that each proposal must include the following: a list of all
portions of the contract that the contractor intends to assign or contract out, descriptions of
potential subcontractors or assignees that include the same information that the RFP requires
the contractor to provide about itself, and copies of the proposed agreements. See 1985 Ken-
tucky RFP at 40-7, § 40.850. The Kentucky RFP also requires the contractor to execute all
subcontracting agreements by the contract award date. Id.
689. See Eckerd Foundation Contract at 2, §J. The language used in the Eckerd Contract
allows the contracting agency to impose any additional conditions that it determines are nec-
essary on the approval of a subcontracting agreement. Id.
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assignee are granted the same rights and charged with the same re-
sponsibilities as are the employees of the contractor. Finally, the
Model Contract expressly affirms that the contractor shall remain
responsible for performance of all work under the contract 69 ° at the
contract price691 regardless of whether all or part of the contract is
contracted out or assigned to others. This provision will ensure that
the contractor cannot escape liability for performance of the con-
tract by shifting the responsibility to other providers.
Model Contract provision:
The contractor shall not subcontract or assign any or all of the serv-
ices to be performed under this contract without the consent, guidance,
and prior express written approval of the contracting agency.6 92 In
the event that approval is granted and some or all of the services are
subcontracted or assigned, the contractor shall guarantee that the sub-
contractor will comply with all of the provisions of this contract, in-
cluding the incorporated ACA Standards. Employees of the
subcontractor or assignee shall have the same rights and obligations
under the contract as do employees of the contractor.
[Optional Paragraph: The contractor shall be required to provide a
payment bond with a surety company that is licensed to do business in
[the appropriate jurisdiction] and that is acceptable to the contracting
agency to insure the payment of all subcontractors, material men, la-
borers, and taxes, including but not limited to unemployment insur-
ance taxes.]6
9 3
The contractor is ultimately responsible for the performance of all
work under the contract at the contract price, regardless of whether
some or all of the work is subcontracted or assigned. In the event that
the contractor or subcontractor fails to comply with the requirements
of this or any other contractual provision, the contracting agency may
fine the contractor [number] ( ) dollars per violation. 694 Alter-
nately [or in addition], the contracting agency may hold the contractor
in breach of the contract and terminate the contract at the contracting
agency's option.
690. See 1985 Kentucky RFP at 40-7, § 40.850.
691. See Eckerd Foundation Contract at 2, §J (stating that the contracting agency shall not
be deemed to have approved an agreement that results in an increase in the total contract
amount).
692. 1984 Kentucky RFP at 11, § 26.
693. 1984 Kentucky RFP at 12, § 26.
694. The contracting agency may want to set different levels of fines that are appropriate




Section 3(H): Independent-Contractor Status
Commentary:
For purposes of the contract, the private contractor should be an
independent contractor vis-A-vis the contracting agency. An express
provision in the contract can be used as prima facie evidence that an
employer-employee relationship does not exist between the con-
tracting agency and the contractor or its employees and that the
contractor and the contracting agency do not have a joint business
relationship.
Model Contract provision:
Nothing contained in this contract is intended or should be con-
strued as creating the relationship of co-partners, joint-ventures, or an
association between the contracting agency and the contractor. The
contractor is an independent contractor and neither the contractor nor
its employees, agents, or representatives shall be considered employ-
ees, agents, or representatives of the contracting agency. 695 These
parties shall not, therefore, be entitled to any benefits that accrue to
employees, agents, or representatives of the contracting agency.
696
From any amount due the contractor, there will be no deductions for
federal income tax or FICA payments, nor for any state income tax,
nor for any other purposes that are associated with any employer-em-
ployee relationship, unless required by law. Payment of federal in-
come tax, FICA, and any state income tax is the responsibility of the
contractor.
697
Section 4: Employee Issues
Section 4(A): Hiring Criteria
1. Employment discrimination
Commentary:
The Model Contract provision includes standard language
prohibiting employment discrimination by the contractor and man-
dating the implementation of an affirmative-action program.
698 It
also incorporates ACA Standards 2-4054,699 2-4055,700 2-4057,70
1
695. See County of Ramsey Contract at 8, § VIII.
696. See Santa Fe Contract at 8, § 3.7. This may include benefits such as insurance, work-
ers' compensation benefits, and disability leave. See id.
697. County of Ramsey Contract at 8, § VIII.
698. Most RFP's and contracts contain similar requirements. See, e.g., INS RFP at 63,
§ 1(l); 1984 Kentucky RFP at 10, § 21; Santa Fe Contract at 29, § 12.2.
699. "Written policy and procedure provide for the selection, retention, and promotion
of all personnel on the basis of merit and specified qualifications." ACA Standard 2-4054.
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and 2-4059702 - which address nondiscrimination and affirmative
action - as mandatory. These requirements ensure that the con-
tract is consistent with applicable federal and state regulations. Be-
cause of the importance of these provisions, the contracting agency
should have the power to cancel the contract or withhold payment
under the contract if the contractor fails to comply with them.
Model Contract provision:
The contractor shall not discriminate against any employee or appli-
cant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, national ori-
gin, age (except as provided by law), marital status, political affiliation,
or handicap. The contractor must take affirmative action to ensure
that employees, as well as applicants for employment, are treated with-
out discrimination because of their race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age (except as provided by law), marital status, political affilia-
tion, or handicap. Such action shall include, but is not limited to, the
following: employment, promotion, demotion or transfer, recruitment
or recruitment advertising, layoff or termination, rates of pay or other
forms of compensation, and selection for training, including appren-
ticeship. The contractor agrees to post notices setting forth the provi-
sions of this clause in conspicuous places, available to employees and
applicants for employment.
The contractor shall, in all solicitations or advertisements for em-
ployees placed by or on behalf of the contractor, state that all qualified
applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age (except as provided by
law), marital status, political affiliation, or handicap, except when it
relates to a bona fide occupational qualification. The contractor shall
comply with the nondiscrimination clause contained in Federal Execu-
tive Order 11246, as amended by Federal Executive Order 11375, rel-
ative to Equal Employment Opportunity for all persons without regard
to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and the implementation of
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and with
Title 41, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 60. The contractor
shall comply with related [jurisdiction] laws and regulations.
The contractor shall comply with regulations issued by the Secre-
tary of Labor of the United States in Title 20, Code of Federal Regula-
700. "Written policy and procedure provide for lateral entry as well as promotion from
within the institution." ACA Standard 2-4055.
701. "Written policy specifies equal employment opportunities exist for all positions.
When deficiencies exist in regard to the utilization of minority groups and women, the institu-
tion can document the implementation of an affirmative action program approved by the ap-
propriate government agency, showing annual reviews and necessary changes required to
keep it current." ACA Standard 2-4057.
702. "Written policy and procedure make provision for the employment of qualified ex-
offenders." ACA Standard 2-4059.
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tions, Part 741, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 11758
and the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The contractor shall comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
any amendments thereto, and the rules and regulations thereunder,
and Section 504 of Title V of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1973 as amended. 70 3 This provision incorporates as mandatory ACA
Standards 2-4054, 2-4055, 2-4057, and 2-4059. The contractor has a
continuing obligation to comply with the Standards, as well as with
revised or additional Standards to the extent that they are approved by
the contracting agency.
In the event that the contractor fails to comply with these provi-
sions, including the applicable ACA Standards, or with any other such
rules, regulations, or orders, this contract may be cancelled, termi-
nated, or suspended in whole or in part by the contracting agency and
the contractor may be declared ineligible for further contracts. 70 4
2. Employment options for correctional and detention employees at exisiting
facilities
Commentary:
A contracting agency's decision to contract out the operation of
an existing facility to a private company raises difficult issues regard-
ing the possible displacement of public employees. It is estimated
that the costs related to staffing a correctional facility comprise
eighty to ninety percent of the total operating cost. 70 5 This is one
area, therefore, in which private contractors must reduce costs if
they are to remain profitable. 70 6 This fact has raised concern among
employees at existing public facilities. They fear that privatization
could result in the loss of jobs or a reduction in salary and loss of
benefits accrued while they were public employees.7 0 7 The con-
tracting agency should be sensitive to these concerns when negotiat-
ing contract terms. It also must recognize, however, that, if the
economic benefits of privatization are to be realized, the contractor
must have some flexibility in choosing and managing its staff.
70 8
703. This provision is derived from 1985 Kentucky RFP at 40-8, § 41.300.
704. This provision is derived from Florida Agreement § V.
705. Note, supra note 9, at 1498 n.158.
706. Id. at 1477.
707. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 106-10 (describing morale problems experienced
by existing employees at various facilities during transition from public to private operation).
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), which rep-
resents more than 40,000 correctional employees, strongly opposes the private management
of correctional facilities. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
Position on Contracting Out Correctional Facilities (July 1985); see PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS,
supra note 460, at 74.
708. See Note, supra note 9, at 1477 (noting claims of private-prison operators that greater
flexibility in hiring and firing employees will lead to cost savings).
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The Model Contract provision attempts to strike a balance be-
tween these two competing interests. It encourages the contractor
to retain existing employees without restricting its ability to upgrade
the quality and efficiency of the staff. Specifically, the Model Con-
tract provides that the contractor must give priority to qualified ex-
isting public employees when filling its initial staff requirements. 70 9
Former public employees who meet the minimum requirements set
forth in the contract, successfully complete the initial training pro-
gram,710 and have qualifications that are equivalent to those of new
applicants7 1' should be hired before new applicants. This hiring
preference should continue until all existing employees are placed
or staffing requirements under the contract are met.
Under the Model Contract, the contractor is not bound to hire all
existing employees. The Model Contract is therefore more permis-
sive than are many existing contracts. 712 Specifically, if the contrac-
tor can adequately operate the facility with less staff, it is free to
release or not to hire those employees who are no longer needed.
This situation should arise rarely, if at all, however, because most
existing facilities are currently understaffed. 713 Most contractors,
no matter how efficiently they utilize their staff, will have to increase
the total number of employees in order to meet staffing require-
709. The Model Contract restrictions only apply during the initial transition from public
to private-sector management. After that time, the contractor is free to hire, retain, and dis-
charge employees according to its needs and subject to other contract provisions regarding
employment practices, personnel requirements, and staff/inmate ratios.
710. See Model Contract § 4(B) (Employee Training Requirements).
711. The Model Contract language is intended to allow the contractor to consider all
appropriate factors, including but not limited to: years of experience in the same or similar
position; level of education or training relevant to the position; and quality of previous per-
formance as evidenced by performance evaluations and records, suits against the employee or
applicant in his or her individual capacity in which the employee or applicant was held liable,
and any other indicia of past job performance.
712. Many contracts require the contractor to hire all existing employees. See CSG RE-
PORT, supra note 533, at 106-07 (noting that Bay County and Hamilton County contracts re-
quire contractors to hire all existing employees); C. RING, supra note 484, at 9. The Bay
County Contract requires that existing employees complete a 40-hour training course to "be
accepted as regular employees of CCA." Bay County Contract at 17, § 5.4. The Hamilton
County Contract requires that the contractor hire all existing employees, but gives the con-
tractor discretion to dismiss them as necessary at a later date. Hamilton County Contract at
41, § 16. For a statute that requires that existing employees be hired by the contractor for
"any position for which they qualify," see 1988 N.M. Laws § 33-1-17(D). See also ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 12-50-110 (Supp. 1987) ("employees whose employment becomes subject to a con-
tract with a private prison contractor shall be given a hiring preference for available positions
for which they qualify").
The Council of State Governments' Report recommends that the contract include a provi-
sion requiring the contractor to give employment preference to existing employees. CSG
REPORT, supra note 533, at xiv.
713. Cf. Funke, The Economics of Prison Crowding, 478 ANNALS 86, 88-89 (1985) (discussing
high cost of staffing).
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ments under the Model Contract.714
Although the contractor is also free to hire a new applicant before
hiring an existing employee, the contractor must first determine that
the new applicant is better qualified for the position.715 The pool of
new applicants who are better qualified than existing employees is
likely to be very small. Therefore, only those existing employees
who are minimally qualified or unqualified for their positions will
face the threat of losing their jobs.
The Model Contract also requires that the contractor offer ex-
isting employees salaries and benefits comparable to those that they
received as public employees. 71 6 In addition, the contractor is re-
quired to credit each existing employee with the amount of annual
leave and compensatory and personal time he or she had accrued
while employed by the contracting agency. 7 17 This requirement is
necessary if qualified existing employees are to have the option of
keeping their jobs at the newly privatized facility. The practical ef-
fect of reducing salaries or eliminating benefits would be to remove
this option for many employees. 718
Model Contract provision:
Every correctional employee currently employed by the contracting
agency who desires to remain employed at the facility shall be ac-
cepted as an employee of the contractor if he or she satisfactorily com-
pletes the training requirements detailed in Subsection 4(B) of this
contract and meets all other requirements regarding employees set
forth in this contract.719 The contractor shall not be required to hire
otherwise qualified employees from the existing facility if the contrac-
714. See Model Contract § 4(D) (Staff Ratio).
715. See supra note 711 (listing factors that contractor should consider in determining
qualification levels of employees and new applicants).
716. In two examples cited by the Council of State Governments' Report, the Bay County
and Hamilton County facilities, the contractor agreed to maintain salary and certain benefits
at the same or slightly higher levels. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 106-07. In the Bay
County Contract, for example, CCA promised that all existing employees would receive at
least a $500 increase over the salary they were currently earning with the county. Bay County
Contract app. A, attach. 1.
717. Many of the objections raised by employees of existing facilities have centered on the
status of accrued-leave time and retirement benefits. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 106-
07 (describing concerns of employees at Bay County, Hamilton County, and Florida School
for Boys facilities over loss of accrued benefits). The Model Contract does not expressly ad-
dress the issue of retirement benefits. It is recommended, however, that the contracting
agency take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that accrued employee-retirement benefits
are not lost due to the privatization of the facility. This may mean that the contracting agency
will have to assume responsibility for payment of benefits already earned.
718. See C. RING, supra note 484, at 28 (observing that, in general, employees of public
corrections facilities remain underpaid). Any further reduction in salary and benefits, there-
fore, could force many employees to leave the facility.
719. This requirement does not apply to administrative employees at existing facilities.
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tor has met the staffing levels required by this contract. The contrac-
tor shall also have the discretion to hire a new applicant over an
existing employee if the contractor determines that the new applicant
is better qualified for the position. Factors to be considered may in-
clude, but are not limited to, records and evaluations of the employee's
past job performance and his or her years of experience, education,
and/or training relevant to the position.
This provision supersedes ACA Standards 2-4054 and 2-4055 during
the initial hiring period only.
720
Existing employees shall be entitled to starting wages and benefits,
including [list benefits] that are equal to or greater than the wages and
benefits that an employee of comparable qualifications would receive
for the same position from the contracting agency. The contractor
shall credit to each former contracting-agency employee the amount of
annual leave, compensatory leave time, and personal leave time, in-
cluding sick leave, that the contracting agency certifies the employee
has on the day employment terminates with the contracting agency.
7 21
3. Employee background investigations
Commentary:
For security reasons, the Model Contract provides that each
prospective employee must be subject to a thorough background in-
vestigation before being accepted for employment. 722 This investi-
gation should include examination of an applicant's criminal,
medical, and employment history. The applicable ACA Standards
are 2-4061 through 2-4063.723 Included in the ACA Standards are
provisions for a criminal record check, a physical examination, and a
probationary appointment term of six months to one year. Persons
not performing satisfactorily may be terminated during the proba-
tionary period.
720. These provisions recommend policy for the selection of employees and are incorpo-
rated as mandatory in Model Contract § 4(A)(1) (Employment Discrimination).
721. This provision is derived from the Santa Fe Contract at 8, § 3.8.
722. Inadequate background checks on private prison guards may lead to guards with
questionable backgrounds being employed at correctional facilities. See Note, supra note 9, at
1498 (citing Pennsylvania Legis. Budget & Finance Comm., Report on a Study of Issues Re-
lated to the Potential Operation of Private Prisons in Pennsylvania 30 (1985)).
723. These Standards provide:
2-4061: "In accordance with state and federal statutes, a criminal record check is con-
ducted on all new employees to ascertain whether there are criminal convictions which have a
specific relationship to job performance."
2-4062: "Written policy and procedure require a physical examination of all employees by
a physician at the time of employment. Provisions exist for reexamination when indicated."
2-4063: "Written policy and procedure provide that employees are appointed initially for
a probationary term of not less than six months or more than one year."
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Model Contract provision:
Prior to and as a condition of employment, a background investiga-
tion shall be made of each prospective employee. This investigation
shall include criminal (obtaining FBI or NCIC records), medical, and
employment histories. A prospective employee may be denied employ-
ment if the background investigation reveals information indicating
that he or she would not be an appropriate correctional employee. The
contractor shall maintain fingerprint charts on every employee.
724
This provision incorporates as mandatory ACA Standards 2-4061
through 2-4063. The contractor has a continuing obligation to comply
with these Standards, as well as with subsequent ACA Standards to
the extent that they are approved by the contracting agency.
Section 4(B): Employee Training Requirements
Commentary:
It is imperative that all of the private contractor's employees re-
ceive adequate training in order to ensure the safety and security of
the inmates, the staff, and the surrounding community. Proper
training may also enable the contracting agency to reduce its poten-
tial liability. 725 There has already been some controversy concern-
ing the adequacy of the training that is currently provided for
private corrections employees and security guards. 726 To avoid
problems in this area, the contract must set forth with sufficient
specificity the amount and substance of the training that the con-
tractor is required to provide its employees.
The Model Contract requires that all prison and jail employees
receive new-employee orientation training prior to their initial as-
signment with the contractor. It also provides for regular training
and continuing-education programs that are appropriate for the var-
ious types of employment. The contractor is required to carry out
these programs in accordance with the guidelines set forth in ACA
724. This provision is derived from Santa Fe Contract at 9, § 3.9; 1985 Kentucky RFP at
30-3, § 30.300.
725. See Note, supra note 629, at 833 n.96 (noting that insufficient training of staff may
lead to prisoner lawsuits alleging due process violations); W. Collins, Contracting for Correc-
tional Services: Some Legal Considerations 17-18 (1985) (unpublished memorandum) (advis-
ing that inadequately trained prison employees may draw contracting agencies into litigation).
726. See CCA Falls Short, supra note 582 (citing statements by former CCA employees that
CCA has not provided adequate training for guards at its Silverdale facility); Note, supra note
629, at 833 n.96 (noting inadequate training of prison guards); Note, supra note 9, at 1498-99
(giving examples of inadequate training provided for private correctional employees). At
least one contract for a private facility, however, requires training in accordance with ACA
Standards and all applicable statutory provisions. See Santa Fe Contract at 10, § 3.10 and app.
D (describing elements of CCA's training program).
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Standards 2-4079 through 2-4101.727 Standards 2-4079 through
727. ACA Standards 2-4079 through 2-4101 provide as follows:
2-4079: "Written policy and procedure provide that the institution's training programs
for all employees are specifically planned, coordinated, and supervised by a qualified em-
ployee at the supervisory level, and reviewed annually. (Essential)." This Standard has been
incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4080: "The individual coordinating the training and staff development program has re-
ceived specialized training for that position. At a minimum, full-time training personnel
should have completed a 40 hour training-for-trainers course. (Essential)." This Standard
has been incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4080-1 (added Aug. 1985): "The training curriculum is developed, evaluated, and up-
dated based on an annual needs assessment that identifies current job-related training
needs." This Standard has been incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4081: (revised Aug. 1983): "There is an advisory training committee composed of the
institution's training officer and representatives from various institution departments. The
committee develops a training plan for the institution, meets at least quarterly to review pro-
gress and resolve problems, maintains a written record of its deliberations, and reports to the
warden/superintendent." This Standard has been incorporated in the Model Contract as
mandatory.
2-4083: "The institution's training and staff development plan provides for an ongoing
formal evaluation of all pre-service, in-service, and specialized training programs, with a writ-
ten report prepared annually. (Essential)." This Standard has been incorporated in the
Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4084: "Library and reference services are available to complement the training and staff
development program. (Essential)."
2-4085: "The training and staff development program uses the resources of other public
and private agencies, private industry, colleges, and libraries. (Important)."
2-4086: "Space and equipment required for the training and staff development program
is available. (Essential)." This Standard has been incorporated in the Model Contract as
mandatory.
2-4087: "The budget includes funds for reimbursing staff for additional time spent in
training or for replacement personnel required when regular personnel are off duty for train-
ing purposes. (Essential)." This Standard has been incorporated in the Model Contract as
mandatory.
2-4088: "Written policy and procedure provide that all new full-time employees receive
40 hours of orientation/training prior to being independently assigned to a particular job.
This orientation/training is to include, at a minimum, orientation to the purpose, goals, poli-
cies and procedures of the institution and parent agency; working conditions and regulations;
responsibilities and rights of employees; and an overview of the correctional field. Depending
upon the employee(s) and the requirements of the particular job, the orientation/training
may include some preparatory instruction related to the particular job. There are provisions
for acknowledging and giving credit for prior training received. (Essential)." This Standard
has been incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4089: "Written policy and procedure provide that all clerical/support employees who
have minimal contact with inmates receive an additional 16 hours of training during the firs"
year of employment and 16 hours of training each year thereafter. (Essential)." This Stan-
dard has been incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4090: "Written policy and procedure provide that all support employees who have reg-
ular or daily inmate contact receive an additional 40 hours of training during their first year of
employment and an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment.
(Essential)." This Standard has been incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4091: "Written policy and procedure provide that all professional specialists employees
who have inmate contact receive an additional 40 hours of training during their first year of
employment, and an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment.
(Essential)." This Standard has been incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4092: "Written policy and procedure provide that all new correctional officers receive
an additional 120 hours of training during their first year of employment and an additional 40
hours of training each subsequent year of employment. At a minimum this training covers the
following areas:
Security procedures
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2-4083, 2-4086 through 2-4095, and 2-4098 are incorporated as
mandatory provisions in the Model Contract.
728
The contracting agency may also want to strengthen these general
ACA guidelines729 by including more specific training requirements
for certain types of employees, or by actually formulating a training
Supervision of inmates
Use of force regulations and tactics
Report writing
Inmate rules and regulations
Rights and responsibilities of inmates




Social/cultural life styles of the inmate population
Communication skills
First aid.
(Essential)." This Standard has been incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4093: "Written policy and procedure provide that all administrative and managerial
staff receive 40 hours of training during their first year of employment, and an additional 40
hours of training each subsequent year of employment. This training covers the following
areas, at a minimum: general management and related subjects; labor law; employee-manage-
ment relations; the interaction of elements of the criminal justice system; and relationships
with other service agencies. (Essential)." This Standard has been incorporated in the Model
Contract as mandatory.
2-4094: "When there is an emergency unit, written policy and procedure provide that all
assigned officers have one year of experience as a correctional officer, which includes 160
hours of training, that they receive 40 hours of relevant emergency unit training prior to
assignment, which may be part of the first year training (160 hours), and that at least 16 hours
of the 40 hours of annual training be specifically related to emergency unit assignment. (Es-
sential)." This Standard has been incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4095: "All part-time staff receive formal orientation appropriate to their assignments
and additional training as needed. (Essential)." This Standard has been incorporated in the
Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4096: "Prior to assignment to a post involving possible use of a firearm, all personnel
authorized to use firearms receive appropriate firearm training; this training covers the use,
safety, care, and constraints involved in the use of firearms. All authorized personnel are
required to demonstrate competency on at least an annual basis. (Mandatory)."
2-4097: "All personnel authorized to use chemical agents are thoroughly trained in their
use and in the treatment of individuals exposed to the chemical agent. (Mandatory)."
2-4098: "All security and custodial personnel are trained in approved methods of self-
defense and the use of force as a last resort to control inmates. (Essential)." This Standard
has been incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory.
2-4099: "Written policy and procedure encourage employees to continue their education.
(Important)."
2-4100: Deleted Mar. 1983.
2-4101 (revised Mar. 1983): "The institution encourages and provides administrative
leave and/or reimbursement for employees attending approved professional meetings, semi-
nars, and/or similar work-related activities."
728. The ACA has classified the majority of these Standards as nonmandatory. Because
of the importance of these provisions to the adequate training of correctional employees,
however, they are incorporated as mandatory in the Model Contract. Changes from nonman-
datory to mandatory status are indicated in supra note 727.
729. ACA Standards have been criticized for their emphasis on formal policy and proce-
dure rather than actual performance, as well as for the generality of their terms. See Note,
supra note 9, at 1475, 1494 (commenting that reliance on ACA Standards, which do not set
forth "concrete" requirements, may allow private contractors to cut costs in the area of per-
sonnel training).
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program that the contractor would be required to implement. 730
Alternatively, the contracting agency may require the contractor to
include a detailed training program as a part of its proposal.73' This
program would then be incorporated in the contract, subject to
modifications negotiated by the parties.
It has been suggested that adequate training of private correc-
tional employees can be achieved through contractual and statutory
provisions that require the contractor's employees to meet the same
training standards as do employees of public facilities. 73 2 While
such a requirement is certainly preferable to allowing training levels
that are lower than those that are currently achieved by public em-
ployees, 733 it nevertheless may not be sufficient. In many cases, stat-
utory and regulatory standards regarding training of prison and jail
personnel are minimal and the actual training that is provided to
public employees is inadequate. 7 4 In those cases, however, in
which state statutes, local ordinances, or existing contracting-agency
policies set training standards that are higher than those that would
be achieved by compliance with ACA Standards, the contract should
require the contractor to meet the more stringent public
standards.
73 5
The parties should also address whether an employee's previous
training may be credited to the training hours that are required for
new employees under the contract. 73 6 This issue will arise primarily
when the contractor takes over an existing facility and hires employ-
ees who are currently working at that facility. The issue may also be
relevant, however, when the contractor provides a new facility and
hires employees from other facilities (whether in the same or other
730. For example, in addition to requiring the Eckerd Foundation to carry out training of
its employees in accordance with ACA Standards, the State of Florida also specifically requires
Aggression Control Techniques training for all child-care staff. Eckerd Foundation Contract
attach. I, at 4. Pennsylvania has considered a proposal that provided that its Department of
Corrections shall formulate a specific training program for private-prison employees. See H.
307, P.N. 337 (Pa. House of Rep. 1985); Woolley, supra note 582, at 324.
731. See Texas RFP at 2, § 3(c).
732. Cf. C. RING, supra note 484, at 28-30 (arguing that fears that private companies will
cut costs in part by spending less on training are unwarranted because the government has
authority to and should require that private providers meet the same standards as those that
must be met in public facilities).
733. Florida requires that private providers must meet the same training requirements
that the government must meet. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.105(6) (West. Cum. Supp. 1988).
Other states leave this matter to the contracting parties. See MONT. CODE ANN, § 7-32-
2232(2)(e) (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(C) (1987).
734. See Note, supra note 629, at 833.
735. Cf. Model Contract § 3(F) (Operating Standards).




The Model Contract does not include a provision addressing this
issue. Should the parties. choose to adopt such a provision, they
should consider whether to distinguish between employees who
have received training under the auspices of the contracting agency
and those who have received their training elsewhere. The parties
should also consider whether such a provision will adequately as-
sure that the quality of training required by ACA Standards (or
more stringent guidelines) will be achieved. Specifically, in deciding
whether to credit- the employees' previous hours of training, the par-
ties should consider whether to require that the appropriate officials
take into account factors such as the relative quality of previous
training, the similarity between the substance of previous training
and that which is provided by the private facility, and the amount of
time that has elapsed between the completion of previous training
and the date of hire. Finally, all training expenses should be the
responsibility of the contractor.
738
Model Contract provision:
All of the contractor's employees shall successfully complete a forty
(40) hour new-employee orientation program, as required by ACA
Standards, after being hired and prior to regular assignment. Thereaf-
ter, the contractor shall comply with all ACA Standards concerning
training (or more stringent standards, should the law require) and shall
ensure that the contractor's employees receive sufficient training to
comply with ACA Standards 2-4079 through 2-4101. Standards
2-4079 through 2-4083, 2-4086 through 2-4095, and 2-4098 are incor-
porated as mandatory. [In addition, the contractor shall take all rea-
sonable actions to help each correctional or detention employee retain
his or her certification from the (appropriate authority and
jurisdiction).
739
The contractor shall provide to the contract monitor documentation
of all completed employee training as soon as possible after its comple-
tion. Upon request, the monitor shall be permitted to review training
curriculum and other training-related records that are maintained by
the contractor. The monitor shall be permitted to audit training
737. Id.
738. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 951.062(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1988) (providing that private
contractor must pay training expenses of "[p]rivate correctional officers responsible for su-
pervising inmates within the facility"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(C) (1987) ("All agreements
with private independent contractors for the operation, or provision and operation, ofjails
shall provide for the independent contractor to provide and pay for training forjailers to meet
minimum training standards .... ").
739. Bay County Contract at 17, § 5.4.
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classes at any time. 740
The contractor shall be responsible for all training expenses.
Section 4(C): Personnel Policy
Commentary:
A written personnel policy, approved by the contracting agency, is
necessary both to guarantee the rights and privileges of the facility's
staff and to delineate their obligations. In addition to requiring
compliance with all ACA Standards relating to personnel, 74' the
Model Contract requires that the contractor's personnel policy con-
tain all legal standards that are applicable to private industry, such
as the Fair Labor Standards Act 742 and the Service Contract Act,
743
740. Santa Fe Contract at 10, § 3.10(B).
741. The applicable ACA Standards are 2-4060. 2-4064, 2-4065, 2-4067, 2-4070, 2-4076,
2-4077, and 2-4078, all of which are incorporated in the Model Contract as mandatory. These
Standards provide as follows:
2-4060: "The warden/superintendent reviews annually the internal personnel policies of
the institution and when indicated, submits recommended changes to the parent agency
which are relevant to the parent agency policies."
2-4064: "Compensation and benefit levels for all institution personnel are comparable to
similar occupational groups in the state or region."
2-4065: "Written policy and procedure provide for employees to be reimbursed for all
approved expenses incurred in the performance of their duties."
2-4067: "There is a personnel policy manual which covers, at a minimum, the following
areas: organization; recruitment procedures; equal employment opportunity provisions; job
qualifications, descriptions and responsibilities; basis for determining salaries; benefits, holi-
days, leave and work hours; personnel records; employee evaluation; in-service training; pro-
motion; retirement, resignation and termination; employee-management relations; physical
fitness policy; disciplinary procedures; grievance and appeals procedures; statutes relating to
political practices and insurance and professional liability requirements. In addition to this
information, new staff are informed, in writing, of the hostage policy of the institution as it
addresses staff roles and safety. A copy of this manual is available to each employee."
2-4070: "The institution makes available to all employees a written code of ethics that
prohibits employees from using their official position to secure privileges for themselves or
others and from engaging in activities that constitute a conflict of interest."
2-4076: "The institution maintains a current, accurate, and confidential personnel record
on each employee."
2-4077: "Written policy and procedure make provision for employees to challenge infor-
mation in their personnel file and have it corrected or removed if it is proven inaccurate."
2-4078: "Written policy and procedure provide for a written annual performance review
of all employees, which is based on defined criteria and is reviewed and discussed with the
employee."
742. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) requires covered employers to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage and over-
time compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular hourly wage for work in
excess of 40 hours per work week. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982) (minimum wage); 29 U.S.C. § 207
(1982 & Supp. 111 1985) (maximum hours).
The FLSA also applies to certain federal, state, and local-government employees, including
security personnel in correctional institutions. Congress has enacted several provisions, how-
ever, that somewhat reduce the impact of the FLSA on these and other public-safety-related
activities, particularly at the state and local levels. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A) (Supp. III
1985) (permitting state and local volunteers to receive nominal compensation for their serv-
ices without becoming "employees" subject to the FLSA's wage and overtime requirements);
29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (1982) (providing federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies lim-
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and any additional standards that the contracting agency has in-
cluded in the RFP.744 Examples of specific areas that must be ad-
dressed in the personnel policy are: salary and benefit levels; hiring,
promotion, and termination procedures; and employee-grievance
procedures.
Unlike governmental entities, independent contractors who pro-
vide services to contracting agencies are not subject to civil-service
requirements. 745 Most federal and state employees, however, as
well as some local employees, are included in a civil-service system
created by constitution or statute.746 Civil-service regulations ad-
ited overtime exception that establishes higher ceilings on the maximum number of hours
that must be worked before overtime compensation is paid); 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (Supp. III
1985) (allowing state and local employees to bargain for compensatory-time plans that allow
them to be compensated for overtime work with time off rather than with money); id.
§ 207(p)(1) (exempting from overtime the hours worked by state and local public-safety em-
ployees on special-detail assignments); id. § 207(p)( 2 ) (providing that state and local employ-
ees may perform part-time work for the same public employer without hours being counted as
overtime if the work "is in a different capacity from any capacity in which the employee is
regularly employed").
These cost-saving measures are not available to private safety employees, even if they are
under contract with a public agency. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.1(c) (1987) (expressly limiting sec-
tion 207(k) to public agencies).
743. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358 (1982). The Service Contract Act applies to private independ-
ent contractors who perform service contracts for the federal government or the District of
Columbia and whose contracts are for more than $2,500 and do not fall within certain statu-
tory exemptions that are provided in the Act. Id. § 351(a). The Secretary of Labor makes an
independent determination regarding the applicability of the Act, see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
McLucas, 364 F. Supp. 750, 769 (D.N.J. 1973), so it is uncertain whether the Act would be
found applicable to contracts for the operation of federal correctional facilities. At least one
RFP for the operation of an INS detention facility, however, expressly incorporates the Act.
INS RFP at 66, § I(1).
The Act requires contractors to pay their employees wages and provide them benefits that
either meet or exceed the levels that are "prevailing... in the locality" as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, or that are determined by a collective-bargaining agreement. 41 U.S.C.
§§ 351(a)(1), (2) (1982). In no event may compensation fall below levels that are set under
the FLSA. Id. § 351(b)(1). The Act also limits the duration of service contracts to five years,
with provisions for renegotiation of wage and benefit levels at least once every two years. Id.
§ 353(d).
744. ACA Standards require the contractor to have policies regarding various personnel
issues, but, except for the general guidelines governing wages and benefits in Standard 2-
4064, the ACA Standards do not address the content of the policies. Therefore, a contracting
agency should require that the contractor meet more specific contractual guidelines to ensure
that the contractor does not achieve cost savings through unreasonable personnel practices.
These guidelines may be derived from the contracting agency's existing policies governing
employee relations, or they may be formulated specifically for private incarceration facilities.
Further, the contracting agency should bear in mind that the National Labor Relations
Board has focused on the amount of control that is maintained by the contractor over core
bargaining issues, such as salary and benefit levels, in deciding whether its employees enjoy
the protection of the NLRA, including the right to strike. See Model Contract § 4(E) (Labor
Disputes/Right to Strike) (noting that, if an exempt governmental agency maintains extensive
control over labor bargaining issues, the employer may not be able to engage in meaningful
bargaining with its employees and may therefore not be subject to the NLRA).
745. R. Kirschner, C. Becker &J. Sullivan, "Punishment for Profit:" The Contracting Out
of Corrections 20 (1986) (consultant's report prepared for AFSCME).
746. Becker, Wlith ll'hose Hands: Privafization, Public Employment, and Democracy, 6 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 88, 94-95 (1988).
694 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:531
dress most aspects of personnel policy. Most notable, perhaps, are
the guarantees of appointment and promotion on the basis of merit
and the prohibition against termination of an employee without
cause.747 Proponents of privatization believe that private industry
will be able to operate incarceration facilities at a lower cost than the
government will, in part because private management will not be
constrained by civil-service regulations.748 Critics, on the other
hand, argue that the civil-service system is necessary to protect em-
ployees, particularly if they are not unionized, and to maintain or
improve the quality of the labor force.749 The Model Contract pro-
vision balances these competing concerns.
Model Contract provision:
The contractor must implement and at all times maintain a person-
nel policy that includes:
(1) all of the elements and substantive guidelines that are set
forth in ACA Standards 2-4060, 2-4064, 2-4065, 2-4067, 2-4070,
2-4076, 2-4077, and 2-4078, which are hereby incorporated as
mandatory;
(2) all applicable federal, state, and local statutory and regula-
tory provisions, including [list provisions]; and
(3) the following additional standards: [list standards].
747. Id. at 95-96.
748. PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 460, at 78.
749. See C. RING, supra note 484, at 28 (citing critics' argument that correctional employ-
ees will not develop the career orientation that is necessary to improve prison operations if
they do not have the protection of union contracts and civil-service requirements); Becker,
supra note 746, at 108 (arguing that, when labor's tie to the state is severed, market forces will
drive private companies to employ the cheapest labor available); Privatizing Prisons Has Become
a Ripe Market for Entrepreneurs Despite Public Sector, Union Opposition and Risks, PRIVATIZATION, July
21, 1988, at 4, 6.
A lawsuit challenging privatization as an illegal infringement on the protections of the state
civil-service system is now pending in California. The plaintiffs contend that, under California
law,
the sole justification for contracting out is economy. Such justification has never
been accepted as a legitimate reason for circumventing the civil service system.
[T]he civil service system has been constitutionally enacted to ensure that competing
interests of economy, stability, competency, fairness and equality be given shared
consideration in structuring state government. The courts have never decided that
cost-savings should be preeminent among these competing interests, and have never
permitted contracting out solely because it is cost efficient to do so. Consistent with
these principles, the Agreements must be considered constitutionally unsound and
cannot be used in lieu of retaining civil service employees.
Points and Authorities in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order
to Show Cause at 21-22, California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n v. California Dep't of
Corrections, No. 356286 (Super. Ct., County of Sacramento, Dec. 22, 1987) (order denying
preliminary injunction); cf. Local 2173 of the American Fed'n of State, County, and Municipal
Employees v. McWherter, No. 87-34-11 (Tenn. Ct. App.June 5, 1987) (affirming dismissal for
lack of standing because challenge to proposed private facility was premature),
1989] PRIVATE INCARCERATION 695
Section 4(D): Staff Ratio
Commentary:
For security reasons, the facility must be adequately staffed
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The parties need not
include a specific numerical staff/inmate ratio in the contract.750 A
requirement that the contractor maintain a specific number of em-
ployees might reduce the incentive to develop innovative, more effi-
cient staffing methods. 75 1 Even if the contractor were to develop a
system that allowed it to staff the facility adequately with fewer peo-
ple, it would remain bound by the contractually required number of
staff.
More efficient use of personnel is often cited as an anticipated
benefit of privatization. 752 Critics of privatization respond that con-
tractors are likely to reduce staff levels in an effort to cut labor costs
and realize a greater profit. 753 Private companies contend, however,
that the necessary cost savings can be achieved through improve-
ments in compensation and working conditions that boost staff mo-
rale and reduce turnover, as well as by efficient staff scheduling to
reduce overtime.754 In order to further ensure that private compa-
nies will in fact provide a level of staffing that is adequate, the con-
tracting agency may want to require prospective contractors to
include staffing patterns in their proposals, which patterns could
later be incorporated in the final contract.755
ACA Standards 2-4072 through 2-4075756 address staff levels at
750. See, e.g., CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 95 (stating that contracting agencies should
avoid overly specific requirements in RFP's, such as specific inmate/staff ratios). The parties
could certainly decide, however, that a specified staff/inmate ratio is appropriate and neces-
sary for a particular facility.
75 1. See id.
752. See, e.g., id.
753. See Note, supra note 9, at 1477 (predicting that private-prison industry will have to cut
labor-related costs if it is to remain profitable); Taylor, Should Private Firms Build, Run Prisons?,
Wash. Post, May 7, 1985, at A15, col. 4 (citing comments of former counsel to Houston ACLU
attributing what he viewed as inadequate staffing levels at INS Houston facility to private
contractor's need to cut costs).
754. Corrections Corporation of America Prospectus 14 (Oct. 1, 1986); see C. RING, supra
note 484, at 29 (citing CCA-operated Silverdale facility as example of improvement in staffing
levels that can be achieved by privatization). But see CCA Falls Short, supra note 582 (noting
critics' claims that Silverdale facility has been plagued by low employee morale and high turn-
over rates due to poor employee-management relations).
755. See Federal Bureau of Prisons RFP at 3, § I(C) (requiring that proposals include an-
ticipated staffing patterns). This requirement would also provide a better basis for compari-
son of proposals on this issue.
756. Personnel requirements in all categories of staff are determined "on an ongoing ba-
sis in order to ensure inmate access to staff and availability of support services." ACA Stan-
dard 2-4072.
"There is a formula used to determine the number of persons needed to staff key positions
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correctional facilities. These Standards should be incorporated in
the contract as mandatory.
Model Contract provision:
The facility shall be staffed 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. The
staffing pattern shall be adequate to ensure close inmate surveillance
and maintenance of security within the facility. The contractor shall
provide adequate staff to maintain an effective patrol of the perimeter
of the facility during periods of darkness, times of emergency, and
when inmates are not involved with supervised activities and/or
programs. 75
7
The staffing pattern shall address transportation and security needs.
The staffing pattern shall also consider the proximity of the facility to
neighborhoods, schools, etc.
758
This provision incorporates as mandatory ACA Standards 2-4072
through 2-4075. The contractor has a continuing obligation to comply
with the existing Standards, as well as with subsequent ACA Stan-
dards to the extent that they are approved by the contracting agency.
Section 4(E): Labor Disputes/Right to Strike
Commentary:
The Labor Dispute/Right to Strike section of the employee provi-
sions is a crucial aspect of the Model Contract. The risk of labor
disputes or work stoppages at private correctional or detention facil-
ities may be increased by the fact that the legal restraints that apply
to strikes by public employees do not apply to strikes by private em-
ployees. 759 The provision that addresses these problems must be
drafted carefully to minimize to the extent possible the risk of a la-
bor disturbance or work stoppage that would threaten the security
of the facility and the surrounding community.
1. Federal facilities
There are two provisions of federal law that prohibit strikes by
in the institution which considers, at a minimum, regular days off, annual leave, holidays qnd
average sick leave." ACA Standard 2-4073.
"The warden/superintendent can document that the vacancy rate of staff positions that are
authorized to be filled and work directly with inmates does not exceed an overall average of
10% during any 18 month period." ACA Standard 2-4074.
"Written policy and procedure provide for provisional appointments to ensure the availa-
bility of personnel for short-term, full-time, or part-time work in emergency situations." ACA
Standard 2-4075.
757. This provision is derived from Hamilton County Contract app. A, at 13, § 5.03(b).
758. This provision is derived from 1985 Kentucky RFP at 30-2, § 30.300.
759. But cf. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 26 (noting contractors' claims that higher
wages and benefits will reduce risk of labor disturbances).
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federal employees, including employees of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. The first, 5 U.S.C. § 731 1,760 prohibits federal employees
from participating in a strike and from belonging to an organization
that participates in or assists in strikes against the federal govern-
ment. Federal employers may seek injunctive relief for violations of
this provision.761 The second federal anti-strike provision, 18
U.S.C. § 1918,762 establishes a criminal penalty for violations of
section 7311. Based on these provisions, courts have held that
strikes by federal employees against the federal government are
forbidden.
763
This prohibition is reflected in 5 U.S.C. § 3333,764 which requires
760. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 states in relevant part:
An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United
States or the government of the District of Columbia if he-...
(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government
of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or
(4) is a member of an organization of employees of the Government of the
United States or of individuals employed by the government of the District of
Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of
the United States or the government of the District of Columbia.
5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1982).
761. United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. (PATCO), 653 F.2d 1134,
1141 (7th Cir.) (reversing district court's holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and
holding injunction to be available remedy against striking controllers), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981).
762. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 provides in relevant part:
Whoever violates the provision of section 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not
accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government
of the District of Columbia if he-...
(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government
of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or
(4) is a member of an organization of employees of the Government of the
United States or of individuals employed by the government of the District of
Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of
the United States or the government of the District of Columbia;
shall be fined not more that $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year and a day,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1982).
763. See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n (ATA) v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.
(PATCO), 516 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("strikes by federal employees continue
to be illegal, 5 U.S.C. § 7311, and indeed criminal, 18 U.S.C. § 1918"), aff'd, 667 F.2d 316 (2d
Cir. 1982); United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. (PATCO), 504 F. Supp.
432, 439-40 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("it is absolutely clear that a federal employee who strikes... may
be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1918"), rev'd on other grounds, 653 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Air Transp. Ass'n v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.
(PATCO), 313 F. Supp. 181, 185 (E.D.N.Y.) ("federal law makes it a crime for a government
employee to participate in a strike"), vacated in part on other grounds, United States v. Profes-
sional Air Traffic Controllers Org. (PATCO), 438 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
915 (1971); Bateman v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 298 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (D.S.C.
1969) ("[s]trikes by Federal employees against the Federal Government are forbidden").
764. 5 U.S.C. § 3333(a) (1982). The relevant portion of section 3333 states:
(a) [A]n individual who accepts office or employment in the Government of the
United States or in the government of the District of Columbia shall execute an affi-
davit within 60 days after accepting the office or employment that his acceptance and
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every federal employee to sign an affidavit that must contain, among
other things, a statement to the effect that the employee will not
violate the restrictions that are set forth in section 7311 regarding
strikes against the federal government. Federal labor unions are
also expressly prohibited from striking. Executive Order 11491
gives federal employees the right to form, join, and assist labor
organizations. 765 It excludes from the definition of "labor organiza-
tion," however, an organization that assists or participates in strikes
against the federal government. 766 It also defines participation in
these activities by such an organization as an "unfair labor
practice." 76
7
The federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of the anti-
strike provisions. A leading case on point is United Federation of Postal
Clerks v. Blount.768 The federal court held constitutional the affidavit
requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 3333, as well as those portions of 5
U.S.C. § 7311(3), 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3), and Executive Order 11491
that prohibit federal employees from participating in strikes against
the United States government or the government of the District of
Columbia.769
holding of the office or employment does not or will not violate section 7311 of this
title.
Id. § 3333(a).
765. Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1966-1970).
766. Id. § 2(e)(2). Specifically, section 2(e)(2) excludes an organization that "asserts the
right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, or assists or
participates in such a strike, or imposes a duty or obligation to conduct, assist, or participate
in such a strike." Id.
President Nixon subsequently amended section 2(e)(2) in Executive Order No. 11616, 3
C.F.R. § 605 (1971-1975). The amended version omits the language that prohibits federal-
employee labor organizations from asserting the right to strike. Id.; see infra notes 770-772
and accompanying text (discussing district-court decision finding that it is unconstitutional for
the federal government to prohibit employees and organizations from asserting the right to
strike).
767. Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 C.F.R. § 872 (1966-1970). Under section 192(b)(4), it is
an unfair labor practice for a federal-employee labor organization to "call or engage in a
strike, work stoppage, or slowdown; picket an agency in a labor-management dispute; or con-
done any such activity by failing to prevent or stop it." Id.
768. 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1972). The action was brought
by a public-employee labor organization, consisting primarily of post-office employees, for
declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating the portions of 5 U.S.C. § 7311, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1918, 5 U.S.C. § 3333, and Exec. Order No. 11491 that prohibit strikes against the federal
government or the District of Columbia. Id. at 880-81.
769. Id. at 885. The plaintiff had contended that the right to strike was a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution. Id. at 881. The court, however, noted that, at common
law, neither private nor public employees had a constitutional right to strike. Id. at 882. This
right was given to private employees by statute. Id. (citing section 157 of the National Labor
Relations Act, which is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-183 (1982)). In the absence of a statute,
therefore, public employees "do not possess the right to strike." Id. The court also disagreed
with plaintiff's assertion that the word "strike" and the phrase "participates in a strike" used
in the challenged statutes were "so vague that men of common intelligence" would differ on
their meaning and application. Id. at 884; see also National Treasury Employees Union v.
Fasser, 428 F. Supp. 295, 298 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that Exec. Order No. 11491 "can con-
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The court was careful to limit its holding to the constitutionality
of the provisions prohibiting actual strikes against the federal gov-
ernment. In an earlier case, National Association of Letter Carriers
[NALC] v. Blount,770 the court had struck down, as an unconstitu-
tional infringement on employees' first amendment rights, portions
of 5 U.S.C. §§ 7311(3) and (4) and the portions of the employment-
affidav it requirement in 5 U.S.C. § 3333 (since repealed) that pro-
hibited federal employees from asserting the right to strike or from
being members of organizations that they knew asserted the right to
strike against the federal or District of Columbia governments. 77
1
The court also found that the provisions of the statute were severa-
ble; therefore, the prohibitions against actual striking were viable
alone.
7 72
The prohibition against strikes by federal employees appears to
extend to employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. There is no
federal statutory language that explicitly defines them as federal em-
ployees and, because they have never struck,773 there are no cases
discussing the applicability of the federal anti-strike provisions to
federal prison employees. A close reading of several sections of the
Federal Code clearly demonstrates, however, that the statutory defi-
nition of "federal employee" includes employees of the Bureau of
Prisons.
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2105,774 a federal-government employee is
defined as an individual who is appointed to the civil service by the
President or other employee of the civil service. Since the President
stitutionally prohibit any picketing, whether or not peaceful and informational, that actually
interferes or reasonably threatens to interfere with the operation of affected government
agency"), aff'd without opinion, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2603 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
770. 305 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970).
771. Id. at 550; see also Police Officers' Guild v. Washington, 369 F. Supp. 543 (D.D.C.
1973) (declaring unconstitutional provision of the D.C. Code, similar to 5 U.S.C. § 7311(4),
which prohibited policemen from becoming members of any labor organization that, inter alia,
went on strike or claimed the right to strike). Although no court has decided the issue, it is
almost certain that identical language in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1918(3) and (4) prohibiting federal
employees and their unions from asserting the right to strike would also be held
unconstitutional.
772. 305 F. Supp. at 548, 550; see also United States v. Taylor, 693 F.2d 919 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding that 5 U.S.C. § 7311 is not rendered totally invalid by unconstitutionality of
provision prohibiting the holding or accepting of federal employment by one who asserts
right to strike, because offending provision may be severed from statute, leaving remainder of
section fully operative).
773. Telephone interview with Marge Harding, Administrator of Affirmative Action Pro-
gram, Federal Bureau of Prisons (Oct. 30, 1986).
774. Section 2105 states in pertinent part:
(a) For the purpose of this title, "employee", except as otherwise provided by
this section or when specifically modified, means an officer and an individual who
is-
(1) appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in an official
capacity-
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appoints the Attorney General to the executive branch of the United
States Government, the Attorney General is an employee of the fed-
eral government, as is anyone whom the Attorney General appoints
to the civil service. 775 Under 18 U.S.C. § 4041,776 the Attorney
General appoints the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, as
well as any other employees that he determines are necessary.
777
Therefore, the Director is an "employee" of the federal government




Most states follow the common-law rule that public employees are
denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a
public employer absent express statutory authorization.780 A state
public employer, when confronted with an actual or threatened ille-
gal strike by public employees, can utilize two effective legal weap-
(A) the President;...
(D) an individual who is an employee under this section ....
5 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(1)(A), (D) (1982) (emphasis added).
The "civil service" is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2101(1) (1982). Section 2101 provides that "the
'civil service' consists of all appointive positions in the executive, judicial, and legislative
branches of the Government of the United States, except positions in the uniformed services
.... .Id.
775. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2105(a)(1)(A), (D) (1982).
776. 18 U.S.C. § 4041 (1982).
777. Id.
778. 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(1)(D) (1982).
779. Id. There are other indications that employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons are
federal employees who are subject to the federal anti-strike provisions. All employees of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons must sign a form, supplied by the Civil Service Commission, enti-
tled "Appointments Affidavit." It requires the affiant to sign an "Oath of Office," "Affidavit
as to Striking Against the Federal Government," and an "Affidavit as to Purchase and Sale of
Office." Appointments Affidavit, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Standard Form 61 (revised
Sept. 1970); see supra note 764 and accompanying text (noting that 5 U.S.C. § 3333 requires
that every federal employee sign an affidavit swearing to abide by the anti-strike provisions of
5 U.S.C. § 7311).
One other provision of the United States Code supports the conclusion that federal prison
employees are federal employees. Entitled "Protection of Officers and Employees of the
United States," 18 U.S.C. § 1114 states in relevant part: "Whoever kills or attempts to kill ...
any officer or employee of any United States penal or correctional institution . . . shall be
punished ...... 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Note that, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4042(1) (1982), the Bureau of Prisons is given "charge of the ... institutions," and that
section 1114 equates officers and employees of such institutions with officers of the United
States.
780. See Hogler, The Common Law of Public Employee Strikes: A New Rule in Califonzia, 37
LABOR L.J. 94, 94 (1986). Other states have adopted statutes that prohibit public-employee
strikes. See Hanslowe & Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes by Government Employees, 67 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 1055, 1060 (1982). California is an exception to the general rule that public
employees cannot strike. The California Supreme Court has held that it would no longer
follow the common-law rule and instead would recognize the legality of a strike by public
employees as long as the strike did not endanger the public health and safety. See County
Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n Local 660, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 586,
699 P.2d 835, 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 438, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985).
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ons to terminate the strike. First, the public employer, which in the
case of the state may be an agency of a state government or a polit-
ical subdivision thereof, can seek injunctive relief against the strike
in the form of a temporary restraining order or a temporary or per-
manent injunction. Second, if the party violates the injunction, the
employer may request that the court hold the party in contempt -
either criminal or civil - and punish the party with a fine or
imprisonment.
Strikes by certain classes of public employees - such as police,
firefighters, and hospital employees - can almost always be en-
joined because of the vital and direct role that they play in preserv-
ing public welfare and safety. 78 ' This theory is commonly referred
to as the "public safety rationale." Some states, including Penn-
sylvania and Oregon, have adopted statutes specifically prohibiting
strikes by public prison employees.
78 2
781. See Rockford v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 98 111. App. 2d 36, 240 N.E.2d 705
(1968) (affirming lower court order enjoining strike by firefighters because strike was threat to
safety of community); New York v. Tannihill, 59 Lab. Gas. (CCH) 51,999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968)
(finding that strike posed unacceptable threat to safety of patients residing in mental hospi-
tal); see also Pelton, Privatization of the Public Sector: A Look at Which Labor Laws Should Apply to
Private Finns Contracted to Perform Public Services, 3 DET. C.L. REV. 805, 818 (1986) (stating that
the most compelling rationale for prohibiting strikes by public employees is public safety).
Ten states have enacted statutes granting public employees the right to strike. These states
are Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. See Comment, Local Public Employees'Right to Strike After County Sanitation District v.
Los Angeles County Employees Association, 17 PAC. L.J. 533, 543 (1986). Even in those states that
have authorized such strikes, however, most limit or prohibit strikes by essential employees,
such as police and firefighters. Id. Alaska, for example, expressly prohibits strikes by police,
firefighters, hospital employees, and prison, jail, and other correctional employees. ALAsKA
STAT. §§ 23.40.200(a), (b) (1984); see Comment, supra, at 544 (reviewing provisions of other
state statutes that give public employees the right to strike). The Pennsylvania and Oregon
statutes also expressly prohibit strikes by prison personnel. See infra note 782 (providing text
of Pennsylvania and Oregon statutes that prohibit strikes by prison personnel).
782. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1988) provides:
Strikes by guards at prison or mental hospitals, or employes directly involved with
and necessary to the functioning of the courts of this Commonwealth are prohibited
at any time. If a strike occurs the public employer shall forthwith initiate in the court
of common pleas of the jurisdiction where the strike occurs, an action for appropri-
ate equitable relief including but not limited to injunctions. If the strike involves
Commonwealth employes, the chief legal officer of the public employer or the Attor-
ney General where required by law shall institute an action for equitable relief, either
in the court of common pleas of the jurisdiction where the strike has occurred or the
Commonwealth Court.
Id. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.736(1) (1987) states:
It shall be unlawful for any emergency telephone worker, police officer, firefighter
or guard at a correctional institution or mental hospital to strike or recognize a picket
line of a labor organization while in the performance of official duties.
Id. The Oregon law was applied in American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v.
Executive Dep't, 52 Or. App. 457, 628 P.2d 1228 (1981) (expanding scope of statute to pro-
hibit strikes by correctional employees who are not guards, but who are within the same bar-
gaining unit as guards). See also supra note 781 (noting that Pennsylvania and Oregon are
among the states that have adopted statutes allowing a limited right to strike for public
employees).
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3. Private facilities
a. The National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)7a s is the primary body
of federal law that controls labor-management relations in private
industry. 784 The basic principle of the NLRA is stated in section
157,785 granting employees the right to form, join, or assist labor
organizations and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining. Courts have consistently held that
collective bargaining, with the right to strike at its core, is the es-
sence of the federal scheme concerning labor relations.
78 6
b. The applicability of the National Labor Relations Act to private
prison and jail employees
Private prison and jail employees, although they perform the
same essential functions as do public prison and jail employees, may
enjoy the right to strike under the NLRA.787 Prior to 1979, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB, or the Board) used the "inti-
mate connection" test to determine whether it should assert
jurisdiction over employers who provided services to government
agencies. 788 Under the first part of this test, the NLRB determines
whether the "employer retains sufficient control over its employees'
terms and conditions of employment so as to be capable of effective
bargaining with the employees' representative." 789 If it makes an
783. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
784. The NLRA does not apply to public employers. See id. § 152(2) (excluding from the
definition of "employer" all federal, state, and local government entities).
785. Section 157 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id. § 157.
786. See, e.g., Division 1287 of the Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82 (1963) (declaring that NLRA prohibits state attempt
to enjoin strike by employees of transit company); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221
(1963) (stating that nothing in NLRA, except as specifically provided, is to be construed to
interfere with strike as means of redress); Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.) (hold-
ing that employees have right to strike, whether for economic reasons, for purposes of im-
proving work conditions, or for mutual aid or protection of employees who are members of
another union), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850 (1972).
787. See supra notes 783-786 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of provi-
sions granting the right to strike to private employees).
788. For a leading case in this area, see Rural Fire Protection Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 584
(1975).
789. Id. at 586.
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affirmative finding on this question, it then examines the relation-
ship between the functions that are performed by the employer and
the purpose of the government agency. If the Board finds that there
was an intimate connection between the two, it will then decline to
exercise jurisdiction over the employer.
790
In National Transportation Service,791 the Board expressly stated that
it would no longer use the second part of the intimate-connection
test and instead would look solely to the amount of control that an
employer retained over the primary terms and conditions of em-
ployment. 792 The Board gave two reasons for this change. First, it
concluded that the second part of the test was too vague and diffi-
cult to apply. 79 3 Second, it found no indication in the language or
legislative history of the NLRA that Congress intended the Board to
decline jurisdiction because an employer was performing a "public
function." 7
94
Subsequently, the Board has attempted to clarify the standard set
forth in National Transportation Service. Two decisions, both issued on
June 24, 1986, illustrate the difficulty in discerning how much con-
trol an employer must retain over labor-related matters before the
Board will assert jurisdiction. 795 In Res-Care, Inc.,796 the Board de-
clined to assert jurisdiction over a private company that provided
residential job-corps centers for the Department of Labor (DOL).79
7
It stated that, to determine whether Res-Care could effectively bar-
790. Id.
791. 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
792. Id. at 565. National Transportation Service involved a private bus company that pro-
vided, among other things, bus service to public schools. Two persons who were employed in
that section of the company filed suit, alleging that they had been discharged in violation of
the NLRA's nondiscrimination provisions. Id. The Board had previously held that the com-
pany was intimately connected to a public function and refused to assert jurisdiction over that
portion of the company's operations. National Transportation Serv., 231 N.L.R.B. 980
(1977). In accordance with that decision, the administrative law judge below found that the
two employees were not covered by the NLRA. The case was on appeal from that decision.
240 N.L.R.B. at 565.
793. To determine whether there was an intimate connection between a private company
and a government agency that is exempt from the NLRA, the NLRB looked to whether the
company was performing a "governmental function." The Board cited numerous examples
illustrating the difficulties that are inherent in deciding what constitutes a governmental func-
tion. 240 N.L.R.B. at 566 & n.7.
794. Id. at 565. The Board exercised its discretion to decline jurisdiction under section
164(c)(1) of the NLRA, which allows the Board to "decline to assert jurisdiction over any
labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the
Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant
the exercise of its jurisdiction .... 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (now codified in 1982 edition of
the Code).
795. Res-Care, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 78, slip op. (June 24, 1986); Long Stretch Youth
Home, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 79, slip op. (June 24, 1986).
796. 280 N.L.R.B. No. 78, slip op. (June 24, 1986).
797. Id. at 2.
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gain with its employees so as to bring it within the NLRA, it would
"examine closely not only the control over essential terms and con-
ditions of employment retained by the employer, but also the scope
and degree of control exercised by the exempt entity over the em-
ployer's labor relations . ... "798
The Board, after discussing in detail the extent of the DOL's in-
volvement in Res-Care's operations, 799 focused specifically on the
DOL's control over employee salary and benefit levels. As part of
its initial proposal, Res-Care was required to submit minimum and
maximum wage rates for each labor grade, fringe-benefit plans, and
a line-item budget that included salaries and benefit plans.8 00 When
the DOL accepted Res-Care's proposal, these amounts became part
of the contract. Res-Care could not deviate from these salary and
benefit levels without prior approval from the DOL. 01 In addition,
the level of compensation that Res-Care received from the DOL
under the contract was tied directly to the approved maximum sal-
ary and benefit amounts. The DOL would not reimburse Res-Care
for "disallowed costs," which were any amounts expended above
the maximum salary and benefit levels in the approved budget
s0 2
Thus, despite the fact that Res-Care actually formulated and sub-
mitted the proposed ranges for salaries and benefits, the NLRB con-
cluded that the DOL retained ultimate control over these items.
The NLRB held, therefore, that Res-Care could not conduct mean-
ingful bargaining with its employees.
80 3
The second case, Long Stretch Youth Home, Inc.,804 involved a pri-
798. Id. at 8.
799. The Board noted that, as part of Res-Care's initial proposal, it was required to sub-
mit a line-item budget, including a Staff Manning Table listing job classifications, a Labor
Grade Schedule, and a Salary Schedule indicating minimum and maximum salary levels for
each grade. Id. at 3. Res-Care was also required to submit a statement of its personnel poli-
cies, including its policies regarding compensatory time, overtime, severance pay, holidays,
vacation, probationary employment, sick leave, cost-of-living increases, and equal employ-
ment opportunities. Id. Moreover, the final contract set other standards regarding maximum
wage levels that could be exceeded only be an express waiver from DOL. Id. at 4.
Res-Care retained control over hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and transfer of employ-
ees under the contract, but it was required to submit its employee-selection criteria and hiring
procedure to the DOL for approval. Id. DOL approval was also required for the job corps'
director and other senior-staff positions. Id. The Board also noted that the contract required
Res-Care to notify the DOL of any potential labor disputes at the facility. Id. at 6. Finally, the
Board observed that the DOL maintained a high level of control through the operation-stan-
dards and monitoring portions of the contract. Id. at 6-7.
800. Id. at 3.
801. Id. at 3-4.
802. Id. at 5.
803. Id. at 10. The Board also stated that the level of control that the DOL retained over
other labor-related issues was inapposite to this particular decision. Id. at 13; see supra note
799 (describing other areas over which the DOL retained varying degrees of authority).
804. 280 N.L.R.B. No. 79, slip op. (June 24, 1986).
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vate nonprofit corporation that was licensed by the Maryland Social
Services Administration (MSSA).80 5 Long Stretch provided room
and board, social services, and medical treatment at its residential
facility for teenaged boys, who were referred by the MSSA and the
Maryland Department ofJuvenile Services.80 6 The NLRB held that,
unlike Res-Care, Long Stretch "retain[ed] sufficient control over
economic terms and conditions of employment essential to mean-
ingful bargaining" to fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
80 7
Specifically, the Board found that Long Stretch, not MSSA, re-
tained ultimate control of salary and benefit levels.808 It acknowl-
edged that there were, in fact, some constraints on Long Stretch's
discretion with regard to employee compensation. Long Stretch
was required, for example, to submit with its initial license applica-
tion a statement of its personnel policies, a list of staff positions and
qualifications, and a proposed budget for the current year.
80 9
Proposed salary ranges, hours, vacation time, sick leave, and retire-
ment plans were included in this information. Once approved,
these policies were reviewed only when Long Stretch renewed its
license, which was necessary at least every five years.810 MSSA did
maintain guidelines for minimum and maximum salary ranges and
for the percentage of total funds that should be allocated to salaries
and benefits, but compliance with these guidelines was not
mandatory.8 1'
The Board concluded, however, that, despite these requirements,
MSSA did not retain ultimate control over wage and benefit levels.
It minimized the importance of MSSA's review of proposed person-
nel policies, noting that any substantive guidelines that MSSA main-
805. Id. at 2.
806. Id.
807. Id. at 10.
808. Id. at 11. The MSSA retained varying degrees of control over aspects of other labor-
management issues. For example, MSSA regulations required Long Stretch to maintain cer-
tain staff positions, including child-care workers, social workers, housekeeping, food-service,
and maintenance employees. Id. at 5-6. MSSA guidelines set forth suggested staff ratios. Id.
at 6. These were not mandatory staffing requirements, but, if staffing were to drop to levels
that were unacceptable to MSSA, then MSSA could suspend or revoke Long Stretch's license.
Id. Long Stretch retained the authority to hire, fire, promote, or lay off workers as long as it
remained within MSSA guidelines. Id. It also had flexibility in determining working condi-
tions, subject to minimum MSSA requirements, such as amount of time off for child-care
workers and amount of in-service training. Id.
Further, MSSA conducted a continuing review of Long Stretch's operations to ensure com-
pliance with all licensing requirements and other regulations. Id. at 8. MSSA retained the
authority to suspend or revoke Long Stretch's license should it not remedy any violation of
MSSA standards. Id. at 7. The Board, however, did not find that any of these factors seriously
limited Long Stretch's ability to engage in meaningful bargaining. Id. at 13-14.
809. Id. at 3.
810. Id.at4.
811. Id. at 3-4.
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tained were not mandatory. 12 Moreover, the Board emphasized
that, unlike Res-Care, Long Stretch did not need to obtain prior ap-
proval before making changes in its personnel policies.8 13
The Board also noted that, although Long Stretch was required to
submit a proposed budget to MSSA annually, the amount of com-
pensation that it received from MSSA was not directly linked to the
salary and benefit amounts that were shown in the budget.8 1 4 The
Board contrasted this point with the facts of Res-Care, in which the
DOL derived the appropriate amount of compensation from line
items in the budget, including maximum salary and benefit
amounts.81 5 In Long Stretch, on the other hand, MSSA procedure
was to combine the proposed budget with those from all other
child-care institutions in the state. It then submitted its own pro-
posed budget to the legislature. MSSA computed the amount that it
would pay to Long Stretch on a per-resident basis after considering
amounts that had actually been appropriated by the legislature.8 16
Thus, Long Stretch was not absolutely required to allocate the allot-
ted funds according to its proposed budget. Conceivably, it could
pay its employees wages and benefits that were in excess of the max-
imum amounts, as long as its total expenditures were within the
amounts that were received from MSSA. Therefore, Long Stretch
could engage in meaningful bargaining on these issues.8 17
Thus, the important issue of National Transportation Service and its
progeny is the relative amounts of control that are retained by the
private employer and the exempt governmental entity over em-
ployee salary and benefit levels.818 The exempt entity's authority to
approve or deny salary ranges and benefit plans that are proposed
by the employer does not necessarily deprive the employer of suffi-
cient control over these areas.81 9 Rather, the NLRB focuses on
812. Id. at 11. The Board noted, however, that an MSSA official had testified that the
agency might intervene if it found that an employer's salaries were "grossly unfair." Id. at 4.
813. Id. at 11. MSSA stated, however, that providers were required to submit annually for
its approval any major changes in operations. Long Stretch would have to submit any major
change in personnel policies to MSSA under this requirement. Id. at 5.
814. Id. at 12.
815. Id. at 11; see supra text accompanying notes 800-802 (describing method by which the
DOL calculated employer's compensation).
816. 280 N.L.R.B. No. 79, slip op. at 3.
817. Id. at 12-13.
818. See Res-Care, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 78, slip op. at 14 (holding that DOL control
over salaries and benefits deprived Res-Care of control over primary terms and conditions of
employment); Long Stretch Youth Home, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 79, slip op. at 10-11 (con-
cluding that Long Stretch maintained sufficient control over economic terms and conditions
of employment, based on its discretion to set salary and benefit levels); see also Locke, "Puiva-
tization'" and Labor Relations: Some Welcome Guidance from the ALRB, 38 LAB. L.J. 166, 170-71
(1987).
819. See Long Stretch Youth Home, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 79, slip op. at II (observing
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whether the employer actually has broad discretion in setting initial
salary and benefit levels,8 20 whether it retains the freedom to deviate
from those levels without prior approval from the exempt entity,
82'
and whether the employer's compensation is tied directly to salary
and benefit amounts in its approved budget.
8 22
It is not clear, however, whether control over other aspects of
management could, in some circumstances, restrict the flexibility of
an employer so as to remove it from NLRB's jurisdiction. In Res-
Care and Long Stretch, the Board did not base its decisions on the
amount of control that the exempt governmental entity maintained
over other, non-economic aspects of the employer's labor relations.
If an exempt government agency maintained extensive control over
selection of employees, staffing levels, or other bargaining issues,
however, the employer could argue that it was unable to engage in
meaningful bargaining and should not be governed by the
NLRA.823
The NLRB has not yet decided a case that addresses the NLRA's
applicability to private-prison or private-jail employees. Several
commentators have suggested that those employees would have the
right to strike under the NLRA.8 24 This broad conclusion does not
seem warranted, however, in light of the NLRB's decisions. It is
true that, under National Transportation Service, such employees will
not be denied the right to strike merely because they perform a pub-
lic function. 825 They may be denied protection under the NLRA,
however, if the exempt government agency retains extensive control
that Long Stretch was required to submit salary ranges and benefit plans to MSSA for
approval).
820. See id. (finding that, because MSSA did not maintain mandatory guidelines regarding
personnel policies, Long Stretch ultimately determined the content of employee salaries and
benefit plans).
821. See id. (noting that Long Stretch could change its personnel policies without prior
consultation with MSSA); Res-Care, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 78, at 3-4 (stating that Res-Care
needed DOL approval before it deviated from minimum/maximum salary ranges or approved
benefit plans).
822. See Res-Care, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 78, slip op. at 10 (observing that Res-Care could
not receive reimbursement for expenditures beyond specific budgetary limits); Long Stretch
Youth Home, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 79, slip op. at 12 (finding that MSSA did not exert direct
control over specific expenditures in budget, such as salaries and benefits).
823. Cf. Locke, supra note 818, at 171 (noting some commentators' views that the ability to
bargain over non-economic labor issues can be an important indicator of whether the em-
ployer maintains discretion to engage in meaningful bargaining with its employees).
824. See, e.g., CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 26 (predicting that, under National Transpor-
tation Service, private prison guards will not be denied the right to strike); C. RING, supra note
484, at 49 nn.2 & 3 (observing that the NLRA appears to extend to private prison employees);
Hearings, supra note 375, at 156-60 (statements of Dave Kelly, President of the Council of
Prison Locals, American Federation of Government Employees, and Norman A. Carlson, Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Prisons) (opining that private prison employees will enjoy the
right to strike).
825. See National Transportation Serv., 240 N.L.R.B. 565, 565 (1975) (stating that the
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over the terms and conditions of their employment, precluding their
employer from engaging in meaningful bargaining under the
NLRA.
4. Recommendations
Because private correctional and detention employees may enjoy
the right to strike under the NLRA, it is essential that certain provi-
sions to prohibit such action be included in the contract. The con-
tractor should be required, for example, to negotiate a "no strike"
clause in the labor contract with its employees. This clause is an
undertaking by the union that it will not resort to a strike during the
duration of the contract.8 26 Since 1970, an injunctive remedy has
been available to management to halt a strike in violation of a no-
strike clause.
8 27
As a no-strike clause is enforceable only during the duration of a
labor contract, the contract must provide for the periods in which
the contractor and its employees negotiate a new contract, or an
agreement is not in force for some other reason. Therefore, the
contractor should be required to use its best efforts to reach an early
and peaceful settlement to any labor dispute. In addition, the con-
tractor should be required to notify the contracting agency at least
sixty days prior to the termination of a labor agreement and imme-
diately upon learning of a potential or impending dispute.828 These
provisions will give the contracting agency an opportunity to pre-
pare to assume operation of the facility in the event of a strike and
thereby avoid the serious consequences that accompany an unex-
pected labor disturbance. Costs that are incurred by the contracting
agency during a strike or labor disturbance should be reimbursed by
the contractor.
Model Contract provision:
(1) The contractor shall include a no-strike provision in any labor
Board would no longer use the intimate-connection test in deciding whether to assert jurisdic-
tion over an employer who was under contract to an exempt government entity).
826. Although private employees are guaranteed the right to strike by the NLRA, unions
often agree to incorporate no-strike clauses into labor contracts. In return, management
agrees to seek peaceful settlement of contract disputes through mutually administered griev-
ance procedures culminating in third-party arbitration.
827. See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 238 (1970)
(holding that anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, do not
deprive lower courts of authority to issue injunctions against work stoppages in violation of
contractual agreements to settle disputes through arbitration).
828. See INS RFP at 67, § I(I) (incorporating by reference "Notice to Government of La-
bor Disputes" clause).
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agreement that it negotiates with a union that is formed or joined by
its employees.
(2) The contractor shall use its best efforts to reach an early and
peaceful settlement to any labor dispute. Such disputes include, but
are not limited to, picketing, lockouts, and strikes.
(3) The contractor shall notify the contracting agency at least sixty
(60) days prior to the termination of any labor agreement with its
employees.
(4) The contractor shall notify the contracting agency immediately
upon learning of a potential or impending strike or serious labor
disturbance.
(5) In the event of a strike or serious labor disturbance, the con-
tracting agency may call on the emergency resources of the [appropri-
ate jurisdiction] to operate and/or control the facility or facilities until
the strike or disturbance has ended. In the event of such an emer-
gency, the contractor shall cooperate fully with the contracting agency
to ensure safe operations.
(6) The contractor shall reimburse the contracting agency [and/or
the appropriate jurisdiction] for any costs incurred during or directly
related to the strike or labor disturbance.
(7) The occurrence of a strike or a serious labor disturbance shall
constitute grounds for cancellation, termination, or suspension of the
contract by the contracting agency.
Section 5: Inmate Issues
Section 5(A): Inmate Management
Commentary:
There are four major categories of inmate management that must
be addressed by the contracting parties: classification, transfer, dis-
cipline, and parole. Because these areas directly affect the nature or
length of an inmate's confinement, 82 9 the Model Contract reserves
final authority on all of these matters to the contracting agency. In
appropriate cases, and with appropriate safeguards, provision has
been made for participation by the contractor when such participa-
tion would not contravene constitutional rights or important policy
considerations.
829. Of course, many aspects of prison operation affect the nature of confinement - in-
cluding food service, medical service, cell size, the provision of rudiments of personal hy-
giene, and the quality or existence of a law library. See Model Contract § 3(F) (Operating
Standards). The categories that are discussed in this section, however, affect individual in-
mates, rather than the inmate population as a whole.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:531
1. Classification
It is important from the outset of negotiations that the parties
reach an understanding concerning the type(s) of prisoners that the
contract will cover.8 30 Unambiguous definitions are required to
avoid any misunderstanding or confusion over whether a particular
prisoner falls into a certain category or classification. If possible,
the parties should use the contracting agency's existing classification
scheme. Any modification or limitation of this scheme should be
made in the contract.8 3'
Precise language regarding classification is necessary to protect
both parties to the contract. On the one hand, inmates whom the
private contractor is unprepared or unable to care for should not be
transferred to the private facility. On the other hand, the private
contractor must not be permitted to refuse to accept certain types of
inmates - such as those who have contracted Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome or others whom it considers to be too difficult
or too expensive to detain. Allowing the contractor to select its in-
mates in such a way could overwhelm the public corrections system
with formidable and costly inmate detention and could compromise
the contracting agency's ability to function in the public's best inter-
est.8 3 2 Furthermore, to the extent that the contractor can refuse to
accept certain inmates, it would not be acting in its own long-term
best interest. Although in the short term its cost figures and the
relative absence of disturbances and escapes would be attractive, it
would soon become clear that these gains resulted primarily from
the inmate-selection process and not necessarily from the provision
of exemplary services.
2. Transfer
The danger that a private-prison company will act to further its
own interests at the expense of those of the public and the inmates
in its custody is particularly acute in the case of inmate transfers.
Public prison officials consider the interests of the public and the
830. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 65-67 (suggesting that contracting parties clearly
specify the criteria for inmate selection in the contract). But cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-
103(d) (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("Any inmate sentenced to confinement in the department shall be
legally eligible to be incarcerated in a facility in which a prison contractor is providing correc-
tional services .... ) (emphasis added).
831. See id. at 66 (noting that overly restrictive classification scheme resulted in too few
inmates to fill the contractual minimum number of beds at Kentucky's Marion Adjustment
Center).
832. See W. Collins, supra note 725, at 6 (noting that contract could be voided if found to
be an excessive delegation ofpower, which arguably occurs when contracting agency is unable
to function in public's best interest).
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inmates when making transfer decisions. In contrast, a private con-
tractor's profit motive and concern for public relations may lead it
to keep only well-behaved inmates, leaving the more difficult prison-
ers to the public prison system.83 3 A contractor may, for example,
institute a retaliatory transfer against an inmate who files a com-
plaint or lawsuit against the private prison and/or its employees. 83 4
Private-prison personnel might also transfer an inmate who exer-
cises his first amendment rights, such as speaking critically of the
private-prison company.83 5 Finally, private-prison officials may
transfer an inmate who formally requests services that the company
is contractually or constitutionally required to provide. 836
To avoid infirmity, the Model Contract expressly denies the pri-
vate contractor the authority to transfer inmates.8 37 Although pri-
vate-prison personnel may make transfer recommendations, the
Model Contract further provides that the contracting agency
reserves the right to accept or reject any recommendation.8 38
3. Discipline
When a person is to be deprived of his or her rights, procedural
due process requires a hearing before an impartial deci-
sionmaker.8 39 This is so because the delegation of adjudicative
833. See Note, supra note 9, at 1493. One contractor has negotiated successfully for the
authority to require a governmental unit to take back unwanted inmates. 268 Center, Inc.
Contract at 2, § C (providing that if, "in the opinion of the Center, [inmates] are disruptive by
non-compliance to rules and regulations and the norms of operating the program .... upon
notification to the County, the County will, forthwith, by means of County transportation and
personnel, remove the person back to the Allegheny CountyJail"). Such a provision is unac-
ceptable because it subordinates the interests of the public and the inmate to those of the
contractor.
834. See Note, supra note 9, at 1492-93.
835. Id. at 1492.
836. See id.
837. Public prison inmates do not have a procedural due process right to a pre-transfer
hearing, even when the transferee institution is less desirable. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
U.S. 238 (1983); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 21
(1976). Because of the private contractor's pecuniary and institutional biases, however, in-
mates in private facilities may be accorded heightened constitutional protection. Moreover,
even public prisoners may not be transferred for having exercised their constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Olim, 461 U.S. at 248 n.9; Baraldini v. Meese, 691 F. Supp. 432, 442-43 (D.D.C. 1988)
(barring Federal Bureau of Prisons from "considering a prisoner's past political association or
personal political beliefs" in deciding on transfers in federal prisons); Note, supra note 9, at
1492.
838. See County of Atlantic Contract at 27, § 4.14.
839. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) ("Not only is a biased deci-
sionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but 'our system of law has always endeavored to pre-
vent even the probability of unfairness.' ") (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)); .1Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 ("A fair [hearing] in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process."); Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1112 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that the
requirement of a "neutral and detached" decisionmaker should not be impaired), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1025 (1984). See generally Jacob & Sharma, Disciplina. and Punitive Transfer Decisions
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power to a private party poses the danger that the party will use that
power to advance its own interests at the expense of those of both
the public and the individual who is directly affected .
40
In the private-incarceration context, the contractor and its em-
ployees will have two potential biases - monetary and institutional.
Regarding monetary bias, if the contractor's compensation is based
on the number of inmates that it houses each day, then it has a pecu-
niary interest in increasing - or, at least, not decreasing - each
inmate's stay.8 4 1 Even if the contractor's compensation does not de-
pend on the length of an inmate's stay, the contractor will neverthe-
less have an institutional bias in favor of disciplining prisoners.8 42
The Model Contract takes the position that private-prison em-
ployees can never have the requisite impartiality that the Constitu-
tion requires. They cannot, therefore, adjudicate alleged
institutional violations.8 43 Thus, the contracting agency must en-
sure that state or federal hearing officers perform all adjudicative
and Due Process I'alues in the American Correctional System, 12 STETsON L. REV. 1, 91-99 (1982);
Note, supra note 9, at 1485-89 (discussing procedural due process in private-prison context).
840. See supra notes 170-208 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of courts that
have invalidated adjudicative acts of private parties).
841. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing effect of compensation
schemes on ability of private-prison personnel to render impartial decisions at disciplinary
hearings); see also Note, supra note 9, at 1485-86 & nn.80-81 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing examples of practical effect of financial pressure to maintain high occupancy on private
companies that provide services to inmates).
842. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing institutional factors that create
private contractor's bias in favor of disciplining inmates).
843. See H'ithrow, 421 U.S. at 47 ("[V]arious situations have been identified in which expe-
rience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is
too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Among these cases are those in which the adjudica-
tor has a pecuniary interest in the outcome .... ); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-70
(1974) (holding that disciplinary proceedings must be conducted according to the following
procedural due process requirements: prison officials must give inmates at least 24-hours'
written notice of the charges; inmates must have the opportunity to call witnesses and to
present evidence in their defense, absent undue interference with security or institutional
goals; the proceedings must be conducted by an impartial decisionmaker; and there must be a
written record of the proceedings); Note, supra note 9, at 1486-87 & nn.85-86 (stating that
impartial-decisionmaker requirement precludes private-prison personnel from sitting as hear-
ing officers); see also supra notes 126-133 & 210 and accompanying text (providing examples of
similar restrictions in this and other areas). Nevertheless, as one commentator has noted, "it
is, for all practical purposes, probably impossible to completely eliminate private employee
involvement in disciplinary proceedings," C. RING, supra note 484, at 20, because private em-
ployees will inevitably be participants in such proceedings, whether as accusers or witnesses.
See Mayer, supra note 76, at 320. See generally supra notes 170-208 (discussing constitutionality
of delegation of adjudicative powers and concluding, based on DiLoreto case, that delegation is
more likely to be upheld ifjudicial review is available; when prisoners' liberty interests are at
stake, however, even provision of judicial review may not save delegation from finding of
unconstitutionality).
The contracting agency must be mindful that, by delegating the incarceration function, ac-
countability is dispersed. As a CCA employee who was in charge of reviewing disciplinary
cases at a privately run INS facility in Houston is reported to have said: "I'm the Supreme
Court." Tolchin, Jails Run by Private Company Force It to Face Question of Accountability, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
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functions and make all decisions that would tend to affect a pris-
oner's liberty interests.
8 44
Because every state and the federal government already have dis-
ciplinary procedures that comport with the needs and administrative
organization of their particular prison systems, it would serve no
purpose for the Model Contract to suggest a procedure that incor-
porates approaches used by one or several of these systems. The
Model Contract therefore requires that the contracting agency use
the disciplinary procedures and rules currently in force in its public
prison system for inmates serving time in privately operated facili-
ties as well.
This approach is similar to that taken in the Council of State Gov-
ernments' Report.8 45 Both approaches recommend that the private
contractor adopt the rules and procedures employed by the con-
tracting agency. But, whereas the Council of State Governments'
Report recommends only that public officers "participate in... disci-
plinary hearings concerning major rule infractions, ' 8 46 the Model
Contract requires that public officers actually conduct all hearings
that will affect the prisoner's liberty interests.8 47 This recommenda-
tion has two components: first, that the public officer conduct, and
not merely participate in, the proceedings; and, second, that this in-
volvement extend to all disciplinary hearings, and not just those that
844. For example, a hearing officer may refuse to honor an inmate's request to call a
particular witness or to compel production of a particular document if he or she determines
that it is "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." Wolffv. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); accord Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 495-500 (1985) (holding, inter
alia, that due process requires that prison officials at some point state their reasons for refus-
ing to call witnesses requested by an inmate at a disciplinary hearing); Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308, 323-24 (1976); see Branham, Implementing and Ignoring the Dictates of the Supreme
Court: A Comparative Study' of Michigan and Illinois Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 12 NEw ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CiV. CONFINEMENT 197, 202 (1986) (discussing factors to consider in making this
determination). Other discretionary powers that prison hearing officers typically possess in-
clude approving restrictive detention in solitary confinement pending the hearing and decid-
ing which sanctions to impose for rule violations. Because these discretionary powers are
likely to affect the liberty interests of inmates, the Constitution requires that a neutral officer
exercise them. Therefore, contracting agencies should pursue both statutory and contractual
delineation of the functions that state or federal hearing officers must perform. Cf. Model
Statute § 11 (Nondelegability of Contracting Agency's Authority).
845. CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 31-33, 68-70.
846. Id. at 70 (emphasis added); see also NIJ REPORT, supra note 546, at 4 ("Government
staff should participate in all major disciplinary hearings."); cf. C. RING, supra note 484, at 21
(suggesting that "disciplinary boards that hear and decide disciplinary matters could be made
up, in whole or in part, of public employees") (emphasis added).
847. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(P)(5) (Supp. 1987) ("No contract for
correctional services may authorize, allow or imply a delegation of authority or responsibility
to a prison contractor for any of the following: ... taking any disciplinary actions."); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 41-24- 110(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987) (using essentially the same language). But see
Federal Bureau of Prisons RFP at 28, § 2(5)(K)(m) (allowing private staff of halfway house to
sit on committee that adjudicates disciplinary matters); Santa Fe RFP addendum 1, at 68,
§ III(3)(a) (permitting detention-center contractor to staff disciplinary panels).
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concern major rule infractions. Although the Council of State Gov-
ernments' approach may be practical and convenient for the con-
tractor, the Model Contract's more stringent requirements
safeguard the prisoner's constitutionally protected liberty interests.
For some of the same reasons that the delegation doctrine con-
demns delegation of adjudicative power to private parties, the doc-
trine also condemns delegation of rule-making power. This practice
raises two major concerns: first, only legislatures are expressly au-
thorized by the constitutions of their respective jurisdictions to
wield rule-making power in the public interest; second, private enti-
ties might make rules that serve their own pecuniary or political in-
terests, rather than those of the public or the inmates. The second
concern is intensified because, unlike elected officials, private par-
ties are insulated from the political process. Their accountability to
the people is therefore suspect. In addition, once a rule has been
privately promulgated, affected parties will be without recourse to
urge its repeal or modification.
Thus, the contract should not grant the private entity discretion
to formulate and implement its own disciplinary rules. Rather, the
contract should incorporate the inmate disciplinary procedure uti-
lized by the contracting agency at existing facilities. If the contrac-
tor wishes to participate in this process, the only constitutionally
acceptable means is for it to propose rules that the government may
then accept, reject, or modify.8 48
4. Parole
There is no constitutional deficiency in a practice that allows pri-
vate-prison officials to recommend that a parole board either deny
or grant parole.8 49 As a policy matter, however, it would be unwise
848. CCA appears to be moving in this direction. In 1985, the Bay County Contract
provided:
To the extent allowable by law, CCA is authorized to impose discipline and order
throughout the County Detention Facilities through rules, regulations and orders,
both verbal and written, and to punish violations in accordance with the disciplinary
system meeting or exceeding such standards as may be from time to time promul-
gated by the American Correctional Association.
Bay County Contract at 16-17, § 5.3. One year later the Santa Fe Contract contained nearly
identical language, but added a provision requiring that "[d]isciplinary rules and procedures
... be submitted to the County Technical Representative within ten (10) working days of the
effective date of this Contract." Santa Fe Contract at 5, § 3.2. It is unclear, however, whether
this provision satisfies the constitutional requirement that a governmental entity accept, re-
ject, or modify proposed disciplinary rules. See supra notes 136-169 and accompanying text
(discussing constitutionality of delegation of rule-making authority).
849. It must be emphasized that this statement is restricted to parole recommendations. Pris-
oners may well have a constitutional liberty interest in the parole decision, depending on the
jurisdiction's statutory language. See, e.g., Board of Pardons v. Allen, 107 S. Ct. 2415, 2417-22
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to permit a private-prison company routinely to make recommenda-
tions to parole boards concerning prisoners in its care. Apart from
the financial interest that private contractors have in lengthening an
inmate's incarceration 50 and the danger that private-prison em-
ployees' parole recommendations will therefore not be objective, 85 1
the duration of one's confinement is simply not a private matter.
Unlike recommendations regarding transfers, for example, which
change only the place or the nature of confinement, parole decisions
may end that confinement altogether.852 Thus, they more clearly
implicate a prisoner's liberty interest.853
To maintain the integrity of the parole system - as well as the
broader criminal-justice system - and to avoid unfairness or the
appearance of unfairness resulting from the contractor's inevitable
bias, the Model Contract prohibits private-prison employees from
making parole recommendations. 854 Interposing a neutral correc-
tional officer between the private prison and the parole board en-
sures that the interests of the public and the inmate will be the focus
of the parole hearing.8 55
(1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1979).
850. See supra note 841 and accompanying text. In limited circumstances, the contractor
would have a financial interest in decreasing, rather than increasing, the number of inmates it
houses. This situation would arise if the contractor were guaranteed a minimum income. See
Model Contract § 3(C) (Compensation). In such a case, the contractor might be biased in
favor of recommending that parole be granted. This would be an infrequent occurrence, how-
ever, as the population level is largely within the control of the contracting agency. Moreover,
since the concept of privatization of incarceration arose primarily in response to extreme
overcrowding, it is unlikely that there would be too few inmates in any facility. Nevertheless,
the contracting agency might want to consider this possibility in negotiating the contractor's
minimum income.
851. See Note, supra note 9, at 1490 & n.104 (citing Pennsylvania Legis. Budget & Finance
Comm., Report on a Study of Issues Related to the Potential Operation of Private Prisons in
Pennsylvania 30 (1985) (warning that private contractors may manipulate prisoners' records
to interfere with parole eligibility); and UPI Wire Release, Aug. 5, 1986 (Commissioner of
Nebraska Department of Corrections suggests that private-prison personnel may have a con-
flict of interest in making parole recommendations)).
852. This statement is not meant to diminish the seriousness of different levels of confine-
ment or conditions of confinement, but rather to emphasize that it is confinement nonethe-
less, rather than release.
853. According to one source, Hamilton County, Tennessee has responded to this danger
by having a public official make all parole recommendations for private-prison inmates. Note,
supra note 9, at 1491 n.107.
854. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 69-70 (proposing that, since "there may be some
basis for legal challenge" if private-prison personnel were to make recommendations to pa-
role authorities, "contribution to this process should be limited to a presentation of the cacts
pertaining to the inmate's level of adjustment during the period of confinement in the private
facility").
855. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 33.16.030(a) (1986) ("The governor shall appoint [parole]
board members on the basis of their qualifications to make decisions that are compatible with
the welfare of the community and of individual offenders."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-
10(A)(3) (1987) ("the [parole] board shall . .. make a finding that a parole is in the best
interest of society and the inmate").
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For the parole board to make an informed decision, however, it
will need to have all relevant information, including some that has
been gathered or prepared by the contractor's employees. In order
to resolve the conflict between the parole board's need for informa-
tion and the contractor's unavoidable bias, the Model Contract rec-
ommends that the contractor's submissions be limited to written
reports that have been prepared in the ordinary course of business.
Model Contract provisions:
(1) Classification
The contracting agency shall classify all inmates, according to its
own criteria. The contractor shall be bound by the agency's
classifications.
(2) Transfer
The contractor shall have no authority to transfer an inmate. The
contractor may, however, recommend in writing that the contracting
agency transfer a particular inmate. The contracting agency shall
have final authority with respect to any transfer decision.
(3) Discipline
The contractor shall have no authority to administer discipline to an
inmate in its custody unless the discipline is ordered by a [state or
federal] hearing officer, pursuant to [the jurisdiction's] disciplinary
procedures. Rules that are formulated by the contractor shall be null
and void except to the extent that they are accepted or modified by the
contracting agency.
(4) Parole
No employee of the contractor shall have any authority to recom-
mend that the parole board either deny or grant parole to any inmate
in the contractor's custody. The contractor's submissions to the parole
board shall be limited to written reports that have been prepared in the
ordinary course of business.
Section 5(B): Use of Force
Commentary:
The contracting parties must address the issues of when, to what
extent, and by whom force may be used against inmates of a pri-
vately operated facility. There are alternative ways of dealing with
these issues and, because of the importance of the use-of-force pro-
visions, an extended discussion of these alternatives follows.8 56
856. See, e.g., ACA Standard 2-4206:
Written policy and procedure restrict the use of physical force to instances ofjusti-
fiable self-defense, protection of others, protection of property, and prevention of
escapes, as a last resort and in accordance with appropriate statutory authority. In
716
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The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohib-
its cruel and unusual punishment.8 57 The use of force against an
inmate may result in a violation of his or her eighth amendment
rights.858 In narrow circumstances, however, the government's use
of force may be justified, particularly in light of the government's
compelling interest in maintaining order and security within the fa-
cility.8 59 In the privatization context, the question is whether a pri-
vate contractor, which operates a facility and assumes the
obligations of the government, may use physical force against in-
mates and, if so, to what extent. These issues should be addressed
both in the contract between the parties and in a statute by each
jurisdiction.
One alternative for dealing with use of force is to prohibit the
private contractor from using any force at all against inmates by al-
lowing the government to retain this power. This approach is im-
practical and unrealistic in a prison or jail environment, however,
and could endanger both the inmates and the private contractor's
employees. If private-prison guards were not allowed to use force,
they would be defenseless against the inmates, who outnumber
them, and they would be unable to offer protection to other 'in-
mates. Because of critical time considerations in the day-to-day situ-
ations that generally warrant the use of force, prison or jail
personnel would be unable to maintain order and security if only
designated government personnel were authorized to use force.
A second, and better, approach would permit private personnel to
no event is physical force justifiable as punishment. A written report is prepared
following all uses of force and is submitted to the administrative staff for review.
See also ACA Standards 2-4186 to 2-4189 (policies and procedures concerning use of fire-
arms). See generally Bay County Contract app. Bat 22, § M; INS RFPat3l, § I(C)(10)(N); 1984
Kentucky RFP at 20, § e; Santa Fe Contract at 5-6, § 3.3.
857. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Note, supra note 9, at 1497 & n.154 (stating that
guarantees of eighth amendment and due process prevent prison guards from using excessive
force against inmates).
858. See Note, supra note 9, at 1483 (noting that prisoners are subjected to cruel and unu-
sual punishment if state fails to take reasonable steps to ensure prisoners' physical safety).
The eighth amendment provides post-conviction protection against excessive force; in addi-
tion, however, "[m]ost courts consider police use of excessive force in both arrest and deten-
tion as violative of the guarantee of due process under the fourteenth amendment."
Comment, Excessive Force Claims: Removing the Double Standard, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 1369, 1370
(1986).
859. SeeJohnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (declaring standard to determine
whether excessive force was justified during pretrial detention), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973). In this case, Judge Henry Friendly stated that, to determine whether the pretrial de-
tention force used was unconstitutional, a court must evaluate the "need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of
injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort ... or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Id. at 1033. See generally Note, Liability of
State Officials and Prison Corporations for Excessive Use of Force Against Inmates of Private Prisons, 40
VAND. L. REv. 983, 991-98 (1987).
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use non-deadly force in certain defined circumstances, but would
reserve to the government the exclusive right to use deadly force in
other limited circumstances. This system would function best under
a contract that clearly designates the locations in which force can be
used and specifically defines the circumstances that may require
force. Under such an arrangement, the contracting agency's guards
would be allowed to use deadly force when warranted, the private
guards would provide better protection and be better protected,
and the private contractor's use of force and the potential abuses
that may arise from permitting it to exercise force would be
restricted.
A third approach would permit the contractor to use both deadly
and non-deadly force in limited circumstances, and thus remove the
government entirely from the use of force at the facility. One could
argue that private guards would be able to provide the best protec-
tion and maintain the greatest degree of control under this system
because of their ability to respond immediately to any situation in
the manner they deemed appropriate. Such open-ended use of
force, however, may be abused unless certain safeguards and guide-
lines are specified in the contract.8 60 Some of the important issues
that the contract should address to limit the abuse of force include
the adequate staffing of the facility, as well as the training of person-
nel on the distinction between deadly and non-deadly force, the cir-
cumstances and places in which force may be used, the reporting
requirements when force is used, and the contractor's relationship
with local law-enforcement agencies with respect to riots and
searching for escapees.
Adequate staffing and proper training of prison personnel are two
of the most effective methods to regulate the use of force.8 6' Be-
cause it is generally feared that private contractors will cut costs by
reducing training programs and staffing in the facility, these areas
demand particular attention to protect inmates against arbitrary or
excessive use of force. It is essential that the private contractor be
required at least to meet ACA Standards and to staff facilities and
train personnel to the same extent and in the same manner that the
860. The contractor obviously has significant incentives to minimize the use of force in its
prison because of exposure to liability. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 30 (noting effects
of negative publicity as well). For an examination of liability issues in the context of use of
force, see Note, supra note 859.
861. See Note, supra note 9, at 1497 & n.156 (observing that inmates are subject to greater




public facilities are staffed and the public personnel are trained.8 62
The contract must also provide definitions that distinguish be-
tween deadly and non-deadly force and identify when and where it is
appropriate for each to be used, regardless of which approach the
contracting parties elect to use. Most contracts have adopted the
ACA Standards, which generally state that physical force should be
restricted to instances of justifiable self-defense, protection of
others, protection of property, prevention of escapes, and in accord-
ance with appropriate statutory authority.8 63 This kind of general
provision, however, is not sufficiently detailed to protect inmates
against cruel and unusual punishment.
8 64
In contrast, the Santa Fe Contract distinguishes between deadly
and non-deadly force and addresses where and when such force may
be used.8 65 The contract designates the employees who are entitled
to use force and the locations in which they may use it.866 Deadly
force is defined as "likely to cause death or serious bodily injury,"
whereas non-deadly force normally does not cause death or serious
bodily injury.8 6 7 In addition to these differences, the specific cir-
cumstances in which deadly or non-deadly force may be used justifi-
ably are set out.8 68 Deadly force may be used only as a last resort to
prevent death or serious bodily harm to the employee or another
person. Non-deadly force may be used to prevent the commission
of a felony or misdemeanor, to defend against physical assault, to
prevent damage to property, to enforce institutional regulations and
orders, and to prevent or quell a riot.
The use of specific contract provisions such as those in the Santa
Fe Contract provides guidance to the contractor in identifying what
constitutes justifiable force and protects inmates against arbitrary
and excessive force. These provisions may be modified, for exam-
ple, to provide that only the contracting agency may use deadly
force and that private employees may use only non-deadly force. In
any event, to limit abuse, the criteria for using force must be quite
specific.
862. See id. at 1499 & n. 167 (recognizing that adequately trained guards are less likely to
abuse inmates); Model Contract §§ 4(B) (Training Requirements), 4(D) (Staff Ratio).
863. ACA Standard 2-4206; see also supra note 856 (listing contracts and RFP's).
864. See Note, supra note 9, at 1482 (noting that eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment has played leading role in prisoners' rights litigation). See gen-
erally Robbins & Buser, supra note 376.
865. Santa Fe Contract at 5-6, § 3.3.
866. Id. at 5, § 3.3(a). The employees entitled to use force are designated "jailers" and
may only use force on the grounds of the facility, while in transport, or in pursuit of an es-
capee. Id.
867. Id. at 6, § 3.3(b).
868. Id. at 6, § 3.3(c).
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Another issue that should be addressed in the contract is the re-
porting and documentation requirement following an incident in-
volving force. A contractor's use of force may be subject to
question, and perhaps litigation; therefore, reporting and documen-
tation of each such instance is imperative. This requirement en-
sures that the contractor is accountable for its actions and provides
a record of the event for future reference.8 69 The ACA Standards,
and all of the contracts that have adopted them, require the filing of
a written report with the administrative staff, detailing the circum-
stances in which the force was used.870
A final issue, and one that no existing contract appears to address,
is the relationship between the contractor and local law-enforce-
ment agencies during escape and riot situations. The contracting
agency typically will have either a formal or informal agreement with
local law-enforcement agencies to aid facility personnel in these
emergency situations. It is advisable for the private contractor to
stand in the shoes of the contracting agency in this relationship, if
possible, or to seek other arrangements to ensure the coordination
of efforts and ciarification of roles and responsibilities.8 71
In conclusion, the best provision for use of force, and the one that
should be adopted both in the Model Contract and the Model Stat-
ute, is the provision used in the Santa Fe Contract. This provision is
both restrictive and specific, in that it distinguishes between deadly
and non-deadly force and offers sufficient detail regarding the cir-
cumstances in which force may be used. This provision must be
supplemented, however, with language addressing training of
prison and jail personnel in use of force and firearms, reporting and
documentation requirements, and the contractor's relationship with
local law-enforcement agencies in the event of riot or escape.
Model Contract provision:
(1) The private contractor's employees serving as "jailers" shall be
allowed to use force only while on the grounds of the facility, while
transporting inmates, and while pursuing escapees from the facility.
(2) "Non-deadly force," which is force that normally would cause
neither death nor serious bodily injury, and "deadly force," which is
869. See Walker, Controlling the Cops: A Legislative Approach to Police Rulemaking, 63 U. DET. L.
REV. 361, 390 (1986) (noting that rules with respect to use of force are more likely to have
effect where accompanied by mandatory reporting and review mechanisms).
870. ACA Standard 2-4206.
871. But see CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 30 (stating that "law enforcement officials
should become the parties responsible for the ultimate capture and return of the escapee").
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force that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, shall be
used only as set forth herein.
(3) Non-Deadly Force. Any [contractor's name] jailer shall be au-
thorized to use only such non-deadly force as the circumstances re-
quire in the following situations: to prevent the commission of a
felony or misdemeanor, including escape; to defend oneself or others
against physical assault; to prevent serious damage to property; to en-
force institutional regulations and orders; and to prevent or quell a
riot.
(4) Use of Firearms/Deadly Force. [Contractor's name] jailers who
have been appropriately certified as determined by the contracting
agency and trained pursuant to the provisions of Subsection (5) shall
have the right to carry and use firearms and shall exercise such au-
thority and use deadly force only as a last resort, and then only to
prevent an act that could result in death or serious bodily injury to
oneself or to another person.
(5) Jailers shall be trained in accordance with ACA Standards 2-
4186 through 2-4189 and 2-4206, concerning the use of force and the
use of firearms, and shall be trained, at the contractor's expense, at the
facilities that train public prison and jail personnel for at least the
minimum number of hours that public personnel are currently trained.
(6) Within three (3) days following an incident involving the use of
force against an inmate or another, the employee shall file a written
report with the administrative staff and contract monitor describing
the incident.
(7) The contractor shall stand in the shoes of the contracting agency
in any agreement, formal or informal, with local law-enforcement
agencies concerning the latter's obligations in the event of emergency
situations, such as riots or escapes.
Section 5(C): Inmate Transportation
Commentary:
Because inmates may need transportation in several different con-
texts, it is important that the parties provide for such needs in the
contract.87 2 For example, inmates must be transported to and from
court, parole and disciplinary hearings, health services, rehabilita-
tion programs, and work assignments, or to a new facility. The par-
ties must also address who will be responsible for transporting the
inmates in an emergency situation, such as a bomb threat.
No compelling public-policy reason necessitates that one party
rather than the other be responsible for inmate transportation. This
872. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 85-86 (noting that "[t]he principal bone of con-
tention between governments and contractors" is failure to provide specifically which party is
responsible for costs related to transportation, medical care, and other services).
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issue should be a matter of negotiation between the parties. If, on
the one hand, the parties decide that the contracting agency will
provide the transportation, a simple provision stating this arrange-
ment would be sufficient. If, on the other hand, the parties decide
that the private contractor will provide some or all of the transporta-
tion services, several safeguards must be addressed in the contract.
The contract must delineate precisely the circumstances in which
the contractor will provide for the inmate transportation and the
point at which responsibility shifts from the contractor to the con-
tracting agency or to some other governmental representative or
designee.
The contract must also specify that the Use of Force provision
apply during transportation of inmates by the contractor8 73 and that
the contractor be required to comply with all applicable insurance,
inspection, and motor-vehicle laws.
There are, of course, many possible hybrid arrangements in which




If the parties decide that the contracting agency shall provide for
all of the transportation needs of the inmates under the care of the
private contractor, the following provision should be used:
The contracting agency shall provide for all of the transportation
needs of the inmates under the contractor's care without cost to the
contractor.
If the parties decide that the contractor shall provide for all of the
transportation needs of the inmates under its care, the following
provision should be used:
The contractor shall provide for all of the transportation needs of
the inmates under its care, from the time that the prisoner is delivered
to the facility by the contracting agency to his or her release or trans-
fer by the contracting agency.
The Use of Force provision in this contract shall apply during the
time that the contractor is transporting inmates. The contractor shall
comply with all relevant statutes, rules, and regulations regarding in-
surance, inspection, and motor vehicles while transporting the inmates.
873. See Model Contract § 5(B) (Use of Force).
874. See Bay County Contract at 17-18, § 5.6 (providing that contractor shall provide
transportation to work site and to medical facilities when necessary or at request of county but
that county shall provide for all other transportation needs of inmates).
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Section 5(D): Inmate Labor
Commentary:
Perhaps not surprisingly, the current interest in prison privatiza-
tion is occurring at the same time that federal and state govern-
ments are showing renewed interest in promoting private-sector
involvement in the prison labor system.875 There are many federal
and state laws that prohibit or discourage private-sector involve-
ment in the prison-labor system.876 Most of this legislation grew out
of public pressure during the 1920s and 1930s from trade unions
and free laborers who feared unfair wage competition and business-
men who feared unfair price competition. 877 Much of this anti-in-
mate-labor sentiment has abated, however, following changing
perceptions that prison labor does not necessarily pose a threat to
labor and business interests and that imprisonment may serve im-
portant rehabilitative functions. 878 As a result, both federal and
state governments have begun to experiment with some private-sec-
tor involvement in prison labor.8 79
Current privatization contracts indicate that parties are not using
inmate labor for purposes other than facility operation and mainte-
nance and contracting-agency work projects.880 This may be the re-
sult of conflicting and changing laws on inmate labor. It may also
stem from concerns that private contractors should not profit di-
rectly from inmate labor because of the potential inmate exploita-
tion that could occur under such a system.88' Undoubtedly, this
issue will become increasingly important as governments continue
to look for ways to reduce the cost of incarceration. The contracting
parties should therefore be prepared to consider these issues.
The parties must negotiate the terms of inmate labor inside the
facility for purposes of facility upkeep and maintenance. The con-
tracting agency must also consider whether inmates may be re-
quired to work on agency projects outside the prison and, if so, who
will be responsible for overseeing such projects. In addition to
designating the type of work that will be permitted in the private
facility, the agency must address whether inmates should receive any
875. See supra notes 412-420 and accompanying text (discussing changes in private-sector
involvement in prison-labor system since the 1970s).
876. See supra notes 405-420 and accompanying text.
877. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
878. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
879. See supra notes 412-420 and accompanying text.
880. See, e.g., Bay County Contract at 16, § 5.2; Santa Fe Contract at 26, § 9 & app. C.
881. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-50-106(e)(2) (Supp. 1987) ("the contractor shall not
benefit financially from the labor of inmates").
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good-time credit or monetary compensation for their labor, who will
be responsible for training and supervising the inmates, and who
will be responsible for job designations, "hirings," and "firings."
Model Contract provision:
The parties agree that all inmates shall be required to keep their
living areas clean. In addition, inmates may, if they volunteer, work in
the food service, laundry, or other areas of the facility. The contractor
shall submit job descriptions for the contracting agency's approval
before assigning inmates to those positions. Job assignments shall be
made by the contractor. These assignments shall be subject to review
by the contracting agency upon written request by the inmates, if they
so elect. The contracting agency shall provide inmates with good-time
credit or monetary compensation for labor performed. The con-
tracting agency shall be responsible for establishing and administering
this compensation program. The contractor shall make inmates avail-
able for contracting-agency work projects upon [number] ( 3
days' written notice to the contractor. The contracting agency shall be
responsible for oversight, transportation, and security of the inmates
during such work projects.88 2
Section 6: Monitoring
Commentary:
To what extent will the contract be monitored and what form will
these monitoring efforts take? The contracting agency's monitoring
of the contract will be extremely important both to ensure that the
private contractor is fulfilling its obligations and to prevent manage-
rial abuse.8 3 Without an appropriate monitoring device, the con-
tracting agency will not be able to supervise the quantity and quality
882. See Bay County Contract at 16, § 5.2; Santa Fe Contract at 26, § 9 & app. C.
883. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, PRIVATE SECTOR OPERATION OF A CORREC-
TIONAL INSTITUTION 77 (1985) (noting, in evaluation of privately operated Florida School for
Boys at Okeechobee, that it is critical that contracting agency have means of assuring that
contractor is fulfilling obligations); Durham, supra note 434, at 70 (stating that "[o]nly
through exacting monitoring and evaluation can a reasoned assessment of the achievements
of privatization be made"); Note, supra note 408, at 356 (noting that, if private prisons are not
monitored, forces that permit pecuniary savings will sacrifice prison conditions and effi-
ciency); Note, supra note 629, at 835-36 (stating that monitors will reduce serious managerial
abuse of private prisons).
The contract monitor's role in ensuring compliance with contractual obligations need not
be limited to passive observation of the contractor's performance. The Federal Bureau of
Prisons' RFP for halfway-house services defines the monitor's duties to include in part "[giv-
ing d]irections to the Contractor which re-direct the contract effort, shift work emphasis be-
tween areas or tasks, require pursuit of certain lines of inquiry, fill in details or otherwise serve
to accomplish the contractual scope of work" and "[supplying] information to the contractor
which assists in the interpretation of the technical portions of the statement of work." Federal
Bureau of Prisons RFP at 72, §§ I(G)(1)(a)(1), (2).
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of the services delivered. 884 In addition, if private prisons become
an entrenched industry, private corporations will be in a position to
allow prison conditions and services to fall below contractual levels,
leaving little recourse for the state.885 Monitoring, therefore, will
play a crucial role in detecting and preventing noncompliance with
the contract at an early stage.88 6
Close and effective monitoring by the contracting agency is also
necessary because the contracting agency retains ultimate responsi-
bility for the care of inmates within the private prison despite its
delegation of that function to the private corporation.88 7 Thus, a
contracting agency's inadequate monitoring could render the con-
tract void upon charges of excessive delegation or increase the con-
tracting agency's exposure to liability.888 Therefore, the monitoring
system recommended under the Model Contract is one that oper-
ates on a continual, current basis and reviews and evaluates the pri-
vate contractor's performance at regular intervals.88 9 A full-time
monitoring system should keep the private corporation accountable
for fulfilling its contractual obligations at all times during the term
of the contract.
There are several alternative monitoring systems that may be im-
plemented.8 90 One system, for example, provides that the con-
tracting agency appoint a full-time contract monitor with an office at
884. See Note, supra note 408, at 356-57 (discussing market failure that occurs when con-
sumer cannot monitor consumption and supplier exploits situation to increase profits).
885. See id. at 357-58 (noting that corporation obtaining initial private contract is in opti-
mal position due to its ability to own facilities, employ most persons with experience, and
have least startup costs for future contracts).
886. See W. Collins, supra note 725, at 17 (stating that conscientious monitoring provides
early identification and correction of any corners cut by contractor in favor of enhancing prof-
its); see also Note, supra note 408, at 358 (declaring that a monitoring system must be supple-
mented with a system to control economic power of the corporation).
887. W. Collins, supra note 725, at 17.
888. Id.; see CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 27 (warning that contracting agency may be
held liable for conditions resulting from inadequate monitoring).
889. Many public agencies have utilized a combination of continuous on-site monitoring
and periodic in-depth monitoring in order to achieve the most effective monitoring system.
CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 115.
890. For examples of how some contracting agencies have addressed the monitoring is-
sue, see Bay County Contract at 17, § 5.5 (providing for county-appointed monitor with office
space and 24-hour access to all areas of the facility as well as to all necessary records and
reports); 1984 Kentucky RFP at 5, § 8 (providing for periodic inspections of facility and sanc-
tions for violations uncovered during inspections); RCA Contract at 34, § 5.8 (providing for
periodic on-site inspections and record reviews to ensure compliance with all aspects of the
contract); Santa Fe Contract at 28, §§ 11.1, 11.2 (providing for county-appointed liaison be-
tween county and private contractor who will have office at facility as well as access to facility
at all times). See also CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 113-21 (discussing possible methods of
monitoring contract performance). The alternatives discussed in this section are not exclu-
sive; several or all may be used in combination in order to meet the contracting agency's
monitoring needs.
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the facility.891 Under this system, the monitor should have access to
all areas of the facility, including access to inmates and staff at all
times, whether announced or unannounced. In addition, the con-
tract should require the contractor to make all books, records, and
reports with respect to the facility available to the contract moni-
tor.8 92 The monitor will not be able to function effectively without
this information.
The advantage of having an on-site contract monitor should be
obvious - monitoring is best achieved from the inside of the facil-
ity.8 93 Larger facilities may require a monitoring staff to ensure that
contractual obligations are fulfilled. Although this full-time moni-
toring system may be costly,8 94 it is the best method for ensuring
adequate supervision of the contract and facility. The more supervi-
sion there is over the implementation of the contract, the more
likely it is that the contractor will comply with the terms of the
contract.
An alternative to an on-site contract monitor is to have periodic
inspections of the facility by persons designated by the contracting
agency.8 95 This monitoring system is less effective than an on-site
monitor because deviations from the contract standards will be de-
tected after the fact and the damage will already have been done. 89 6
Nevertheless, monitoring by inspection will impose some restric-
891. See Bay County Contract at 17, § 5.5; Santa Fe Contract at 28, § 11.1.
892. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 102 (listing items that should be included in
contract to ensure effective monitoring). Regular reports on all aspects of the contractor's
performance are required as a part of many monitoring systems. Reports regarding ex-
traordinary occurrences - such as escapes, riots, or injuries to inmates - are particularly
crucial. The contracting agency should clearly specify all written reports and records that it
expects the contractor to prepare in addition to those required by ACA Standards. This will
ensure that the monitor has the information that he or she needs to monitor the contractor's
performance adequately. Id. at 102-03; Eckerd Contract at 2, §§ K, M & attach. I (specifically
requiring various types of reports relating to maintenance, finance, health and safety, unusual
incidents, and programs at the facility); CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 102 (stating that
Kentucky requires its Marion facility to report "extraordinary occurrences"). The contract
should also state how often reports and records must be prepared, how long they should be
maintained, and whether the contracting agency shall have possession of some or all of these
materials upon termination of the contract.
893. See Crane, supra note 433, at 39. Mr. Crane stated that, "[t]o make contractual obli-
gations stick, the government should appoint a contract monitor with access, at all times, to
the facility, inmates, employees and records. At larger institutions, this should be a full-time
or even a round-the-clock position." Id.
894. See CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 117 (noting that, for a smaller facility, it may be
more cost efficient to have a contracting-agency official visit the facility on a regular basis than
to maintain a full-time monitor on site).
895. See 1984 Kentucky RFP at 5, § 8.
896. See Note, supra note 408, at 364 (noting that effective monitoring system requires
continuing long-term access to relevant information). But see CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at
113 (pointing out that periodic monitoring may provide for more in-depth review of a con-
tractor's performance and may be particularly effective when used in conjunction with a con-
tinuous on-site monitoring program).
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tions on the private contractor to make and keep it accountable, and
will be less costly to implement.
Preserving public access to the facility has also been proposed as a
supplemental method of monitoring the contract.8 97 There is no
constitutional guarantee of public access. To keep a private prison
open to the public, therefore, the contract must include such a pro-
vision. Public access, particularly with respect to the media, offers
an opportunity to monitor the private prison at virtually no cost to
the government. If a very short notice period is required for access
and the entire facility is accessible, public access may produce some
satisfactory monitoring results.8 98 Inmates can play a particularly
significant role in alerting the public and the media to any problems
within the facility.8 99 This system used alone, however, cannot pro-
vide effective monitoring. The public is not aware of specific con-
tractual obligations and will not be able to detect the more subtle
deviations from the terms of the contract. In addition, in the inter-
ests of safety and security, certain limitations must be imposed on
the public's access to private prisons. 900 These limitations under-
mine the effectiveness of public access as the sole monitoring device
at a facility.
Finally, in addition to monitoring, a system imposing sanctions
for detected abuses should be implemented to control the private
firm's conduct effectively. A system of fines may provide the neces-
sary incentives. As one commentator has noted, "[p]roperly set
fines will operate to align private interest with public duty and will
create market incentives to innovate in care and rehabilitation.- 901
If a private firm continues to depart from its contractual obligations
or violates the contract in many respects or repeatedly, the contrac-
tor may be considered in breach of the contract and the contracting
agency must have contractual remedies to cure the breach.
In light of these various alternatives, the Model Contract provides
that the contracting agency should appoint a full-time, on-site con-
tract monitor. This system of monitoring will most effectively detect
abuses and deviations from the contract's provisions. The contract
monitor should have access to inmates and staff, to all areas of the
facility, and to all books, records, and reports of the facility on a
897. Note, supra note 408, at 363-67 (noting that a combination of fines, public access,
and inmate interaction with the media will help to ensure compliance with the contract).
898. Id. at 365.
899. Id. at 366-67.
900. Id. at 365-66; see also INS RFP at 34, § I(C)(13)(H) (stating that access may be denied
where contractor has clear and convincing evidence that visits will jeopardize security of facil-
ity or safety of detainee or visitor).
901. Note, supra note 408, at 361 (footnotes omitted).
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twenty-four-hour basis. The contractor should be responsible for
providing office space on-site for the contract monitor and his or
her staff. The public, particularly the media, should be guaranteed
access to the facility, and the procedure for gaining access on short-
term notice should be described in the contract. Although a provi-
sion for public access is not critical, such a provision will provide
additional control over the performance of the contract. In addi-
tion, the contractor should be fined for any noncompliance with the
contract's provisions and, after repeated departures from the terms
of the contract, the contractor may be deemed in breach of the con-
tract.90 2 Finally, the contract should specify that the contractor is
responsible for all costs that are associated with monitoring the con-




(A) On or before thirty (30) days after the execution of this con-
tract, the contracting agency shall appoint a contract monitor, who
will be an employee of the contracting agency, to be the official liaison
between the contracting agency and the contractor. The contract mon-
itor [and his or her staff] shall be provided an office in the facility and
shall have access at all times, with or without notice, to inmates and
staff, to all areas of the facility, and to all books, records (including
financial records), and reports kept by the contractor concerning the
renovation, repair, construction, maintenance, and operation of the
facility.90 4
The monitor [and his or her staff] will be responsible for monitoring
compliance with all contractual obligations, including compliance with
the incorporated ACA Standards. The contractor must maintain
whatever documentation is necessary to prove that the contractor is
meeting its obligations under the contract.90 5 This includes, but is not
limited to, all reports and other documentation required by ACA Stan-
dards, as well as the following reports: [list them]. The contractor
shall be responsible for all costs associated with the monitoring of the
facility, except for the salaries of the monitor [and his or her staff].
902. The Council of State Governments' Report makes similar recommendations regard-
ing sanctions as a necessary component of a monitoring system. CSG REPORT, supra note 533,
at 104-05. The Report also encourages the use of incentives to raise the level of contractor
performance. Id. The Model Contract does not include an incentive clause. The level of
compensation paid for services rendered under the contract should provide sufficient incen-
tive for high-level contractor performance. Contracting agencies should not need to offer
additional bonuses in order to secure a well-managed and well-operated private facility.
903. Cf. McAfee, supra note 402, at 856 (noting that Tennessee Private Prison Contracting
Act of 1986 provides that contractor shall bear cost of monitoring).
904. This provision is derived from Santa Fe Contract at 28, § 11.1.
905. This provision is derived from Federal Bureau of Prisons RFP at 8, § II(l)(A).
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(B) Members of the public, including the media, must apply for ac-
cess to the facility [number] ( __) days before the date that such a
visit is planned. An application for access shall include the date and
time of the planned visit, the purpose of the visit, and any other rele-
vant information that the contractor's representative requires. Access
shall be granted, except where the contractor has clear and convincing
evidence that such visits jeopardize the security of the facility or the
safety of the inmates or visitor.90 6 The monitor shall have final review
over all decisions regarding public access to the facility.
(C) The contractor shall be fined [number] ( __) dollars for each
instance of noncompliance with the contract.90 7 The contractor will
be given a reasonable time, as determined by the monitor, to rectify
the noncompliance. If the noncompliance is not rectified in this period
or if [number] L.._) instances of noncompliance are detected in a
[number] (L month period,90 8 the contractor shall be deemed to
be in breach of the contract.
Section 7: Termination
Commentary:
The Model Contract provides the contracting agency with consid-
erable latitude in determining what sanctions to impose when the
private contractor fails to perform under the contract. Specifically,
the contracting agency may terminate the contract for: contractor
default;909 the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, reorganization, or
liquidation; unavailability of funds; or convenience.9 10 Although the
termination option should always be available at the discretion of
the contracting agency, 91 1 it may not always be an effective means of
dealing with performance deficiencies; thus, less drastic measures
906. This provision is derived from INS RFP at 34, § I(C)(13)(H).
907. The contracting agency may want to set different levels of fines that are appropriate
to the seriousness or the degree of the contractual violation. These levels should be specified
in the contract.
908. The contracting agency may want to vary the number of violations allowed before
the contractor may be deemed in default, depending on the importance of the Standard vio-
lated. The contracting agency should specify such variations in the contract.
909. Thus, for example, the contracting agency could terminate the contract in the event
of a work stoppage.
910. Also referred to as an "escape clause," this provision permits the contracting agency
to terminate the contract for any reason whatsoever. This provision is necessary under the
Supreme Court's decision in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), which interpreted
article 1, section 10 of the Constitution as applying to contracts to which the state itself is a
party. Thus, state contracts can be voided by the legislature only if the contract so provides.
Id. at 135-39; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("No State shall pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts"). See generally C. RING, supra note 484, at 47-50 (discussing contract-
terminatio n provisions); McAfee, supra note 402, at 859-61 (discussing the necessity of an
escape clause in privatization contracts).
911. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2232(2)(f) (1987) ("The agreement must include
... a provision that the county may immediately terminate the contract for good cause.");
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-2 , § 3(c)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988) ("a proposal is not
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should be available to cure the defective performance. 912
The contracting agency must consider what steps it will take in the
event that the contractor fails to perform under the contract, espe-
cially if the failure is abrupt and the contracting agency has no
choice but to terminate the contract. Provision for who will assume
the contractor's role and how prison or jail services will be immedi-
ately resumed must be clearly set forth in the contract. The wisest
course is for the jurisdiction to enact a statute prohibiting the enter-
ing of a contract for the operation of an incarceration facility until a
satisfactory plan has been developed and certified by the appropri-
ate executive officer or legislative body, demonstrating the method
by which the government would resume control of the facility upon
contract termination.91 3 Such a provision should also be included in
an RFP.
The Model Contract's bankruptcy provision permits the con-
tracting agency to act promptly by terminating the contract in the
event that the private contractor files a petition for bankruptcy, re-
organization, or liquidation. The contracting agency would there-
fore not be required to wait for actual bankruptcy proceedings.
Assuming that the contract is deemed an executory contract under
the Federal Bankruptcy Code, this provision may be subject to chal-
lenge because the Code expressly prohibits termination or modifica-
tion of a contract at any time after the filing for bankruptcy. 9 14 To
avoid this potential conflict with the Code, the Model Contract,
under the Termination for Convenience provision, requires the con-
tractor to inform the contracting agency of its intention to file a peti-
tion for bankruptcy at least ten days prior to filing such a petition. 91 5
The termination provisions help to ease the transition when con-
trol of the facility changes. These provisions also save the con-
tracting agency time, resources, and money, including litigation
expenses, by granting the contracting agency considerable latitude
and flexibility in determining the appropriate measures to take in
the event of a default or, as the Termination for Convenience clause
acceptable unless it... permits the state to terminate the contract for cause"). See generally W.
Collins, supra note 725, at 18.
912. For example, the Model Contract permits the contracting agency to offset the con-
tractor's default by deducting payments to the contractor. See Model Contract § 7(A) (Termi-
nation for Default).
913. See Model Statute § 10 (Termination of Contract and Resumption of Government
Control).
914. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1982).
915. Section 365(e)(1) applies only after bankruptcy has been filed, thus placing pre-peti-
tion termination action beyond the scope of the Code. For a thorough discussion of the im-
plications of the Code on private prison contracts, see Note, Privatization of Con-ections: Is the
State Out on a Limb Wlhen the Conpany Goes Bankrupt?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1988).
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provides, permitting termination of the contract simply when it is in
the contracting agency's best interest.
Model Contract provisions:
This contract shall be subject to the following provisions:
(A) Termination for Default
The contracting agency may terminate this contract when it deter-
mines that (1) the private contractor has failed to meet the minimum
standards of operations set forth in Subsection 3(F) of this contract, or
(2) the contractor has failed to meet other contract provisions where
such failure seriously affects the operation of the facility.
Thirty (30) days prior to termination by the contracting agency, it
shall serve the contractor with written notice of default(s), by certified
mail. If the contractor has failed to correct the default to the con-
tracting agency's satisfaction within the period of time specified in the
contracting-agency notice, the contractor shall be deemed to be in de-
fault of the contract and the contract shall be terminated immediately,
or, at the option of the contracting agency, it may offset the default by
deducting payments to the contractor or seek other equitable remedies.
If after Notice of Termination for Default it is determined by the
contracting agency, the arbitrators, or a court that the contractor was
in default because of causes beyond the control and without the error
or negligence of the contractor, the termination shall be deemed to
have been issued as a Termination for Convenience, with the parties'
rights governed accordingly.
In the event of default, in full or in part as provided herein, the
contracting agency may procure, on terms that it finds appropriate,
goods or services similar to those to be provided hereunder, and the
contractor shall be liable to the contracting agency for any excess
costs for such similar goods and services. In addition, the contractor
shall be liable to the contracting agency for administrative costs in-
curred by the contracting agency in procuring such similar goods or
services. The performance bond required in Subsection 3(D) of this
contract shall guarantee payment of such excess costs and the contrac-
tor shall be liable for any excess over and above said amount if the
bond proceeds are insufficient to pay such costs.
In the event of Termination for Default, subject to the retainage
provision, the contractor shall be paid in accordance with the contract
price for each contracting-agency inmate held by the contractor until
the date of termination.
The rights and remedies of the contracting agency provided in this
Subsection shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other
rights and remedies provided by law or pursuant to the contract.
(B) Termination for Contractor Bankruptcy
The contractor must inform the contracting agency of its intention
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to file a petition for bankruptcy at least ten (10) days prior to filing
such a petition. The contractor's filing without conforming to this re-
quirement shall be deemed a material pre-petition incurable breach. 9 16
In the event of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, reorganization,
or liquidation pursuant to any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, Title
11 U.S.C., the contracting agency shall have the right to terminate the
contract under the same conditions as if it were a Termination for
Default. In the event of termination for contractor bankruptcy, the
contractor shall be required to cooperate and assist the contracting
agency to the fullest extent possible to reestablish prison or jail serv-
ices as quickly as possible.
(C) Termination for Unavailability of Funds
In the event that the contracting agency's funds for the contract
become unavailable, the contracting agency shall have the right to ter-
minate the contract without penalty and on the same terms and condi-
tions as if it were a Termination for Convenience. Availability of
funds will be determined at the sole discretion of the contracting
agency.
(D) Termination for Convenience
The contracting agency may terminate performance of work under
the contract in whole or in part whenever, for any reason, the con-
tracting agency determines that it is in its best interest to do so. The
contracting agency shall give the contractor, without penalty to the
state, ninety (90) days' notice prior to termination of the contract.
The contractor shall have no right to any general, special, inciden-
tal, consequential, or any damages whatsoever of any description or
amount, except that the contracting agency shall pay for all supplies
and equipment on order and not yet delivered to the facility as of the
date of termination.
(E) Procedure on Termination
Upon delivery by certified mail to the contractor of a Notice of Ter-
mination specifying the nature of the termination, the extent to which
performance of work under the contract is terminated, and the date on
which such termination becomes effective, the contractor shall:
(1) stop work under the contract on the date and to the extent
specified in the Notice of Termination;
(2) place no further orders for materials, services, or facilities,
except as may be necessary for completion of such portion of the
work under the contract as is not terminated;
(3) terminate all orders to the extent that they relate to the
performance of work terminated by the Notice of Termination,
except as may be necessary to avoid the incurrence of penalty
916. Note, supra note 915, at 338 (quoting Ruben, Legislative andJudicial Confusion Concern-
ing Executory Contracts in Bankrupo., 89 DICK. L. REV. 1029, 1059 (1985)).
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assessments and the continuation of which the contracting agency
has approved;
(4) assign to the contracting agency in the manner and to the
extent directed by the [contracting officer] all of the right, title,
and interest of the contractor under the orders so terminated, in
which case the contracting agency shall have the right, in its dis-
cretion, to settle or pay any or all claims arising out of the termi-
nation of such orders;
(5) with -the approval or ratification of the [contracting officer],
settle all outstanding liabilities and all claims arising out of such
termination of orders, the cost of which would be reimbursable in
whole or in part, in accordance with the provision of the
contracts;
(6) transfer title to the contracting agency (to the extent that
title has not already been transferred) and deliver in the manner,
at the times, and to the extent directed by the [contracting officer]
all files, processing systems, data manuals, or documentation, in
any form, that relate to work terminated by the Notice of
Termination;
(7) complete the performance of such part of the work as shall
not have been terminated by the Notice of Termination; and
(8) take such action as may be necessary, or as the [contracting
officer] may direct, for the protection and preservation of the
property related to the contract that is in the possession of the
contractor and in which the contracting agency has or may ac-
quire an interest.
The contractor shall proceed immediately with the performance of
the above obligations notwithstanding any delay in determining or ad-
justing the amount of any item of reimbursable price under this
provision.
(F) Resumption of Government Control
Notwithstanding any other provision of this contract to the con-
trary, prior to entering a contract for the private operation of any
prison or jail, a plan shall be developed by the contracting agency and
certified by the [Governor or appropriate executive officer or legisla-
tive body] demonstrating the method by which the government would
resume control of the facility upon contract termination.
Section 8: Miscelaneous Provisions
Section 8(A): Entire Agreement
Commentary:
The entire-agreement provision is a standard contractual provi-
sion. Its purpose is to preclude a claim by either party that promises
or statements made during the bidding or negotiation phases were
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meant to be part of the final contract, even though they were not
expressly included in the contract itself. In this provision, the par-
ties should identify all documents, schedules, attachments, appendi-
ces, exhibits, and other items that comprise the agreement.
Model Contract provision:
This contract constitutes the entire contract and supersedes all
other prior agreements and understandings, both written and oral, be-
tween the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. The term
"contract" includes [list of Exhibits, Attachments, Appendices, etc.].
Section 8(B): Amendment
Commentary:
The amendment provision of the contract should conform to
standard contract language. Thus, both parties should be required
to sign any amendment to the contract.
Model Contract provision:
This contract may be amended only in writing signed by the parties.
Section 8(C): Severability
Commentay:
The Model Contract includes a severability provision stating that,
in the event that a court or legislature finds a provision of the agree-
ment void, that provision shall be severed from the contract and the
rest of the contract shall remain in force. If the contracting agency
determines, however, that the severed provision is essential to the
purpose or performance of the entire agreement, then it may termi-
nate the contract. This action would be deemed a termination for
convenience. 9 1
7
The Model Contract provision ensures that an otherwise satisfac-
tory contractual arrangement will not be disrupted or terminated by
a judicial or legislative finding that a provision, not essential to the
whole, is invalid. It also ensures, however, that a contracting agency
will not be bound by a contract that no longer contains a provision
that is essential to the private operation of the correctional facility.
917. The Model Contract provision is patterned after the Santa Fe Contract's severability
provision, which states that, should the county determine that the contract is "substantially
impaired" by a finding of invalidity, the contract shall be terminated for the convenience of
both parties. See Santa Fe Contract at 30, § 12.4. It further provides that the county need not
observe the 90-day notice requirement that would otherwise apply to a termination for con-
venience under the contract Id.
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The provision is consistent with the general rule that a court may
uphold as much of a contract as is valid, as long as the invalid provi-
sion is not essential to the purpose of the contract.9 18
Model Contract provision:
If any term, provision, covenant, or restriction of this contract is
held by a court of competent jurisdiction or the legislature to be inva-
lid, void, or unenforceable, the remainder of the terms, provisions, cov-
enants, and restrictions of this contract shall remain in full force and
effect, and shall in no way be affected, impaired, or invalidated.
If, however, the contracting agency determines that the invalid pro-
vision or provisions are essential to the purpose or performance of the
contract, it may terminate the contract. Such a termination shall be
deemed a Termination for Convenience as set forth in Section 7(D) of
this contract.
Section 8(D): Venue and Choice of Law
Commentary:
The contract should include a venue provision to select a forum
that is convenient for the parties.9 19 Further, a choice-of-law provi-
sion designating the internal law of the state in which the contract is
entered should be included to aid in the resolution of any contract
disputes. Such a provision avoids the problems that are encoun-
tered with the doctrine of renvoiY
20
Model Contract provision:
Venue for the enforcement of this contract and all claims or disputes
relating thereto shall be in the [select appropriate court and
jurisdiction].
This contract, the rights and obligations of the parties hereto, and
any claims or disputes relating thereto shall be governed by and con-
strued in accordance with the internal law of the State of [ .] in
the resolution of all issues.
9 2 1
918. See S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1630, 1779 (3d ed.
1972).
919. New Mexico requires a particular venue by statute. See 1988 N.M. Laws § 33-1-
17(A)(5).
920. Renvoi concerns whether, when one state is referred by its choice-of-law process to
the law of another state, the referral is to the internal law of the other state only or to the
whole law of the state, including its choice-of-law process. See generally E. SCOLES & P. HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAws 67-72 (1982).
921. This provision is derived from Hamilton County Contract app. B, at 3, art. V. The
language "relating thereto," rather than "arising from this contract" or "arising on this con-
tract," is recommended to avoid the problem of determining what law should be used for
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Section 8(E): Alternative Dispute Resolution
Commentary:
Although there is a variety of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
techniques available, 922 most of the privatization contracts that em-
ploy some form of ADR choose arbitration. 923 These contracts re-
quire that the parties submit to binding arbitration in accordance
with the rules of the American Arbitration Association if they are
unable mutually to resolve any contract-related controversy. 92"
Although these arbitration provisions are quite common in commer-
cial contracts,925 the parties should carefully consider the need for
and suitability of binding arbitration in the privatization setting.
Under an arbitration provision, the parties agree to submit their
dispute to neutral third parties (typically industry experts) who will
enter a decision that, depending on the particular contract, will be
either binding or nonbinding on the parties. 926 Arbitration is "nor-
mally less formal, faster, and less expensive than the judicial pro-
cess" 927 and works well where there is a continuing relationship
between the contracting parties. 928 The benefits of arbitration,
however, must be weighed against the drawbacks - including the
use of an informal discovery process that might make it extremely
difficult for the contracting agency to gain access to materials and
evidence held by the private contractor, and decisions that are not
fully developed. These features may hinder an appeal of the deci-
sion, if available. The parties should also consider the relationship
between the contract's termination and arbitration provisions and
determine whether an arbitration provision would be necessary or
effective under a contract that allows termination at will. Finally, the
parties must provide for the continued operation of the facility while
the dispute is being arbitrated. Specifically, when the dispute in-
volves an issue for which there is insufficient time to arbitrate, the
questions concerning modification of the contract. See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star
Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1955).
922. These techniques include negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.
923. E.g., Santa Fe Contract at 31-32, § 12.7; Bay County Contract at 35-36, § 1I.
924. See supra note 923.
925. See generally Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1985) (noting that "American Arbitration Association now handles close to 10,000"
commercial disputes each year).
926. "Binding decisions" are not truly binding on the parties because a dissatisfied party
has the right to request a trial de novo, which is conducted without any reference to or consid-
eration given to the prior arbitration process. Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Federal District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29, 32-33 (1985).
927. Riskin, The Special Place of.1fediation in Alternative Dispute Processing, 37 U. FL%. L. REV.
19, 21 (1985).
928. Sander, supra note 925, at 5.
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parties must adopt interim measures that will allow them to arbitrate
rather than terminate the contract.
Although commentators recommend some sort of ADR mecha-
nism in general privatization contracts, there has been no substan-
tive discussion of its appropriateness in the private-corrections
context.929 Before including an ADR provision in the contract, the
parties should carefully consider the desirability of such a provision.
The Model Contract provision is typical of those that parties have
used in privatization contracts to date, although the discovery-pro-
cess provision has been modified.
930
Model Contract provision:
Any controversy regarding this contract that the parties are unable
to resolve by mutual agreement may be submitted to binding arbitra-
tion in [location] in accordance with the rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association.
Any decision of the arbitrators shall be conclusive as to the matter
submitted and may be enforced in any court of competent jurisdiction
in the State of [ ]. Issues under arbitration shall be heard and
decided by three arbitrators, one of whom shall be designated by the
contracting agency, one of whom shall be designated by the contractor,
and one of whom shall be designated by the court in [location], or, in
the absence of such a designation, by the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation. Any factual decision on an issue being arbitrated, including
the sharing of costs of arbitration, made by at least two of the arbitra-
tors shall be the decision of the arbitrators and such decision shall be
final, non-appealable, and binding on both parties.
The following terms shall be binding on the parties:
(1) Either party may require that the hearing be recorded.
(2) After it is determined by either party that a dispute cannot
be resolved without arbitration, it shall be submitted for arbitra-
tion within fifteen (15) business days. "Business days" shall mean
Monday through Friday, excluding holidays. After submission, a
written decision shall be rendered within ninety (90) days, unless
an extension is agreed to by both parties.
(3) Neither party shall appoint an employee or agent as an
arbitrator.
(4) Each party reserves the right to appeal any question of law.
929. E.g., CSG REPORT, supra note 533, at 64 (stating that "[a] method for resolving any
future contractual differences which may emerge should be agreed to before activation of the
facility").
930. This provision is derived from the Santa Fe Contract at 31-32, § 12.7, with the ex-
ception that Subsection (5) was added, Subsection (1) was deleted, and Subsection (2) was
modified to require a written decision.
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(5) Discovery shall be conducted in accordance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Section shall operate only by mutual consent of the parties.
B. Summary of Model Contract Provisions
Section 1: Policy Statement - Goals and Responsibilities of the Parties
This contract between the contracting agency and the contractor for
the operation and maintenance of incarceration facilities, entered for
the benefit of the public and inmates, is premised on the following
goals of privatization:
(A) to provide the public with prison or jail services that are cost
efficient and effective with respect to the purposes and goals of
incarceration;
(B) to provide inmates with proper care, treatment, rehabilitation,
and reformation; and
(C) to provide the public and inmates with prison or jail services
that meet the requirements of the American Correctional Association
and other such minimum standards that may be promulgated by the
contracting agency.
This contract is entered in consideration of these goals of
privatization.
Section 2: Private Financing and Physical Plant
Section 2(A): Private Financing
The private contractor will provide financing for the facility under
this contract in accordance with the financing plan that has been ap-
proved by the contracting agency. Any financial obligation of the con-
tracting agency under this plan is subject to the annual appropriation
of funds by the legislature.
If this contract is terminated at any time under any of the termina-
tion clauses provided in Section 7, the contracting agency shall have
the right to take possession of the facility immediately for the purpose
of operating the facility. It shall also have the option to repurchase
the facility within ninety (90) days of the termination of the contract.
Section 2(B): Physical Plant
The contractor shall provide a facility in accordance with the final
architectural designs and the final plans and specifications that have
been [will be] submitted by the contractor [by (date)] and approved by
the contracting agency. The facility shall conform to all standards set
forth in the contract, including all applicable ACA Standards regard-
ing the physical plant. Compliance with all applicable state and local
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building codes, including [list, if desired], in accordance with ACA
Standard 2-4153, is mandatory. In the event that there is a conflict
among state, local, and/or national codes, the more stringent stan-
dard(s) shall apply.
Section 3: General Contract Terms
Section 3(A): Term
The term of this contract shall be for a period of three (3) years
commencing on [time and date] and terminating on [time and date],
subject to the availability of funds and unless earlier terminated in
accordance with the relevant provisions of this contract.
Section 3(B): Renewal
An option to renew this contract for an additional [number]
( ) year term shall be exercisable by the contracting agency on
like terms and conditions except with respect to compensation paid to
the contractor. The contracting agency may exercise its option to re-
new the contract [number] (L times, after which the contracting
agency will reopen the contract for competitive bidding.
Compensation shall be negotiated between the parties before each
renewal period. The price shall not increase more than [number]
L) percent over any one renewal period, nor shall the price rise
more than [number] ( ) percent over the entire duration of the
contract.
Should the private contractor desire to renew this contract, it shall
notify the contracting agency in writing and submit a written price
proposal at least [number] (. days prior to the termination date
of this contract. Should the private contractor not desire to renew this
contract, it shall notify the contracting agency in writing no later than
[number] (-) days prior to the termination date of this contract.
Failure to so notify shall be a valid basis for forfeiture of the retainage
account balance then held by the contracting agency and subsequent
retainage amounts, until the termination of this contract.
Section 3(C): Compensation
(1) Per-Diem Rate
The contracting agency shall pay the contractor every [number]
( ) days (payment period) a per-diem charge of [number]
LJ) dollars per inmate day (per-diem rate). For purposes of es-
tablishing an inmate day, the inmate's arrival and departure days will
count as one inmate day. On or before [number] L ) days after
the payment period, the contractor shall provide the contracting
agency with a statement showing the number of inmate days charged
for the prior payment period.
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(2) Minimum and Maximum Inmate Population
The contracting agency shall pay the contractor a minimum of
[number] (L dollars per payment period, which shall be deter-
mined by multiplying the cost per inmate day times [number] ( )
(guaranteed minimum inmate population). In no event shall the con-
tracting agency pay the contractor in excess of [number] () dol-
lars, which shall be determined by multiplying the cost per inmate day
times [number] (_ (maximum inmate population).
(3) Annual Adjustments to Per-Diem Rate
The per-diem rate shall be adjusted at the beginning of each fiscal
year. The adjustment shall be based on increases or decreases in the
Consumer Price Index. The adjustments, which are intended to reflect
changes in the purchasing power of a given amount of money ex-
pressed in dollars, shall not be greater than five percent (5%).
(4) Unforeseen-Circumstances Adjustment
Although the parties intend to fix the per-diem rate subject to an-
nual adjustments, the parties recognize that unforeseen circumstances
may arise during the term of this contract. Therefore, the parties
agree that within [number] (L days after the end of the [ordinal
number] full fiscal year of the term of this contract, either party may
elect to request in writing a change in the per-diem rate to reflect any
change in the cost of operating and maintaining the facility. If there is
an irreconcilable breakdown in negotiations, the parties should refer to
Section 7 of this contract for termination procedures.
Section 3(D): Performance Bond
A performance bond in the amount of [number] L dollars (or
[number] (. percent of the contract price) is required to assure
the contractor's faithful performance of the specifications and condi-
tions of this contract. The bond is required throughout the term of this
contract. The terms and conditions of the bond must be approved by
the contracting agency, and such approval is a condition precedent to
this contract taking effect.
Section 3(E): Indemnification, Immunity, and Insurance
(1) Indemnification and Immunity
(A) The contractor assumes full responsibility for and shall indem-
nify the contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and repre-
sentatives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the
Superintendent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and
their respective legal representatives, heirs and beneficiaries, and shall
pay all judgments rendered against any or all of them for any and all
loss or damage of whatever kind and nature to any and all contracting-
agency property, real or personal, including but not limited to any
buildings, structures, fences, equipment, supplies, accessories, inven-
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tory, or parts furnished, while in the contractor's custody and care for
use or storage, resulting in whole or in part from the acts, errors, or
omissions of the contractor or any officer, agent, representative, em-
ployee, or subcontractor thereof for whatever reason.
(B) The company shall save and hold harmless and indemnify the
contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and representa-
tives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries, and shall pay
all judgments rendered against any or all of them for any and all loss
or damage of whatever kind against any and all liability, claims, and
cost, of whatever kind and nature, for physical or personal injury and
any other kind of injury, including, specifically, deprivation of civil
rights, and for loss or damage to any property or injury resulting from
a breach of the terms of this contract occurring in connection with or
in any way incident to or arising out of the occupancy, use, service,
operation, or performance by the company, its agents, employees, or
representatives of any of the provisions or agreements contained in
this contract, including any Appendices, for which the contracting
agency or any of the hereinabove-mentioned indemnified parties, who
may become legally liable resulting in whole or in part from the acts,
errors, or omissions of the company, or any officer, agent, representa-
tive, employee, or subcontractor thereof for whatever reason.
(C) The company shall save and hold harmless and indemnify the
contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and representa-
tives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries who may be-
come legally liable resulting in whole or in part from any inmate who
escapes from the facility.
(D) The company shall save and hold harmless and indemnify the
contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and representa-
tives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries who may be-
come legally liable resulting in whole or in part from damages to any
person or firm injured or damaged by the company, its officers, agents,
representatives, or employees, by the publication, translation, repro-
duction, delivery, performance, use, or disposition of any data
processed under this contract in a manner not authorized by the con-
tract or by federal or state statutes, rules, regulations, or case law.
(E) The company shall save and hold harmless and indemnify the
contracting agency, its officials, agents, employees, and representa-
tives, including attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries, for any fail-
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ure of the company, its officers, agents, representatives, or employees
to observe state and federal laws, including but not limited to labor,
minimum-wage, and unfair-employment laws.
(F) The company agrees to pay losses, liabilities, and expenses
under the following conditions:
(1) The parties who shall be entitled to enforce this indemnity
of the contractor shall be the contracting agency, its officials,
agents, employees, and representatives, including attorneys, other
public officials, and the Superintendent/Warden, any successor in
office to any of the foregoing individuals, and their respective
legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries.
(2) The losses, liabilities, and expenses that are indemnified
shall include judgments, court costs, legal fees, the costs of expert
testimony, amounts paid in settlement, and all other costs of any
type whether or not'litigation is commenced. Also covered are
investigation expenses, including, but not limited to, the costs of
utilizing the services of the contracting agency incurred in the
defense and handling of said suits, claims, judgments, and the
like, and in enforcing and obtaining compliance with the provi-
sions of this paragraph whether or not litigation is commenced.
(3) Nothing in this contract shall be considered to preclude an
indemnified party from receiving the benefits of any insurance the
contractor may carry that provides for indemnification for any
loss, liability, or expense that is described in this contract.
(4) The company shall do nothing to prejudice the contracting
agency's right to recover against third parties for any loss, de-
struction of, or damage to the contracting agency's property.
Upon the request of the contracting agency or its officials, the
company shall furnish to the contracting agency all reasonable
assistance and cooperation, including assistance in the prosecu-
tion of suits and the execution of instruments of assignment in
favor of the contracting agency in obtaining recovery.
(5) The settlement of any claim or action involving a monetary
amount covered by insurance shall require the written consent of
each indemnified party to this contract against whom a claim is
made or action commenced. No such settlement shall be effective
without such written consent. The indemnified party or parties
shall not unreasonably withhold such consent.
(6) The settlement of any claim or action involving a nonmone-
tary amount, or the settlement of an amount of damages in excess
of or not otherwise covered by insurance, shall require the written
consent of each indemnified party to this contract against whom a
claim is made or action commenced. No such indemnified party
shall be liable for any settlement of any such claim or action ef-
fected without his, her, or its written consent.
(G) Nothing herein is intended to deprive the contracting agency of
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the benefits of any law limiting exposure to liability and/or setting a
ceiling on damages, or any laws establishing defense(s) for the con-
tracting agency.
(H) By entering this contract, the contracting agency does not
waive any immunity that may extend to it by operation of law.
(I) By entering this agreement, the company expressly waives any
immunity that may extend to it by operation of law.
(2) Insurance
(A) The contracting agency shall be named as an insured on any and
all insurance policies taken by the contractor for the construction, op-
eration, or management of a facility or facilities, and the coverage
shall extend to its officials, agents, employees, and representatives, in-
cluding attorneys, other public officials, and the Superinten-
dent/Warden, in their official or individual capacities, and their
respective legal representatives, heirs, and beneficiaries.
(B)(1) All insurance or other certificates required under this con-
tract must provide no less than thirty (30) days' advance notice to the
contracting agency of any contemplated cancellation.
(B)(2) The company will not cancel, or allow to be canceled, any
policy of insurance without contracting-agency approval. Each policy
shall be approved by the contracting agency prior to the effective date
of this contract. The contracting agency reserves the right, in its dis-
cretion, to reject any policy issued by an insurer that is deemed to be
not fully reliable or otherwise deemed to be unsuitable.
(B)(3) The contracting agency shall have the right, but not the obli-
gation, to advance an amount of money as required to prevent the in-
surance required herein from lapsing for nonpayment of premiums. If
the contracting agency advances such amount, then the company shall
be obligated to repay to the contracting agency the amount of any ad-
vances plus interest thereon at the maximum rate allowable by law,
and the contracting agency shall be entitled to set off and deduct such
amount from any amounts owed to the company pursuant to this con-
tract. No election by the contracting agency to advance insurance pre-
miums shall be deemed to cure a default by the company of its
obligation to provide insurance.
(C) This contract shall not become effective until the contractor
provides the contracting agency with policies of insurance of the fol-
lowing types, for the following purposes, and in the following amounts:
(1) Insurance protecting it under workers' compensation acts
and from other claims for damages for physical or personal in-
jury, including death, to inmates or prison employees, which may
arise from operations performed by the contractor, by a subcon-
tractor, or by a person directly or indirectly employed by either
of them. Such insurance will cover, but is not limited to, claims
arising out of personal-injury liability, professional liability (mal-
practice), and contractual liability.
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(2) Insurance in an amount not less than current coverage as
maintained by the contracting agency as of the effective date of
this contract with a deductible not greater than ten-thousand dol-
lars ($10,000), protecting the facility, and any other real or per-
sonal property described in or used pursuant to this contract,
against loss by fire, theft, or any other hazard, including destruc-
tion in whole or in part. Future additional coverage shall be de-
termined in accordance with reasonable valuation less the
deductible stated above. In the event of a loss, the contractor
shall pay all deductible amounts.
(3) General liability insurance, which shall specifically include
civil-rights matters, in an amount not less than twenty-five-mil-
lion dollars ($25,000,000) for each occurrence. Such insurance
shall also include coverage for the cost of defense for all con-
tracting-agency officials and others indemnified pursuant to this
contract.
(4) Automobile and other vehicle liability insurance in an
amount not less than two-million dollars ($2,000,000) for each oc-
currence and ten-million dollars ($10,000,000) for all occurrences.
(5) Insurance in an amount not less than fifty-thousand dollars
($50,000) relating to instances of dishonesty.
(D) The contracting agency shall exercise its best efforts to allow
the contractor to maintain insurance for the facility at the contractor's
expense under the contracting agency's fire and property insurance.
The contracting agency shall maintain fire and property insurance in
accordance with state law.
(E)(1) The contractor shall assume the defense for any action for
which there is insurance coverage with counsel selected by the con-
tractor, but the contracting agency may participate in the defense if it
chooses to do so.
(E)(2) Within ten (10) days after receipt by an indemnified party of
written notice of the commencement of any action against him, her, or
it, such party shall notify the contractor in writing of the commence-
ment thereof. Failure to so notify the contractor within such period
shall not relieve the contractor from any liability that it may have to
the indemnified party otherwise hereunder unless a judgment shall
have been entered against the contractor, or the contractor shall other-
wise have suffered irreparable injury, on account of such failure. In
case any such action shall be brought against an indemnified party,
and if the indemnified party shall notify the contractor of the com-
mencement thereof, the contractor shall be entitled to participate in
and assume the defense thereof, with counsel selected by the company
who is reasonably satisfactory to the contracting agency's counsel.
(F) The contracting agency shall remain solely responsible for any
losses or costs resulting from claims or litigation pending at the time
that this contract first becomes effective or arises thereafter from an
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occurrence prior to the time that this contract first became effective.
The contractor agrees to cooperate with the contracting agency in the
defense of these suits and conform its operation of the facility or facili-
ties to any court orders or settlement agreements resulting from such
claims or litigation.
Section 3(F): Operating Standards
The contractor shall [construct,] operate and maintain the facility in
accordance with all applicable constitutional standards, federal, state,
and local laws, rules, regulations, and ordinances, and certification or
licensing requirements that are effective or become effective during the
contract term, as well as court orders rendered during the contract
term [including, but not limited to, ]. The contractor shall
also comply with one-hundred percent of the mandatory ACA Stan-
dards and ninety percent of the nonmandatory ACA Standards.
When the contract expressly provides that a Standard is incorpo-
rated as mandatory, compliance with that Standard is mandatory for
purposes of the contract despite the fact that it may be classified as
nonmandatory by the ACA.
If any provision of this contract is more stringent than the applica-
ble ACA Standard(s), the contract provision shall govern and must be
complied with by the contractor.
If any applicable federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation is in
conflict with the ACA Standards, the more stringent requirement shall
govern and must be complied with by the contractor.
The contractor must maintain compliance with the required percent-
ages of mandatory and nonmandatory ACA Standards, as well as all
other contractual provisions and standards, from the date the contract
commences to the date the contract terminates [except that, when the
contractor assumes operation of an existing facility, it shall have
ninety (90) days from the date the contract commences to achieve com-
pliance with applicable ACA Standards relating to the condition of the
physical plant]. In the event that the ACA Standards are modified
during the contract term, including any renewal period, the contractor
shall have [number] (L months to bring the facility into compli-
ance with the new Standards, provided that the new Standards have
been approved by the contracting agency.
Section 3(G): Subcontracts and Assignments
The contractor shall not subcontract or assign any or all of the serv-
ices to be performed under this contract without the consent, guidance,
and prior express written approval of the contracting agency. In the
event that approval is granted and some or all of the services are sub-
contracted or assigned, the contractor shall guarantee that the subcon-
tractor will comply with all of the provisions of this contract, including
7451989]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:531
the incorporated ACA Standards. Employees of the subcontractor or
assignee shall have the same rights and obligations under the contract
as do employees of the contractor.
[Optional Paragraph: The contractor shall be required to provide a
payment bond with a surety company that is licensed to do business in
[the appropriate jurisdiction] and that is acceptable to the contracting
agency to insure the payment of all subcontractors, material men, la-
borers, and taxes, including but not limited to unemployment insur-
ance taxes.]
The contractor is ultimately responsible for the performance of all
work under the contract at the contract price, regardless of whether
some or all of the work is subcontracted or assigned. In the event that
the contractor or subcontractor falls to comply with the requirements
of this or any other contractual provision, the contracting agency may
fine the contractor [number] ( ) dollars per violation. Alter-
nately [or in addition], the contracting agency may hold the contractor
in breach of the contract and terminate the contract at the contracting
agency's option.
Section 3(H): Independent-Contractor Status
Nothing contained in this contract is intended or should be con-
strued as creating the relationship of co-partners, joint-ventures, or an
association between the contracting agency and the contractor. The
contractor is an independent contractor and neither the contractor nor
its employees, agents, or representatives shall be considered employ-
ees, agents, or representatives of the contracting agency. These par-
ties shall not, therefore, be entitled to any benefits that accrue to
employees, agents, or representatives of the contracting agency.
From any amount due the contractor, there will be no deductions for
federal income tax or FICA payments, nor for any state income tax,
nor for any other purposes that are associated with any employer-em-
ployee relationship, unless required by law. Payment of federal in-
come tax, FICA, and any state income tax is the responsibility of the
contractor.
Section 4: Employee Issues
Section 4(A): Hiring Criteria
(1) Employment Discrimination
The contractor shall not discriminate against any employee or appli-
cant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, national ori-
gin, age (except as provided by law), marital status, political affiliation,
or handicap. The contractor must take affirmative action to ensure
that employees, as well as applicants for employment, are treated with-
out discrimination because of their race, color, religion, sex, national
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origin, age (except as provided by law), marital status, political affilia-
tion, or handicap. Such action shall include, but is not limited to, the
following: employment, promotion, demotion or transfer, recruitment
or recruitment advertising, layoff or termination, rates of pay or other
forms of compensation, and selection for training, including appren-
ticeship. The contractor agrees to post notices setting forth the provi-
sions of this clause in conspicuous places, available to employees and
applicants for employment.
The contractor shall, in all solicitations or advertisements for em-
ployees placed by or on behalf of the contractor, state that all qualified
applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age (except as provided by
law), marital status, political affiliation, or handicap, except where it
relates to a bona fide occupational qualification. The contractor shall
comply with the nondiscrimination clause contained in Federal Execu-
tive Order 11246, as amended by Federal Executive Order 11375, rel-
ative to Equal Employment Opportunity for all persons without regard
to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and the implementation of
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and with
Title 41, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 60. The contractor
shall comply with related [jurisdiction] laws and regulations.
The contractor shall comply with regulations issued by the Secre-
tary of Labor of the United States in Title 20, Code of Federal Regula-
tions, Part 741, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 11758
and the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The contractor shall comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
any amendments thereto, and the rules and regulations thereunder,
and Section 504 of Title V of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1973 as amended. This provision incorporates as mandatory ACA
Standards 2-4054, 2-4055, 2-4057, and 2-4059. The contractor has a
continuing obligation to comply with the Standards, as well as with
revised or additional Standards to the extent that they are approved by
the contracting agency.
In the event that the contractor fails to comply with these provi-
sions, including the applicable ACA Standards, or with any other such
rules, regulations, or orders, this contract may be cancelled, termi-
nated, or suspended in whole or in part by the contracting agency and
the contractor may be declared ineligible for further contracts.
(2) Employment Options for Correctional and Detention Employees
at Existing Facilities
Every correctional employee currently employed by the contracting
agency who desires to remain employed at the facility shall be ac-
cepted as an employee of the contractor if he or she satisfactorily com-
pletes the training requirements detailed in Subsection 4(B) of this
contract and meets all other requirements regarding employees set
forth in this contract. The contractor shall not be required to hire
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otherwise qualified employees from the existing facility if the contrac-
tor has met the staffing levels required by this contract. The contrac-
tor shall also have the discretion to hire a new applicant over an
existing employee if the contractor determines that the new applicant
is better qualified for the position. Factors to be considered may in-
clude, but are not limited to, records and evaluations of the employee's
past job performance and his or her years of experience, education,
and/or training relevant to the position.
This provision supersedes ACA Standards 2-4054 and 2-4055 during
the initial hiring period only.
Existing employees shall be entitled to starting wages and benefits,
including [list benefits] that are equal to or greater than the wages and
benefits that an employee of comparable qualifications would receive
for the same position from the contracting agency. The contractor
shall credit to each former contracting-agency employee the amount of
annual leave, compensatory leave time, and personal leave time, in-
cluding sick leave, that the contracting agency certifies the employee
has on the day employment terminates with the contracting agency.
(3) Employee Background Investigations
Prior to and as a condition of employment, a background investiga-
tion shall be made of each prospective employee. This investigation
shall include criminal (obtaining FBI or NCIC records), medical, and
employment histories. A prospective employee may be denied employ-
ment if the background investigation reveals information indicating
that he or she would not be an appropriate correctional employee. The
contractor shall maintain fingerprint charts on every employee.
This provision incorporates as mandatory ACA Standards 2-4061
through 2-4063. The contractor has a continuing obligation to comply
with these Standards, as well as with subsequent ACA Standards to
the extent that they are approved by the contracting agency.
Section 4(B): Employee Training Requirements
All of the contractor's employees shall successfully complete a forty
(40) hour new-employee orientation program, as required by ACA
Standards, after being hired and prior to regular assignment. Thereaf-
ter, the contractor shall comply with all ACA Standards concerning
training (or more stringent standards, should the law require) and shall
ensure that the contractor's employees receive sufficient training to
comply with ACA Standards 2-4079 through 2-4101. Standards 2-
4079 through 2-4083, 2-4086 through 2-4095, and 2-4098 are incorpo-
rated as mandatory. [In addition, the contractor shall take all reason-
able actions to help each correctional or detention employee retain his
or her certification from the (appropriate authority and jurisdiction).]
The contractor shall provide to the contract monitor documentation
of all completed employee training as soon as possible after its comple-
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tion. Upon request, the monitor shall be permitted to review training
curriculum and other training-related records that are maintained by
the contractor. The monitor shall be permitted to audit training
classes at any time.
The contractor shall be responsible for all training expenses.
Section 4(C): Personnel Policy
The contractor must implement and at all times maintain a person-
nel policy that includes:
(1) all of the elements and substantive guidelines that are set forth in
ACA Standards 2-4060, 2-4064, 2-4065, 2-4067, 2-4070, 2-4076, 2-
4077, and 2-4078, which are hereby incorporated as mandatory;
(2) all applicable federal, state, and local statutory and regulatory
provisions, including [list provisions]; and
(3) the following additional standards: [list standards].
Section 4(D): Staff Ratio
The facility shall be staffed 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. The
staffing pattern shall be adequate to ensure close inmate surveillance
and maintenance of security within the facility. The contractor shall
provide adequate staff to maintain an effective patrol of the perimeter
of the facility during periods of darkness, times of emergency, and
when inmates are not involved with supervised activities and/or
programs.
The staffing pattern shall address transportation and security needs.
The staffing pattern shall also consider the proximity of the facility to
neighborhoods, schools, etc.
This provision incorporates as mandatory ACA Standards 2-4072
through 2-4075. The contractor has a continuing obligation to comply
with the existing Standards, as well as with subsequent ACA Stan-
dards to the extent that they are approved by the contracting agency.
Section 4(E): Labor Disputes/Right to Strike
(1) The contractor shall include a no-strike provision in any labor
agreement that it negotiates with a union that is formed or joined by
its employees.
(2) The contractor shall use its best efforts to reach an early and
peaceful settlement to any labor dispute. Such disputes include, but
are not limited to, picketing, lockouts, and strikes.
(3) The contractor shall notify the contracting agency at least sixty
(60) days prior to the termination of any labor agreement with its
employees.
(4) The contractor shall notify the contracting agency immediately
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upon learning of a potential or impending strike or serious labor
disturbance.
(5) In the event of a strike or serious labor disturbance, the con-
tracting agency may call on the emergency resources of the [appropri-
ate jurisdiction] to operate and/or control the facility or facilities until
the strike or disturbance has ended. In the event of such an emer-
gency, the contractor shall cooperate fully with the contracting agency
to ensure safe operations.
(6) The contractor shall reimburse the contracting agency [and/or
the appropriate jurisdiction] for any costs incurred during or directly
related to the strike or labor disturbance.
(7) The occurrence of a strike or a serious labor disturbance shall
constitute grounds for cancellation, termination, or suspension of the
contract by the contracting agency.
Section 5: Inmate Issues
Section 5(A): Inmate Management
(1) Classification
The contracting agency shall classify all inmates, according to its
own criteria. The contractor shall be bound by the agency's
classifications.
(2) Transfer
The contractor shall have no authority to transfer an inmate. The
contractor may, however, recommend in writing that the contracting
agency transfer a particular inmate. The contracting agency shall
have final authority with respect to any transfer decision.
(3) Discipline
The contractor shall have no authority to administer discipline to an
inmate in its custody unless the discipline is ordered by a [state or
federal] hearing officer, pursuant to [the jurisdiction's] disciplinary
procedures. Rules that are formulated by the contractor shall be null
and void except to the extent that they are accepted or modified by the
contracting agency.
(4) Parole
No employee of the contractor shall have any authority to recom-
mend that the parole board either deny or grant parole to any inmate
in the contractor's custody. The contractor's submissions to the parole
board shall be limited to written reports that have been prepared in the
ordinary course of business.
Section 5(B): Use of Force
(1) The private contractor's employees serving as "jailers" shall be
allowed to use force only while on the grounds of the facility, while
transporting inmates, and while pursuing escapees from the facility.
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(2) "Non-deadly force," which is force that normally would cause
neither death nor serious bodily injury, and "deadly force," which is
force that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, shall be
used only as set forth herein.
(3) Non-Deadly Force. Any [contractor's name] jailer shall be au-
thorized to use only such non-deadly force as the circumstances re-
quire in the following situations: to prevent the commission of a
felony or misdemeanor, including escape; to defend oneself or others
against physical assault; to prevent serious damage to property; to en-
force institutional regulations and orders; and to prevent or quell a
riot.
(4) Use of Firearms/Deadly Force. [Contractor's name] jailers who
have been appropri- ately certified as determined by the contracting
agency and trained pursuant to the provisions of Subsection (5) shall
have the right to carry and use firearms and shall exercise such au-
thority and use deadly force only as a last resort, and then only to
prevent an act that could result in death or serious bodily injury to
oneself or to another person.
(5) Jailers shall be trained in accordance with ACA Standards 2-
4186 through 2-4189 and 2-4206, concerning the use of force and the
use of firearms, and shall be trained, at the contractor's expense, at the
facilities that train public prison and jail personnel for at least the
minimum number of hours that public personnel are currently trained.
(6) Within three (3) days following an incident involving the use of
force against an inmate or another, the employee shall file a written
report with the administrative staff and contract monitor describing
the incident.
(7) The contractor shall stand in the shoes of the contracting agency
in any agreement, formal or informal, with local law-enforcement
agencies concerning the latter's obligations in the event of emergency
situations, such as riots or escapes.
Section 5(C): Inmate Transportation
Either:
[The contracting agency shall provide for all of the transportation
needs of the inmates under the contractor's care without cost to the
contractor.]
or:
[The contractor shall provide for all of the transportation needs of
the inmates under its care, from the time that the prisoner is delivered
to the facility by the contracting agency to his or her release or trans-
fer by the contracting agency.
The Use of Force provision in this contract shall apply during the
time that the contractor is transporting inmates. The contractor shall
comply with all relevant statutes, rules, and regulations regarding in-
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surance, inspection, and motor vehicles while transporting the
inmates.]
Section 5(D): Inmate Labor
The parties agree that all inmates shall be required to keep their
living areas clean. In addition, inmates may, if they volunteer, work in
the food service, laundry, or other areas of the facility. The contractor
shall submit job descriptions for the contracting agency's approval
before assigning inmates to those positions. Job assignments shall be
made by the contractor. These assignments shall be subject to review
by the contracting agency upon written request by the inmates, if they
so elect. The contracting agency shall provide inmates with good-time
credit or monetary compensation for labor performed. The con-
tracting agency shall be responsible for establishing and administering
this compensation program. The contractor shall make inmates avail-
able for contracting-agency work projects upon [number] ()
days' written notice to the contractor. The contracting agency shall be
responsible for oversight, transportation, and security of the inmates
during such work projects.
Section 6: Monitoring
(A) On or before thirty (30) days after the execution of this con-
tract, the contracting agency shall appoint a contract monitor, who
will be an employee of the contracting agency, to be the official liaison
between the contracting agency and the contractor. The contract mon-
itor [and his or her staff] shall be provided an office in the facility and
shall have access at all times, with or without notice, to inmates and
staff, to all areas of the facility, and to all books, records (including
financial records), and reports kept by the contractor concerning the
renovation, repair, construction, maintenance, and operation of the
facility.
The monitor [and his or her staff] will be responsible for monitoring
compliance with all contractual obligations, including compliance with
the incorporated ACA Standards. The contractor must maintain
whatever documentation is necessary to prove that the contractor is
meeting its obligations under the contract. This includes, but is not
limited to, all reports and other documentation required by ACA Stan-
dards, as well as the following reports: [list them]. The contractor
shall be responsible for all costs associated with the monitoring of the
facility, except for the salaries of the monitor [and his or her staff].
(B) Members of the public, including the media, must apply for ac-
cess to the facility [number] () days before the date that such a
visit is planned. An application for access shall include the date and
time of the planned visit, the purpose of the visit, and any other rele-
vant information that the contractor's representative requires. Access
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shall be granted, except where the contractor has clear and convincing
evidence that such visits jeopardize the security of the facility or the
safety of the inmates or visitor. The monitor shall have final review
over all decisions regarding public access to the facility.
(C) The contractor shall be fined [number] (L dollars for each
instance of noncompliance with the contract. The contractor will be
given a reasonable time, as determined by the monitor, to rectify the
noncompliance. If the noncompliance is not rectified in this period or
if [number] L.) instances of noncompliance are detected in a
[number] (L month period, the contractor shall be deemed to be
in breach of the contract.
Section 7: Termination
This contract shall be subject to the following provisions:
(A) Termination for Default
The contracting agency may terminate this contract when it deter-
mines that (1) the private contractor has failed to meet the minimum
standards of operations set forth in Subsection 3(F) of this contract, or
(2) the contractor has failed to meet other contract provisions where
such failure seriously affects the operation of the facility.
Thirty (30) days prior to termination by the contracting agency, it
shall serve the contractor with written notice of default(s), by certified
mail. If the contractor has failed to correct the default to the con-
tracting agency's satisfaction within the period of time specified in the
contracting-agency notice, the contractor shall be deemed to be in de-
fault of the contract and the contract shall be terminated immediately,
or, at the option of the contracting agency, it may offset the default by
deducting payments to the contractor or seek other equitable remedies.
If after Notice of Termination for Default it is determined by the
contracting agency, the arbitrators, or a court that the contractor was
in default because of causes beyond the control and without the error
or negligence of the contractor, the termination shall be deemed to
have been issued as a Termination for Convenience, with the parties'
rights governed accordingly.
In the event of default, in full or in part as provided herein, the
contracting agency may procure, on terms that it finds appropriate,
goods or services similar to those to be provided hereunder, and the
contractor shall be liable to the contracting agency for any excess
costs for such similar goods and services. In addition, the contractor
shall be liable to the contracting agency for administrative costs in-
curred by the contracting agency in procuring such similar goods or
services. The performance bond required in Subsection 3(D) of this
contract shall guarantee payment of such excess costs and the contrac-
tor shall be liable for any excess over and above said amount if the
bond proceeds are insufficient to pay such costs.
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In the event of Termination for Default, subject to the retainage
provision, the contractor shall be paid in accordance with the contract
price for each contracting-agency inmate held by the contractor until
the date of termination.
The rights and remedies of the contracting agency provided in this
Subsection shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other
rights and remedies provided by law or pursuant to tile contract.
(B) Termination for Contractor Bankruptcy
The contractor must inform the contracting agency of its intention
to file a petition for bankruptcy at least ten (10) days prior to filing
such a petition. The contractor's filing without conforming to this re-
quirement shall be deemed a material pre-petition incurable breach.
In the event of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, reorganization,
or liquidation pursuant to any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, Title
11 U.S.C., the contracting agency shall have the right to terminate the
contract under the same conditions as if it were a Termination for
Default. In the event of termination for contractor bankruptcy, the
contractor shall be required to cooperate and assist the contracting
agency to the fullest extent possible to reestablish prison or jail serv-
ices as quickly as possible.
(C) Termination for Unavailability of Funds
In the event that the contracting agency's funds for the contract
become unavailable, the contracting agency shall have the right to ter-
minate the contract without penalty and on the same terms and condi-
tions as if it were a Termination for Convenience. Availability of
funds will be determined at the sole discretion of the contracting
agency.
(D) Termination for Convenience
The contracting agency may terminate performance of work under
the contract in whole or in part whenever, for any reason, the con-
tracting agency determines that it is in its best interest to do so. The
contracting agency shall give the contractor, without penalty to the
state, ninety (90) days' notice prior to termination of the contract.
The contractor shall have no right to any general, special, inciden-
tal, consequential, or any damages whatsoever of any description or
amount, except that the contracting agency shall pay for all supplies
and equipment on order and not yet delivered to the facility as of the
date of termination.
(E) Procedure on Termination
Upon delivery by certified mail to the contractor of a Notice of Ter-
mination specifying the nature of the termination, the extent to which
performance of work under the contract is terminated, and the date on
which such termination becomes effective, the contractor shall:
(1) stop work under the contract on the date and to the extent
specified in the Notice of Termination;
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(2) place no further orders for materials, services, or facilities,
except as may be necessary for completion of such portion of the
work under the contract as is not terminated;
(3) terminate all orders to the extent that they relate to the
performance of work terminated by the Notice of Termination,
except as may be necessary to avoid the incurrence of penalty
assessments and the continuation of which the contracting agency
has approved;
(4) assign to the contracting agency in the manner and to the
extent directed by the [contracting officer] all of the right, title,
and interest of the contractor under the orders so terminated, in
which case the contracting agency shall have the right, in its dis-
cretion, to settle or pay any or all claims arising out of the termi-
nation of such orders;
(5) with the approval or ratification of the [contracting officer],
settle all outstanding liabilities and all claims arising out of such
termination of orders, the cost of which would be reimbursable in
whole or in part, in accordance with the provision of the
contracts;
(6) transfer title to the contracting agency (to the extent that
title has not already been transferred) and deliver in the manner,
at the times, and to the extent directed by the [contracting officer]
all files, processing systems, data manuals, or documentation, in
any form, that relate to work terminated by the Notice of
Termination;
(7) complete the performance of such part of the work as shall
not have been terminated by the Notice of Termination; and
(8) take such action as may be necessary, or as the [contracting
officer] may direct, for the protection and preservation of the
property related to the contract that is in the possession of the
contractor and in which the contracting agency has or may ac-
quire an interest.
The contractor shall proceed immediately with the performance of
the above obligations notwithstanding any delay in determining or ad-
justing the amount of any item of reimbursable price under this
provision.
(F) Resumption of Government Control
Notwithstanding any other provision of this contract to the con-
trary, prior to entering a contract for the private operation of any
prison or jail, a plan shall be developed by the contracting agency and
certified by the [Governor or appropriate executive officer or legisla-
tive body] demonstrating the method by which the government would
resume control of the facility upon contract termination.
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Section 8: Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 8(A): Entire Agreement
This contract constitutes the entire contract and supersedes all
other prior agreements and understandings, both written and oral, be-
tween the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. The term
'contract' includes [list of Exhibits, Attachments, Appendices, etc.].
Section 8(B): Amendment
This contract may be amended only in writing signed by the parties.
Section 8(C): Severability
If any term, provision, covenant, or restriction of this contract is
held by a court of competent jurisdiction or the legislature to be inva-
lid, void, or unenforceable, the remainder of the terms, provisions, cov-
enants, and restrictions of this contract shall remain in full force and
effect, and shall in no way be affected, impaired, or invalidated.
If, however, the contracting agency determines that the invalid pro-
vision or provisions are essential to the purpose or performance of the
contract, it may terminate the contract. Such a termination shall be
deemed a Termination for Convenience as set forth in Section 7(D) of
this contract.
Section 8(D): Venue and Choice of Law
Venue for the enforcement of this contract and all claims or disputes
relating thereto shall be in the [select appropriate court and
jurisdiction].
This contract, the rights and obligations of the parties hereto, and
any claims or disputes relating thereto shall be governed by and con-
strued in accordance with the internal law of the State of [ ]
in the resolution of all issues.
Section 8(E): Alternative Dispute Resolution
Any controversy regarding this contract that the parties are unable
to resolve by mutual agreement may be submitted to binding arbitra-
tion in [location] in accordance with the rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association.
Any decision of the arbitrators shall be conclusive as to the matter
submitted and may be enforced in any court of competent jurisdiction
in the State of [ ]. Issues under arbitration shall be heard and
decided by three arbitrators, one of whom shall be designated by the
contracting agency, one of whom shall be designated by the contractor,
and one of whom shall be designated by the court in [location], or, in
the absence of such a designation, by the American Arbitration Asso-
PRIVATE INCARCERATION
ciation. Any factual decision on an issue being arbitrated, including
the sharing of costs of arbitration, made by at least two of the arbitra-
tors shall be the decision of the arbitrators and such decision shall be
final, non-appealable, and binding on both parties.
The following terms shall be binding on the parties:
(1) Either party may require that the hearing be recorded.
(2) After it is determined by either party that a dispute cannot
be resolved without arbitration, it shall be submitted for arbitra-
tion within fifteen (15) business days. "Business days" shall mean
Monday through Friday, excluding holidays. After submission, a
written decision shall be rendered within ninety (90) days, unless
an extension is agreed to by both parties.
(3) Neither party shall appoint an employee or agent as an
arbitrator.
(4) Each party reserves the right to appeal any question of law.
(5) Discovery shall be conducted in accordance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Section shall operate only by mutual consent of the parties.
IV. STATUTORY DIMENSIONS
This section of the paper is divided into two major parts. The first
part addresses the authority of the federal government to contract
for the private operation of its incarceration facilities. Because the
Federal Bureau of Prisons is required by statute to "[p]rovide tech-
nical assistance to State and local governments in the improvement
of their correctional systems," 9 3 ' many state and local governments
will likely look to the authorization for and experience of federal
prison and jail privatization should they decide to consider priva-
tization as an option. This part concludes that there is federal au-
thority to contract out for the confinement of federal inmates only in
residential community-treatment centers. If the Bureau of Prisons
or any state or local government decides to privatize its incarcera-
tion facilities, it should do so only after the enactment of explicit
and unambiguous legislation designed specifically for that purpose.
The public, through its elected representatives, deserves a say in
that decision.
The second part of this section presents a Model Statute and ac-
companying commentary.
931. 18 U.S.C. § 4042(4) (1982).
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4. Federal Statutory Authorization to Designate Privately
Operated Places of Confinement
1. Introduction
Any discussion concerning the federal government's authority to
designate a privately operated facility as a place of confinement for
adult federal prisoners must begin with 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b).93 2 Sec-
tion 4082(b) stated:
The Attorney General may designate as a place of confinement
any available, suitable, and appropriate institution or facility,
whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise, and whether
within or without the judicial district in which the person was con-
victed, and may at any time transfer a person from one place of
confinement to another.
9 3 3
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984934 replaced section
4082(b) with 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b),9 3 5 which provides:
The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the pris-
oner's imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available
penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of
health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether main-
tained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or
without the judicial district in which the person was convicted,
that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable .... 936
The key words of section 4082(b) that have been used to support
arguments in favor of federal authority to privatize prisons have not
been altered by section 3621(b). As noted in Senate Report No.
225:
Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (b) follows existing law in providing
that the authority to designate the place of confinement for Fed-
eral prisoners rests in the Bureau of Prisons. The designated pe-
932. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1982).
933. Id. (emphasis added).
934. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1986)).
935. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
936. Id. (emphasis added). This section further provides that, in designating a place of
confinement, the Bureau of Prisons should consider:
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence-
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was
determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate;
and
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursu-
ant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28 ....
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nal or correctional facility need not be in the judicial district in
which the prisoner was convicted and need not be maintained by
the Federal Government. Existing law provides that the Bureau
may designate a place of confinement that is available, appropriate,
and suitable. Section 3621 (b) continues that discretionary author-
ity with a new requirement that the facility meet minimum standards of
health and habitability established by the Bureau of Prisons.
93 7
This language and the plain language of the statute indicate that
Congress did not intend, through passage of section 3621 (b), to ex-
pand the types of prison facilities in which federal prisoners could
be placed. The critical phrase in section 4082(b) defining the types
of eligible facilities - those "maintained by the Federal Govern-
ment or otherwise" - remains intact in section 3621(b). Section
3621(b) merely sets forth certain additional factors that must be
considered when the Bureau of Prisons selects a facility for a partic-
ular prisoner. 938 Consequently, one must examine the legislative
history of section 4082(b) to determine whether the confinement of
federal prisoners in private as well as in public facilities is
authorized.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b)
18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) permitted the Attorney General to designate
as a place of confinement for federal prisoners any "available, suita-
ble, and appropriate institution or facility, whether maintained by
the Federal Government or otherwise."'93 9 The meaning of "or other-
wise" is unclear on its face and is therefore subject to alternative
interpretations.
The legislative history of section 4082 is silent, however, with re-
spect to the meaning of this language. The former Director of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Norman A. Carlson, suggested at one
point that the "or otherwise" language authorized the Attorney
General to contract with private corporations for the confinement of
federal prisoners in all situations - i.e., in both secured and un-
secured contexts.9 40 This phrase, however, has also been inter-
937. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1984) (emphasis added; footnotes omit-
ted), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3324-25.
938. See supra note 936.
939. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
940. Hearings, supra note 375, at 141 (statement of Norman A. Carlson, Director, Federal
Bureau of Prisons). In 1985, however, Mr. Carlson testified to the contrary, stating that the
Bureau of Prisons lacked the necessary statutory authority to contract with the private sector
for the confinement of adult federal prisoners in both the secured and unsecured contexts.
Director Carlson stated:
My gut reaction would be that I the Bureau of Prisons] would not be able to privatize
one of the existing 45 institutions.... I do not think we have the authority and as
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preted as referring to other public facilities only - i.e., facilities
operated by a state or territory or some political subdivision
thereof.94' With respect to prisoners in the secured-confinement
context, the latter interpretation is correct. This construction of the
"or otherwise" language is supported by the current contracting
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4002,942 as well as by Congress's purposes
in enacting section 4082(b) and the Act of which it was originally a
part.943 Subsequent amendments to section 4082(b) have modified
these purposes. Consequently, the meaning of the phrase "or
otherwise" has changed, but only to the rather limited extent of per-
mitting the Attorney General to contract with private corporations
for the confinement of federal prisoners in certain special facilities,
such as residential community-treatment centers.
a. Legislative intent of 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b)
18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 753f, enacted in
1940,944 which provided in pertinent part that the Attorney General
"may designate ... any available, suitable, and appropriate institu-
tion or facility, whether maintained by the Federal Government or
otherwise," for the confinement of federal prisoners. 945 Section
753f was passed in conjunction with several other statutes under an
"Act to Reorganize the Administration of Federal Prisons, to au-
thorize the Attorney General to contract for the care of United
States prisoners, to establish Federal jails, and for other pur-
poses." 9 4 6 Thus, section 753f must be interpreted in relationship to
Director, I would not contemplate contracting out to the private sector for the opera-
tion of one of our regular institutions.
Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Parole Commission: Hearings Before the Subeonim. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties, and the Adujinistration ofJnstice of the House Comn. on theJudicia, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1985) (testimony of Norman A. Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons).
941. Hearings, supra note 375, at 106 (statement of Ira P. Robbins, Barnard T. Welsh
Scholar and Professor of Law and Justice, The American University, Washington College of
Law).
942. 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1982). Section 4002 provides:
For the purpose of providing suitable quarters for the safekeeping, care, and sub-
sistence of all persons held under authority of any enactment of Congress, the Attor-
ney General may contract, for a period not exceeding three years, with the proper
authorities of any State, Territory, or political subdivision thereof, for the imprison-
ment, subsistence, care, and proper employment of such persons.
Id.; see infra notes 964-967 and accompanying text (discussing impact of section 4002 on sec-
tion 4082(b)).
943. "Act to Reorganize the Administration of Federal Prisons, to authorize the Attorney
General to contract for the care of United States prisoners, to establish Federal jails, and for
other purposes." H.R. 7832, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930), reprinted in 1930 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 325.
944. 18 U.S.C. § 753f (1940) (recodified at 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1982)).
945. Id.
946. H.R. 7832, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930), reprinted.in 1930 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 325.
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both the entire Act of which it was a part and the congressional pur-
pose behind passage of the Act.947 In particular, sections 753a
through 753c establish the necessary context for interpreting sec-
tion 753f.9 48
In large part, the Act was passed in response to a shortage of
prison space for federal prisoners.9 49 Not only were the federal in-
stitutions severely overcrowded, but the state and local institutions
on which the federal government heavily relied for providing addi-
tional prison space were overcrowded as well. 950 The conditions of
confinement in the state and local prisons that did accept federal
inmates were generally far below federal standards. 95' Under ex-
isting law, the federal government was "powerless to remedy the
deplorable conditions of filth, contamination, and idleness which
[were] present in most of the antiquated jails of the country, for it
[was] wholly dependent upon the charity of the States" with respect
to whether and on what terms a state would accept federal
prisoners. 9
5 2
These problems were exacerbated by the lack of a central admin-
istrative organization that was empowered to remedy this situa-
tion.953 Congress considered and ultimately adopted the view of
United States Attorney General William DeWitt Mitchell, who called
947. See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("In expounding a statute,
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provi-
sions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.") (quoting United States v. Heirs of Bois-
dor6, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849), and citing Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395,
402-03 (1975); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)).
948. See infra notes 957-963 and accompanying text (discussing text of section 753a
through section 753c and their relationship to section 7530.
949. See Federal Pfisoners and Penitentiaies: Hearings on H.R. 7832 Before the House Coamn. on
theJudiciary, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15 (1929) [hereinafter Healings on H.R. 7832] (statement
of William DeWitt Mitchell, U.S. Attorney General, remarking that existing federal institu-
tions were grossly inadequate with respect to the burgeoning numbers of federal prisoners);
id. at 21-22 (comments of Rep. John G. Cooper, stating that a serious crisis confronted those
who administered the federal penal system, due in part to the tremendous increase in the
number of federal prisoners); S. REP. No. 533, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930) (Senate Judiciary
Committee noting that congestion in federal penal institutions constituted emergency situa-
tion requiring passage of Act); H.R. REP. No. 106, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930) (letter from
William DeWitt Mitchell, stating that both federal and state penal institutions were
overcrowded).
950. See H.R. REP. No. 106, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930) (letter from William DeWitt
Mitchell, stating that both federal and state penal institutions were overcrowded).
951. See Hearings on H. R. 7832, supra note 949, at 22 (statement of Rep. John G. Cooper,
remarking that conditions in nonfederal institutions, especially city and county jails, were
deplorable).
952. S. REP. No. 533, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930) (letter from William DeWitt Mitchell),
quoted in H.R. REP. No. 106, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930).
953. S. REP. No. 533, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930) (letter from William DeWitt Mitchell,
stating that existing organizational system was altogether inadequate); Hearings on H.R. 7832,
supra note 949, at 21 (statement of Rep. John G. Cooper, stating that those administering the
federal penal system faced a very serious crisis due, in part, to the lack of a proper program to
deal with federal prisoners).
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upon the legislature to establish a "bureau which is definitely
charged with the duty of supervising the care and treatment of Fed-
eral offenders." 954 Mitchell noted that it was "doubtful if the Fed-
eral Government ought ever to have a complete system of jails
paralleling similar institutions now found in the political subdivi-
sions of the various states. It is possible, however, for the central
Government to improve conditions by certain administrative revi-
sions of its present practices." 955 Express authorization under the
Act to designate the institution to which a prisoner should be sent
and the power to transfer prisoners from one institution to another
were also considered to be necessary for the efficient administration
of the federal prison system.
9 56
Section 753 was a broad provision placing the Bureau of Prisons
in charge of all federal penal and correctional institutions, as well as
"the safekeeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline" of all
federal offenders. 957 This section empowered the federal govern-
ment to contract with the "proper authorities of any State or Terri-
tory or political subdivision thereof" for a period not to exceed
three years.958 If these other jurisdictions were unable or refused to
954. S. REP. No. 533, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930) (letter from William DeWitt Mitchell),
quoted in H.R. REP. No. 106, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930). Prior to the enactncnt of section
753f, federal prisoners had been confined in various institutions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 691
and 692. Section 691, entitled "Temporary jails for confinement of United States prisoners,"
provided that "[iun a State where the use ofjails, penitentiaries, or other houses is not allowed
for the imprisonment of [federal prisoners,] ... any marshal in such state ... may hire, or
otherwise procure . . . a convenient place to serve as a temporary jail." 18 U.S.C. § 691
(1926). Section 692 authorized the marshal to "make such other provisions as he may deem
expedient and necessary for the safe-keeping of the prisoners." Id. § 692. A plain reading of
these statutes would suggest that a marshal could contract with both public and private enti-
ties for the temporary confinement of federal prisoners. Sections 691 and 692 were repealed,
however, by the 1948 recodification of Title 18.
955. S. REP. No. 533, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930) (letter from William DeWitt Mitchell),
quoted in H.R. REP. No. 106, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930).
956. See S. REP. No. 533, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1930) (letter from William DeWitt Mitch-
ell, stating that proper administration and regulation of federal penal institutions makes it
necessary for some central coordinating agency to exercise authority of designating prisoners'
place of confinement and prison transfers), cited in H.R. REP. No. 106, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1930); S. REP. No. 533, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930) (report ofSen. Steiwer, remarking that
Act "will enable the Bureau of Prisons to act immediately with respect to certain classes of
prisoners and thus alleviate the present congestion and unsafe conditions without waiting for
the completion [of construction of other federal facilities provided for in companion bill,]" as
well as "provide . . . an adequate system for dealing with certain great masses of Federal
prisoners held in local jails and workhouses"); Heaings on H.R. 7832, supra note 949, at 28-29
(comments of Sanford Bates, Superintendent of Prisons, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, remarking that
the Act would remedy conflicting statutes regarding placement of federal prisoners in federal,
state, and count' institutions).
957. 18 U.S.C. § 753a (1940) (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1982)).
958. Id. § 753b (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1982)). Section 753b provided that
"lilt shall be the duty of the Bureau of Prisons to provide suitable quarters for the safe-keep-
ing, care, and subsistence of all persons convicted of offenses against the United States. [or]
charged with offenses against the United States .... For this purpose the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons ra-Y contract, for a period not exceeding three years with the pwper authorities of any
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enter into a contract, or if existing facilities were not available at a
reasonable cost for the imprisonment of federal prisoners, then sec-
tion 753c authorized the Attorney General to build a federal "house
of detention, workhouse, jail, prison-industries project or camp or
other place of confinement. " 959
In the context of sections 753b and 753c, the "or otherwise"
phrase of section 753f can only be interpreted as referring to institu-
tions belonging to a state, territory, or political subdivision
thereof.960 The Act authorized only three alternatives for confining
federal prisoners: an existing federal institution;96 1 a new federal
institution;962 or a state, territorial, or other public institution. 963
Thus, there is no statutory authority under section 753f - the pre-
cursor to sections 4082(b) and 3621(b) - or any other section of
the original Act, either express or implied, that enables the federal
government to contract with private entities for the confinement of
federal prisoners.
b. 18 U.S.C. § 4002's restrictions on 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b)
18 U.S.C. § 4002, based on 18 U.S.C. § 753b, is the only provi-
sion that authorizes the Attorney General to contract for the con-
finement of adult federal prisoners.9 64 Sectibn 4002 permits the
federal government to contract for the confinement of federal pris-
oners in state institutions.9 65 Title 18 of the United States Code is
silent concerning contracts with private entities for the confinement
of adult federal prisoners. In view of section 4002's explicit terms,
State or TerntoOy or political subdivision therof, for the imprisonment, subsistence, care, and proper
employment of any person held under authority of any United States statute." Id. (emphasis
added); see hrra notes 964-967 and accompanying text (discussing importance of section
4002's restrictions on section 4082(b)).
959. 18 U.S.C. § 753c (1940) (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4003 (1982)). Section 753c
provided that:
If by reason of the refusal or inability of the authorities having control of any jail,
workhouse, penal, correctional, or other suitable institution of any State or Territory,
or political subdivision thereof, to enter into a contract for the imprisonment, subsis-
tence, care, or proper employment of United States prisoners, or if there are no
suitable or sufficient facilities available at reasonable cost, the Attorney General is
authotized to select a site either within or convenient to the State, Territory, or judicial
district concerned and cause to be erected thereon a house of detention, workhouse,jail,
prison-industries project, or camp or other place of confinement.
Id. (emphasis added). Notably, Congress authorized only one course of action in situations in
which nonfederal public institutions were unavailable: construction of a federal facility. Con-
gress made no mention whatsoever of using the private sector to fill this need.
960. See S. REP. No. 533, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 106, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1930); Hearings on I.R. 7832, supra note 949; see also supra note 959.
961. 18 U.S.C. § 753f (1940).
962. Id. § 753c.
963. Id. § 753b.
964. See supra note 942 (quoting provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1982)).
965. 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1982).
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the fairest reading of the "or otherwise" language in section
4082(b) is that it does not encompass private institutions.9 66 Any
other reading of section 4082(b) would contradict the plain mean-
ing of this phrase as it is established in section 4002.967
966. An interesting question is whether, after the federal government contracts with a
state to house a federal prisoner pursuant to section 4002, the state may then place the federal
inmate in a facility that is operated by a private contractor. Obviously, Congress has not
addressed this question. Such a situation may create an assignor-assignee relationship, so
that the assignee (the state) will stand in the shoes of the assignor (the federal government).
If so, then the state will not have the authority because the federal government cannot confer
more power than it has.
967. But see Hearings, supra note 375, at 150 (letter from Clair Cripe, General Counsel,
Federal Bureau of Prisons). Mr. Cripe concluded that "there is authority to contract with
private facilities ... based both on the legislative history to Section 4082, and on the need to
read Section 4002 so as to make meaningful the language of Section 4082, which allows
designation to non-federal facilities, including private facilities." Id. This 18-sentence opin-
ion letter lacks comprehensive support for this conclusion. See also infra note 979.
Nevertheless, the President's Commission on Privatization, in its March 1988 Report, gave
great weight to this letter in determining that the federal government was authorized to con-
tract for the private operation of correctional and detention facilities, see REPORT OF TIE PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 9, at 147, and recommended that the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, "as an experiment .... contract for the private operation of one
new facility comparable to at least one government-run facility, and cooperate with outside
researchers in an evaluation of the results." Id. at 153. In its "Management Improvement
Program," the Reagan Administration also proposed pilot projects to "test private sector
management and operation at a minimum security prison." EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT- FISCAL YEAR 1989, at 103 (1988). So far Congress has refused to fund the proposal,
H.R. 4782, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). See S. REP. No. 388, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 48
(1988) ("The Committee notes that utilizing private sector detention firms for specialized
inmate populations may be appropriate but feels the budget proposal affecting a Federal min-
imum security facility signals the first step in the privatization of the Federal Prison System
and opposes such a move."); H.R. REP. No. 688, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1988) (recom-
mending "no new budget ... authority for fiscal year 1989 for those Department ofJustice
programs and activities for which no authorization of appropriations has been enacted.").
Along with section 4002, which provides for housing federal prisoners in state or other
public institutions or facilities, one might try to find support in 18 U.S.C. § 5003 for federal
authority to privatize prisons. Such an effort would also be futile. Section 5003, entitled
"Custody of State offenders," provides in pertinent part:
(a)(l) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons when proper and adequate facilities
and personnel are available may contract with proper officials of a State or territory,
for the custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of persons con-
victed of criminal offenses in the courts of such State or territory.
(2) Any such contract shall provide-
(A) for reimbursing the United States in full for all costs or expenses
involved;
(B) for receiving in exchange persons convicted of criminal offenses in the
courts of the United States, to serve their sentence in appropriate insti-
tutions or facilities of the State or territory by designation as provided in
section 4082(b) [now 362 1(b)] of this title, this exchange to be made
according to formulas or conditions which may be negotiated in the
contract; or
(C) for compensating the United States by means of a combination of inon-
etary payment and of receipt of persons convicted of criminal offenses
in the courts of the United States, according to formulas or conditions
which may be negotiated in the contract.
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c. 1965 amendment to section 4082(b) expanding scope of Attorney
General's authority to designate places of confinement
In 1948, section 753f was recodified at section 4082(b), with
changes in phraseology that did not affect the substance of the pro-
vision.968 Section 4082(b) was amended in 1965 to add the term
"facility," 969 in order to expand the Attorney General's authority to
designate places of confinement for federal prisoners. 970 Specifi-
cally, the amendment gave the Attorney General the "additional au-
(3) No such contract shall provide for the receipt of more State or territory pris-
oners by the United States than are transferred to that State or territory by such
contract.
18 U.S.C. § 5003(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
Although the term "facilities" is not defined in the statute, it should be interpreted as refer-
ring only to those institutions that are available for the confinement of federal prisoners
under 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) - i.e., public facilities or, only in the special case of residential
community-treatment centers, private facilities. The legislative history of section 5003 sup-
ports this interpretation. The House Committee on the Judiciary, for example, reported the
following:
Frequently, State officials request the Bureau of Prisons to undertake the custody,
treatment, and training of State prisoners where specialized types of institutions and
training programs are indicated but are not available in the States. These requests
usually relate to juveniles and drug addicts, concerning whom many of the States are
without satisfactory institutions and training programs. The Bureau of Prisons
points out that it now has Federal facilities available, including medical and adminis-
trative personnel, to accommodate those State offenders that are in need of the vari-
ous types of treatment that Federal institutions are providing. In this respect, the
Bureau states that the accommodation of State prisoners will materially help to re-
duce the overhead expenses of maintaining and running these Federal prison
institutions.
H.R. REP. No. 1663, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1952) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1952 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1420, 1421 (uniformly referring to the facilities in section 5003
as federal institutions).
Thus, section 5003 provides absolutely no support for federal authority to privatize institu-
tions or facilities for the confinement of federal prisoners. To contend otherwise would be to
create no more than a bootstrap argument.
968. H.R. 3190, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 93 CONG. REc. 4012 (1948). Only minor
changes in phraseology were made. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1964) with 18 U.S.C. § 753f
(1940) (illustrating differences between statute before and after recodification). See also H.R.
REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) (discussing changes resulting from recodification).
Prior to 1948, there had been other amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 753f that made substantive
changes in the statute; these changes, however, did not affect the "or otherwise" phrase. See
S.R. 1698, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 CONG. REC. 9897 (1939); H.R. 1831, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., 87 CONG. REC. 122 (1941); H.R. REP. No. 172, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941); S. REP. No.
369, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); S. REP. No. 593, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. REP.
No. 1606, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
969. S. REP. No. 613, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3076, 3077.
970. The 1965 amendment
designated as subsec. (b) the former second and third unnumbered paragraphs of
the section, added "or facility" following "appropriate institution", substituted "may
at any time transfer a person from one place of confinement to another" for "may
order any inmate transferred from one institution to another", and made minor
changes in language.
18 U.S.C. § 4082 amendments (1976); see H.R. 6964, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., I ll CONG. REC.
6452 (1965); S. REP. No. 613, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3076; H.R. REP. No. 694, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); infra notes 971-
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thority to commit or transfer prisoners to residential community
treatment centers.''971 The purpose of the amendment was to facili-
tate the rehabilitation of federal prisoners by providing "prerelease
assistance in obtaining jobs and shelter and thus reduc[ing] the like-
lihood of further conflicts with the law." 972 However, this privilege
was intended to extend only to prisoners who were "considered to
be salvageable and amenable to such programs. Those prisoners
who remain[ed] a distinct threat to the community [would] be re-
tained in secure institutions.' '
9 73
In amending the statute, Congress referred to the existing resi-
dential community-treatment centers and halfway houses that had
been operated for youthful and juvenile offenders under the Youth
Corrections Act 974 and the Juvenile Delinquency Act,975 and ex-
pressed the view that a similar variety of facilities was contemplated
for adult federal prisoners.9 76 Because both the YCA and the JDA
explicitly authorized the Attorney General to contract with public
and private entities for the provision of residential community-treat-
ment centers, the amendment has been interpreted by the Bureau of
Prisons as granting the Attorney General the same power to con-
tract for adult residential community-treatment centers.9 77 This in-
terpretation has not been contested. Since 1981, the federal
government has relied solely on contract community-treatment cen-
ters; some seventy percent of those contracts are now with private
979 and accompanying text (discussing scope of changes incurred with addition of term
"facility").
971. S. REP. No. 613, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S, CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3076, 3077.
972. H.R. REP. No. 694, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); see S. REP. No. 613, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1965), repiinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3076, 3077 (stating that
the "residential community treatment centers, the so-called halfway houses, would make it
possible to reintroduce prisoners to the community in a gradual and controlled way").
973. S. REP. No. 613, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1965) (letter from Nicholas Katzenbach,
United States Attorney General), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3076,
3082; see also H.R. REP. No. 694, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (stating that only prisoners
who are considered "good material for such treatment" will be committed to residential com-
munity-treatment centers).
974. Federal Youth Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 93-415, tit. V, § 501 (1974) (later codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5025 (1982)), repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 218(g).
975. Act ofJune 16, 1938, ch. 486, 52 Stat. 764 (later codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 5031-5042 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
976. S. REP. No. 613, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 3076, 3078; see also H.R. REP. No. 694, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) (stating
that the amendment "would authorize commitment of adult prisoners to similar treatment
centers" - i.e., similar to the centers that were being operated at the time that the amend-
ment was considered).
977. See Hearings, supra note 375, at 168-69 (Bureau of Prisons staff paper entitled "Priva-




Thus, although section 4082(b) was expanded to allow the Attor-
ney General to confine adult federal prisoners in privately run facili-
ties, Congress contemplated such action only with respect to
qualified pre-release prisoners in residential community-treatment
centers. 979 Congress did not intend the amendment to be a broad
grant of authority to place adult federal prisoners in all types of pri-
vately run facilities.
3. Conclusion
18 U.S.C. § 4082(b), now section 3621(b), authorized the Attor-
ney General to confine adult federal prisoners in institutions or fa-
cilities run by the federal government or by any state, territory, or
political subdivision thereof. This interpretation of the statute is
supported by its language and legislative history, as well as by 18
U.S.C. § 4002. An exception arises only with respect to the confine-
ment of federal prisoners in residential community-treatment cen-
ters. Section 362 1(b) permits the Bureau of Prisons to contract with
a private entity for the confinement of qualified pre-release prison-
ers in such facilities. Thus, section 3621 (b) should not be construed
as authorizing the Bureau to contract with private entities for the
confinement of adult federal prisoners in any other context.
If Congress determines that such authorization is necessary or de-
sirable, then it should so provide explicitly and unambiguously.
And if the Bureau of Prisons privatizes confinement for adult federal
prisoners in the absence of such legislation, then it will be setting an
inappropriate example for the states.
B. Model Statute and Commentary
There are many similarities between the Model Statute and the
978. See Hearings, supra note 375, at 168 (Bureau of Prisons staff paper entitled "Privatiza-
tion in Federal Corrections").
979. In this regard, the conclusions that were reached by the Bureau of Prisons' General
Counsel are incorrect. See Hearings, supra note 375, at 149-50. Mr. Cripe stated that the 1965
amendment "broaden[ed] the scope of both § 4082 and § 4002." Id. at 149. In his view, the
legislative history of the 1965 amendment to section 4082(b) "makes it clear that the legisla-
tion was meant to extend to adult inmates the kind of authority which the Attorney General
already had in Sections 4082, 5013, and 5039. This prior authority allowed the Attorney
General to commit and transferjuveniles ... to halfway houses .... " Id. at 149-50. The logic
of this statement is unclear: If section 4082(b) already authorized such designations of con-
finement, why would an amendment be necessary? Furthermore, Mr. Cripe concluded that
there is "nothing in Section 4082 or its legislative history [that] would restrict [contracting
with] private halfway houses." Id. at 150. The analysis set forth elsewhere in this paper,
however, concludes that contracting with private entities for the confinement of adult federal
prisoners was not allowed until the 1965 amendment, and then only for facilities such as
residential community-treatment centers. See supra notes 968-978 and accompanying text.
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Model Contract. Like the Model Contract, for example, the Model
Statute responds to the concerns of the constitutional-delegation
section 8 0 by having accountability as its dominant theme. Also like
the Model Contract, the best provisions from current statutes were
incorporated or adapted. Further, like the Model Contract, the
Model Statute does not purport to be exhaustive. Some jurisdic-
tions may already have general legislation that adequately addresses
various features and concerns of private incarceration (such as the
need to avoid conflicts of interest in the contracting process); others
may not. If a legislature decides to privatize an incarceration facil-
ity, it must enact legislation that comports with the existing body of
law.
There is one significant difference between the Model Statute and
the Model Contract: the provisions of the Model Statute must not
be compromised. They set a mandatory minimum level for private-
incarceration contracts and the private-incarceration process.98' As
such, the content of the statute is a matter for the legislature and the
contracting agency, and not for the private contractor.98 2
The following statutes were considered in drafting the Model
Statute:
* Alaska Stat. § 33.30.031 (1986) (authorizing corrections
commissioner to contract with private entities, inter alia, for
the provision of halfway houses, group homes, and facilities
for misdemeanor offenders).
* Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-1609 & 41-1609.01 (1985 &
Supp. 1987) (authorizing corrections department to contract
with private entities for the confinement of adult and youth
offenders and the provision of various related services enu-
merated in the statute).
" Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-50-101 to 12-50-110 (Supp. 1987) (au-
thorizing state, regional, and local corrections agencies to
contract with private entities for the financing, acquisition,
construction, and operation of correctional facilities).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 17-27-101 to 17-27-115 (1986 & Supp.
980. See supra notes 11-213 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutionality of delegat-
ing incarceration function).
981. A legislature should, of course, consider building on this bedrock with more strin-
gent, but not less stringent, requirements if that would be appropriate to circumstances within
the jurisdiction.
982. See supra note 424 (defining terms). Also unlike the section on the Model Contract,
this section on the Model Statute presents the commentary after the statutory provision,
rather than before. This is done because the statutory commentary is necessarily shorter than
is the contractual commentary - first, because the statutory provisions should not be negotia-
ble, and second, because the statutory commentary avoids repetition by drawing on and cross-
referencing the contractual commentary.
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1987) (authorizing local corrections boards to utilize com-
munity correctional facilities and programs operated by pri-
vate organizations); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-11-104.1 & 30-
11-104.2 (1986) (authorizing counties to finance jails and
other buildings through lease-purchase agreements).
0 Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 944.105 & 944.1053 (West Gum. Supp.
1988) (authorizing state corrections department to contract
with private entities for the provision, operation, and main-
tenance of correctional facilities); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 951.062
& 951.063 (West Cum. Supp. 1988) (authorizing counties to
contract with private entities for operation and maintenance
of county detention facilities).
0 Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 352-3, 353-1.1 & 353-1.2 (1985) (author-
izing director of social services to contract for private resi-
dential youth facilities, community correctional centers, and
high-security correctional facilities); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 353-
3(7) (Supp. 1987) (authorizing director of corrections to
contract with private entities for "the treatment, training,
education, and work of committed persons").
* Ind. Code Ann. § 11-8-3-1 (Burns 1981) (authorizing cor-
rections department to contract with private entities for the
custody and care of committed persons and for related
services).
• Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-5210 (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1987) (au-
thorizing secretary of corrections to contract with private en-
tities for the provision of facilities and various rehabilitation
programs for inmates in the secretary's custody).
* 1988 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. §§ 197.500 to 197.525 (Bald-
win) (authorizing state to contract with private entities to es-
tablish, operate, and manage adult correctional facilities).
* La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 39:1780 to 39:1795 (West Cum.
Supp. 1988) (inter alia, providing for private ownership and
lease-purchase financing of correctional facilities).
0 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 241.32 (West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1988)
(authorizing commissioner of corrections to contract with
private entities for separate custody or specialized care and
treatment of inmates).
e Mo. Ann. Stat. § 217.138 (Vernon Gum. Supp. 1988) (au-
thorizing state department of corrections, cities, and coun-
ties to contract with private entities for the construction of
corrections facilities).
e Mont. Code Ann. § 7-32-2201 (1987) (authorizing contracts
with private parties for the provision, maintenance, and op-
eration of county jails); Mont. Code Ann. § 7-32-2231
(1987) (authorizing construction of county jails by private
industry and the lease back of such facilities for operation by
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the county); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-32-2232 to 7-32-2234
(1987) (providing statutory requirements for privately oper-
ated county jails); Mont. Code Ann. § 53-30-106 (1987) (au-
thorizing state department of corrections to enter contract
with private entities to house "selected inmates").
e Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 209.141 (Michie 1987) (general grant
of authority to state department of prisons to contract with
private entities to carry out corrections-related functions).
* 1988 N.M. Laws § 33-1-17 (amending N.M Stat. Ann. § 33-
1-17 (1987)) (authorizing state department of corrections to
contract for the operation of "any adult female facility" and
the renovation or construction of such facilities); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 33-3-26 & 33-3-27 (1987) (authorizing two projects
for private operation, or private provision and operation, of
county jails).
* Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, §§ 561, 563 & 563.1 (West Cum.
Supp. 1988) (authorizing department of corrections to con-
tract with private entities for operation of the department's
correctional facilities and to use other non-departmental fa-
cilities for the incarceration and treatment of persons under
the custody of the department).
* Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, §9 1081 to 1085 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1988) (instituting one-year moratorium on the private oper-
ation of correctional facilities in the state, through June 30,
1987).
* 1987 S.C. Acts § 55.7 (authorizing department of correc-
tions to contract for "any and all services").
* Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-24-101 to 41-24-115 (Cum. Supp.
1987) (authorizing commissioner of corrections to contract
with private entities for the provision of correctional
services).
e Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6166g-2 (Vernon Supp. 1988)
(authorizing board of corrections to contract with private
entities for the financing, construction, operation, mainte-
nance, and management of secure correctional facilities).
* Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-26 (1986 & Supp. 1987) (authoriz-
ing department of corrections to contract with private enti-
ties for the care, treatment, and supervision of offenders in
its custody).
* Va. Code Ann. §§ 53.1-180 to 53.1-185 (1982 & Cum. Supp.
1987) (authorizing director of department of corrections
and localities to contract with private nonprofit entities for
residential and nonresidential community-diversion pro-
grams and services).
* Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-18-101 to 7-18-114 (1987) (authorizing con-
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tracts with private profit organizations for the establishment,
maintenance, and operation of community correctional facil-
ities and programs).
Section 1: Enabling Legislation
The contracting agency may contract with private entities for the
construction, lease, acquisition, improvement, operation, and manage-
ment of correctional facilities and services only as provided in this
Act.
No contract shall be entered or renewed unless it offers substantial
cost savings to the contracting agency and at least the same quality of
services as that offered by the contracting agency.
The intended beneficiaries of any contract entered pursuant to this
Act shall include inmates incarcerated at the affected facility or facili-
ties and members of the public.
Commentary:
Enabling legislation authorizing the contracting agency to con-
tract with a private entity will most likely be necessary in a jurisdic-
tion that decides to privatize its prisons. 983 The proposed enabling
legislation grants the contracting agency broad authority to contract
with a private entity for "construction, lease, acquisition, improve-
ment, operation, and management of correctional facilities and serv-
ices." The jurisdiction may choose to limit its grant of authority to
tailor the legislation more closely to its actual needs and thereby
restrict private contracts to the construction of a facility, for exam-
ple, or permit such contracts at minimum-security facilities only.
98 4
Advocates of prison privatization have cited two primary benefits
that will result from privatization: less cost to the public, and
proper treatment and care for inmates. Consequently, the proposed
enabling legislation seeks to hold the private entity strictly accounta-
ble for these results by requiring it to show that the contract will
offer substantial cost savings to the contracting agency and by ex-
pressly creating third-party-beneficiary status under the contract for
inmates and the public.
Several jurisdictions have incorporated the requirement of cost
983. See supra pp. 768-71 (listing private-incarceration statutes).
984. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 217.138 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1988) (permitting private
contracts for construction of correctional facility); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-106 (1987) (au-
thorizing private contracts for confinement of "selected inmates where suitable programs
have been established"); 1987 S.C. Acts § 55.7 (permitting private contracts "for any and all
services" related to construction of a new facility); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-
2 ,
§§ l(b)(1), 2 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (restricting private contracts to facilities with up to 500
inmates, and minimum- and medium-security inmates).
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savings into their prison-privatization laws. Tennessee, for exam-
ple, requires that proposals for correctional-services contracts offer
"substantial cost savings" 98 5 to the state, a requirement that is met if
the proposer's annual cost projection is "at least five percent (5%)
less than the likely full cost to the state of providing the same serv-
ices."98 6 Texas requires at least a 10.f cost savings from private
facilities, which must offer "a level and quality of programs at least
equal to those provided by state-operated facilities that house simi-
lar types of inmates. ' 98 7 Arizona permits the renewal of a private
contract "only if the contractor is providing at least the same quality
of services as [the] state at a lower cost or if the contractor is provid-
ing services superior in quality to those provided by [the] state at
essentially the same cost."' 98 8 South Carolina authorizes private
contracting for the construction of a facility, but requires that such
services "(1) demonstrate reasonably comparable, cost-effectiveness
to traditional methods of construction, (2) result in long-term oper-
ational cost-savings, [and] (3) result in the provision of a new facility
of sufficient bed, program, and support space more expeditiously
than traditional methods . "..."989
The proposed enabling legislation requires "substantial" cost sav-
ings to the jurisdiction and the provision of services of at least the
same quality as services that are provided by the government. Sub-
stantial cost savings, rather than reasonable cost savings, was the
term chosen for the proposed statute, for several reasons. First,
considering the oft-stated claim by proponents of prison and jail
privatization that they can reduce costs substantially, they should be
held to their promise to the taxpayers and government officials.
985. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(c)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
986. Id. § 41-24-104 (c)(1)(E).
987. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-2, § 3(c)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
988. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4 1-1609.01(L) (Supp. 1987). In determining the quality of
services provided by the contractor, the statute requires consideration of the following
factors:
1. The nature of inmates in the facilities.
2. Whether the facilities meet professional standards.
3. The level of training provided to the staff and the level of training accomplished
by the staff.
4. The number and nature of complaints against the staff.
5. The number and nature of violent or other disruptive incidents among inmates
or against the staff.
6. The number of escapes and attempted escapes.
7. The number and nature of disciplinary actions against inmates and the staff.
8. The number of inmates productively active, the level of production and the na-
ture of the activity provided to inmates.
9. The rate at which inmates complete programs successfully.
10. Other matters related to the quality of services provided.
Id. § 41-1609.01(M).
989. 1987 S.C. Acts § 55.7.
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Second, considering the arguably unsuitable message that privatiza-
tion of corrections conveys, 990 the government should be reluctant
to compromise its obligations to the public without showing sub-
stantial benefits in return. Third, considering the constitutional risk
that the government undertakes by delegating the incarceration
function, 991 its potential economic gain should be maximized in
return.
As a practical matter, of course, it must be recognized that the
difference between substantial and reasonable cost savings is one of
degree only. The legislature, therefore, can statutorily specify a
formula for evaluating cost savings, as Tennessee has done.992 Al-
ternatively, or in addition, the contracting parties can particularize
the method for assessing costs. Moreover, the cost-saving formula
will necessarily incorporate a complex set of factors - including
cost projections and subjective criteria measuring the quality of
services and conditions of confinement - that will be difficult to
quantify. For example, a five-percent or greater cost savings to the
state under Tennessee's "substantial cost savings" provision would
be deceptive if the contractor were to provide lower quality services.
Hence, the proposed standard should be understood to require at
the very least that the contractor provide the same quality of serv-
ices at substantially less cost or substantially better services at the
same or less cost than that which the contracting agency would have
to pay.993 This requirement applies both to the initial contract and
to contract renewals.
No jurisdiction has explicitly designated the public or inmates as
third-party beneficiaries in its privatization contracts. Arguably,
third-party-beneficiary status may be implied from statutory lan-
guage requiring the private contractor to assume all liability for any
breach of contract.9 9 4 The proposed enabling legislation expressly
designates inmates and the public as third-party beneficiaries in pri-
vate contracts. The reasons for including this provision, such as in-
990. See suipra notes 211-213 and accompanying text (discussing question of symbolism).
991. See supra notes 11-213 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of private-
prison delegation).
992. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(c)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
993. See id. § 41-24-104(c)(2) ("No proposal shall be accepted unless such proposal offers
a level and quality of services which are at least equal to those which would be provided by the
state."); cf. supra note 749 (discussing California correctional officers' contention that cost
savings do not justify circumventing civil-service system).
994. For example, section 944.105(3) of the Florida statutes provides:
Any private entity entering into a contract with the department pursuant to this
section shall be liable in tort with respect to the care and custody of inmates under its
supervision and for any breach of contract with the department.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.105(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1988).
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creased contractor accountability, are thoroughly explored in the
Model Contract.995
Section 2: Site Selection
Before the contracting agency may award a contract for the private
construction and/or operation of a correctional or detention facility,
the agency must approve the site for the proposed facility. Approval
shall be based on the following:
(A) criteria formulated by the contracting agency, including:
(1) availability of qualified personnel within the local labor
market;
(2) total usable and developable acreage of various sites consid-
ering the use and purpose of the facility;
(3) accessibility of each site to existing utility, transportation,
educational, law enforcement, health care, social, fire protection,
refuse collection, water, and sewage disposal services;
(4) susceptibility of each site to natural and man-made environ-
mental hazards;
(5) patterns of residential growth and projected population
growth;
(6) community opinion as determined at a public hearing or
hearings of record; and
(7) any other criteria that the contracting agency, in conjunc-
tion with local governments, deems appropriate; and
(B) a report prepared by the governing body of the jurisdiction in
which the proposed site is located, stating whether the site is in compli-
ance with local-government comprehensive plans, land-use ordinances,
zoning ordinances or regulations, and other local ordinances that are
in effect at the time the report is submitted.
After the contracting agency has approved a site, the agency must
then seek approval from the legislature, which shall consider all of the
information that was reviewed by the contracting agency, as well as
any other criteria that it deems appropriate. Construction and/or op-
eration of a private facility may not commence until the legislature has
approved the selected site.99 6
995. See Model Contract § I (Policy Statement - Goals and Responsibilities of the
Parties).
996. Some of these provisions are derived from FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 944.095 (West Cum.
Supp. 1988), which addresses the citing of correctional facilities generally. See also ACA Stan-
dard 2-4161: "The institution [should be] located within 50 miles of a civilian population
center of at least 10,000 people, or minimally within one hour driving time of a hospital, fire
protection, and public transportation." The note that accompanies Standard 2-4161
provides:
Proximity to a civilian population center is essential in order to augment the services
provided directly by the institution, to provide greater recruitment and training op-




The Model Statute addresses basic concerns that may arise with
respect to the siting of a privately owned and/or operated prison or
jail. There are several ways in which to choose such a site. The
contracting agency may select the site itself, for example, or the site
may already be owned by the government and designated for the
purpose of incarceration. In these cases, additional legislation may
not be necessary. Alternatively, the private contractor might select
the site, with the RFP merely setting general geographical guide-
lines. In that case, additional legislation may be necessary to ensure
that the site will be selected not only on the basis of factors that are
important to the contractor - such as the price of the property -
but also on the basis of factors that protect the interests of the con-
tracting agency, the surrounding community, and the inmates.
The Model Statute requires that the contracting agency make an
initial evaluation of each proposed site according to the criteria that
are set forth in the statute and any other criteria deemed important
by the contracting agency. 997 Many jurisdictions may already have
established criteria for the selection of sites for public facilities;
these criteria may be adaptable for use in the evaluation of sites for
private facilities as well.
998
The requirement that a public hearing be held for each proposed
site is intended to ensure that the public will have meaningful input
in the site-selection process. Although it may be administratively
cumbersome to hold public hearings concerning several proposed
sites, community opinion - which is an essential component - will
have little effect on the selection of a site unless it is considered
during the initial phase of the process.
Section 3: Contract Term and Renewal
The initial contract for the operation of a facility or for incarcera-
tion of prisoners or inmates therein shall be for a period of not more
than three (3) years with an option to renew for an additional period of
ployment opportunities for inmates on work or study release. Nearby social
agencies, schools, colleges, universities, and hospitals are potentially valuable re-
sources for a correctional institution.
ACA Standard 2-4161 discussion. At least one state requires legislative approval of the site of
each private correctional or detention facility. AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(3) (Supp.
1987).
997. Consideration of these factors in the early stages should prevent situations such as
the one that arose in Pennsylvania, where a private interstate protective-custody facility was
proposed to be built on a toxic-waste dump. See supra note 467.
998. See supra note 996.
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two (2) years.9 99 Contracts for construction, purchase, or lease of a
facility shall not exceed a term of fifteen (15) years. 10 0 0 Any contract
for the construction or operation of a facility shall be subject to annual
appropriation by the [appropriate legislative body].' 0 0 '
Commentary:
As discussed in the Model Contract sections on Term and Re-
newal, 00 2 the overall contract term must be long enough for the
contractor to become established in its new role and to develop a
track record on which the contracting agency can base a comparison
of public and private performance. However, the contract term
must also be short enough to prevent market entrenchment and to
provide the parties with sufficient flexibility to deal with changing
needs and priorities. The Model Statute adopts a term provision
that reflects an accommodation of these conflicting concerns, and
one that the majority of states employ: an initial three-year term
with an option to renew for one two-year period. 003 Thus, the
Model Statute limits the total initial contract term to five years, re-
quiring a competitive rebidding process within that period to bene-
999. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1609.01(I), (J) (Supp. 1987) ("the initial contract
term shall be for a period of three years in order to allow the contractor sufficient time to
demonstrate its performance and to provide sufficient information to allow a comparison of
the performance of the contractor to the performance of this state in operating similar facili-
ties": "[t]he initial contract may include an option to renew for an additional period of two
years"); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 41-24-105(a), (b) (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("the initial contract term
shall be for a period of three (3) years in order to allow the contractor sufficient time to
demonstrate its performance and to provide sufficient information to allow a comparison of
the performance of the contractor to the performance of the state in operating similar facili-
ties"; "[t]he initial contract may include an option to renew for an additional period of two (2)
years"); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(A) (1987) ("No agreement.., for the operation of
a jail or for incarceration of prisoners therein shall be made for a period of more than three
years."); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-2, § 3(c)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1988) ("for an ini-
tial contract term of not more than three years, with an option to renew for additional periods
of two years"). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.105(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1988) ("The contract
term shall be determined by the negotiating parties and shall be contingent upon annual
appropriations."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 561(L) (West Cum. Supp. 1988) ("Contracts
awarded ... shall be entered into for a period of one (1) year, subject to renewal at the option
of the State of Oklahoma for a cumulative period not to exceed fifty (50) years.").
1000. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(A) (1987) ("Agreements binding on future governing
bodies for construction, purchase, or lease of ajail facility for not more than fifteen years are
hereby authorized.").
1001. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-50-106(d) (Supp. 1987) ("subject to the requirement
for annual appropriation of funds by each political subdivision and subject to the requirement
of biennial appropriations by the state"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.105(2) (West Cum. Supp.
1988) ("The contract term ... shall be contingent upon annual appropriations."); 1988 N.M.
Laws § 33-1-17(A)(6) ("continuation of the contract is subject to the availability of funds");
1987 S.C. Acts § 55.7(4) ("services must . . . be subject to the year-to-year appropriation
process of the General Assembly and the state procurement procedures"); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-2, § 3(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988) ("payment by the state is subject to
the availability of appropriations").
1002. See Model Contract §§ 3(A) (Term), 3(B) (Renewal).
1003. See supra note 999.
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fit the contracting parties as well as other private companies that
may want to compete for access to the market.
The Model Statute also recognizes the potential need for longer
contract terms when the contract involves more than just the opera-
tion of a facility - for example, when construction, purchase, or
lease of a facility is involved. Thus, the Model Statute authorizes
terms of up to fifteen years for such contracts.
The Model Statute offers a workable compromise in the long-term
versus short-term debate by offering the contractor the possibility of
a five-year, stable, and ongoing arrangement if its performance
meets the standards established by the contracting agency. 1004 This
Term and Renewal Provision creates an environment in which there
is sufficient incentive for the contractor to risk the undertaking.
There is also sufficient security for the contracting agency. If the
contractor does not perform as required, the contract will not be
renewed.
Finally, many of the statutes that authorize multi-year contracts
for the ownership or operation of a correctional or detention facility
provide that payments due under the contract are subject to annual
or biennial appropriation by the legislature.100 5 Such a limitation
ensures that the contract will be viewed as a current expense, and
not a long-term debt of the jurisdiction.l0 0 6 Although this provision
places some limitation on the contracting agency's obligation to per-
form for the full contract term, the risk that it poses to the private
contractor is minimal, for it is unlikely that a jurisdiction would in
fact fail to appropriate the necessary funds for such an essential gov-
ernmental function as the operation of a prison or jail facility.
Section 4: Standards of Operation
All facilities that are governed by this Act shall be designed, con-
structed, and at all times maintained and operated in accordance with
the American Correctional Association Standards in force at the time
of contracting, as well as with subsequent ACA Standards to the ex-
tent that they are approved by the contracting agency. The facility
shall meet the percentage of Standards required for accreditation by
the American Correctional Association, except where the contract re-
quires compliance with a higher percentage of nonmandatory stan-
dards. The contract may allow the contractor an extension of time in
which to meet a lower percentage of nonmandatory Standards only
when the contract is for the renovation of an existing facility, in which
1004. See Model Statute § 1 (Enabling Legislation).
1005. See supra note 1001; see also Model Contract §§ 2(A) (Private Financing), 3(A) (Term).
1006. See Model Contract § 2(A) (Private Financing).
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case the contractor shall have not longer than three (3) months to meet
those Standards that are applicable to the physical plant.
In addition, all facilities shall at all times comply with all federal
and state constitutional standards, federal, state, and local laws, and
all court orders.
Commentary:
The Model Statute requires that all private correctional facilities
meet at least the percentage of ACA Standards necessary to receive
accreditation by the ACA and the Commission on Accreditation for
Corrections. The ACA Standards are widely regarded in the indus-
try as comprehensive and demanding. 100 7 Thus, the Standards pro-
vide a respected, uniform measure of the quality of service that the
contractor is providing.
The statutory language requires that the contractor meet at least
the percentage of nonmandatory Standards required for accredita-
tion. It allows the contracting agency to require compliance with a
higher level of nonmandatory Standards under the contract, how-
ever. The contracting agency should review the Standards closely to
determine whether some or all of the nonmandatory Standards are
so vital to the operation of a private facility that compliance should
be required in the contract. Likewise, legislators should review the
Standards to determine whether there are any that should be made
mandatory by statute as well as by contract. Further, to avoid the
possible finding of an unconstitutional delegation in this area to the
extent possible, 008 ACA Standards that are developed subsequent
to the contract date shall bind the contractor only to the extent that
they are approved by the contracting agency.
The Model Statute requires the contractor to bring the facility
into compliance immediately and to maintain compliance through-
out the contract term. An exception is made for contracts that in-
clude renovation of an existing structure as part of an operations
and management contract because of the special problems that a
contractor may encounter in bringing such a facility into compli-
ance.' 00 9 The Model Statute, therefore, allows the contracting
agency to give the contractor a short extension of time to meet non-
mandatory Standards when the contracting agency feels that an ex-
tension is necessary and justified.
Several jurisdictions require accreditation by statute and/or by
1007. See Model Contract § 3(F) (Operating Standards).
1008. See supra notes 136-169 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional require-
ments for delegation of rule-making authority).
1009. See Model Contract § 3(F) (Operating Standards).
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contract as a supplemental means of monitoring compliance with
ACA Standards.10 10 The Model Statute does not make accreditation
a statutory requirement, however. The accreditation process can in
no way replace on-site monitoring by the state, and its usefulness as
a supplemental means of monitoring is limited by the questions that
have been raised concerning its effectiveness.101 1 Thus, it is an issue
that is best left to negotiation between the contractor and the con-
tracting agency.
In addition to requiring compliance with ACA Standards, the
Model Statute also expressly requires that the facility conform to all
federal and state constitutional standards, applicable laws, and court
orders. This language, derived from the Texas statute,10 12 places
prospective contractors on notice that all applicable legal standards
are necessarily incorporated in a valid contract for the private own-
ership and/or operation of a correctional or detention facility, even
if they are not expressly stated in the contract.
Section 5: Use of Force
(A) A private contractor's employees serving as "jailers" shall be
allowed to use force only while on the grounds of a facility, while
transporting inmates, and while pursuing escapees from a facility.
(B) "Non-deadly force," which is force that normally would cause
neither death nor serious bodily injury, and "deadly force," which is
force that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, shall be
used only as set forth herein.
(C) Non-Deadly Force. A private-company jailer shall be authorized
to use only such non-deadly force as the circumstances require in the
following situations: to prevent the commission of a felony or misde-
meanor, including escape; to defend oneself or others against physical
assault; to prevent serious damage to property; to enforce institutional
regulations and orders; and to prevent or quell a riot.
(D) Use of Firearms/Deadly Force. Private-company jailers who
have been appropriately certified as determined by the contracting
agency and trained pursuant to the provisions of Subsection (E) shall
have the right to carry and use firearms and shall exercise such au-
thority and use deadly force only as a last resort, and then only to
1010. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 561(R)(2) (West Supp. 1988) (requiring contractor to
receive accreditation within three years); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 61 6 6 g- 2 , § l(b)(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1988) (stating that facility must receive and retain accreditation, but not speci-
fying time period); cf. 1988 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. § 197.510 (Baldwin) (requiring private
adult correctional facility to submit plan for achieving compliance with ACA Standards within
five years).
1011. See Model Contract § 3(F) (Operating Standards).
1012. "'I*x. RE\v. Civ. STVr. ANx. art. 6166g-2, § l(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (requiring
coml)liance with court orders and kaderal constitutional standards).
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prevent an act that could risult in death or serious bodily injury to
oneself or to another person.
(E) Private-company jailers shall be trained in the use of force and
the use of firearms, in accordance with ACA Standards 2-4186 through
2-4189 and 2-4206, and shall be trained, at the contractor's expense, at
the facilities that train public prison and jail personnel for at least the
minimum number of hours that public personnel are currently, trained.
(F) Within three (3) days following an incident involving the use of
force against an inmate or another, the employee shall file a written
report with the administrative staff and contract monitor describing
the incident.
(G) A private contractor shall stand in the shoes of the contracting
agency in any agreement, formal or informal, with local law-enforce-
ment agencies concerning the latter's obligations in the event of emer-
gency situations, such as riots or escapes.
Commentary:
Given the paramount importance of and concerns regarding the
use of force in a prison or jail setting, especially by private person-
nel, it is surprising that so fewjurisdictions have statutes that govern
use of force.' 0 13 Even the few states that do have use-of-force provi-
sions do not address the issue with any specificity. As discussed in
the Model Contract section on Use of Force, comprehensiveness is
not only desirable in such a provision, but also essential to ensure
the safety of facility personnel and inmates alike. With only phrase-
ological changes, the Model Statute adopts the provision recom-
mended in the Model Contract.
Section 6: Employee Training Requirements
All employees of a facility operated pursuant to this Act must re-
ceive, at a minimum, the same quality and quantity of training as that
required by federal, state, and/or local statutes, rules, and regulations
for employees of public correctional and detention facilities. If any or
all of the applicable American Correctional Association Standards re-
lating to training are more stringent than are governmental standards,
training shall be provided in accordance with the more stringent Stan-
dard(s). All training expenses shall be the responsibility of the
contractor.
1013. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-50-107 (Supp. 1987); 1988 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv.
§ 197.510(20) (Baldwin); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2234 (1987); OHL%\. STAT. ANN. tit. 57,




It is essential that minimum employee-training requirements be
set by statute as well as in the contract. A correctional or detention
facility cannot be operated safely and according to constitutional,
statutory, and contractual standards without an adequately trained
staff. Training is expensive, however. Incarceration is a labor-in-
tensive industry, with labor costs comprising approximately eighty
to ninety percent of total costs.' 0 14 Training is one area in which
prospective contractors may attempt to reduce costs in order to en-
sure that they make a profit.10 15 Minimum training levels, therefore,
should not be subject to negotiation, but rather should be set by
statute. 0 1 6
Despite the importance of this issue, many jurisdictions have
failed to address it in statutes that authorize privately operated cor-
rectional or detention facilities. Of those that have addressed the
issue, only one - Florida - requires private employees to meet the
same training requirements that government employees must
meet. 0 1 7 The Model Statute expressly provides that private em-
ployees must, at a minimum, receive the same amount of training
that their counterparts in the public sector receive. The training
must not only equal the number of hours provided for by law, but the
quality of coverage of the required subject areas must also be
equivalent. If ACA Standards are higher than the contracting juris-
diction's minimum requirements, however, ACA Standards should
govern. This language ensures that the private contractor's employ-
ees will be adequately trained to operate the facility in accordance
with constitutional, statutory, and contractual standards. Finally,
the Model Statute requires that the contractor be responsible for all
training expenses. 01 8
Section 7: Monitoring
An individual who is responsible for monitoring all aspects of the
private contractor's performance under the contract shall be appointed
and employed by the contracting agency. The monitor shall appoint a
1014. See Note, supra note 9, at 1498 n.158.
1015. See Model Contract § 4(A)(2) (Employment Options for Correctional or Detention
Employees at Existing Facilities).
1016. But see Morr. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2232(2)(e) (1987) (stating that "[t]he agreement
must include . . . minimum standards for the training of jailers"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-
27(C) (1987) (allowing for "minimum training standards [to be] specified in the contract").
1017. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.105(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1988).
1018. See, e.g., id. § 951.062(6) (requiring private contractor to pay training expenses for
employees who supervise inmates); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-27(C) (1987) (requiring contrac-
tor to pay expenses for jailers to meet minimum training standards).
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staff to assist in monitoring at the facility, as the monitor determines
to be necessary. The monitor shall be provided an on-site work area,
shall be on-site on a daily basis, and shall have access to all areas of
the facility and to inmates and staff at all times. The contractor shall
provide any and all data, reports, and other materials that the monitor
determines are necessary to carry out monitoring responsibilities
under this Section.
The monitor or his designee shall report to the r ] committee
of the legislature at least annually on the contractor's performance.
Members of the public shall have the same right of access to private
facilities as they do to public facilities.
Commentary:
It is essential that any statute authorizing the private operation of
correctional or detention facilities contain a provision directing the
contracting agency to monitor all aspects of the contractor's per-
formance on the contract, and granting it broad authority to carry
out its monitoring responsibilities. Although the contracting agency
may be able to delegate some of the governmental functions that are
associated with the operation of a facility, it cannot delegate its re-
sponsibility to see that those functions are carried out in accordance
with constitutional and legislative standards, as well as with other
standards that are mandated by public policy. 0 19 Without an effec-
tive monitoring system, contractor abuses will go undetected and
the contracting agency will not be able to ensure the safety of pris-
oners, staff, and the surrounding community. Nor will it be able to
ensure the integrity of other aspects of the private contractor's oper-
ations, such as its use of contract funds.
The Model Statute is designed to give the contracting agency
maximum access to all of the information that it will need to carry
out its oversight responsibilities. It provides that the contracting
agency must appoint a monitor for the facility who will be on-site on
a daily basis. 0 20 It also expressly provides that the contracting
agency shall have access to any other information that it deems nec-
essary to oversee the facility effectively.' 0 2 ' The information that
can be obtained through daily first-hand observation and contact
1019. See supra notes 11-213 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of dele-
gating incarceration function).
1020. Currently, only one state statute expressly requires on-site monitoring. See TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-2, § 3(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (requiring that every proposal
provide for "regular, on-site monitoring by the Texas Department of Corrections"). Several
contracts also provide for on-site monitoring. See Bay County Contract at 17, § 5.5; Santa Fe
Contract at 28, § 11.I.
1021. See Model Contract § 6 (Monitoring) (noting importance of access to all areas of the
llacility. to inmates and staf: and to all records and repoi Is maintained by lie Conractor).
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with staff and inmates is crucial to the effectiveness of any monitor-
ing system. Periodic in-depth inspections and written reports, while
valuable sources of additional information, cannot by themselves be
relied on to provide adequate evaluation of a prison or jail
facility. 1
022
Members of the public and the media who visit a facility may
prove to be another helpful source of information for the moni-
tor.10 23 Therefore, the Model Statute provides that the public shall
have access to a private correctional or detention facility, subject
only to the limitations that are placed on access to an equivalent
public facility. Jurisdictions may want to consider other means of
involving the public in the monitoring process, such as placing
members of the public on the monitoring team. The Model Statute
stops short of requiring such steps, however.
Finally, the Model Statute provides that the monitor shall report
at least annually to an appropriate committee of the legislature on
the contractor's performance. 10 24 This requirement will ensure that
the legislature is kept up-to-date on the condition of private facili-
ties. It will also allow the legislature to determine whether further
action is necessary or, in fact, whether private operators should be
allowed to continue operating correctional or detention facilities at
all.
Section 8: Liability and Sovereign Immunity
(A) The contractor shall assume all liability arising under the
contract.
(B) The sovereign immunity of the contracting agency shall not ex-
tend to the contractor. Neither the contractor nor the insurer of the
contractor may plead the defense of sovereign immunity in any action
arising out of the performance of the contract.
Commentary:
As discussed in the Model Contract section on Immunity, the pri-
vate contractor should be required to assume all liability arising
under the contract and should be prohibited from using the state or
federal government's sovereign-immunity defense to limit such lia-
1022. See Model Contract § 6 (Monitoring) (discussing alternative methods of monitoring).
1023. See Model Contract § 6 (Monitoring).
1024. This portion of the monitoring provision is derived from the Tennessee statute. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-109 (Cum. Supp. 1987) (stating that the monitor "shall report at
least annually or as requested to the select oversight committee on corrections or any other
legislative committee on the performance of the contractor").
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bility.1025 Arizona, 0 26 Tennessee, 0 27 and Texas, 10 28 for example,
have adopted this statutory scheme in their prison-privatization leg-
islation. Under these provisions, there is an economic incentive
compelling the private contractor to provide proper inmate care and
treatment. In other words, it creates a self-enforcing accountability
system in which the private contractor is required, without constant
governmental oversight and supervision, to exercise the necessary
degree of care to ensure compliance with the contract.
To preserve the level of accountability established under the lia-
bility statute, the second part of the proposed statutory scheme rec-
ommends that the contractor be denied use of the contracting
agency's sovereign-immunity defense, which serves to limit liabil-
ity.' 0 29 Under this arrangement, the private contractor will be more
accountable because it is required to assume all liability arising
under the contract. Permitting the contractor to escape liability
through the use of a sovereign-immunity defense would undermine
the goal of accountability. Prohibiting the use of this defense acts as
an additional safeguard against noncompliance with the contract be-
cause it eliminates a significant escape device and places full respon-
sibility on the contractor for its failure to provide the type of inmate
care and treatment with which it has been entrusted.
Section 9: Insurance
The contractor shall provide an adequate plan of insurance, specifi-
cally including insurance for civil-rights claims, as determined by an
independent risk-management or actuarial firm with demonstrated ex-
perience in public liability for [state/county] governments. In deter-
mining the adequacy of the plan, the firm shall determine whether:
(A) the insurance is adequate to protect the contracting agency from
actions by a third party against the contractor or contracting agency
as a result of the contract;
(B) the insurance is adequate to assure the contractor's ability to
fulfill its contract with the contracting agency in all respects and to
1025. See Model Contract § 3(E)(1) (Indemnification and Immunity). The contracting
agency may want to consider language that specifically states that the private contractor is not
deprived of the "benefit ofany law limiting exposure to liability, setting a limit on damages, or
establishing defenses to liability." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6 166g-2, § 4 (Vernon Supp.
1988). Such language would seem unnecessary, however, to the extent that the provision
merely affirmatively states what is already available to the private contractor.
1026. AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.1609.01(0) (1985 & Supp. 1987).
1027. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-107(b) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
1028. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-2, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
1029. The courts have not yet addressed the question of whether a private contractor can
assert a sovereign-immunity defense. See Model Contract § 3(E)(1) (Indemnification and
Immunity).
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assure that the contractor is not limited in this ability due to financial
liability that results from judgments;
(C) the insurance is adequate to protect the contracting agency
against claims arising as a result of any occurrence during the term of
the contract on an occurrence basis; and
(D) the insurance is adequate to satisfy other requirements specified
by the independent risk-management or actuarial firm.1
030
Insurance accepted under this statute may not be provided by the
contractor.
Commentary:
As discussed in the Model Contract section on Insurance, the con-
tracting agency must require that the private contractor be ade-
quately insured to avoid becoming liable itself for the contractor's
mistakes and breaches of contract. 10 3 1 To accomplish this goal,
both Arizona' 0 32 and Tennessee 0 33 have adopted statutory provi-
sions that require an expert in the area of risk management to evalu-
ate the adequacy of the private contractor's proposed insurance
plan. Specifically, an experienced independent risk-management or
actuarial firm will be required to evaluate the overall adequacy of a
proposed plan by considering, among other things, whether the in-
surance applies to third-party actions, whether it is adequate to as-
sure completion of and compliance with the contract, and whether it
is issued on an occurrence basis.
The statute expressly prohibits self-insurance by the contractor to
protect the contracting agency against the possibility that the con-
tractor will be unable to absorb the financial losses that are associ-
ated with prisoner litigation. Self-insurance adds further risk in an
area in which the contracting agency will want to ensure, to the
greatest extent possible, that it will not be held financially accounta-
ble for the contractor's wrongdoing. This goal can be accomplished
by shifting the risk to an independent insurance company. Taken
together with other factors considered by the risk-management or
actuarial firm to be necessary for eliminating the contracting
agency's exposure, this statute provides the necessary steps for en-
suring that the private contractor obtain an adequate plan of
insurance.
1030. This statute is derived from ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(N)(2) (Supp. 1987)
and TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-I07(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
1031. See Model Contract § 3(E)(2) (Insurance).
1032. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(N)(2) (Supp. 1987).
1033. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-107(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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Section 10: Termination of Contract and Resumption of Government
Control
The contracting agency may cancel the contract without cause at
any time after the first year of operation, without penalty to the con-
tracting agency, on giving ninety (90) days' written notice.
Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act to the contrary,
prior to entering a contract for the private operation of a prison or jail,
a plan shall be developed by the contracting agency and certified by
the [Governor or appropriate executive officer or legislative body]
demonstrating the method by which the government will resume con-
trol of the facility upon contract termination.
Commentary:
Both Arizona 0 34 and Tennessee 03 5 have enacted no-cause termi-
nation statutes that permit the contracting agency to terminate the
contract, with ninety days' written notice, for convenience or with-
out cause.10 3 6 It is imperative that the contracting agency be
granted such authority, because the provision enables the agency to
respond quickly and effectively to problems arising under the con-
tract or, alternatively, to internal problems, such as appropriation of
funds. Because the need for such action is unlikely during the early
stages of the contract term, the contracting agency should be pro-
hibited from exercising this authority during the first year of the
contract. Of course, the contracting agency may terminatefor cause
at any time, including within the first year of the contract.103 7
Further, to anticipate abrupt contract termination, such as from
bankruptcy, strike, or judicial finding of unconstitutionality, each
jurisdiction must develop a comprehensive plan - in advance of
entering a contract - for reassuming control of a facility
immediately. 
0 38
1034. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(C) (Supp. 1987) (contract "[p]roposer must
agree that this state may cancel the contract at any time after the first year of operation, with-
out penalty to this state, on giving ninety days' written notice").
1035. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(4) (Gum. Supp. 1987) (containing language nearly
identical to Arizona's).
1036. For states that provide for termination for cause, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-
27(F) (1987) ("All agreements with private independent contractors for the operation, or pro-
vision and operation, ofjails shall provide for termination for cause by the local public body
parties upon ninety days' notice to the independent contractor."); TEX. REV. CIx. STAT. ANN.
art. 6166g-2, § (3)(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (contract must permit "the state to terminate
the contract for cause, including as cause the failure of the private vendor or county to meet
the conditions required by this article and other conditions required by the contract").
1037. For the Model Contract's language on "cause." see Model Contract § 7 (Ter-
mination).
1038. See TENN. CODF. ANN. § 41-24-106(1) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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Section 11: Nondelegability of Contracting Agency's Authority
No contract for private correctional or detention services shall au-
thorize, allow, or imply a delegation of the authority or responsibility
of the contracting agency to a prison or jail contractor to:
(A) classify inmates or place inmates in less restrictive custody or
more restrictive custody;
(B) transfer an inmate, although the contractor may recommend in
writing that the contracting agency transfer a particular inmate;
(C) formulate rules of inmate behavior, violations of which may sub-
ject inmates to sanctions, except to the extent that they are accepted
or modified by the contracting agency;
(D) take any disciplinary action;
(E) grant, deny, or revoke sentence credits;
(F) recommend that the parole board either deny or grant parole,
although the contractor may submit written reports that have been
prepared in the ordinary course of business;
(G) develop and implement procedures for calculating sentence cred-
its or inmate-release and parole-eligibility dates;
(H) require an inmate to work, except on contracting-agency
projects; approve the type of work that inmates may perform; or award
or withhold wages or sentence credits based on the manner in which
individual inmates perform such work; or
(I) determine inmate eligibility for furlough and work release.
Commentary:
To the greatest extent possible, this section is designed to accom-
modate constitutional concerns involving delegation. As discussed
in the Model Contract section on Inmate Management, the con-
tracting agency is much more likely than the contractor is to take
into consideration the interests of the public and the inmates in for-
mulating and implementing incarceration rules and policies - i.e.,
to be accountable. 0 39 Therefore, all of the important questions
concerning the nature and length of inmate confinement are re-
served exclusively to the contracting agency. Many of the states that
authorize privatization have enacted similar statutes.1
0 40
Section 12: Conflict of Interest
(A) The following individuals shall not solicit or accept, directly or
1039. See Model Contract § 5(A) (Inmate Management); see also supi'a notes 11-213 and ac-
companying text (discussing constitutionality of delegating incarceration function).
1040. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1609.01(P) (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-
50-108 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-110 (Cum. Supp. 1987); TEx. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6166g-2, § 3(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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indirectly, any personal benefit or promise of a benefit from a private
correctional or detention company negotiating, doing business with, or
planning (within the individual's knowledge) to negotiate or do busi-
ness with the contracting agency:
(1) a member of, or any other person or entity under contract
with, any governmental body that exercises any functions or re-
sponsibilities in the review or approval of the undertaking or car-
rying out of the project,10 4 1 including but not limited to any
employee of the contracting agency, any person serving as the
monitor of a private corrections or detention facility, and any per-
son on the staff of such a monitor; and
(2) a member of the immediate family of any of the above-
named individuals.
None of the above-named individuals shall use his or her position,
influence, or information concerning such negotiations, business, or
plans to benefit himself, herself, or another.
(B) A private prison or jail contractor shall agree that, at the time of
contracting, it has no interest and shall not acquire any interest, direct
or indirect, that would conflict in any manner or degree with the per-
formance of its services. The contractor shall further covenant that, in
the performance of the contract, it shall not employ any person having
any such known interests.'
0 4 2
(C) Any violation of this Section shall be governed by Section
[__] of this Code.
Commentary:
As is the case with contracting for other goods and services, 0 43
contracting with the private sector for the construction and opera-
tion of incarceration facilities carries with it the danger that govern-
ment officials, employees, and contractors will have actual or
apparent conflicts of interest in the course of their mutual deal-
ings.'0 4 4 All jurisdictions already have conflict-of-interest statutes
1041. This provision is derived from 1984 Kentucky RFP at 6, § 14.
1042. This provision is derived from 1984 Kentucky RFP at 6, § 14.
1043. See, e.g., Wines, Conflict-of-Interest Rules Ignored, Pentagon Aides Tell House Panel, N.Y.
Times,July 7, 1988, at B5, col. I (stating that "Defense Department officials and private con-
sultants have widely ignored some regulations intended to prevent conflicts of interest in
weapons purchases," according to testimony of the Pentagon's inspector general).
1044. See, e.g., 2 ".lModel" Pisons, supra note 433. This article reported, inter alia, that Cor-
rections Corporation of America Chairman Thomas Beasley "gave three contracts directly to
sitting commissioners" of Hamilton County while CCA's proposal was before the county's
Board of Commissioners. Id. Also, "[w]hen Beasley was negotiating with the commission, he
gave a contract for local public relations to the woman who had managed [the election cam-
paign of one of the commissioners]." Id. That commissioner has since been voted out of
office in an election in which CCA was an issue. Id.; see also PENNSYLVANIA JOINT STATE GOV'T
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE PRIVATE PRISON TASK FORCE 34 (1987) (stating that "[p]rivate prison
entrepreneurs who invest in lobbying efforts which support tougher sentences and mandatory
imprisonment may be able to increase the demand for their service").
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that govern the procurement process. Because these statutes are
quite detailed and complex, they can generally be applied in the pri-
vate-incarceration context. To supplement existing law, if neces-
sary, jurisdictions should include a conflict-of-interest provision in
legislation authorizing the private construction, ownership, or oper-
ation of prison and jail facilities.
10 45
The Model Statute's language is broad. Some of its restrictions
apply to any person whose interests may conflict with those of the
contracting agency, the community, and the inmates of a private fa-
cility. Specifically, it extends to any member of any governmental
body that is charged with the initial decision to privatize facilities,
the selection of a contractor, or any other responsibilities in connec-
tion with the private construction and/or operation of a facility.
Also included are any official or employee of the contracting agency,
regardless of his or her rank or function, as well as the monitor of
the private facility and his or her staff. The statute also reaches the
contractor and its employees.
No amount of legislation can completely deter illegal or unethical
behavior in the contracting process. The Model Statute, therefore,
expresses the jurisdiction's commitment to fairness in the competi-
tive-bidding process and provides notice to individuals who conceiv-
ably might run afoul of the law. Appropriate state or federal officials
must be vigilant in detecting and punishing violations in accordance
with other relevant laws of the jurisdiction.
C. Summary of Model Statutory Provisions
Section 1: Enabling Legislation
The contracting agency may contract with private entities for the
construction, lease, acquisition, improvement, operation, and manage-
ment of correctional facilities and services only as provided in this
Act.
No contract shall be entered or renewed unless it offers substantial
cost savings to the contracting agency and at least the same quality of
services as that offered by the contracting agency.
The intended beneficiaries of any contract entered pursuant to this
Act shall include inmates incarcerated at the affected facility or facili-
ties and members of the public.
1045. Cf. ACA Standard 2-4070 ("The institution makes available to all employees a writ-
ten code of ethics that prohibits employees from using their official position to secure privi-
leges for themselves or others and from engaging in activities that constitute a conflict of
interest.").
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Section 2: Site Selection
Before the contracting agency may award a contract for the private
construction and/or operation of a correctional or detention facility,
the agency must approve the site for the proposed facility. Approval
shall be based on the following:
(A) criteria formulated by the contracting agency, including:
(1) availability of qualified personnel within the local labor
market;
(2) total usable and developable acreage of various sites consid-
ering the use and purpose of the facility;
(3) accessibility of each site to existing utility, transportation,
educational, law enforcement, health care, social, fire protection,
refuse collection, water, and sewage disposal services;
(4) susceptibility of each site to natural and man-made environ-
mental hazards;
(5) patterns of residential growth and projected population
growth;
(6) community opinion as determined at a public hearing or
hearings of record; and
(7) any other criteria that the contracting agency, in conjunc-
tion with local governments, deems appropriate; and
(B) a report prepared by the governing body of the jurisdiction in
which the proposed site is located, stating whether the site is in compli-
ance with local-government comprehensive plans, land-use ordinances,
zoning ordinances or regulations, and other local ordinances that are
in effect at the time the report is submitted.
After the contracting agency has approved a site, the agency must
then seek approval from the legislature, which shall consider all of the
information that was reviewed by the contracting agency, as well as
any other criteria that it deems appropriate. Construction and/or op-
eration of a private facility may not commence until the legislature has
approved the selected site.
Section 3: Contract Term and Renewal
The initial contract for the operation of a facility or for incarcera-
tion of prisoners or inmates therein shall be for a period of not more
than three (3) years with an option to renew for an additional period of
two (2) years. Contracts for construction, purchase, or lease of a facil-
ity shall not exceed a term of fifteen (15) years. Any contract for the
construction or operation of a facility shall be subject to annual appro-
priation by the [appropriate legislative body].
Section 4: Standards of Operation
All facilities that are governed by this Act shall be designed, con-
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structed, and at all times maintained and operated in accordance with
the American Correctional Association Standards in force at the time
of contracting, as well as with subsequent ACA Standards to the ex-
tent that they are approved by the contracting agency. The facility
shall meet the percentage of Standards required for accreditation by
the American Correctional Association, except where the contract re-
quires compliance with a higher percentage of nonmandatory stan-
dards. The contract may allow the contractor an extension of time in
which to meet a lower percentage of nonmandatory Standards only
when the contract is for the renovation of an existing facility, in which
case the contractor shall have not longer than three (3) months to meet
those Standards that are applicable to the physical plant.
In addition, all facilities shall at all times comply with all federal
and state constitutional standards, federal, state, and local laws, and
all court orders.
Section 5: Use of Force
(A) A private contractor's employees serving as "jailers" shall be
allowed to use force only while on the grounds of a facility, while
transporting inmates, and while pursuing escapees from a facility.
(B) "Non-deadly force," which is force that normally would cause
neither death nor serious bodily injury, and "deadly force," which is
force that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, shall be
used only as set forth herein.
(C) Non-Deadly Force. A private-company jailer shall be authorized
to use only such non-deadly force as the circumstances require in the
following situations: to prevent the commission of a felony or misde-
meanor, including escape; to defend oneself or others against physical
assault; to prevent serious damage to property; to enforce institutional
regulations and orders; and to prevent or quell a riot.
(D) Use of Firearms/Deadly Force. Private-company jailers who
have been appropriately certified as determined by the contracting
agency and trained pursuant to the provisions of Subsection (E) shall
have the right to carry and use firearms and shall exercise such au-
thority and use deadly force only as a last resort, and then only to
prevent an act that could result in death or serious bodily injury to
oneself or to another person.
(E) Private-company jailers shall be trained in the use of force and
the use of firearms, in accordance with ACA Standards 2-4186 through
2-4189 and 2-4206, and shall be trained, at the contractor's expense, at
the facilities that train public prison and jail personnel for at least the
minimum number of hours that public personnel are currently trained.
(F) Within three (3) days following an incident involving the use of
force against an inmate or another, the employee shall file a written
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report with the administrative staff and contract monitor describing
the incident.
(G) A private contractor shall stand in the shoes of the contracting
agency in any agreement, formal or informal, with local law-enforce-
ment agencies concerning the latter's obligations in the event of emer-
gency situations, such as riots or escapes.
Section 6: Employee Training Requirements
All employees of a facility operated pursuant to this Act must re-
ceive, at a minimum, the same quality and quantity of training as that
required by federal, state, and/or local statutes, rules, and regulations
for employees of public correctional and detention facilities. If any or
all of the applicable American Correctional Association Standards re-
lating to training are more stringent than are governmental standards,
training shall be provided in accordance with the more stringent Stan-
dard(s). All training expenses shall be the responsibility of the
contractor.
Section 7: Monitoring
An individual who is responsible for monitoring all aspects of the
private contractor's performance under the contract shall be appointed
and employed by the contracting agency. The monitor shall appoint a
staff to assist in monitoring at the facility, as the monitor determines
to be necessary. The monitor shall be provided an on-site work area,
shall be on-site on a daily basis, and shall have access to all areas of
the facility and to inmates and staff at all times. The contractor shall
provide any and all data, reports, and other materials that the monitor
determines are necessary to carry out monitoring responsibilities
under this Section.
The monitor or his designee shall report to the [ ] com-
mittee of the legislature at least annually on the contractor's
performance.
Members of the public shall have the same right of access to private
facilities as they do to public facilities.
Section 8. Liability and Sovereign Immunity
(A) The contractor shall assume all liability arising under the
contract.
(B) The sovereign immunity of the contracting agency shall not ex-
tend to the contractor. Neither the contractor nor the insurer of the
contractor may plead the defense of sovereign immunity in any action
arising out of the performance of the contract.
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Section 9: Insurance
The contractor shall provide an adequate plan of insurance, specifi-
cally including insurance for civil-rights claims, as determined by an
independent risk-management or actuarial firm with demonstrated ex-
perience in public liability for [state/county] governments. In deter-
mining the adequacy of the plan, the firm shall determine whether:
(A) the insurance is adequate to protect the contracting agency from
actions by a third party against the contractor or contracting agency
as a result of the contract;
(B) the insurance is adequate to assure the contractor's ability to
fulfill its contract with the contracting agency in all respects and to
assure that the contractor is not limited in this ability due to financial
liability that results from judgments;
(C) the insurance is adequate to protect the contracting agency
against claims arising as a result of any occurrence during the term of
the contract on an occurrence basis; and
(D) the insurance is adequate to satisfy other requirements specified
by the independent risk-management or actuarial firm.
Insurance accepted under this statute may not be provided by the
contractor.
Section 10: Termination of Contract and Resumption of Government
Control
The contracting agency may cancel the contract without cause at
any time after the first year of operation, without penalty to the con-
tracting agency, on giving ninety (90) days' written notice.
Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act to the contrary,
prior to entering a contract for the private operation of a prison or jail,
a plan shall be developed by the contracting agency and certified by
the [Governor or appropriate executive officer or legislative body]
demonstrating the method by which the government will resume con-
trol of the facility upon contract termination.
Section 11: Nondelegability of Contracting Agency's Authority
No contract for private correctional or detention services shall au-
thorize, allow, or imply a delegation of the authority or responsibility
of the contracting agency to a prison or jail contractor to:
(A) classify inmates or place inmates in less restrictive custody or
more restrictive custody;
(B) transfer an inmate, although the contractor may recommend in
writing that the contracting agency transfer a particular inmate;
(C) formulate rules of inmate behavior, violations of which may sub-
ject inmates to sanctions, except to the extent that they are accepted
or modified by the contracting agency;
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(D) take any disciplinary action;
(E) grant, deny, or revoke sentence credits;
(F) recommend that the parole board either deny or grant parole,
although the contractor may submit written reports that have been
prepared in the ordinary course of business;
(G) develop and implement procedures for calculating sentence cred-
its or inmate-release and parole-eligibility dates;
(H) require an inmate to work, except on contracting-agency
projects; approve the type of work that inmates may perform; or award
or withhold wages or sentence credits based on the manner in which
individual inmates perform such work; or
(I) determine inmate eligibility for furlough and work release.
Section 12: Conflict of Interest
(A) The following individuals shall not solicit or accept, directly or
indirectly, any personal benefit or promise of a benefit from a private
correctional or detention company negotiating, doing business with, or
planning (within the individual's knowledge) to negotiate or do busi-
ness with the contracting agency:
(1) a member of, or any other person or entity under contract
with, any governmental body that exercises any functions or re-
sponsibilities in the review or approval of the undertaking or car-
rying out of the project, including but not limited to any employee
of the contracting agency, any person serving as the monitor of a
private corrections or detention facility, and any person on the
staff of such a monitor; and
(2) a member of the immediate family of any of the above-
named individuals.
None of the above-named individuals shall use his or her position,
influence, or information concerning such negotiations, business, or
plans to benefit himself, herself, or another.
(B) A private prison or jail contractor shall agree that, at the time of
contracting, it has no interest and shall not acquire any interest, direct
or indirect, that would conflict in any manner or degree with the per-
formance of its services. The contractor shall further covenant that, in
the performance of the contract, it shall not employ any person having
any such known interests.
(C) Any violation of this Section shall be governed by Section
L. .] of this Code.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems that face our nation's prisons and jails will not be
resolved in the foreseeable future. One idea that has been sug-
gested, at least as a partial solution, is privatization. If a jurisdiction
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that is endeavoring to manage the incarceration crisis finds priva-
tization of one or more facilities to be attractive, it will then un-
avoidably confront some extremely difficult choices.
On the one hand stand the risks of private incarceration, includ-
ing: voter alienation; improper and inadequate inmate care; a failed
experiment costing many millions of dollars and depleting the gov-
ernment's expertise and work force; creation of additional liability;
and a symbol that, as a matter of principle, may be imprudent to
embrace. On the other hand stand the perceived benefits of priva-
tization: better care at reduced cost. Because these benefits are as
yet only promised and, in the adult secure-confinement context, un-
fulfilled, a government that is considering prison orjail privatization
should do so only with utmost caution. It is toward that end that
this paper has been written.
The constitutional, contractual, and statutory analyses contained
in this paper are designed to assist jurisdictions in their evaluation
of the critical legal issues of private incarceration, so that they may
anticipate and avoid later problems to the greatest extent possible.
One aim of the Model Contract and Model Statute is to emphasize
that, before financial benefits to the private-incarceration industry
are considered, the rights, interests, and concerns of the public, the
government, and the inmates must be addressed satisfactorily.
One must realize that, although this paper is comprehensive, it is
not complete, for the extent of adoption of the relevant documents
will necessarily vary from one jurisdiction to another. Further, in
such a new area as this, issues and ideas will need to be developed
and explored further. Thus, although there may be agreement that
something must be done about the sordid state of our nation's pris-
ons and jails, the urgency of the need should not interfere with the
circumspection that must accompany a decision to delegate to pri-
vate companies one of government's most basic responsibilities:
controlling the lives and living conditions of those whose freedom
has been taken in the name of the government and the people.
Perhaps the privatization experiment will fail. If so, at least the
recent privatization debate will have provided an incentive and, per-
haps, an example for the government to perform its incarceration
function better. Alternatively, perhaps the experiment will succeed.
If it is to do so, however, the debate must be an ongoing one, with
all of the interested parties at all times recognizing the need for the
government's continual involvement, the need to consider alterna-
tives to incarceration, the need to consider incarceration in its
broader criminal-justice context, and the admonition that privatiza-
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tion will not relieve the government of its obligations or the private
provider of its corresponding responsibilities.
It bears repeating that privatization of prisons and jails may be
neither constitutional nor wise. If the concept is going to be imple-
mented, however, it is clear that, to have any chance of succeeding
in the long run, it must be accomplished with total accountability.
With incarceration, as with all areas of the justice system, we must
remain eternally vigilant.
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